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Publications; War Plane Production
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- Description
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Publications; War Plane Production
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box: 565
folder: 2
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1940 to 1943
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I
LABOR. .
,
m
i
H
e
v
i
g
r
o
F
,
d
r
o
F
Met With a Union
dent of the AFL
ernment into the picture.
Mr. Dewey conferred with Mr. Bennett
at his Ypsilanti estate yesterday, but all he
could report to the union was that Mr. Bennett would have a statement to give today.
This has caused leaders of the Ford organizing drive to ask: Is Harry Bennett going to
the Government
If the company hedges on its pledge, the
The
union’s heat will be on Mr. Dewey.
UAW is demanding that Mr. Dewey either
prevail upon Mr. Bennett to keep his word
a man who
or label the Ford spokesman
a pledge
breaks
to the Government.
The last 24 hours have brought still other
question
the
to
answers
raised
in
a
new
series of Ford newspaper advertisements:
at
Trouble
Labor
This About
“What's
' Ford’s?” The ad’s answer was “Outsiders.”
general
I. A. Cappizzi,
Nevertheless,
counsel to Ford, has met with a union delegation for the first time in the company s
jabor relations.
Mr. Cappizzi’s conference, held Monday
with
of four
a committee
representing
Lin-
|
—eoln-werkers, was followed by a declaration
by him that it would never happen again.
The
Ford
attorney says he was
by the Lincoln
who
workmen,
outsmarte
he said re-
quested the conference as individuals and
then acted as spokesmen for the union's
—
Lincoln members.
To this the Lincoln unionists reply:
Building and Construc-
tion Trades Department, announced _today that 19 more AFL unions, through
their international officers, had agreed not
ize the Ford Motor Co. awaited word today
from Harry Bennett, company personnel director, on whether he intends to keep a
pledge to the U. S. Government to reinstate several hundred laid-off River Rouge
plant workers “after Jan. Be
Mr. Bennett's pledge was given to |James
F. Dewey, chief labor conciliator of the
Department of Labor, three weeks ago,
when a protest by the United Auto Workers,
CIO, against the layoffs brought the Govy-
of the U.S. AP
“Since when does the high priced general
counsel for the Ford Motor Co. meet. mere
workmen on individual grievances?”
Mr. Cappizzi’s chagrin is indicated by the
sweeping nature of his statement:
“In view of what happened Monday at the
Lincoln plant, the company will not confer
with any union committee or deal with the
union. We will have nothing to do with the
union because there is nothing to discuss. If
the group had announced itself as a union
committee, we would not have seen them.”
to strike in defense industries.
Earlier this week 19 metal trades unions
enunciated a similar policy.
The case of 240 employes of the Ranger
Corp.,
strike tomorrow
prepared
are
who
to
raises, joas presented
to win
yesterday by PM. As was explained, the
company’s side was omitted because company officials were not available for com-
ment. A company spokesman, who wishes to
remain
anonymous,
now
makes
a statement,
which we are happy to print below. (An
editorial on this subject, is on page 2.)
FARMINGDALE,
‘L. Ly Jane
S.—As
offi-
cers and members of Local 661, United
Auto Workers, got picket signs and _ their
soup kitchen ready for a strike, set for tomorrow, against the Ranger Engineering
Corp., Government agents expressed hope
that a last-minute conference might result
in a settlement.
The
morrow;
meeting
is scheduled
if no compromise
for 5 p.m.
to-
is reached the
men will walk out at 7:45, when the night
7
shift usually goes on duty.
all:
Pupils Tell of Defects
Principals
On Lahor’s‘No’ List:
A Bay State Militia
Special
Jan.
BOSTON,
Correspondence
labor
8—Organized
organized taxpayers became
and
us with more facts on existing conditions.
On Monday we told how the Board of Education granted and then rescinded
permission to take pictures of conditions in the schools. PM has taken the position
that it has the right to go into the schools (outside of school hours) to find out the
physical condition of the school buildings, and it has the right and the duty to make
these conditions public in words and in pictures.
We said we would follow through by going into the schools with or without
the permission of the Board of Education.
Today we tell you what happened when a PM reporter and photographer went
chusetts Federation of Taxpayers is opposing a plan of Governor Saltonstall, re-elected
socialite Republican, to create a state mili-
tary organization, replacing the National
Guard called into the federal service. For
reasons of self-defense, the state AFL and
into. the schools, at noon and at 3 o'clock.
CIO organizations condemn the proposal.
Governor Saltonstall in his inaugural on
Jan. 2 asked the legislature for $350,000. to
uniform and equip a new state guard of
|
By RAYMOND ABRASHKIN
Morris Engel, PM photographer, and I|
near|.
11, Washington,
arrived ; at FS:
Greene Aves., Brooklyn, just as the pupils
were leaving the school for lunch. A teacher
questioned us at the door. When I told her
-we were from PM and wanted_to take pictures she let us pass.
We went to a second-floor classroom where
Mr. Engel took a picture of the rolling
that formed two walls of the room to
trate an objectionable condition often
in older public school buildings.
doors can be rolled aside to create one
room that is used as an assembly hall.
Calvin
Governor
Coolidge break the strike of the Boston
|
Police Force.
Arguments advanced by the taxpayers
ture, a teacher ordered us to sit down,
said:
“Don't
setts has a state police force as well as local
can
in
are
ops
tro
l
era
fed
t
tha
and
police,
of possible emergencies.
are
Although their hours
domestics.
and wages are incredible, oppesiis
legislation
remedial
to
tion
gathering. Tom O’Connor, in a series beginning tomorrow in PM, reveals the plight of domestics and
unmasks their enemies.
(not
an unlimitéd
order
as was
place
until
you
She told us we could not take pictures
without the Board of Education’s permission.
She insisted we leave, and told the school
custodian, Dominick Froscella, to stay with
us and make sure we did leave.
called.
today
said
official
company
A
Ranger is working on a $7,500,000
any
principal in charge of the school, came in.
20TH CENTURY FEUDALISM
New
thousand
hundred
Two
York werkers labor under nearThey
go
;
other
and
the principal.”
Soon Miss Anna E. McNeely, a dignifiedlooking, elderly woman who is assistant
tonments in the state not far from any scenes
conditions.
doors
illusfound
These
large
As soon-as Mr. Engel had taken his pic-
husac
Mas
t
tha
out
nt
poi
y
ntl
joi
or
lab
and
feudal
|
3
7000 men, who would serve without pay
except when out on duty. Their purpose, he
said, would be “to preserve order and afford
to persons and property in local
protection
emergencies.” Rifles and bayonets will be
provided by the War Department, the governor said. He requested that the money be
of the regular
in advance
appropriated
budget.
In the last World War, the Massachu-
helped
‘Lots of Schools Worse
“What would you do if we went back
and took pictures?” I asked him at the door.
“T would stop you.”
“Would you use force?” I asked.
“I would call the policeman on the corner—but why can't you go to some other
schools? There are lots of. schools worse
than this. Why don’t you go to P. S. 45:
Why get me in trouble?”
I went back to the principal's office alone,
that
order
reported)
to
a
ten
to the company.
per
cent
raise,
at P. S. 94, 68th St. and Amsterdam
AVE:
and asked for permission to
building so that I could write
I saw.
Miss.
McNeely
said
inspect the
about what
she
had
just
phoned the Board of Education and had
been told we could not go through the
building. She had been told, she said, that
our paper’s request for permission was be-
ing considered by the Board.
_ (This is the first intimation we have had
that our request is being reconsidered.)
“Even as a private citizen, I can't walk
through
hours to
children
“No,”
I left.
a school building outside of class
see under what conditions our
are being educated” I asked.
Miss McNeely said.
Mr. Engel and I went around the
corner to the Waverly Annex of Boys’ High
School. The annex is housed in a building
that was once part of P. S. 11.
Soon a group of boys gathered
and I saw Dominick
two
corner
teachers.
whistle,
away
and
came
One
go
over
around,
Froscella tear around
a
into
of the
and
huddle
teachers
shooed
with
blew
a
the boys
from us. I asked him if it were true
that there was no lunchroom
in the school.
Demands Credentials
“When
show
you
credentials
from
the
‘Board of Education,” said this middle-aged,
stern-looking teacher, “I will answer your
questions.”
“Are you
asked.
according |
:
Ranger insists that its product is the only
successful one of its type, and is therefore
and
needed for national’ defense. Army
Navy officials and Defense Commission representatives must also regard it as important, for they are working hard to prevent
the walkout.
|
toilet
is part of the girls’ outside
This
the
of six-cylinder in-line engines for Army
|
training planes.
Replying to the union complaint that
wages are lower than elsewhere in the industry, the spokesman said that the average
wage is $26 for a 48-hour week, which, he
says, is standard. The company has agreed
to granting paid vacations and holidays, and
to step up wages from 50 cents an hour
for beginners to 55 cents after six months,
and 60 cents after one year. This would |
amount
we
are
being educated. We repeat our invitation to the public and to city officials to supply
day in leading a fight in Massachusetts
against the establishment of a so-called State
|
.
Guard.
For reasons of pocket-book, the Massa-
setts State Guard
Won't
This is the third installment in a series. PM is telling this story because
believe the public should know under what conditions New York City children
bedfellows to-
w
o
r
r
o
m
o
T
e
u
D
Is
e
k
i
r
t
Plane S
Engineering
SCHOOLS
1941
John P. Coyne, presi-
WASHINGTON:
: union
and
DETROIT, Jan. 8.—Workers
officials engaged in the campaign to union-
play fast and loose with
8,
Strike-Out
Correspondence
Special
JANUARY
WEDNESDAY,
PM;
This is part of the yard of P. S. O5.
Lafayette near Sumner Aves., Brooklyn. It’s a non-fireproof school.
in
charge
of
the
school?”
I
“T ame
“May I have your name?”
“I do not care to give it to you.”
(The Board of Education Directory for
1940 lists Henry E, Grimshaw as the teacher
in charge of the-annex.)
As Mr. Engel and I
for the
started back
reyes
500 PLANES
A DAY
500 PLANES
hours required to custom-build a Chevrolet car by hand and then multiply this
figure by Chevrolet's daily production and use that tremendous figure to prove
that Chevrolet could not possibly produce 6,000 cars a day. Custom-building
of an automobile, it has been estimated, requires 1,100 man hours of work.
This means that it would have required 4,400,000,000 man hours to produce
the 4,000,000 cars of the 1939 model. To carry the contention of our critics
on this score to their logical conclusion: it would have required 2,200,000
men working 40 hours a week fifty weeks a year to produce last year’s 4,000,000 automobiles.
The persons who argue thus speak of mass production quantities but use
the mathematics of custom-built production methods. It is an elementary
fact that the number of hours spent doing things by hand as compared to the
A DAY
The reduced weight of an aircraft motor per horsepower as compared with
automobile motors is secured firstly by the difference in the design of the
motor and secondly by the fact that all parts of an aircraft motor are reduced
to a minimum weight by removing all surplus metal. This is done by a process
of machining. The same basic machinery is used to machine parts for an
aircraft motor as for an automobile motor, excepting that a more complete and
precise machining job is done in the case of the aircraft motor. The available
machinery in the automobile industry can be retooled to turn out aircraft
motors of 1,000 or 2,000 horsepower of either the air-cooled or liquid-cooled
design.
The objection has also been raised that aircraft engines must be made in
more precise dimensions than automobile engines.
As our program
points
number of hours spent operating machines (machine-hours) varies in ever
increasing proportion to the extent that mass production techniques are introduced into the production process. The number of hours spent in building
out, more precise parts are obtained by more precise tooling.
and as the over-all man hours decrease the machine hours increase in percentage as compared to the work done by hand. One can go into a modern
continuous strip steel mill and see this in its sharpest form.
criticism of our plan. Such bottlenecks can be met if production of such
armament, instruments, etc., is spread over existing industries whose machine
capacities and production facilities are adaptable to such production. The
pooling of such productive capacity with central assembly plants using the
same approach we suggest for aircraft production will make it possible to
eliminate any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc.
an automobile is less than one-sixth of what it was when the industry started,
FLOOR SPACE REQUIRED
This mistake of thinking of mass production of planes in the mathematics
of custom-built hand production also raises the question of the practicality of
providing the neecssary floor space for assembly work. Another elementary
fact is that the number of days necessary to complete the production cycle
(in machining and fabricating industries such as autos and aircraft) is short-
ened in proportion to the extent that mass production technique is applied.
The shorter the production cycle the less floor space is needed. This is true
because the number of jobs in the process of production is held at a minimum.
If the Chevrolet Motor Company had to build 6,000 cars a day by the same
methods that are now being used to build planes, the total man power and
floor space of the entire automobile industry would not be adequate to turn
out its present production.
Our original report cited the availability of floor space—785,000 feet—at
the Hupmobile plant, in Detroit, for the assembling of motors. A further
striking example of available floor space is the Reo plant at Lansing, Michigan,
which has the following vacant space: Mt. Hope Avenue plant, 553,237 square
feet; Building No. 4800, 247,931
square feet.
square feet; Building No. 4700,
104,247
In Reo’s main plant 500,000 square feet is fully equipped with
production machinery. Starting January 13, 1941, Reo will be producing five
motors per day in a plant that at one time produced 160 truck and 125 passenger cars in one eight-hour shift.
DIFFERENCES
IN
ENGINES
Doubts have been expressed on the adaptability of automobile production
machinery to production of aircraft motors because of the reduced weight of
aircraft motors. These doubts are without foundation.
SHORTAGE
OF
ARMAMENTS
Any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc., is not a legitimate
SIMILARITY OF BASIC MACHINERY
In our program we state that basic machinery used for automobile production can be adapted for producing aircraft parts. We point out that precise and
difficult parts of the Allison engine are being made in the old Cadillac plant
in Detroit with machinery which duplicates existing unused automobile plant
machinery. These statements have been challenged in some quarters. Here-
with is a list of machinery, newly constructed and installed in the Allison
division in Detroit, which duplicates existing automobile plant machinery:
Grinding machines:
Cincinnati centerless, Exlo internal and external,
Bland, Norton, Landis, Blanchard, Brown and Sharpe, (Bryant) and Held.
(These machines are used to produce the following parts which are common
to both aircraft and automobile motors: camshafts, crankshafts, bearings, con-
necting rods, wrist pins.) Milling machines: Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Sunstrand and Brown and Sharpe. Keller machines: Wickes lathes, Greenlee
lathes and Cincinnati lathes. Spline machines: Sunstrand, and Brown and
Sharpe. Hones: Exlo and Wickes.
PRESENT
USE
OF
FACILITIES
It is argued that the facilities of the automobile industry are already being
employed for production of aircraft parts. Our surveys indicate that not ten
percent of the available facilities are being brought into play for defense purposes. The present plans do not contemplate the coordination and full use of
facilities which alone can produce a large number of planes within a comparatively short period.
A DAY
Packard and other companies are still digging the ditches and pouring the
concrete for their new airplane engine factories. The Axis powers will not
wait politely until these factories are finished.
New plants, when finally erected, must be filled with new machinery and
this new equipment largely duplicates machinery already available in our automobile plants. The machine industry is overtaxed. The emergency of war
cannot be met in the normal time necessary to construct new plants and equip
them with the required production machinery.
We propose, instead of building entirely new machines, to make the tools
required to adapt existing automotive machinery to aircraft manufacture.
We propose to transform the entire unused capacity of the automotive
industry into one huge plane production unit. Production under this plan
would not replace the output of the aircraft industry proper, which would
continue to construct the large bombers and planes of special design.
Fifty Percent of Automobile Industry's Potential Capacity Is Unused
No industry in the world has the tremendous unused potential productive
capacity of the American automotive industry, and no industry is as easily
adaptable to the mass production of planes. A careful survey will show that
the automobile industry as a whole is not using more than 50 percent of its
maximum potential capacity if that capacity were properly coordinated and
operated to the fullest degree.
The automotive industry could produce 8,000,000 cars a year. It is producing approximately 4,000,000. These unused plant reserves, as shown by
the figures given in the Federal Trade Commission’s report on the motor
vehicle industry, are greater than the total motor plant capacity of England,
Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Japan combined. Adapted to plane production, this unused potential capacity would give us world plane supremacy
within a short time.
At present the automotive industry never operates at more than 80 to 90
percent of its maximum potential capacity, and then only for a few months
each year. The rest of the year it operates on reduced schedules, and many
plants shut down completely. If automobile production were spread evenly
over a 12-month period, it would be possible, without reducing the total out-
put of automobiles, to convert a large portion of this machinery to the manufacture of planes.
During the automotive year ending August, 1940, Nash used only 17 percent of its productive capacity; Dodge used 3614 percent. Nash, working at
maximum capacity, could have manufactured its total output for the 12
months in 491 working days; Dodge, in 111 working days. Chevrolet, the
largest single producer of motor cars, turned out over a million cars during
the last model year, and yet used less than 50 percent of its potential productive capacity. The main Chevrolet Motor plant at Flint, Michigan, produced 380 completed motors per hour at the peak of the 1937 production
season, utilizing all four of its complete motor machining and assembly lines.
At the present time, at the peak of the 1940 production season, the Chevrolet
500 PLANES
Pi secant
500 PLANES
A DAY
ng
ndi
sta
line
or
mot
one
h
wit
,
hour
per
ors
mot
282
ing
duc
pro
is
Flint plant
ift
-sh
two
a
on
ing
rat
ope
are
s
line
ing
ain
rem
e
thre
the
le
whi
,
idle
y
tel
comple
,
nda
awa
Ton
in
t
plan
or
mot
new
a
t
buil
has
let
vro
Che
,
1937
e
Sinc
basis.
per
ors
mot
te
ple
com
65
ing
duc
pro
is
e
tim
t
sen
pre
the
at
ch
whi
k,
New Yor
hour, with a plant capacity of 90 motors per hour. This would indicate that
at the peak of the production season Chevrolet is only building 347 motors
per hour, with an actual capacity of 470 motors per hour. With an unused
capacity of 123 motors per hour at the peak of the production season, it is
obvious that Chevrolet has an unused reserve which becomes tremendous during the month of reduced operating schedules.
The availability of automotive production facilities for plane production in
Chevrolet is again shown in the case of the Chevrolet drop forge plant in
Detroit, the largest drop forge shop of its kind in the world. If this shop
were operated at full capacity, it could produce all the drop forgings required
for the production of 500 airplane motors per day, and still supply the Chevrolet company with sufficient drop forgings for 1,000,000 Chevrolet cars a year.
Skilled labor to operate this shop at full capacity is available. Other forge
shops, including the Buick and the Dodge forge shops, are also working at far
less than capacity. (See appendix for shop equipment and production sched-
ules. )
Automobile Motor Building Facilities Can Be Adapted to Make Plane Motors
Are the facilities used in manufacturing automobile motors adaptable to the
manufacture of airplane motors? The answer is that they are.
Both the automobile and airplane motors are combustion engines, essentially
the same mechanism for generating power by exploding gas. Both motors
contain cylinders, carburetors, pistons, crankshafts, camshafts, valves, spark-
plugs, ignition systems, etc.
The same basic machinery is utilized in the manufacture of these basic parts
common to both motors.
True, there are differences between the automobile
and the airplane engine, as there are differences of a lesser degree between the
engine of the Chevrolet and the engine of the Cadillac. These differences
between different engines are produced by adding certain tools, dies, jigs or
fixtures to the basic machine in order to make a difference in the product. The
same “tooling” process adapts the same basic machinery to the production of
the airplane engine. Graphic proof of this statement is even now being sup-
plied by General Motors. Many of the most difficult and precise parts of the
Allison aviation engine are being manufactured in the Cadillac plant in
Detroit, much of it with retooled Cadillac machinery. The new Allison plant
in Indianapolis, still in process of expansion, is being used largely for assembly.
The experience of General Motors in making Allison parts with retooled
Cadillac machinery should also dispose of the bugaboo of “tolerances.” “Tolerances” are the allowable fractional variations in size of engine parts, and they
must be far finer in the plane engine than in the automobile engine. But these
more precise dimensions can be obtained by more precise tooling.
500 PLANES
A DAY-
When the contemplated airplane motor plants are completed, it will be
necessary to equip them with the same kind of basic production machinery
already standing idle half of the time in the nation’s automotive factories.
This basic machinery will be duplicated, and after it is duplicated it will still
be necessary to construct the special tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures required to
adapt this machinery to the manufacture of plane engines.
In the process of duplicating basic machinery, lies the most serious delay.
This lag, which from all indications may continue, may well defeat our national
defense program. An additional burden is placed on the already over-loaded
machine tool industry. We propose to short-cut the process by building only
the tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures necessary to convert idle automotive machinery
into plane engine machinery. A few special machines will be necessary, but
these will be but a small part of the total equipment. In this way a job that
will otherwise take at least 18 months can be done in six months.
Certain basic machines are necessary to build both automobile and aircraft
types of engines. These include gear cutters, gear shapers, screw machines,
bullards, drill presses, punch presses, broaching machines, turret lathes, various
types of milling machines, various types of lathes and Fay machines, lapping
machines, various types of grinding machines, die casting machines, forge
presses, header machines, foundry equipment, welding and riveting equipment.
Automobile Industry Adaptable for Stamping of Wings and Fuselage
The plane has three main parts: engine, wings and fuselage. Just as there is
unused capacity for the production of motors, so there is unused capacity for
the production of the wings and fuselage. The large body plants and the parts
plants have metal stamping equipment now used for stamping out parts for
the body of the automobile which can be adapted to stamping out the parts
which make up the wings and fuselage of the plane. Proof of this is provided
by the tentative plans being made by the automotive industry at the suggestion
of Mr. Knudsen to manufacture parts of the wings and fuselages for large
bombers.
A survey of the large body plants will show that their equipment for pressing and stamping metal parts are also not being used to full capacity. Murray
Body, Briggs and the Fisher Body plants show a 50 percent overall unused capacity in their pressrooms. Striking is the example of the Fisher Body plant in
Cleveland, which contains one of the largest pressrooms in the industry. At
present it is operating at but 40 percent of capacity, although automobile
body production is now at its peak. In 1936-37 this plant made all the
stampings for Chevrolet bodies, employing 9200 employes. Today it employs
but 3500, for Fisher has built a new plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan, further
adding to body capacity.
(See appendix for equipment in the Cleveland
Fisher plant.)
Technical problems are involved, of course, in constructing new dies to
stamp the lighter aluminum alloys used in plane production. That these problems are not insuperable is shown by the fact that Murray and Briggs are
already stamping wing parts for Douglas bombers.
500 PLANES
A DAY
Skilled and Production Labor Available in the Automobile Industry
Skilled labor is necessary to turn out the tools and dies required to adapt
these various types of automotive machinery to plane production. The auto
industry has the largest reservoir of skilled labor in the world. More than
25,000 tool and die workers, jig and fixture men, pattern makers, draftsmen
and designers, and allied craftsmen are employed in the auto industry at the
peak of its tooling program.
Tooling is even more seasonal than production. Each year thousands of the
industry's most skilled craftsmen work at top speed for a few months to com-
plete the necessary tooling work to adapt the old machinery to the new models.
When the tooling program is completed, only a skeleton crew of these skilled
craftsmen are retained for maintenance and duplicate tooling. Three or four
thousand skilled craftsmen are shifted to ordinary production jobs while more
than 10,000 are laid off entirely until their labor is needed for the next tooling
season. During the past five years more than half of the tool and die makers
in the industry, or more than 10,000, averaged less than six months work per
year. At the present time there are approximately 3,000 tool and die makers
unemployed in the auto industry; some 2,500 have been transferred to ordinaty machine-tending production jobs. Many of the remainder are on a short
work week.
In addition to the men who are unemployed, those working on production
and those employed only part time, there are at least 2,000 tool and die men
who have permanently gone into production jobs because of the short work
year in the tool and die industry. These mechanics could be combed out of
production departments and made available again for tool and die work.
Thus in manpower, as in machines, we have unused capacity; the highly
specialized and valuable skills of 7,500 tool and die workers are available to do
the necessary tooling for the plane production program here outlined.
Fisher Body Corporation, a division of General Motors, is now working on
wood models for a new body design. Chrysler also is working on new models,
for which some die work is likewise under way. If the automobile industry
goes ahead with plans for new models, it will absorb unemployed tool and die
workers. However, if the introduction of new models in the auto industry
could be delayed for six months,
from
12,000 to 15,000
skilled mechanics
could be made available to build the necessary tools, dies, jigs and fixtures for
the production of an all metal pursuit ship on a mass production basis.
The tool and die shops of the automotive industry, like the tool and die
workers themselves, are partially idle. The 90 tool and die jobbing shops in
the Detroit area affiliated with the Automotive Tool and Die Manufacturers
Association employ 7,000 tool and die workers when operated at full capacity.
In addition to these shops in the Association, there are some 75 additional tool
and die shops which
And, in addition to
departments within
as “captive” tool and
employ 1,500 tool
these independent
the auto, body and
die shops. These
and die workers at capacity production.
enterprises, there are large tool and die
parts plants proper. These are known
great “captive” tool and die shops have
500 PLANES
500 PLANES
A DAY
ign
des
and
g
lin
too
the
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the general plan should be given the production board and there should be
close inspection of each part manufactured before its release.
We propose the establishment of a central motor assembly plant to which
all complete parts shall be shipped after they pass inspection.
The automotive industry has unused floor space as it has unused men and
a capacity beyond the available manpower if all the skilled men in the entire
industry were employed on a full-time basis.
A typical example of the tremendous unused capacity of these captive shops
is that of Fisher Body No. 23 at Detroit. This is the largest tool and die shop
in the world.
It builds the sheet metal dies, welding bucks and fixtures, and
special machinery for all Fisher Body plants in the General Motors Corporation. In 1931 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 4,800 tool and die makers
at the peak of the tooling program. In 1940 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 1,400 tool and die makers at the peak of the tooling season. In December, 1940, this plant employed only 175 tool and die makers and even
these few were on a reduced work week.
As important as the tool and die worker is the engineer who designs the
tools and dies. Here, too, the same situation repeats itself. There are in the
Detroit and metropolitan areas about 2,100 designing engineers. Their drawings would be needed for the new tools and dies required to adapt automotive
machinery to plane production. Designing engineers, like tool and die workers, are largely unemployed between tooling seasons. Here, too, a six months
| machines. We suggest that the Hupmobile plant in Detroit (a plant which
produced only 371 cars in 1939, and which at the present time is completely
idle) be leased by the government for a central motor assembly plant. The
plant is large enough for five assembly lines with a daily total production
capacity of 500 complete aircraft engines a day. The plant could be operated
on a three 74 hour shift basis and the unused machinery now in the building
could be placed in other plants in accordance with the general production
plan.
Similar methods can be applied to the manufacture and assembly of the
wings and fuselage, and here, too, there is ample unused floor space for new
assembly lines. Six complete floors of a building one block long and a half
block wide are available at Fisher Body Plant No. 21, Detroit, which for(This work has now been transferred to
merly made bodies for Buick.
delay in new automobile models would make available an ample supply of
the necessary skilled men.
Just as there is no shortage of skilled labor in the automobile industry, so
there is no shortage of unskilled labor.
Despite the defense program, there is
a minimum of 100,000 former automobile workers unemployed or on WPA,
not to speak of the thousands of young people in automobile production areas
who would welcome an opportunity to work in plane production.
The first task of the board would be to organize a staff of production and
tooling engineers and assign them to make a plant-by-plant survey of the
industry to determine the capacity of each plant, and the extent to which it is
The next task of the board would be to break down a
blue-
print of the type of plane chosen for mass production into its constituent
parts and allocate the various parts of the engine, wings and fuselage among
the different automotive plants in accordance with their unused capacity and
the kind of work to which that unused capacity is being adapted. Work is to
be parcelled out with an eye to spreading it as widely as possible, for much
quicker results will be obtained if each plant has to cope with but one or two
probelms of design and tooling. As contrasted with the present method,
which dumps half a hundred technical problems into the lap of one manufacturer who must build an entire engine or plane, this method has all the advantages of division of labor.
aS A
We propose that the President of the United States appoint an aviation
production board of nine members, three representing the government, three
representing management and three representing labor. We propose that this
board be given full authority to organize and supervise the mass production
of airplanes in the automobile and automotive parts industry.
being utilized.
Fisher Body Plant No. 1 at Flint, Michigan.)
-
The Program in Operation
A DAY
Several floors are also available
at the Fisher Body Plant No. 23 in Detroit, and there is also floor space available at the Briggs Highland Park plant and at the old Ford Highland Park
lant.
: Outstanding example of idle floor space is the Murray Body Corporation
Since
in Detroit, the third largest body making corporation in America.
its loss of the Ford body contract, Murray is not producing a single automobile
body. There are 234,375 square feet of floor space in Buildjng 107 in Murray
Plant No. 1, 300,000 square feet available in Building No. 121 and 20,000
square feet available in Building No. 129. This available space will probably
be needed for the contract Murray has obtained to stamp the metal parts and
assemble the wing sections for Douglas bombers, but there is still 200,000 feet
more of modern floor space in the Murray plant which is now being used for
storage. This could be turned to the uses of this production program.
Similar is the situation at the Fisher Body plant in Cleveland. The third,
fourth and fifth floors of this building are now being used for storage, and
could easily be made available for assembly lines. This plant at one time made
all metal stampings for Chevrolet bodies. Additional floor space is also available in the Cleveland area.
A final assembly plant would also be needed for the job of assembling the
engine, wings and fuselage into the completed plane. For this purpose we
suggest the construction of cheap flat hangars in the open space around the
Wayne County airport. Completed engines, wings and fuselage would be
500 PLANES
Appendix I
A DAY
trucked from the sub-assembly plants to these hangars and the completed
planes could be flown from the airport. Similar flat hangars could be erected
for final assemblies at the Cleveland airport.
We suggest that the sub-assemblies and the final assemblies be placed under
the control of men carefully selected upon the basis of skill and experience
from the various assembly staffs in our motor car and body plants, and that
these picked men be used as the core of the assembly staffs to be developed
under this plan. Provisions for protecting the seniority of these men must
be guaranteed.
The first few thousand planes produced will not meet 100 percent performance requirements, for in mass production of planes as in mass production of
automobiles a few thousand jobs must always be run before the “bugs” (technical problems of machining and assembly) are worked out. This is not
serious since the first few thousand planes will more than meet the require-
NUMBER OF CARS AND TRUCKS PRODUCED IN U.S. AND CANADA
NAME
The automotive industry workers believe that this plan is the only one
which offers hope of quick production of planes. It seeks solution of our
problem not in the costly and lengthy work of erecting entire new plants, but
in the efficient organization of existing idle man-power, machines, skill and
floor space.
By dividing the parts among many manufacturers, the greatest possible
number of minds is brought to bear on the production problems involved.
Though we propose payment of a fair profit to each manufacturer in accordance with his share in the work, we can foresee the fears this plan may arouse
on the part of some managements. They may prefer a method whereby the
government finances entire new engines and aircraft plants. Aviation companies may look with misgiving on a production program that would inevitably
cut the cost of planes by putting their production on a mass production basis.
But we believe the average management executive would not put forward
these selfish considerations at a time of crisis.
Labor offers its whole-hearted cooperation. All that Labor asks is intelligent planning, a voice in matters of policy and administration, recognition of
its rights, and maintenance of its established standards.
The merit of our plan is that it saves time, and time is our
mal methods can build all the planes we need—if we wait until
to get them. This plan is put forward in the belief that the
is immediate, and terrifying. Precious moments pass away as
dare not invite the disaster that may come with further delay.
problem. Nor1942 and 1943
need for planes
we delay. We
1,044,100
aeieenietsitterciprntiletrearcitionianssaainniieonemniietaenpionrcbambiies
1,149,662
CHeeared DEON TI casein cctcneecnerreeenciin
icons ceincpectcccgptennscrtshtnincannncslomianinagegtilaonsinn _—
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ecient cesta
I
56,410
552,610
378,510
81,390
103,210
1,279,003
52,275
412,545
304,455
69,660
83,680
913,900
ote teremnnniarsieeemiilspiosiitibnnivarmnnertnie
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86,695
121,301
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57,216
90,674
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—---..--.-----..---—-------..---Hudson-Terraplane
235,065
199,569
220,214
45,668
224,475
196,732
291,021
38,032
22,681
2,547
97,632
32,803
21,067
125,207
ere eecieentiinemer eretetieenenernmeners
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WEARER
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14,035
65,302
114,682
12,727
32,930
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936,581
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icc raises
Cy ar ah TOG
Motors_..._--..-......---------.-.-.
ener econ
anne
General
T GLE
CLR
Total
"EG
ments as training ships.
Management Responsibility and Labor Cooperation
SEPT. ’39 THRU AUG. ’40
SEPT. ’36 THRU AUG. '37
OF COMPANY
I
“Big
Total
1,846,815
869,980
1,906,588
1,115,720
* Grand total also includes production of Diamond T Truck, Federal Truck, Int’l
Harvester, Mack Truck, Reo Truck, Stutz and miscellaneous not listed separately.
Ward’s Automotive Reports.
Source:
Canadian production represents approximately 4% of the total production.
Note:
Appendix II
PRODUCTION
POSSIBILITIES OF MAJOR
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530,745
221,318
552,255
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Dodge
Studebaker
Plymouth
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172,800
835,200
336,000
964,800
544
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163,268
207,070
360,000
240,000
430,479
On basis of 13-hour day.
OX
216,000
441,600
345,600
2,136,000
721,500*
33
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42
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118,368
217,125
288,384
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1,044,100
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45
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a
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87
Appendix II
500 PLANES
FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR PLANE PRODUCTION IN THE
CHEVROLET FORGE PLANT, DETROIT
example, stands 40 feet from the base to the top of the press and is large
enough to hold and operate a draw or flange die which itself weights from 70
to 80 tons.
The following equipment in the Chevrolet Drop Forge plant at the present
time—the peak of the plant production program—is operating at approximately 60% of capacity used.
Number of Machines
Size of Machines
Types of Machines
19
29
12
9
6
15
11
5
1,500
2,500
3,500
5,000
12,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
1
1
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Board
Board
Board
250 ton
950 ton
2
a
|
11
plant.
Present employment in the Fisher Cleveland press room
to which the presses are now idle. There are 600 men on
on the afternoon shift, and 67 on the midnight shife.
In addition to Cleveland Fisher Body, every major body
mobile industry has unused press room capacity which can,
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammers
Hammers
Hammers
special dies, be adapted to plane production.
1,000 ton
Forge Press ( Hydraulic)
1,500 lbs.
Board Hammers
Virtually all of the criticisms of the program have been anonymous—aircraft and automotive industry executives refusing, for some reason, to lend
their names to their printed views. The criticisms do not in any case run
against the feasibility of the program. By and large, they indicate either a
sad Jack of imagination or an insistence by automotive interests to continue
with “business as usual.” However, since some misconceptions of the program have gained credence it is advisable to discuss and dispose of these
matters.
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
If the above equipment were used
required for the production of 500 airplane engines per day, and still supply
Motor
Car
Company
with
sufficient forgings
for
1,000,000 °
BOMBERS
Chevrolet cars in the coming year. Skilled hammermen are available to operate these forge hammers at full capacity.
In addition to the Chevrolet Forge plant, there are many other forge plants,
such as the Buick Forge plant, Dodge Truck and Forge, etc., which have considerable unused capacity.
Numerous small blanking and stamping presses
To appreciate the full significance of the above list of equipment, one must
realize the tremendous size of these presses, their cost, and the time it would
require a new plant to get delivery of such presses. A big Toggle press, for
a
peegrenereessaneto
area
ntnenncerietntgimnesisten oy cteemassvicoesantmengipwereeneee
Type of Machines
Double Crank Presses
Toggle Presses
No. 78 Single Crank Presses
277 ee
Number of Machines
74
19
26
OR PURSUIT
SHIPS
It has been wrongly assumed that the program contemplated the production
only of pursuit ships. Our reference to the possible production of 500 fighting
planes a day was used only to indicate the over-all productive capacity of an
automobile industry whose idle machines and idle men were fully mobilized
and whose private interests were temporarily subordinated. The productive
capacity we have indicated can as readily be adapted to the production of
medium-sized or heavy bombers. If these latter types are built rather than
pursuit ships, the
increased amount
could build many
are contemplated,
daily production would be scaled down in proportion to the
of work required on each plane. Nevertheless, our program
more bombers, large or small, than are now being built or
and in much shorter time.
MAN-HOURS
a
FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY FOR STAMPING METAL SECTIONS FOR WINGS AND FUSELAGE
The following stamping presses in the Cleveland Fisher Body Plant are at
the present time—the peak of the body production season—operating at less
than 50 percent of capacity.
ili
pani
Appendix IV
plant in the autowith the necessary
REPLY TO OBJECTIONS
at full capacity, this plant alone could produce all the necessary drop forgings
the Chevrolet
reflects the extent
the day shift, 300
Appendix V
In addition to the hammers and presses listed, numerous large and small
upsetting (header) presses are available.
Such presses cost from $150,000 to $175,000 and it would require
years to get delivery of the number and type of such press equipment that
is now standing idle more than 50 percent of the time at the Cleveland Fisher
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Forge Press ( Hydraulic)
1,600 ton
A DAY
REQUIRED
Some sources in the automobile industry assert our plan is impractical
because of the relatively small percentage of machine hours in manufacturing
an automobile as compared with the total man hours required to build a plane.
These sources contend that out of 18,000 man-hours necessary to build a
pursuit ship, 10,000 are devoted to construction of air frames, work on which
is usually done by hand. In attempting to prove their point, these sources
simply multiply 10,000 man-hours by 500 planes a day which gives them a tremendous and impressive figure. It would be as logical to take the number of
500 PLANES A DAY
FOREWORD
The Congress of Industrial Organizations has given to the Government a
proposal for mass production of defense aircraft. The immediate affect has
been an encouraging lift for national defense—through widespread publication and discussion. Valuable as this is, we are convinced that the program
merits more than verbal praise and piece-meal application.
The CIO’s proposal was drafted at my request and the request of R. J.
A Program for the Utilization of the Automobile
Industry for Mass Production of Defense Planes
By WALTER
Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers of America, affliated
with the CIO. It is the result of the experience of a group of skilled automobile workers, headed by Walter P. Reuther, who studied this problem for
months and arrived at the conclusions contained in the report. Their findings
bear the imprint of the unanimous approval of the Executive Board of the CIO.
Our program was born out of the CIO’S desire to make its utmost possible
contribution to national defense. The specific program for mass production
of defense aircraft indicates the great extent to which organized labor's know]edge and abilities may be utilized in our present national emergency. The
program implements a general program already outlined by the CIO for a
larger recognition of labor’s responsibilities and prerogatives in this emergency.
The efforts of our country to preserve and perfect our democratic institutions finds no greater response than in the ranks of American labor. Our aircraft production program is concrete evidence of that fact; and it also bespeaks
the logic of our desire for a greater recognition of organized labor’s role in
national defense.
England's battles, it used to be said, were won on the playing fields of Eton.
This plan is put forward in the belief that America’s can be won on the
assembly lines of Detroit.
In an age of mechanized warfare, victory has become a production problem.
The automotive workers for whom I speak think our industrial system a productive giant capable of any task, provided it is not forced into battle with one
hand tied behind its back. They also believe that we need send no men to a
future conflict with the Axis powers if we can supply enough machines now
to our first line of defense in Britain. The machines we and the British need
most are planes, and the survival of democracy depends on our ability to turn
them out quickly.
The workers in the automotive industry believe that the way to produce
planes quickly is to manufacture them in automobile plants. The automotive
industry today is operating at only half its potential capacity. This plan proposes that the unused potential of the industry in machines and men be utilized in the mass production of aircraft engines and planes. It is our considered opinion that it would be possible, after six months of preparation, to
turn out 500 of the most modern fighting planes a day, if the idle machines
and the idle men of the automotive industry were fully mobilized and private
PHILIP MURRAY, President
Congress of Industrial Organizations
AUTHOR'S
NOTE
interests temporarily subordinated to the needs of this emergency.
This program is an outgrowth of the American automobile workers’ conviction that the future of democracy and all that our people hold dear are
dependent upon the speedy and successful prosecution of our national defense.
I have discussed the general outlines of the program with Assistant Secretary
of War Robert Patterson; Philip Murray, President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; Sidney Hillman, member of the National Defense Advisory
Time, every moment of it precious, its tragic periods ticked off by bombs
falling upon London and the Midlands, will not permit us to wait until new
mass production factories for aircraft and aircraft engines finally swing into
action late in 1942. Emergency requires short-cut solutions. This plan is
Labor’s answer to a crisis.
Mr. William F. Knudsen says that airplane production is 30 percent behind
schedule. It will continue to be behind schedule so long as we continue to
rely on the expansion of existing aircraft plants, and on the construction of
new plants. Expansion of existing aircraft plants means the expansion of
plants utilizing the slow and costly methods of an industry geared to handtooled, custom-made production.
New plants cannot be built and put into operation in less than 18 months.
Commission; and R. J. Thomas, President of the UAW-CIO.
In 18 months Britain’s battle, for all her people’s bravery, may be lost, and our
gn
a
own country left to face a totalitarian Europe alone.
pee
Upon being urged by these leaders of government and labor to complete the
survey, I consulted with a number of highly-skilled designing engineers, tool
and die makers, jig and fixture men, and pattern and model makers, employed
for years by General Motors, Chrysler, Packard, Hudson, Briggs, Murray Body
and other automobile companies. Individually and jointly, we made first-hand
studies of aircraft motor parts and wing and fuselage assemblies. All of these
men are members of the UAW-CIO and are recognized by managements as
well as by the union as master technicians. They have contributed to the formulation of this program which we now present as part of labor’s contribution
toward the solution of a grave national problem.
P. REUTHER*
* Director,
General
Motors. Department,
United
Automobile
Workers
of America,
CIO; member, Committee on Training in Industry, National Defense Advisory ComMission.
DAY
5OO PLAN
A Program for the Utilization of the Automobile
Industry for Mass Production of Defense Planes
By WALTER
FOREWORD
by PHILIP
INTRODUCTION
American
P. REUTHER
Couneil
MURRAY
by GEORGE
On
Public
WASHINGTON, D.C.
©
SOULE
Affairs
FOREWORD
The Congress of Industrial Organizations has given to the Government a
proposal for mass production of defense aircraft. The immediate affect has
been an encouraging lift for national defense—through widespread publication and discussion. Valuable as this is, we are convinced that the program
merits more than verbal praise and piece-meal application.
The CIO’s proposal was drafted at my request and the request of R. J.
Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated
with the CIO. It is the result of the experience of a group of skilled automobile workers, headed
by Walter
P. Reuther, who
studied this problem
for
months and arrived at the conclusions contained in the report. Their findings
bear the imprint of the unanimous approval of the Executive Board of the CIO.
Our program was born out of the CIO’S desire to make its utmost possible
contribution to national defense. The specific program for mass production
of defense aircraft indicates the great extent to which organized labor’s know]edge and abilities may be utilized in our present national emergency. ‘The
program implements a general program already outlined by the CIO for a
larger recognition of labor's responsibilities and prerogatives in this emergency.
The efforts of our country to preserve and perfect our democratic institutions finds no greater response than in the ranks of American labor. Our aircraft production program is concrete evidence of that fact; and it also bespeaks
the logic of our desire for a greater recognition of organized labor’s role in
national defense.
PHILIP MURRAY, President
Congress of Industrial Organizations
AUTHOR’S
NOTE
This program is an outgrowth of the American automobile workers’ conviction that the future of democracy and all that our people hold dear are
dependent upon the speedy and successful prosecution of our national defense.
I have discussed the general outlines of the program with Assistant Secretary
of War Robert Patterson; Philip Murray, President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; Sidney Hillman, member of the National Defense Advisory
Commission; and R. J. Thomas, President of the UAW-CIO.
Upon being urged by these leaders of government and labor to complete the
survey, I consulted with a number of highly-skilled designing engineers, tool
and die makers, jig and fixture men, and pattern and model makers, employed
for years by General Motors, Chrysler, Packard, Hudson, Briggs, Murray Body
and other automobile companies. Individually and jointly, we made first-hand
studies of aircraft motor parts and wing and fuselage assemblies. All of these
men are members of the UAW-CIO and are recognized by managements as
well as by the union as master technicians. They have contributed to the formulation of this program which we now present as part of labor’s contribution
toward the solution of a grave national problem.
e
WALTER
P. REUTHER
INTRODUCTION
By GEORGE
SOULE*
Here is a plan to speed up warplane production to aid the defense of Britain
and the United States. It asserts that within six months the automobile industry
could be turning out 500 fighting planes a day, in addition to whatever the
airplane industry itself may be able to do. Such a plan is certainly worth
careful investigation.
The plan is sponsored by men who have an intimate technical knowledge
of the automobile industry. It is proposed by Walter P. Reuther, an official
of the United Automobile Workers of America, after consultation with designing engineers and highly skilled specialists employed in numerous auto plants.
Any proposal by such a body of men deserves a hearing. Again and again it
has been demonstrated in American industry that suggestions arising from
those who do the work, and through long personal experience understand
industrial problems, are immensely valuable.
The plan points out indubitable facts that few Americans know. The automobile industry is operating at only about 50 percent of capacity, largely
because of seasonal production. If its output were spread evenly throughout
the year, half its plant and manpower could be used for something else. Could
this something else be warplanes? Here is where serious disagreement arises.
Some connected with the plane industry say it could not, because plane engines
and bodies are more complicated and require more exact and refined processes.
This report answers the objection by detailed facts and figures. Machinery,
plant and manpower, it asserts, are available to do the necessary jobs. To the
layman, it offers convincing evidence that if we want mass production of warplanes, the automobile industry can give it to us.
The layman, of course, is not qualified to decide the technical questions at
issue. But all of us, as American citizens, have a right and duty to insist that
the questions be carefully investigated and decided by those competent to
judge, without the influence of private interest or prejudice. We cannot be
satisfied with a negative response on the part of the aircraft industry itself,
which has an obvious interest in avoiding competition. Nor can we be satisfied
with the judgment of army experts who through experience only with special
production of frequently changed models do not understand the quality potentialities of mass production.
Nor, finally, can we be satisfied with a reluctance
of certain automobile employers to sacrifice competitive advantage by planning
production for the whole industry as a unit.
It would seem that little could be lost even if the plan were unsuccessful.
At present half our productive capacity in automobiles is going to waste.
Let us not permit this plan to be shoved aside by the inertia of vested interests.
* Editor, New Republic; Chairman, National Economic and Social Planning Associa-
tion; Director-at-Large, National Bureau
of Economic
Research.
SOO PLANES A DAY
A Program for the Utilization of the Automobile
Industry for Mass Production of Defense Planes
By WALTER
P. REUTHER*
England’s battles, it used to be said, were won on the playing fields of Eton.
This plan is put forward in the belief that America’s can be won on the
assembly lines of Detroit.
In an age of mechanized warfare, victory has become a production problem.
The automotive workers for whom I speak think our industrial system a productive giant capable of any task, provided it is not forced into battle with one
hand tied behind its back. They also believe that we need send no men to a
future conflict with the Axis powers if we can supply enough machines now
to our first line of defense in Britain. The machines we and the British need
most are planes, and the survival of democracy depends on our ability to turn
them out quickly.
The workers in the automotive industry believe that the way to produce
planes quickly is to manufacture them in automobile plants. The automotive
industry today is operating at only half its potential capacity. This plan proposes that the unused potential of the industry in machines and men be utilized in the mass production of aircraft engines and planes. It is our considered opinion that it would be possible, after six months of preparation, to
turn out 500 of the most modern fighting planes a day, if the idle machines
and the idle men of the automotive industry were fully mobilized and private
interests temporarily subordinated to the needs of this emergency.
Time, every moment of it precious, its tragic periods ticked off by bombs
falling upon London and the Midlands, will not permit us to wait until new
mass production factories for aircraft and aircraft engines finally swing into
action late in 1942. Emergency requires short-cut solutions. This plan is
Labor’s answer to a crisis.
Mr. William F. Knudsen says that airplane production is 30 percent behind
schedule. It will continue to be behind schedule so long as we continue to
rely on the expansion of existing aircraft plants, and on the construction of
new plants. Expansion of existing aircraft plants means the expansion of
plants utilizing the slow and costly methods of an industry geared to handtooled, custom-made production.
New plants cannot be built and put into operation in less than 18 months.
In 18 months Britain’s battle, for all her people’s bravery, may be lost, and our
own country left to face a totalitarian Europe alone.
* Director, General Motors Department, United Automobile Workers of America,
CIO; member, Committee on Training in Industry, National Defense Advisory Commission.
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
5
Packard and other companies are still digging the ditches and pouring the
concrete for their new airplane engine factories. The Axis powers will not
wait politely until these factories are finished.
New plants, when finally erected, must be filled with new machinery and
this new equipment largely duplicates machinery already available in our automobile plants... The machine industry is overtaxed. The emergency of war
cannot be met in the normal time necessary to construct new plants and equip
them with the required production machinery.
We propose, instead of building entirely new machines, to make the tools
required to adapt existing automotive machinery to aircraft manufacture.
We propose to transform the entire unused capacity of the automotive
industry into one huge plane production unit. Production under this plan
would not replace the output of the aircraft industry proper, which would
continue to construct the large bombers and planes of special design.
Fifty Percent of Automobile Industry’s Potential Capacity Is Unused
No industry in the world has the tremendous unused potential productive
capacity of the American automotive industry, and no industry is as easily
adaptable to the mass production of planes. A careful survey will show that
the automobile industry as a whole is not using more than 50 percent of its
maximum potential capacity if that capacity were properly coordinated and
operated to the fullest degree.
The automotive industry could produce 8,000,000 cars a year. It is producing approximately 4,000,000. These unused plant reserves, as shown by
the figures given in the Federal Trade Commission’s report on the motor
vehicle industry, are greater than the total motor plant capacity of England,
Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Japan combined. Adapted to plane production, this unused potential capacity would give us world plane supremacy
within a short time.
At present the automotive industry never operates at more than 80 to 90
percent of its maximum potential capacity, and then only for a few months
each year. The rest of the year it operates on reduced schedules, and many
plants shut down completely. If automobile production were spread evenly
over a 12-month period, it would be possible, without reducing the total output of automobiles, to convert a large portion of this machinery to the manufacture of planes.
During the automotive year ending August, 1940, Nash used only 17 percent of its productive capacity; Dodge used 3614 percent. Nash, working at
maximum capacity, could have manufactured its total output for the 12
months in 4914 working days; Dodge, in 111 working days. Chevrolet, the
largest single producer of motor cars, turned out over a million cars during
the last model year, and yet used less than 50 percent of its potential productive capacity. The main Chevrolet Motor plant at Flint, Michigan, produced 380 completed motors per hour at the peak of the 1937 production
season, utilizing all four of its complete motor machining and assembly lines.
At the present time, at the peak of the 1940 production season, the Chevrolet
6
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
Flint plant is producing 282 motors per hour, with one motor line standing
completely idle, while the three remaining lines are operating on a two-shift
basis. Since 1937, Chevrolet has built a new motor plant in Tonawanda,
New York, which at the present time is producing 65 complete motors per
hour, with a plant capacity of 90 motors per hour. This would indicate that
at the peak of the production season Chevrolet is only building 347 motors
per hour, with an actual capacity of 470 motors per hour. With an unused
capacity of 123 motors per hour at the peak of the production season, it is
obvious that Chevrolet has an unused reserve which becomes tremendous during the month of reduced operating schedules.
The availability of automotive production facilities for plane production in
Chevrolet is again shown in the case of the Chevrolet drop forge plant in
Detroit, the largest drop forge shop of its kind in the world. If this shop
were operated at full capacity, it could produce all the drop forgings required
for the production of 500 airplane motors per day, and still supply the Chevrolet company with sufficient drop forgings for 1,000,000 Chevrolet cars a year.
Skilled labor to operate this shop at full capacity is available. Other forge
shops, including the Buick and the Dodge forge shops, are also working at far
less than capacity. (See appendix for shop equipment and production sched-
ules. )
Automobile Motor Building Facilities Can Be Adapted to Make Plane Motors
Are the facilities used in manufacturing automobile motors adaptable to the
manufacture of airplane motors? The answer is that they are.
Both the automobile and airplane motors are combustion engines, essentially
the same mechanism for generating power by exploding gas. Both motors
contain cylinders, carburetors, pistons, crankshafts, camshafts, valves, sparkplugs, ignition systems, etc.
The same basic machinery is utilized in the manufacture of these basic parts
Ba
common to both motors.
True, there are differences between the automobile
and the airplane engine, as there are differences of a lesser degree between the
engine of the Chevrolet and the engine of the Cadillac. These differences
between different engines are produced by adding certain tools, dies, jigs or
fixtures to the basic machine in order to make a difference in the product. The
same “tooling” process adapts the same basic machinery to the production of
the airplane engine. Graphic proof of this statement is even now being supplied by General Motors. Many of the most difficult and precise parts of the
Allison aviation engine are being manufactured in the Cadillac plant in
Detroit, much of it with retooled Cadillac machinery. The new Allison plant
in Indianapolis, still in process of expansion, is being used largely for assembly.
The experience of General Motors in making Allison parts with retooled
Cadillac machinery should also dispose of the bugaboo of “tolerances.” “Tolerances” are the allowable fractional variations in size of engine parts, and they
must be far finer in the plane engine than in the automobile engine. But these
more precise dimensions can be obtained by more precise tooling.
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
7
When the contemplated airplane motor plants are completed, it will be
necessary to equip them with the same kind of basic production machinery
already standing idle half of the time in the nation’s automotive factories.
This basic machinery will be duplicated, and after_it_is duplicated it will still
be necessary to construct the special tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures required to
7 ditties.
ae
adapt this machinery to the manufacture of plane enginés7™
In the process of duplicating basic machinery, lies the most serious delay.
This lag, which from all indications may continue, may well defeat our national
defense program. An additional burden is placed on the already over-loaded
machine tool industry. We propose to short-cut the process by building only
the tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures necessary to convert idle automotive machinery
into plane engine machinery. A few special machines will be necessary, but
these will be but a small part of the total equipment. In this way a job that
will otherwise take at least 18 months can be done in six months.
Certain basic machines are necessary to build both automobile and aircraft
types of engines. These include gear cutters, gear shapers, screw machines,
bullards, drill presses, punch presses, broaching machines, turret lathes, various
types of milling machines, various types of lathes and Fay machines, lapping
machines, various types of grinding machines, die casting machines, forge
presses, header machines, foundry equipment, welding and riveting equipment.
Automobile Industry Adaptable for Stamping of Wings and Fuselage
The plane has three main parts: engine, wings and fuselage. Just as there is
unused capacity for the production of motors, so there is unused capacity for
the production of the wings and fuselage. The large body plants and the parts
plants have metal stamping equipment now used for stamping oui parts for
the body of the automobile which can be adapted to stamping out the parts
which make up the wings and fuselage of the plane. Proof of this is provided
oy the tentative plans being made by the automotive industry at the suggestion
of Mr. Knudsen to manufacture parts of the wings and fuselages for large
bombers.
A survey of the large body plants will show that their equipment for pressing and stamping metal parts are also not being used to full Capacity. Murray
Body, Briggs and the Fisher Body plants show a 50 percent overall unused capacity in their pressrooms. Striking is the example of the Fisher Body plant in
Cleveland, which contains one of the largest pressrooms in the industry. At
present it is operating at but 40 percent of capacity, although automobile
body production is now at its peak. In 1936-37 this plant made all the
stampings for Chevrolet bodies, employing 9200 employes. Today it employs
but 3500, for Fisher has built a new plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan, further
adding to body capacity.
(See appendix for equipment in the Cleveland
Fisher plant.)
Technical problems are involved, of course, in constructing new dies to
stamp the lighter aluminum alloys used in plane production. That these probJems are not insuperable is shown by the fact that Murray and Briggs are
already stamping wing parts for Douglas bombers.
ip
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
500 PLANES
PLAN
Skilled and Production Labor Available in the Automobile Industry
Skilled labor is necessary to turn out the tools and dies required to adapt
these various types of automotive machinery to plane production. The auto
industry has the largest reservoir of skilled labor in the world. More than
25,000 tool and die workers, jig and fixture men, pattern makers, draftsmen
and designers, and allied craftsmen are employed in the auto industry at the
peak of its tooling program.
Tooling is even more seasonal than production. Each year thousands of the
industry's most skilled craftsmen work at top speed for a few months to complete the necessary tooling work to adapt the old machinery to the new models.
When the tooling program is completed, only a skeleton crew of these skilled
craftsmen are retained for maintenance and duplicate tooling. Three or four
thousand skilled craftsmen are shifted to ordinary production jobs while more
than 10,000 are laid off entirely until their labor is needed for the next tooling
season. During the past five years more than half of the tool and die makers
in the industry, or more than 10,000, averaged less than six months work per
year. At the present time there are approximately 3,000 tool and die makers
unemployed in the auto industry; some 2,500 have been transferred to ordinary machine-tending production jobs. Many of the remainder are on a short
work week.
on
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e
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.
stry
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and
year in the tool
production departments and made available again for tool and die work.
ly
high
the
;
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capa
ed
unus
have
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mach
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as
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ower
Thus in manp
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.
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and
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and
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could be made ava
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pro
s
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and
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Too
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the
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ty.
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In addition to these shops
n.
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ker
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and die shops which empl
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and
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se
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And, in addition to
n
ow
kn
are
se
The
.
per
pro
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pla
ts
par
and
y
bod
o,
aut
the
departments within
e
hav
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and
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ve”
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“ca
at
gre
se
The
ps.
sho
die
and
as “captive” tool
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
9
a capacity beyond the available manpower if all the skilled men in the entire
industry were employed on a full-time basis.
A typical example of the tremendous unused capacity of these captive shops
is that of Fisher Body No. 23 at Detroit. This is the largest tool and die shop
in the world.
It builds the sheet metal dies, welding bucks and fixtures, and
special machinery for all Fisher Body plants in the General Motors Corporation. In 1931 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 4,800 tool and die makers
at the peak of the tooling program. In 1940 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 1,400 tool and die makers at the peak of the tooling season. In December, 1940, this plant employed only 175 tool and die makers and even
these few were on a reduced work week.
As important as the tool and die worker is the engineer who designs the
tools and dies. Here, too, the same situation repeats itself. There are in the
Detroit and metropolitan areas about 2,100 designing engineers. Their drawings would be needed for the new tools and dies required to adapt automotive
machinery to plane production. Designing engineers, like tool and die workers, are largely unemployed between tooling seasons. Here, too, a six months
delay in new automobile models would make available an ample supply of
the necessary skilled men.
Just as there is no shortage of skilled labor in the automobile industry, so
there is no shortage of unskilled labor. Despite the defense program, there is
a minimum of 100,000 former automobile workers unemployed or on WPA,
not to speak of the thousands of young people in automobile production areas
who would welcome an opportunity to work in plane production.
ef
The Program in Operation
We propose that the President of the United States appoint an aviation p YY
V4
production board of nine members, three representing the government, three
representing management and three representing labor.
We propose that this
board be given full authority to organize and supervise the mass production
of airplanes in the automobile and automotive parts industry.
The first task of the board would be to organize a staff of production and
tooling engineers and assign them to make a plant-by-plant survey of the
industry to determine the capacity of each plant, and the extent to which it is
being utilized. The next task of the board would be to break down a blueprint of the type of plane chosen for mass production into its constituent
parts and allocate the various parts of the engine, wings and fuselage among
the different automotive plants in accordance with their unused capacity and
the kind of work to which that unused capacity is being adapted. Work is to
be parcelled out with an eye to spreading it as widely as possible, for much
quicker results will be obtained if each plant has to cope with but one or two
probelms of design and tooling. As contrasted with the present method,
which dumps half a hundred technical problems into the lap of one manufacturer who must build an entire engine or plane, this method has all the advantages of division of labor.
yw
X.
ef
yh
oe
8
Ww
Oo
-
Pal
|
500
PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
500 PLANES
PLAN
The production board should have power to allocate the tooling and designing necessary among the various tool and die shops in accordance with their
capacity and their specialized qualifications.
\
Power to appoint inspectors for each plant in accordance with its part in
od
e general plan should be given the production board and there should be
A / close inspection of each part manufactured before its release.
,
\vyh
,
R
.
e
We propose the establishment of a central motor assembly plant to which
all complete parts shall be shipped after they pass inspection.
The automotive industry has unused floor space as it has unused men and
machines. We suggest that the Hupmobile plant in Detroit (a plant which
produced only 371 cars in 1939, and which at the present time is completely
idle) be leased by the government for a central motor assembly plant. The
plant
is | large enough h for for five five assassembly y lines lines with
lant
with a a dail
daily total 1 production
producti
capacity of 500 complete aircraft engines a day. The plant could be operated
on a three 74 hour shift basis and the unused machinery now in the building
could be placed in other plants in accordance with the general production
plan.
'
Similar methods can be applied to the manufacture and assembly of the
wings and fuselage, and here, too, there is ample unused floor space for new
assembly lines. Six complete floors of a building one block long and a half
block wide are available at Fisher Body Plant No. 21, Detroit, which formerly made bodies for Buick.
(This work has now been transferred to
Fisher Body Plant No. 1 at Flint, Michigan.) Several floors are also available
at the Fisher Body Plant No. 23 in Detroit, and there is also floor space available at the Briggs Highland Park plant and at the old Ford Highland Park
plant.
Outstanding example of idle floor space is the Murray Body Corporation
in Detroit, the third largest body making corporation in America. Since
its loss of the Ford body contract, Murray is not producing a single automobile
body. There are 234,375 square feet of floor space in Building 107 in Murray
Plant No.
1, 300,000 square feet available in Building No.
121 and 20,000
square feet available in Building No. 129. This available space will probably
be needed for the contract Murray has obtained to stamp the metal parts and
assemble the wing sections for Douglas bombers, but there is still 200,000 feet
more of modern floor space in the Murray plant which is now being used for
storage. This could be turned to the uses of this production program.
Similar is the situation at the Fisher Body plant in Cleveland. The third,
fourth and fifth floors of this building are now being used for storage, and
could easily be made available for assembly lines. This plant at one time made
all metal stampings for Chevrolet bodies. Additional floor space is also available in the Cleveland area.
A final assembly plant would also be needed for the job of assembling the
engine, wings and fuselage into the completed plane, For this purpose we
suggest the construction of cheap flat hangars in the open space around the
Wayne County airport. Completed engines, wings and fuselage would be
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
11
trucked from the sub-assembly plants to these hangars and the completed
planes could be flown from the airport. Similar flat hangars could be erected
for final assemblies at the Cleveland airport.
We suggest that the sub-assemblies and the final assemblies be placed under
the control of men carefully selected upon the basis of skill and experience
from the various assembly staffs in our motor car and body plants, and that
these picked men be used as the core of the assembly staffs to be developed
under this plan. Provisions for protecting the seniority of these men must
be guaranteed.
The first few thousand planes produced will not meet 100 percent performance requirements, for in mass production of planes as in mass production of
(tech
”
“bugs
the
e
befor
run
be
s
alway
must
jobs
and
thous
few
a
s
obile
autom
nical problems of machining and assembly) are worked out. This is not
serious since the first few thousand planes will more than meet the requirements as training ships.
Management Responsibility and Labor Cooperation
y
onl
the
is
n
pla
this
t
tha
e
iev
bel
s
ker
wor
ry
ust
ind
e
tiv
omo
The aut
of
on
uti
sol
ks
see
It
.
nes
pla
of
n
tio
duc
pro
ck
qui
of
e
hop
which offers
,
nts
pla
new
ire
ent
ng
cti
ere
of
k
wor
y
gth
len
and
tly
cos
the
in
problem not
l
skil
es,
hin
mac
,
wer
-po
man
idle
ng
sti
exi
of
ion
zat
ani
org
ent
ici
eff
in the
one
our
but
and
le
sib
pos
st
ate
gre
the
s,
rer
ctu
ufa
man
y
man
g
on
am
ts
par
By dividing the
ed.
olv
inv
ms
ble
pro
n
tio
duc
pro
the
on
r
bea
to
t
ugh
bro
is
number of minds
ord
acc
in
rer
ctu
ufa
man
h
eac
to
fit
pro
fair
a
of
t
men
pay
e
pos
Though we pro
use
aro
may
n
pla
this
rs
fea
the
e
ese
for
can
we
k,
wor
the
in
ance with his share
the
y
reb
whe
hod
met
a
fer
pre
may
y
The
ts.
men
age
man
on the part of some
pacom
on
ati
Avi
.
nts
pla
ft
cra
air
and
s
ine
eng
new
ire
ent
government finances
y
abl
vit
ine
ld
wou
t
tha
m
gra
pro
n
tio
duc
pro
a
on
ing
giv
mis
nies may look with
s.
basi
n
tio
duc
pro
s
mas
a
on
n
tio
duc
pro
ir
the
g
tin
put
by
nes
pla
of
cut the cost
d
war
for
put
not
ld
wou
ive
cut
exe
nt
me
ge
na
ma
e
rag
ave
the
e
iev
But we bel
these selfish considerations at a time of crisis.
i;
ell
int
is
s
ask
or
Lab
t
tha
All
on.
ati
per
coo
d
rte
hea
lewho
its
ers
off
or
Lab
of
on
iti
ogn
rec
on,
ati
str
ini
adm
and
icy
pol
of
s
ter
mat
in
ce
voi
a
ng,
gent planni
standards.
its rights, and maintenance of its estab
Nor
m.
ble
pro
our
is
e
tim
and
e,
tim
es
sav
it
t
tha
is
n
pla
our
of
The merit
3
194
and
2
194
il
unt
t
wai
we
f
d—i
nee
we
nes
pla
the
all
ld
bui
can
s
mal method
nes
pla
for
d
nee
the
t
tha
ief
bel
the
in
d
war
for
put
is
n
pla
s
Thi
m.
the
to get
We
ay.
del
we
as
y
awa
s
pas
s
nt
me
mo
us
cio
Pre
g.
yin
rif
is immediate, and ter
ay.
del
r
the
fur
h
wit
e
com
may
t
tha
er
ast
dis
the
ite
inv
not
e
dar
Appendix HI
Appendix I
NUMBER OF CARS AND TRUCKS PRODUCED IN U.S. AND CANADA
SEPT. ’36 THRU AUG. ’37
NM
RII © scion
seins
irate drecsnmmatrsaicn
ditional
1,149,662
BNE
etnies veehinsiecsnic ech cis pantincoesba
dineersscd
ote dobtemdssienemiek
iia
235,065
RPI
ore sec emeceienersnemtrss
lant reece eet eamiineigie
iim
199,569
ON
ae
etree eed eh de
ae
daca
ie
220,214
le Sl
45,668
CSO
TA INE BRCTUEIN UN teil
56,410
ce
552,610
NAME
IE
BNI
NE
pees cists laa stood
eects hoagie
eccpkiice anciagtleniiceledschao
snenieinieiabe ncadguba
catbeteni kam icine
neta cack utc in
sled A St seenretnion roeaderesscielicctedeaens
ee UE
i
eis
cee i
tel
1,279,003
32,803
21,067
125,207
Nash-Lafayette -..................... s id caine
dais ido
BN
air h dheeeaed scatterers ee rasecosennionesa ona oe
I
iia
wie Sint an nthaensgicineisinbantansctormcmaaeaniits
86,695
121,301
104,931
la since
NT FN
PAR
I
A
ee ee
I
FN
sores
I
ee
ie
(eners:
ree NN
A I
OI
RRR
* Grand
300
eo eeecepreees:
erie
ide
14,035
eres
65,302
sedstalieeine
cn oceans
MO...
hd cecdeecdaeiioesrsiestinnbaaeeeiobiebeiaciwtccige
also
includes
production
of
1,906,588
1,115,720
Harvester, Mack Truck, Reo Truck, Stutz
Source:
Ward’s Automotive Reports.
Note:
Canadian production represents
and
1,311,716
4,334,204
Diamond
mately 60% of capacity used.
Size of Machines
Number of Machines
T
Truck,
miscellaneous
approximately
4%
not
of
Federal
listed
the
Truck,
separately.
total
production.
Appendix II
Oo
&
g
sZ
59
a
Cadillac
22
Studebaker
Plymouth
31
43
Dodge
3614
Chrysler and
DeSoto
Oldsmobile
Willys-
Overland
Hudson
Pontiac
Nash
Chevrolet
Buick
* Note:
w.&
ae
a
3
6ey >9
134,768
530,745
6
Bo
i
SQ
os
8
FAQ
fo
m
SH oo
o
>
172,800
835,200
nS
ee
a
Fuco
SS
OQ
BSs
66
108
24
221,318
a92200
494,660
336,000
964,800
544%
163,268
360,000
167
135%
147
648,000
17
207,070
240,000
40
51
118,368
217,125
216,000
441,600
17
49
42
288,384
1,091,900
430,479
On basis of 13-hour day.
345,600
2,136,000
F200"?
103
128
75
38,032
304,455
114,682
412,545
153,340
196,732
32,930
75
50
97,632
224,475
4914
57,216
.. 1,044,100
147
121
291,021
92
72
445
185
41
ORN
SA
S
5
172
Ow
an
s
3
fe
8 of
Present Production of Completed
Motors per Hour
6.8ao
Y
BES
Ber
~I
I
ae
oh Oy
os
g.o
co
~~
S27
fas
a
|
3
32.
© *
°
2
<
+r ON —~I Ov
—~I Uo CO NO
A,ae
UO
Mee
fond
—
ol goed
£8
ie:
me
g
_
3
20 ma.
odes
war
Qe
2
yoax
Bb,
oe, 5 ju» Highest Past Production of Com=O
© pleted Motors Per Hour
5*a oh
o
N2
3
rot
From Sept. ’39, thru Aug. ’40
a
PLANTS
Total Production
owt
as
Q,
Oo
Production
4>
Peak
ep
POSSIBILITIES OF MAJOR
12 Months
PRODUCTION
1,500 Ibs.
2,500 Ibs.
Steam Hammer
Steam Hammer
9
5,000 lbs.
Steam Hammer
6
12,000 lbs.
1
2
950 ton
1,000 ton
1,000
2,000
3,000
250
119
Steam Hammer
Board
Board
Board
Forge
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
ton
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Board Hammers
1,500 Ibs.
11
In addition to the hammers
upsetting (header) presses are
at full capacity, this plant alone
required for the production of
Motor
Car
Hammers
Hammers
Hammers
Press (Hydraulic)
Forge Press ( Hydraulic)
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
1,600 ton
3
the Chevrolet
Steam Hammer
3,500 Ibs.
15
11
5
1
Int’l
Types of Machines
19
29
12
4,228,706
1,846,815
869,980
936,581
3,653,376
5,068,803
case icicle enicnadibeieiniereicebiditeimenincias
Oe aire tinerticie esr clemson sa
total
1,044,100
224,475
196,732
291,021
38,032
52,275
412,545
304,455
69,660
83,680
913,900
22,681
2,547
97,632
371
57,216
90,674
114,682
12,727
32,930
378,510
81,390
103,210
rn epcienseneetlinnabns
ae
ieectbaicact tse ek roan esaommaumbad aan
a rvccierpremenisversencsgescliiraieevethcem
teene
IN
SEPT. ’°39 THRU AUG. ’40
OF COMPANY
AVAILABLE FOR PLANE PRODUCTION IN THE
CHEVROLET FORGE PLANT, DETROIT
The following equipment in the Chevrolet Drop Forge plant at the present
time—the peak of the plant production program—is operating at approxiFACILITIES
and presses listed, numerous large and small
available. If the above equipment were used
could produce all the necessary drop forgings
500 airplane engines per day, and still supply
Company
with
sufficient
forgings
for
1,000,000
Chevrolet cars in the coming year. Skilled hammermen are available to operate these forge hammers at full capacity.
In addition to the Chevrolet Forge plant, there are many other forge plants,
such as the Buick Forge plant, Dodge Truck and Forge, etc., which have con-
siderable unused capacity.
Appendix IV
PAM
ST
R
FO
RY
ST
DU
IN
LE
BI
MO
TO
AU
IN
E
BL
LA
AI
AV
ES
TI
FACILI
ING METAL SECTIONS FOR WINGS AND FUSELAGE
at
are
nt
Pla
y
Bod
her
Fis
and
vel
Cle
the
in
s
sse
pre
ng
mpi
sta
ing
low
fol
The
less
at
g
tin
era
—op
son
sea
n
tio
duc
pro
y
bod
the
of
k
pea
he
e—t
tim
t
sen
the pre
than 50 percent of capacity.
es
in
ch
Ma
of
pe
Ty
Number of Machines
s
sse
Pre
k
an
Cr
le
ub
Do
74
s
sse
Pre
le
gg
To
19
No. 78 Single Crank Presses
26
s
se
es
pr
ng
pi
am
st
d
an
ng
ki
an
bl
l
al
sm
us
ro
me
Nu
st
mu
one
t,
en
pm
ui
eq
of
list
e
ov
ab
the
of
nce
ica
nif
sig
l
ful
To appreciate the
d
ul
wo
it
e
tim
the
and
t,
cos
ir
the
s,
sse
pre
se
the
of
e
siz
realize the tremendous
s.
sse
pre
h
suc
of
ry
ive
del
get
to
nt
pla
w
ne
a
e
uir
req
A big Toggle press, for
14
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
500
PLAN
These sources contend that out of 18,000 man-hours necessary to build a
pursuit ship, 10,000 are devoted to construction of air frames, work on which
is usually done by hand. In attempting to prove their point, these sources
simply multiply 10,000 man-hours by 500 planes a day which gives them a tremendous and impressive figure. It would be as logical to take the number of
15
fact that the number of hours spent doing things by hand as compared to the
number of hours spent operating machines (machine-hours) varies in ever
increasing proportion to the extent that mass production techniques are introduced into the production process. The number of hours spent in building
an automobile is less than one-sixth of what it was when the industry started,
and as the over-all man hours decrease the machine hours increase in percentage as compared to the work done by hand. One can go into a modern
continuous strip steel mill and see this in its sharpest form.
FLOOR
——
i
a
BOMBERS OR PURSUIT SHIPS
Some sources in the automobile industry assert our plan is impractical
because of the relatively small percentage of machine hours in manufacturing
an automobile as compared with the total man hours required to build a plane.
PLAN
on this score to their logical conclusion: it would have required 2,200,000
men working 40 hours a week fifty weeks a year to produce last year’s 4,000,000 automobiles.
The persons who argue thus speak of mass production quantities but use
the mathematics of custom-built production methods. It is an elementary
Virtually all of the criticisms of the program have been anonymous—aircraft and automotive industry executives refusing, for some reason, to lend
their names to their printed views. The criticisms do not in any case run
against the feasibility of the program. By and large, they indicate either a
sad lack of imagination or an insistence by automotive interests to continue
with “business as usual.” However, since some misconceptions of the program have gained credence it is advisable to discuss and dispose of these
matters.
REQUIRED
REUTHER
This means that it would have required 4,400,000,000 man hours to produce
the 4,000,000 cars of the 1939 model. To carry the contention of our critics
Appendix V
REPLY TO OBJECTIONS
MAN-HOURS
A DAY—THE
hours required to custom-build a Chevrolet car by hand and then multiply this
figure by Chevrolet’s daily production and use that tremendous figure to prove
that Chevrolet could not possibly produce 6,000 cars a day. Custom-building
of an automobile, it has been estimated, requires 1,100 man hours of work.
example, stands 40 feet from the base to the top of the press and is large
enough to hold and operate a draw or flange die which itself weights from 70
to 80 tons. Such presses cost from $150,000 to $175,000 and it would require
years to get delivery of the number and type of such press equipment that
is now standing idle more than 50 percent of the time at the Cleveland Fisher
plant.
Present employment in the Fisher Cleveland press room reflects the extent
to which the presses are now idle. There are G00 men on the day shift, 300
on the afternoon shift, and 67 on the midnight shift.
In addition to Cleveland Fisher Body, every major body plant in the automobile industry has unused press room capacity which can, with the necessary
special dies, be adapted to plane production.
It has been wrongly assumed that the program contemplated the production
only of pursuit ships. Our reference to the possible production of 500 fighting
planes a day was used only to indicate the over-all productive capacity of an
automobile industry whose idle machines and idle men were fully mobilized
and whose private interests were temporarily subordinated. The productive
capacity we have indicated can as readily be adapted to the production of
medium-sized or heavy bombers. If these latter types are built rather than
pursuit ships, the daily production would be scaled down in proportion to the
increased amount of work required on each plane. Nevertheless, our program
could build many more bombers, large or small, than are now being built or
are contemplated, and in much shorter time.
PLANES
SPACE
REQUIRED
This mistake of thinking of mass production of planes in the mathematics
of custom-built hand production also raises the question of the practicality of
providing the neecssary floor space for assembly work. Another elementary
fact is that the number of days necessary to complete the production cycle
(in machining and fabricating industries such as autos and aircraft) is shortened in proportion to the extent that mass production technique is applied.
The shorter the production cycle the less floor space is needed. This is true
because the number of jobs in the process of production is held at a minimum.
If the Chevrolet Motor Company had to build 6,000 cars a day by the same
methods that are now being used to build planes, the total man power and
floor space of the entire automobile industry would not be adequate to turn
out its present production.
Our original report cited the availability of floor space—785,000 feet—at
the Hupmobile plant, in Detroit, for the assembling of motors. A further
striking example of available floor space is the Reo plant at Lansing, Michigan,
which has the following vacant space: Mt. Hope Avenue plant, 553,237 square
feet; Building No. 4800, 247,931
square feet; Building No. 4700,
104,247
square feet. In Reo’s main plant 500,000 square feet is fully equipped with
production machinery. Starting January 13, 1941, Reo will be producing five
motors per day in a plant that at one time produced 160 truck and 125 passenger cars in one eight-hour shift.
DIFFERENCES IN ENGINES
Doubts have been expressed on the adaptability of automobile production
machinery to production of aircraft motors because of the reduced weight of
aircraft motors. These doubts are without foundation.
16
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
The reduced weight of an aircraft motor per horsepower as compared with
automobile motors is secured firstly by the difference in the design of the
motor and secondly by the fact that all parts of an aircraft motor are reduced
to a minimum weight by removing all surplus metal. This is done by a process
of machining. The same basic machinery is used to machine parts for an
aircraft motor as for an automobile motor, excepting that a more complete and
precise machining job is done in the case of the aircraft motor. The available
machinery in the automobile industry can be retooled to turn out aircraft
motors of 1,000 or 2,000 horsepower of either the air-cooled or liquid-cooled
design.
The objection has also been raised that aircraft engines must be made in
more precise dimensions than automobile engines. As our program points
Out, more precise parts are obtained by more precise tooling.
SHORTAGE
OF
ARMAMENTS
Any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc., is not a legitimate
criticism of our plan. Such bottlenecks can be met if production of such
armament, instruments, etc., is spread over existing industries whose machine
capacities and production facilities are adaptable to such production. The
pooling of such productive capacity with central assembly plants using the
same approach we suggest for aircraft production will make it possible to
eliminate any possible bottlenecks in atmaments, instruments, etc.
SIMILARITY OF BASIC MACHINERY
In our program we state that basic machinery used for automobile production can be adapted for producing aircraft parts. We point out that precise and
difficult parts of the Allison engine are being made in the old Cadillac plant
in Detroit with machinery which duplicates existing unused automobile plant
machinery. These statements have been challenged in some quarters. Herewith is a list of machinery, newly constructed and installed in the Allison
division in Detroit, which duplicates existing automobile plant machinery:
Grinding machines: Cincinnati centerless, Exlo internal and external,
Bland, Norton, Landis, Blanchard, Brown
and Sharpe,
(Bryant)
and Held.
(These machines are used to produce the following parts which are common
to both aircraft and automobile motors: camshafts, crankshafts, bearings, con-
necting rods, wrist pins.) Milling machines: Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Sunstrand and Brown and Sharpe. Keller machines: Wickes lathes, Greenlee
lathes and Cincinnati lathes. Spline machines:
Sharpe. Hones: Exlo and Wickes.
PRESENT
USE
OF
Sunstrand, and Brown
FACILITIES
and
It is argued that the facilities of the automobile industry are already being
employed for production of aircraft parts. Our surveys indicate that not ten
percent of the available facilities are being brought into play for defense purposes. The present plans do not contemplate the coordination and full use of
facilities which alone can produce a large number of planes within a comparatively short period.
A
PROGRAM
UTILIZATION
FOR
MASS
FOR
Director,
Automobile
OF
THE
PRODUCTION
OF
DEFENSE
By Walter
Pe
Reuther
General
Workers
PLANES
Department,
Motors
of America,
INDUSTRY
AUTOMOBILE
CIO;
United
Member,
l
a
n
o
i
t
a
N
,
y
r
t
s
u
d
n
I
in
g
n
Committee on Traini
Defense Advisory Commission,
e
l
i
b
o
m
o
t
u
a
n
a
c
i
r
e
m
A
e
th
of
h
t
w
o
r
g
t
u
o
an
is
m
a
This progr
l
al
d
an
y
c
a
r
c
o
m
e
d
of
e
r
u
t
u
f
e
th
at
th
n
o
i
t
c
i
v
n
o
c
!
s
worker
y
d
e
e
p
s
e
th
n
o
p
u
t
n
e
d
n
e
p
e
d
e
ar
ar
de
d
l
o
h
e
l
p
o
e
p
r
ou
that
and
successful
T have
prosecution
the
discussed
Assistant
Secretary
of
general
of War
our
of
outlines
Robert
defense
national
the
Patterson,
programe
program
and
with
with
l
a
i
r
t
s
u
d
n
I
of
s
s
e
r
g
n
o
C
e
th
of
t
n
e
d
i
s
e
r
P
;
y
a
r
r
u
Philip M
l
a
n
o
i
t
a
N
e
th
f
o
r
e
b
m
e
m
,
n
a
m
l
l
i
H
y
e
n
d
i
S
;
s
n
Organizatio
t
n
e
d
i
s
e
r
P
,
s
a
m
o
h
T
J.
R.
d
an
;
n
o
i
s
s
i
m
m
o
C
y
r
o
s
i
Defense Adv
e
0
I
,
C
a
c
i
r
e
m
A
s
of
r
e
k
r
e
o
l
W
i
b
o
m
o
t
u
A
d
e
of the Unit
r
o
b
a
l
d
n
a
t
n
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m
n
r
e
v
o
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of
s
r
e
d
a
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s
e
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t
by
d
e
g
Upon being ur
y
l
h
g
i
h
of
r
e
b
m
u
n
a
h
t
i
w
d
e
t
l
u
s
n
o
c
I
,
y
e
v
r
u
s
to complete the
d
n
a
g
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j
,
s
r
e
k
a
m
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d
d
n
a
l
o
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t
,
s
r
e
e
n
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g
n
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g
skilled desi
s
r
a
e
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r
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f
d
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p
m
e
s
r
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k
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a
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r
e
t
t
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p
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fixture men, a
y
a
r
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u
M
,
s
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g
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r
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,
n
o
s
d
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,
d
r
a
k
c
a
P
,
r
e
l
s
y
r
h
C
,
s
r
o
t
by General Mo
t
n
i
o
j
d
n
a
y
l
l
a
u
d
i
v
i
d
n
I
,
s
e
i
n
a
p
m
o
c
e
l
i
b
o
Body and other autom
d
n
a
s
t
r
a
p
r
o
t
o
m
t
f
a
r
c
r
i
a
of
s
e
i
d
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t
s
d
n
a
h
t
s
r
i
f
ly we made
s
r
e
b
m
e
m
e
r
a
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e
m
e
s
e
h
t
of
l
l
A
.
s
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l
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m
e
s
s
a
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a
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s
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wing and
as
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e
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as
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e
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e
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a
n
a
m
by
d
e
z
i
n
g
o
c
e
r
e
r
a
d
n
a
O
of the UAW-CI
d
e
t
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b
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r
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v
a
h
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h
T
.
s
n
a
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c
e
t
r
e
t
s
a
m
as
n
by the unio
as
t
n
e
s
e
r
p
w
no
we
h
c
i
h
w
m
a
r
g
o
r
p
is
th
of
n
o
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t
a
l
to the formu
e
v
a
r
g
a
of
n
o
i
t
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l
o
s
e
th
d
r
a
w
o
t
n
o
i
t
u
b
i
r
t
n
o
c
part of labor's
national
United
probleme
Automobile
:
,
O
I
C
,
a
c
i
r
e
m
A
of
s
Worker
Michigan
Detroit,
WePeRe
281
West
Grand
Blvd.
England's
of
Eton.
be
won
In
The
The
This
would
and
private
and
men
idle
the
are
most
to
ability
interests
operating
is
in
of
months
planes
automotive
temporarily
if the
a day,
industry
that
idle
to
the
it
out
machines
mobilized
fully
were
subordinated
turn
to
preparation,
air-
of
production
opinion
indus-
the
of
potential
mass
potential
its
half
only
at
considered
our
is
[+
the
plants.
in automobile
unused
the
that
fighting
the
of
them
pro-
to
way
the
that
believe
industry
utilized
six
after
modern
of the most
500
planes.
possible,
be
be
men
and
and
engines
eraft
proposes
plan
in machines
try
today
industry
automotive
capacity.
of
line
need
our
on
depends
manufacture
to
is
quickly
planes
duce
automotive
the
in
workers
and
we
Axis
the
with
British
the
also
They
first
our
to
now
not
is
it
quickly.
out
them
turn
conflict
democracy
of
survival
the
and
planes,
a
future
machines
The
Britain.
in
defense
enough
supply
can
we
if
powers
tied
industrial
our
back,
its
machines
production
provided
task,
behind
to
men
no
send
need
we
that
believe
hand
one
with
battle
into
forced
any
of
capable
giant
productive
systema
can
think
speak
I
whom
for
workers
automotive
The
problem,
America's
a
become
has
victory
warfare,
mechanized
of
age
an
fields
Detroit.
of
lines
assembly
the
on
that
belief
the
in
forward
put
is
plan
This
were
said,
be
to
used
it
battles,
playing
the
on
won
MASS
FOR
INDUSTRY
LE
BI
MO
TO
AU
E
TH
OF
N
IO
AT
IZ
IL
UT
R
A PROGRAM FO
PRODUCTION OF DEFENSE PLANES.
needs
of
this |
emergency.
Time,
by
to
every
bombs
wait
moment
falling
until
new
of
upon
mass
it
precious,
London
and
production
its
the
periods
tragic
Midlands,
factories
for
will
ticked
not
aircraft
permit
and
off
us
aircraft
2~-program
F.
William
Mr.
on
It
schedule.
behind
rely
to
continue
construction
the
the
means
plants
of
plants
of
expansion
Expansion
utilizing
the
aircraft
existing
slow
costly
and
production.
made
custom
hand-tooled,
to
geared
industry
an
of
methods
plants.
new
of
and
plants,
aircraft
existing
of
expansion
the
on
be
to
continue
will
as
long
so
schedule
behind
percent
30
is
production
airplane
that
says
Knudsen
a crisis.
to
answer
Labor's
is
plan
This
solutions.
short-cut
we
swing
finally
engines
in
late
action
into
requires
lHmergency
1942.
18
n
a
h
t
s
s
e
l
in
n
o
i
t
a
r
e
p
o
o
t
n
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t
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p
d
n
a
t
l
i
u
b
e
b
t
o
n
n
a
c
s
t
n
a
l
p
New
New
and
for
concrete
wait
not
will
new
struct
new
of
new
their
until
war
plants
these
be met
cannot
equip
be
filled
them
the
with
Axis
The
with
new
machinery,
availacle
already
The
.
d
e
x
a
t
r
e
v
o
s
i
y
r
t
indus
normal
the
powers
finished.
machinery
duplicates
in
are
factories
must
the
pouring
and
ditches
factories.
engine
airplane
The machine
plants.
and
are
largely
digging
still
erected,
finally
machinery
in our automobile
emergency
companies
politely
when
plants,
this
months
other
and
Packard
the
18
In
months.
all
for
battle,
Britains's
bravery,
people's
her
time
required
necessary
to
production
con-
machSeer,
We
propose,
tools
instead of
do
requiret
manufacture.
adapt
building
existing
entirely
new
automotive
the
machines,
to
make
machinery
to
aircraft
j=
program
designe
special
No
4s
more
using
The
on
the
by
would
to
give
a few
of
percent
each
months
schedules,
duction
large
During
percent
of
evenly
of
this
automotive
its
the
reducing
portion
the
plants
spread
were
The
of
rest
shut
over
down
productive
of
ending
capacitys
to
the
last
at
more
than
80
and
then
only
for
August,
Dodge
would
it
automobiles,
manufacture
used
Nash
364
pro»
automobile
If
period,
reduced
on
operates
it
completely.
output
machinery
year
year
12-month
a
total
the
time.
short
capacity,
potential
maximum
a
operates
never
industry
year,
many
and
ible, without
a
plane
its
within
aoniene
Japan
potential capacity
unused
this
supremacy
automotive
the
present
90
world
us
Italy,
France,
production,
plane
to
Adapted
ed.
At
England,
of
capacity
Germanys
and
Russia
plant
motor
total
the
than
greater
are
report
Commission's
Trade
Federal
the
Industry,
Vehicle
Motor
the
in
given
figures
These
as
reserves,
plant
unused
is
Lt.
a yeate
cars
8,000,000
produce
4,000,000,
approximately
producing
shown
could
industry
automotive
and
degreé.
fullest
the
to
that
if
capacity
potential
operated
is not
whole
as a
industry
maximum
its
coordinated
properly
were
capacity
of
percent
50
than
mass
careful
A
planes.
of
production
industry
no
and
industry,
automotive
automobile
that the
show
survey will
the
to
adaptable
easily
as
American
the
of
capacity
tive
the
has
world
the
in
industry
produce
potential
unused
tremendous
IS UNUSED.
CAPACITY
POTENTIAL
INDUSTRY'S
AUTOMOBILE
OF
PERCENT
FIFTY
of
planes
and
bombers
large
the
construct
to
continue
would
which
output
the
replace
not
would
plan
proper,
Industry
Aircraft
the
of
to
be
convert
of
planes,
used
only
percente
poss»
17
4.mprogram
Chevrolet,
days,
than
of
an
of
123
obvious
The
Drop
Forge
all
produce
airplane
forge
to
the
motors
drop
sufficient
labor
If
world,
the
in
plant
operate
shops,
is
per
day,
forgings
this
including
and
for
shop
the
at
full
Buick
at
operated
full
is
Dodge
Chevrolet
capacity,
production
Chevrolet
the
the
cars
kind
it
could
500
shops;
with
Skilled
a years
available.
forge
of
its
company
Chevrolet
the
capacity
and
tremendous
shop of
forge
the
for
supply
1,000,000
is
plane
for
of
case
the
drop
largest
still
it
season,
facilities
in
shown
required
capacity
schedules.
production
were
shop
with
hour,
becomes
which
pros
the
unused
production
the
reserve
unused
the
forgings
drop
of
peak
again
Detroit,
this
per
90
of
of
pro-=-
is
time
per
an
With
hour.
a new
capacity
ors
otg
347imn
build
operating
automotive
Chevrolet
in
production
in
of
availability
an
reduced
of
months
the
during
only
operat~-
are
built
peak
line
motor
present
the
at
Chevrolet
lines
has
a plant
present
the
one
with
the
at
that
indicate
the
has
Chevrolet
that
with
at
hour.
per
motors
per
hour,
motors
4°70
of
capacity
actual
York,
is
Chevrolet
season
duction
New
which
would
This
hour,
an
motors
motors
complete
65
ducing
Tanawanda,
in
plant
motor
the
Chevrolet
1957,
Since
basis.
shift
two
a
on
ing
season,
remaining
three
the
while
idle,
completely
standing
At
hour,
per
motors
282
producing
is
plant
Flint
production
year's
this
of
peak
the
at
time,
and
machining
motor
complete
its
lines.
assembly
four
all
utilizing
season,
wseodiea tiie
1957
the
of
peak
the
at
hour
- per
Flint,
at
plant
Motor
rolet
motors
completed
380
produced
Michigan,
Chev»
main
The
capacity.
productive
potential
its
of
percent
50
last
the
during
cars
a million
over
out
less
used
yet
and
year,
model
turned
cars,
of motor
producer
single
the largest
working
111
in
Dodge,
days;
working
494
in
months
12
the
for
output
capacity,
maximum
at
working
Nash,
total
its
manufactured
have
could
other
are
also
5-program
at
working
to
facilities
the
Are
the
The
valves,
basic
seme
The
degree
These
fine
in
airplane
Graphic
Motors,
aviation
of
tools,
adapts
in
basic
to
fixtures
or
jigs
dies;
The
product,
the
the
a
of
of
engine
the
produce
mach»
basic
the
"tooling"
same
of the
the production
to
machinery
between
engines are
different
between
a difference
the same
enginée
proof
Many
it
most
the
of
engine
statement
this
of
are
being
in
for
assemblys
experience
still
of
in
General
and
manufactured
process
Motors
now
even
is
difficult
Cadillac
with retooled
Indianapolis,
The
make
to
order
process
much
certain
adding
by
differences
and
Chevrolet
the
of
basic
differences
are
there
as
engine,
engine
the
between
Cadillac.
the
ed
the airplane
and
automobile
lesser
both
to
common
partys
these
of
differences
are
there
True,
motorse
camshafts,
crankshafts,
manufacture
the
in
is utilized
machinery
Both
etCe
systemS,
ignition
sparkplugs,
essen~
engines,
exploding gas.
by
power
pistons,
carburetors,
cylinders,
motors contain
combustion
are
motor
generating
for
mechanism
same
the
tially
airplane
and
automobile
the
Both
ares
they
that
is
answer
adaptable
motors?
airplane
of
manufacture
MOTORS
MAKE PLANE
motors
automobile
in manufacturing
used
ADAPTED TO
BE
FACILITIES CAN
BUILDING
MOTOR
AUTOMOBILE
equipment
shop
schedules,)
production
and
(See
capacity.
than
less
far
for
appendix
being
precise
in
the
in
Cadillac
new
of
by
General
the
Allison
plant
Allison
in
Detroit;
plant
is
being
used
largely
Allison
parts
with
retooled
expansion,
making
parts
The
machinery,
of
supplied
{
6=program
machinery
Cadillac
-
and
mobile
engine.
precise
tooling.
equip
to
necessary
already
inery
autometive
is.
it
after
and
duplicated,
be
mache
production
basic
in the nation'ts
time
the
will
machinery
basic
This
factories.
of
kind
same
of
half
idle
standing
the
with
them
be
wiil
it
completed,
are
plants
motor
contemplated airplane
the
When
by
obtained
be
can
dimensions
auto-=
the
in
than
engine
plane
the
in
precise
more
these
But
finer
far
be
must
they
parts,
more
the
are
"Tolerances"
engine
of
size
in
variations
fractional
allowable
"tolerances".
of
bugaboo
the
of
dispose
also
should
ls,
too
l
cia
spe
the
uct
str
con
to
ary
ess
nec
be
ll
duplicated it will sti
dies,
of
facture
In
A few
inery.
a
small
otherwise
Certain
aircraft
screw
types
of
grinding
ines,
basic
types
lathes,
machines,
foundry
are
enginess
and
Fay
die
equipment,
this
way
a
These
various
machines,
types
machines,
welding
and
will
in six months.
both
and
automobile
shapers
gear
punch
presses,
broaching
milling machines,
machines,
forge
riveting
be
will
job that
cutters,
of
lapping
mach-
gear
include
presses,
drill
casting
build
shorte
to
engine
these
to
necessary
plane
but
In
placed
fixtures
necessary,
18 months can be done
bullards,
turret
lathes
the
machines
of
be
will
total equipment.
at least
machines,
machines,
of
part
take
machines
special
into
machinery
is
and
jigs
dies,
tools,
the
well
propose
We
industry.
tool
automotive
idle
convert
to
only
building
by
process
the
necessary
but
overloaded
already
thé
machine
may
burden
additional
An
programe.
defense
continue,
may
indications
serious
most
the
machinery,lies
basic
all
from
which
national
our
defeat
cut
of duplicating
lag,
This
delay.
on
engines.
plane
process
this
manue
the
to
machinery
this
adapt
to
required
fixtures
and
jigs
various
presses,
equipmente
various
types of
header
mach»
Vaprogram
unused
for stamping
now used
can
fuselage
automotive
of
A survey
capacity.
Striking
contains
it
is
pody
the
is
operating
production
but
in
at
is
Briggs
now
its
at
Cleveland
are
peak.
bodies,
for Fisher
adding
already
of
percent
40
but
3500,
further
the
largest
the
Body
n
i
s
m
o
o
r
s
s
e
r
p
for Chevrolet
stampings
Michigan,
and
of
one
st employs
ment
example
the
Fisher
the
of
to body
Fisher
has
in
plant
although
9200
employing
automobile
all
made
employese
t
n
a
l
p
w
e
n
a
t
l
i
bu
(See
present
At
plant
this
1936-37
capacity.
Today
,
s
d
i
p
a
R
d
n
a
r
G
at
appendix
for
equip-=
plante)
stamping
wing
50
which
Cleveland,
the industrye
capacity,
In
a
show
pressroomse
their
in
capacity
unused
overall
percent
Body,
Murray
the
and
Briggs
full
to
plants
Body
Fisher
for
equipment
used
being
not
also
are
parts
metal
stamping
and
pressing
body
large
the
their
that
show
will
nts
pla
manufacture
bomberse
large
for
fuselages
and
wings
the
of
parts
the
at
industry
Mr.
of
suggestion
to
Knudsen
the
by
made
being
plans
tentative
the
by
provided
is
this
of
Proof
planes
the
of
and
wings
the
up
which make
parts
the
out
stamping
to
adapted
be
for
parts
out
which
automobile
the
of
body
the
equipment
stamping
metal
have
plants
parts
the
and
plants
body
large
the
for
capacity
wings
the
of
production
The
fusclagee
and
parts
for
Douglas
bombers e
8=program
INDUSTRY
AUTOMOBILE
THE
IN
AVAILABLE
LABOR
PRODUCTION
AND
SKILLED
ROO
ns
AA
A
NR
OEE
makers,
pattern
in
employed
industry's
the
ery
of
crew
skeleton
of
Many
to
addition
have
men who
die
short
work
combed
tool
and
the
year
out
die
are
men
only
employed
those
and
be
remainder
the
on
who
permanently
in
the
of production
works
work
there
time,
gone
and
are
the
tool
and
into
die
makers
six months
approximately
5,000
some
23900
jobs.
production
weeke
working on
those
are
at
production
industry.
departments
laid
SeCasone
die
than
industry;
auto
unemployed,
are
part
tool
short
a
tooling
less
are
are
10,000
next
machine-tending
ordinary
to
the
in
unemployed
of
a
only
maintenance
the
averaged
there
time
present
the
half
10,000,
than
more
transferred
been
have
or
makers
die
and
years
five
At
yeare
per
tool
In
industry,
the
work
past
the
During
than
more
for
needed
is
labor
their
until
entirely
off
in
ordinary
to
shifted
while
jobs
production
than
more
machin~
old
craftsmen
skilled
thousand
four
or
Three
toolinge
and duplicate
for
retained
are
oraftamen
skilled
these
few
a
for
completed,
is
program
inoatng
the
When
models.
ew
the
to
the
complete
to
months
cf
thousands
the
adapt
to
worl
tooling
necessary
speed
top
at
work
craftsmen
skilled
most
year
Each
production.
than
seasonal
more
even
is
Tooling
the
at
programe
tooling
its
of
peak
are
craftsmen
allied
and
designers,
and
industry
auto
the
die
men,
fixture
and
jig
workers,
the
in
labor
skilled
of
production,
plane
to
machinery
to
required
dies
and
tools
reservoir
and
tool
CO ONL
AACS NIE. ee
Ne Bi
Nt
a as lac aa
the
automotive
largest
draftsmen
Nice tate
ty Aman
out
turn
of
25,000
than
More
world,
Nl ae:
to
the
has
industry
auto
The
a
Nias
te
types
cnpsour
these
adapt
ihe «et lle
is necessary
labor
“c4lled
Sei
ee
=
EOI
et
AO
eat
ase alltedh eimai
gia gamit
and
least
jobs
These
made
production
2,000
because
mechanics
available
tool
and
of
the
could
again
for
9-program
outlined,
here
new
to
tool
The
Die
and
Association,
tool
1,500
employ
75
some
are
there
capacity
at
die
and
tool
productione
In
addition
and
are
These
all
skilled
the
time
tool
"captive"
as
men
in
the
body
auto,
and
die
industry
entire
and
tool
large
there
are
parts
plants
proper,
shops.
These
great
were
employed
on
"captive"
a
fw.
basiSe
A typical
shops
known
the
within
departments
die
enterprises,
independent
these
the
which
shops
\
to
in
shops
these
to
addition
additional
workers
and die
employ
In
capacity.
full
at
operated
when
Association
Manufacturers
Tool
workers
die
and
tool
7,000
and
die
and
tool
area affiliated with the Automotive
in the Detroit
sobbing shops
90
The
idle,
partially
tool
the
like
industry,
product-
basise
production
a mass
on
automotive
the
are
themselves,
workers
die
dies,
available
the
for
fixtures
and
jigs
six
for
made
be
could
mechanics
skilled
ship
of
shops
die
and
auto
intro-
the
delayed
be
could
industry
will
it
if
However,
the
If
way.
models,
new
for
workers,
die
and
pursuit
metal
all
an
of
fon
plans
tools,
necessary
the
build
ahead
with
15,000
to
12,000
from
months,
under
work
the
in
models
new
of
duction
likewise
die
tool
unemployed
these
absorb
goes
industry
automobile
also
on
working
is
Chrysler
is
some
which
for
models,
design,
body
a new
for
models
wood
is now working
a division of General Motors,
Body Corporation,
Fisher
on
necessary
the
do
to
available
program
production
plane
the
for
tooling
are
workers
die
and
tool
7,500
of
skills
valuable
and
specialized
we
in machines,
as
in manpower,
Thus
highly
the
capacity;
unused
have
is
example
that
of
the
of Fisher
tremendous
Body
Noe
2d
unused
at
capacity
Detroit.
of
This
these
captive
the
largest
is
10-program
and
ing
bucks
and
fixtures,
in
the
General
plants
at
(December
13,
and
even
these
are in
There
engineers,
required
tooling
skilled
Just
as
is
no
shortage
there
is
no
there
program,
workers
unemployed
in
in
propose
propose
and
tools
Designing
production,
between
unemployed
in
new
these
dies
automobile
highly
necessary
IN
on
WPA,
not
production
to
areas
Despite
labor,
of 100,000
is a minimum
speak
of
who
would
automobile
the
the
automobile
former
the
ine
thousands
welcome
an
young
of
opportunity
OPERATION
that
the
this
President
of
the
United
States
an
appoint
aviation
government,
of nine members,
three
representing
the
and
three
representing
labor.
We
organize
and
representing
that
unskilled
of
in
production,
plane
production board
three
or
labor
skilled
of
shortage
there
automobile
THE PROGRAM
We
of
supply
new
the
designing
2,100
men,
defense
work
delay
months
itself.
repeats
about
largely
are
ample
an
for
to plane
workers,
a six
too,
area
needed
be
machinery
die
situation
same
designs
who
engineer
the
is
metropolitan
would
available
make
so
to
and
week,
worker
the
too,
and
Here,
seasons.
dustry,
people
die
automotive
like tool
would
models
and
work
makers;
die
and
tool
175
only
time
present
the
At
season,
and
tool
1,400
employed
tooling
the
peak of
the
at
23
employs
reduced
drawings
to adapt
No,
a
Here,
Detroit
the
Their
engineers,
on
tool
dies,
and
tools
the
are
the
as
important
As
few
Plant
plant
this
1940)
makers
tooling
the
of
peak
the
die makers
Body
Fisher
1940
In
program.
die
and
tool
4,800
employed
23
No.
Plant
Body
Fisher
1931
In
Corporation,
Motors
Body
Fisher
all
for
special machinery
and
weld-«
dies,
metal
sheet
the
builds
It
world.
the
in
shop
die
tool
management
board
be
given
full
y
authoritto
super=
Lleprogram
industry.
parts
of
survey
which it
is
to
has
cope
contrasted
production
their
Power
or
to
board
necessary
designing
with
the
results
or
one
but
into the
unused
capa-~
best
adap-
is
capacity
be
of
the
all
tooling.
and
design
each
if
obtained
wide~
as
it
spreading
a hundred
half
build
must
who
manufacturer
has
method
this
plane,
their
dumps
which
one
of
lap
with
will
problems
method,
present
fuselage
to
eye
an
with
two
and
unused
that
quicker
much
accordance
among
wings
divi-
of
advantages
labor.
of
The
out
with
with
engine
entire
sion
be
problems
technical
parcelled
for
possible,
as
plant
to
is
Work
ted,
work to
which
of
kind
the
and
city
in
plants
automotive
different
the
of
parts
various
the
engine,
the
parts
tituent
cons
its
into
production
the
of
a blueprint
down
break
to
be
would
mass
for
and
plant,
of each
capacity
the
utilizede
being
board
the
of
chosen
allocate
and
an
to
plane
of
type
As
industry
task
next
The
ly
the
to determine
extent
the
engineers
tooling
and
fon
a plant-by-piant
make
to
them
assign
and
product-
of
staff
a
organize
to
be
would
board
the
of
task
first
The
production
mass
the
vise
automotive
and
automobile
the
s
airplanein
of
capacity
appoint
among
and
power
have
should
the
their
various
tool
specialized
for
inspectors
to
each
plant
allocate
die
and
and
tooling
the
shops in
accordance
qualifications.
in
accordance
with
its
part
e
er
th
d
an
d
ar
bo
on
ti
uc
od
pr
e
th
n
ve
gi
be
ld
ou
sh
an
pl
l
ra
ne
ge
e
th
in
shoulda
be
close
of
inspection
each
part
manufactured
before
its
re~
leases
We
propose
which
all
the
establishment
completed
parts
of
shall
a
be
central
shipped
motor
after
assembly
they
plant
pass
to
inspections
L2—program
The
and
is
assembly
a
with
ines
and
basis
and
wings
floors
plant
also
is
Since
single
in
its
107
Noe
in Building
Murray
This
has
sections
of
modern
storage.
and
for
to
Douglas
floor
This
has
now
been
is
Briggs
Highland
Murray
Body
is
Murray
square
20,000
spaces
could
stamp
the
but
bombers,
$n
be
the
metal
Murray
turned
to
parts
plant
the
is
and
which
uses
of
floor
space
available
the
200,000
this
a
in Building
for
is
producing
feet
assemble
still
Park
Corporation
of
feet
available
feet
there
not
Detroit,
America.
in
square
500,000
1,
Noe
Plant
in
25
No.
corporation
making
Several
Michigane )
d
e
d
e
e
n
be
y
l
b
a
b
o
r
p
l
space wil
available
obtained
work
are 254,575 square
‘There
in Murray
121
space
the
contract,
body
Ford
body.
automobile
Building
129,
of
loss
the
plant.
body
largest
third
the
Detroit,
floor
idle
of
example
Outstanding
in
old
the
at
and
Park
Highland
Ford
De-
the
at
available
space
floor
21,
Plant
Body
Fisher
the
at
available
also
are
there
and
Fisher
to
transferred
No.
Flint,
1 at
No.
Plant
Body
long
one block
Body Plant
(This
Buick.
for
bodies
made
formerly
at Fisher
for
space
floor
unused
the
of
assembly
and
of a building
floors
available
are
and a half block wide
which
there
is ample
Six complete
new assembly lines.
troit,
too
here
and
fuselage,
the
manufacture
to
applied
be
can
methods
Similar
with
accordance
in
other plants
plan.
production
general
the
in
be placed
could
building
the
in
now
machinery
unused
the
be
could
plant
The
a day.
shift
7% hour
on a three
operated
eng-=
aircraft
complete
500
of
capacity
production
total
daily
large
is
plant
The
plant.
lines
assembly
five
for
enough
motor
a central
for
government
the
by
leased
be
idle )
completely
last
cars
371
only
produced
which
time
present
the
at
which
and
year,
plant
(a
Detroit
in
plant
Hupmobile
the
that
suggest
We
machines.
floor
unused
has
industry
automotive
men
unused
has
it
as
space
now
contract
wing
the
feet
being
Nos
more
used
production
for
programe
—
13-program
Similar
storage,
A
assembly
final
and
wings
staffs
assembly
the
tecting
The
production
the "bugs"
This
The
of
(technical
not
is
Our
offers
the
the
open
to
plants
the
airport.
the
at
problem not
in
for
a
problems
serious
requirements
of
in
workers
quick
the
first
the
as
training
production
costly
that
believe
and
of
must
and
few
and
the
for
pros
cimmcale
pére
as
always
assembly)
thousand
in
be
are
mass
run
before
worked
planes
will
the
only
shipse
this
planes.
lengthy
100
planes
of
jobs
of machining
since
of
core
skill
car
motor
our
meet
not
will
thousand
few
of
basis
placed
guaranteed.
production
mass
be
Provisions
plan.
be
must
produced
planes
industry
hope
men
these
of
automobiles
of
automotive
which
this
engines,
from
the
as
used
be
this
under
developed
thousand
than meet
more
be
men
picked
these
requirements,
formance
out.
te
seniority
few
first
that
in
staffs
assembly
various
the
from
and
plants,
body
in
the
upon
selected
carefully
men
of
control
the
experience
and
hangars
assemblies
final
the
and
assemblies
sub
the
that
suggest
under
For
airport.
Cleveland
We
assembling
assemblies
final
for
erected
be
could
hangars
Flat
Similar
the
and
hangars
these
Addie
plane.
flown
be
could
planes
completed
bodies.
subeassembly
the
from
trucked
be
This
‘Coanksteed
BIB port.
County
fuselage would
Plat
cheap
of
lines,
of
job
the
for
area.
Cleveland
completed
ee
tke
construction
the
Wayne
the
around
space
fuselage
suggest
we
purpose
and
wings
engine,
the
plant
assembly
needed for
be
also
would
used
being
now
for Chevrolet
the
in
The
Cleveland,
in
are
for
stampings
available
also
is
space
floor
tional
available
all metal
time made
at one
plant
building
this
of
be made
easily
could
and
floors
plant
Body
Fisher
the
at
fifth
and
fourth
third,
situation
the
is
work
plan
is
solution
It
seeks
of
erecting
entire
one
14-progran
By
the
dividing
planning,
intelligent
of
recognition
The
merit
of
methods
Normal
whole-hearted
its
offers
Labor
its
our
rights
plan
can
is
build
the
moments
need
pass
for
away
planes
as
may come with further
wpr emw
uopwa
cio
we
of
its
established
time,
and
time
and maintenance
it
that
the
all
saves
planes
we
need
=
if
asks
is
administration,
and
policy
of
labor
that
All
cooperation.
in matters
a voice
1s
we
our
wait
standards.
probleme.
until
ef
li
be
e
th
in
d
ar
rw
fo
t
pu
is
an
pl
This
1948 and 1943 to get theme
that
considerations
selfish
these
forward
put
their
average
the
Kanter
we
But
production
crisis.
of
time
a
not
would
executive
management
at
production
a mass
on
production
basis,
aircraft
putting
by
planes
of
the cost
cut
inevitably
would
that
program
look
may
companies
Aviation
plantse
a
on
misgiving
with
and
engines
new
entire
finances
&-
prefer
may
They
managements.
this
fears
the
foresee
can
we
work,
some
of
government
the
method whereby
in
the
part
the
on
arouse
may
a
in
manufacturer
each
to
profit
fair
of
his share
with
accordance
plan
payment
propose
we
Though
on
to bear
brought
is
of minds
number
involvede
problems.
production
the
possible
greatest
the
manufacturers,
many
among
parts
space.
floor
and
skills
machines,
power,
efficient
the
in
but
plants
new
mane
idle
existing
of
organization
is
immediate,
delay.
delay.
We
dare
and
not
terrifying.
invite
the
Precious
disaster
that
APPENDIX
I
.
NUMBER OF CARS AND TRUCKS PRODUCED IN UNITED STATES
AND CANADA FROM SEPTEMBER 1936 through AUGUST 1937
AND FROM SEPTEMBER 1989 through AUGUST 1940,
Chevrolet
Oldsmobile
Buick
Cadillac-LaSalle
General Motors Truck
Plymouth
Dodge
~Dasovo
Chrysler
Ford-Mercury
Lincoln
Graham
Hudson-Terraplane
Hupmobile
Nashe-Lafayette
Packard
Studebaker
Willys
“GRAND
“Grand
eous
which
Source:
CONE
A
iO
Note:
total
199,569
2203214
45,668
56,410
052 5,610
378,510
81,590
103,210
1,279,005
0258035
216067
125,207
500
86,695
121,501
104,931
196,752
2915021
58,052
O23275
412,545
504,455
69,66@
83,680
913,900
223681
2504'7
97,652
ete
Opes
90,674
114,682
Ward!s
624900
TOTAL=-5, 068,803
4.5228, '706
1,906,588
1 tg (20
Leese 10
4 $354,204
1,846,815
— 869,980
936,581
59655,576
Ma
Canadian
total
listed
not
LY OI
:
OE
L
OLDE
St LEGA
eat
Automotive
el
Leg tet
65,502
Aa
NN
ee
RB
NN a
OI
production
production,
production
ck
Truck,
of
Reo
Diamond
Truck,
T Truck,
and
Stutz
miscellan=
Reports
AA AN
EI
LT
OTE,
represents
approximately
4%
of
.
Federal
separately.
ON A
AUG,!40
Dek 475
14,0355
Harvester,
are
thru
!39
1,044,100
includes
also
SEPT,
1,149,662
General Motors
Chrysler
Ford
“Bie 3"
Int!
Truck,
2
|
White-Indiana
'37
AUG.
255,065
,
Pontiac
Total
Total
Total
Total
!36
SEPT,
COMPANY
OF
NAME
thru
the
:
SPPENDIX
Iiflt
IN THE
PACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR PLANE PRODUCTION
CHEVROIET FORGE PLANT, DETROIT.
NUMBER
MACHINES
OF
oY
-
Le
9
&
L5
dnb
5
in
operate
In
to0U
Loe.
@80C0
1085
5000
12,000
1000
i).
5000
forge plants,
which
Lbs.
lbse
lbs.
es
lbs.
at
such
have
as
and
the
this
Skilled
Forge
Buick
considerable
If
the
supply
still
for
a
could
the
for
and
above
the
alone
required
hammermen are
production
Chevrolet
1,000,000
Chevrolet
available
to
capacity.
full
at
(Hydraulic)
(Hydraulic)
plant
forgings
sufficient
hammers
Press
Press
are available.
day,
Chevrolet
the
Hammer
Hammer
Hammers
Hammers
Hammers
Hammer
forgings
drop
year,
forge
Steam
Steam
Board
Board
Board
capacity,
per
with
Hammer
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Board Hammers
and Presses, numerous large
presses
full
Hammer
Steam
Forge
Forge
ton
ton
engines
coming
to
Steam
Steam
necessary
the
these
addition
ete,
used
Company
the
MACHINES
©
LOS.
(Header)
is
OF
TYPE
. 7000 ton
1600 ton
L500 lbs,
the above Hammers
airplane
Motor Car
cars
were
all
500
AVAILABLE
OF
2000
upsetting
produce
of
to
addition
equipment
EQUIPMENT
SIZE
250
950
2
1
small
capacitye
MACHINES
19
2
S
io
In
of
60%
approximately
at
operating
program,
production
plant
the
of
peak
the
is
which
time,
present
the
t
equipmenin
following
The
ne
at
plant
Forge
Drop
Chevrolet
)
plant,
Forge
unused
there
plant,
are
Dodge
capacity o
many
Truck
other
and
Forge,
Iiitl
APPENDIX.
IN
E
L
B
A
L
I
A
V
A
S
E
I
T
I
FACIL
METAL SECTIONS
The
are
time,
present
the
at
production
body
capacity.
of
50 percent
than
less
at
operating
season,
of
peak
the
is
which
the
plant
Body
Fisher
Cleveland
the
in
presses
stamping
following
STAMPING
R
O
F
Y
R
T
S
U
D
N
I
E
L
I
B
O
M
O
AUT
FOR WINGS AND FUSELAGE.
Available Equipment
of Machines
No,
74,
LZ.
26
small
realize
must
one
and
A
presses.
base
to
draw
9
Fisher
plant,
extent
day
in
employment
to
which
shift,
300
presses
the
on
Fisher
the
the
are
afternoon
enough
to
hold
70
to
80
from
weighs
it
and
Cleveland.
now
idle,
tho
from
operate
and
such
tonse
require
would
such
of
to
years
the
reflects
press
room
There
are
600
on
the
midnight
67
and
shift,
feet
40
cost,
their
delivery
stands
large
175,000
to
$150,000
from
cost
which
die
flange
or
itself
get
to
plant
example,
is
and
press
the
of
top
the
for
press;
Toggle
big
presses
Present
would
4t
the time
a new
require
of equipment,
list
presses,
these
of
size
tremendous
the
above
the
of
presseSe
stamping
and
blanking
significance
full
the
appreciate
crank presses
presses
Single Crank presses
Double
Toggle
No, 78
Numerous
To
of Machines
Tyoe
men
on
the-
shift.
ad
In
addition
automobile
the
to
Cleveland
industry
necessary
has
special
Fisher
unused
dies,
be
Body,
press
every
room
adapted
to
body
major
capacity
plane
plant
which
can,
productione
in
the
with
oe
tH
S
a
a
=
Py
—
|
production
NAME OF PLANT:
Present
of
- eomplete motors per houre
months t¢
=
cal
2-wonths Bota
through
to build
50
8
)
weeks
production
:
:
production
HiGoths ghest past production of
completed motors per hour.
7
1939,
needed
total
1940.
from Sept.,
days
fugust,
Work
12 months
per
day.
on basis of two 8-hour
shifts per day at peak
production.
shifts
Total output at peak
city on basis:
of twaoe
capawae
hour
‘
in yeare
Possible increased output
over year ending August,
Fior
o
s|
eop
on
ti
uc
od
Pr
ef
from Sept.39-fug.40l
:
4
ct
ai
Oo
Ps
SP
Ser pee
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©
C
Gi
SH
A ER NE
eae
daye
hr,
13
of
basis
On
Notes
“%
1940,
Percentage
Go
acity used
|
won
battle
the
to
accustomed
facul ty
for
translating
harmonious
There
relations
labor
thpee
were
with
basic
gee production
and
men-power
defense
materials
of
of
the
productiog,
td
with managemenan
enterprise.
or
the
the
ot ve
entire
industry
Whti OMe ‘
and
govérfiment
of
plant.
had
become
foresight
and
a
had
executing
for
same
in
elements
of
group
spegific
for
was
a
union, “euther
into
industrialists
mightiest
nation's
strategistH.e
it
need
the
workers
auto
the
of
role
the
whether
porgrams,
of
councils
top
the
in enry
mekers
d ie
Rouge
River
vast
Ford's
and
of
charge
in
already
was
he
22
of
of tool
trade
the
of
mastery
his
die
skilled
sixty
of
the,
of
knowledge
technical
His
production,
the age
at
ma ke ry
war,
from
came
industry
In
our
was
Hitler
would
victory
that
and
whic
nations
the
to
go
a
strike
out
working
BT .ss
people/
industry
of
pooling
a
plan:
Reuther's
automobile
into
the
acainst
the
4 single,
voice
for
in the directionolt
to
plants,
machinery
co-ordinated
labor /
jointly
such a collassal
.
oie
Conversion
of
|
tools
and
These
industry
industry
the
dies,
jigs
and
mm
fixtures
achieved
by desigins
existing
basic
idea
any
ee
to
was
to pe
was
of
would
thus
for
the
job
out
his
plan
seemed
Qa
mm
the
oi
a drayvatic
tam
a
building
12,000
the
new
of aircraft
most
vital
ne eff of
campaigner
apprfach
to
eade
‘42 models
making
for
public
the
new
and
skilled/mechanics
J
15,000
to
tools
terms
»
machinery.
4
in
a seasoned
we
free
new
my
xX
well
:
AN
and
dies.
production
/Keuther
planes
because
denocracies-at-war
rene.
©
he
reslized
Spve rumen ta 1
spelled
the
ain
/recouse,
need
attention.
for
‘Before
he
was
ready
with
the
details,
but
f
as
took
the
a
project
. 3
up
informally
Hillman,
He
tem# discussed
of OPM.
Hillman
UAW
plan
man.
president
industry
and
the
reflect
plan
his per puer,
automobile
its
appea
i
a 6
verdict
from
the
ihe
the
Cus
of
again.
ob
~~
its
in
UAW;
to
the
move
that
lobo
to
position
was
they
not
a new
official
an
to
at
specialists
called
be
might
automobile
phenomenon
—
shop
hd
chairmen
pons ved
andjlocal
into
union
“eather
on
the
hee
problems.
Ben
officers
office
~ Tool end
sulted
to
rae
“
aoU Keke.
@,
ow
views.
ways
fact,
Sent
said.
the
industry
f)
industry
General* “otors
of
in a better
be
could
obviously,
get
Sidney
That was in the
eee
ro
eee
reported
Mr. Knudsen's
can't
former
the
fast,"
"We
it with
with
as
The
,
#
principles
his basic
of the soundnessof
oonSido ny
already
ene
began
data
making
on production
¥
die
Blackwood,
makers
were
one of
GM'
con-
~3felt
By
November
of
1940
they
a
classrmom
at
Cass
Technical
on
themselves
sure
gr ound.
about
twenty-five
unofficial
in
the
production
et
Ga Sik
an
group,
~
were
convened
nie
There
“euther
Detroit's
Ta Patni
council,
side,
on
*
West
Sehool
ve
erimy
High
ieee
In
AL
Se aon
nights.
and his
recommandations.
;
‘
teen decal
utl ined ‘the
a
vecegsed
n
room
adjacent
Th
difficulties.
what
"Well,
“suther
"we
put
_———
| sen
should
motors
airplane
the
Manche or Us oe
planes
eguli
if
they
Saw
the
in
all-night
lhe qd
presented
no
in surmoun vad?
room.
class
de AT
Can'we
in ~Qijm
mounted
in ‘pro. ress.
Meise
think?
in
valleys
where
tuilding
school
Ye-convened
you
do
the
ac
idle
it
of
seminar
y ere
cen %
Robls Royce and
‘\)if
Or a
training
vocational
high
the
of
much
peaks and
the
of
The
inspect
to
adjourned
machinery,
nnemtmmme~“£Z£aaais
nenthe,
seven
least
at
|
could turn
indu acne
ta
icoek
he
time because
the
part.of
ig: dee tee.
"
re
hes
take
Which,
je
ta ges
a large
suai
of his
results
the
reported
“euther
Hudsin and Paxkerd.
Ford,
Chrysler,
GM,
of
the shops
in
years
for
labored
had
men who
die makers,
tool and
engineers,
apsignine
proposition.
help
the
bosses
run
their
plants
more De
oe
paper.
idle
Reuther
He
spent
carefully
machime
capacity
the
next
few
documented
in the
weeks
his
plants
putting
claim
e
|
of
that
the
the
plan
there v was
industry.
down
in
tremendous
Bere
acain
he
the
as
industry
auto
entire
HeTe , <qontmminttemerime
Laboratory.
their
the
using
experts,
oduct ion
tumed p
shops
the
in
men
wi
had
e.,
Fordinen
and
on
draw
inde’ onee
t he
story
The
isPes,
it
stage;
of
a
and
Reuther
plan
|
a dismal
oe
'®
Immensely
the
A
press.,,.qgsiiity
who,
government
V ‘Forma
Krier”
songs it
president
Murray,
of the
the light
saw
as
from
es
Philip
of day,when
of Industria
Congress
in
ee O. ,
tie
te
naaethe
of
acourag ims
Neuther
peeve
bs
men
few
a
oa
S@edddpOrdelactlaas
men.
part
larger
th-
of
tind>
n
k
w
i
c
e
f
re
- Ure Wize ions,
|
before
the
for
Mr,
table
the-2
its cons tructive
Knudsen
with
omobile
got
industr
|
Ossing
ofM.
attitude,
around
Reuther and
The
to
some
was
discussing
of
cet
his
thx
the
labora
program
colleagues.
oh
named
deci
Bha—-CHC-&
LF 6FaTt—_iHGus
plan,
ticet -xsetien.—__———_
however
7
See ames
worthy
its~i
~
a
hondeddouwn
t,
public
months
accross
Meamwhile
“Sx
had
2HYLISOX
President ,
Several
was
& Ue
(Wty
franck
end B,J. Thewas, head of the UAW-C10, fowartea it to Sim
bouguet
,
eS obstruction,
dollar-a-year
of
and
Rout
its
Tiri ee
OP. 's
ae
ee
was
encouraging
rh
Nashinston
the
wots
soak a and
kn
ade
but seem
‘A
dir.
including
them,
die shops
moves to
now
the
lines
e
allyvof
of
abserienees
Siadusupeonnioniiodion. the
ies;
corporat
hurle
could
ther
capacit
and
plents
own
its
the
e e UAW
but
ae
cer ta fn)
GM
advantag
an
i
Ae
Soman
1
the
an
imprac-
Cfo,
proposal,
aired
They
Charles
Post 1
@isated
tion
was
the j—
A
making
industry
be
woul’
out
speed
/ the
Jes
ce
-
bege on
industry
Aey
"for
The
was
airplane
the
gong
when
the
but
Many
somewhat
mafm
Ss
preident,
LrrmeheR
was
space) to make
2 plane
—
rec ‘uired
of
This
course
the
take
to
His, technique
by
how
ae
it
GonofeU0
faggeek in
more
A
to
was
was
not
vigorous
its
aircreft
are
'making
the
ett
industry's
prospect
the
that
production
mass
through
okeove- kor
ewem critic
-
its
of the
plan.
pPre-dXy
AXiers20
.
trick and
into
that
reported
it
the amount of the plantand
y them by 500 a day.
iar
figures
a neat
Perhaps
criticism.
the
Commerce,
of man-hours,
Yume
it
field
e
L
x
,
7
the
we
turned
hp
when
why
Om
.hand—buiit
venture
of
Chamber
the most
t ha
:
proposing
labor
for
or
astronomizal
produced
was
number
custom
a
ae
ne
Jouett Soman
John H,
ol.
Aeronautical
the
rate,
q Fsack
:
1940,
2h,
Dec.
of
nal
Mr
J
the “Wall Street
0
at
pleesed
partifularly
not
are
airraft shares
tholders of
—~
‘
or
wf
ga
es
ti
li
ci
fa
s
it
of
me
so
may use
automobile industry
planes."
tapk,
no
automobile
while
time,
4
materiel
of
amount
explained
of
rang
Cot ak
aidx blinding."
TS D,
Ran T
T
industry
When
a long
:
ready."
most
the
sgutomotive
eminent
‘nine
that
it
giving
plan without
ts Kh Fe
Wipers,"
Windshield
are Not
aamitte
anything
be
to
going
is
Corpora-
dif jerent
be
he added,
but,
"staggering,"
Research
of war meterials
production
mass
into
got
are
0m Kgla
tar
‘A.
Vener al “tors
different,"
in existence." [roaring
wes
plant
ust
the plant
"so
asserted,
engineer
ttanks
mention.
direct
of
Evening
“euther
the
belittle
effort tf
Bhis
of
theme
the
,eturday
"Guns
industry.
the
with
for patience
the
of
president
Kettering,
F.
fe
article‘ wiblished—by
well-timed
, suspiciously
tions.
through
largely
skepticism
their
publica-
trade
articles’ in
inspired
Ss
(The labor proposal, sewmd
enabled be~ Quroneft Cadrenty
serret—the~sussese-—ofthe
of
management. fiemerer,
te; What
ed
A
Reuther was
but
rather
Ys
in
automobile
fewer
had
industry's
workers,
less
done was to
of custog—-built
inspired
that
could
ten
"as cue
in.
per
of
again
unnamed,
(aY=3«Wa
faim
C
to
1942,
found
a
SCOT
it
was
Verve
the
Tor
to
take
=
noe
merits
Col.
Jouett ¢ircula
/
now
d¢finitely
machinery
in
f
that
theft plan
mT
ses
socticonce tog
)
ry
:
for
granted
BS
:
/
repudiated,
the autoneiple
i
Bez,
een
plan
had
reluctantly
mwn/as impractical.
wurne
2
=
)
quoted O° ata
ST
therafter,
the
plants,
1K
——
Seer
"
a year
that
hac
ted they
prductyon.
On January kst<m
ae
Te
rie
ate
Oh
lal db aanhongeteebats
until
been
el
pntiaiee:
thoroughly
SAITO
me
tes
o
January,
b,’otM
aint
tp oc
«
and
responsible
newspapermen took—the—Lroeubte
0-<e.
et
to
)
d
e
o
d
e
p
e
r
o
l
t
a
y
s
e
D
d
y
h
o
a
l
w
p
h
l
e
o
a
th
t
n
pr
u
i
b
f
gave
N pts.
The ge
neoyOinted Cirectly
to one of the most PYO Sent of
lmmt to the government
of the OP 's inspired
=
oe
primed
a
.
saxina
aie
ds
z=mnaxetiemey
3
SET
it
might
of
dis saussed
the
program
ae
aon
What
Col.
aircraft
More
:
Air
HOTT
for
Faas
Ths61s620n6
the
t
°soo
Nera
4 yeer men
appearance
$ied—peims
of
"
rest
basic
for
space.
mea
quantit]
es in the mathematics
industry,
expsting
the effect
taken
locate the an
AY,
up Srcntermare
Hall
the
production
steb at Ce, nelfpepoen
Yy “inst
wanting.
the dollar
Following
atttomobile
e
oa
SRORPTOUS
the
Mass
plant
For the
the 4ssocisfed ‘ress.
tl ot ee ae
AG
less
production
by fre-tooling,
The most effective
was
\
cent, of
converted,
b
far
o* mass
cK ped
co
be
and
methods.
production methods.
contention
oply
production
man-hours
speak
a
mass
the
program
hed
to
be
LUS
be
by ingest y
ory
aoe
<
soi
ae
Sua Lelie),
es
ager
ris
FOP
ee
and
feuth er
perhaps
agreed
helpful
to
cancelled,
Legs Step foatein hthClehn ns
eee
a
errnm
ey,
be
reset!
Soree
e
e n
ont.
interestine
publicly.
bub—tt—coutenet-
it
aL
Town
bo
speak pet
ve
the
conc—of_themthen—in—corernment,
Securities
Cammission,
Cosmus
There
capitol's
in the
H,
John
Ve
and “xchange
Carmody,
Club.
we
—
to
of
squirt
a
was
frreasury,
y
from
comes
he
thee
one
‘wrong!
thing
source,!"
sides
national
defense
we might
Ya
wings
and
plents
could
fugniane
sit
ROA 02
ve
Caudsen
xxistins
Morgenthau wir) PO
Y?
yes teaionn
of
day.
He
home.
program, "
your
with
wrong
very
tam the next day.
the fresident
the plan before
the
of
thet
secretary
Mor ganthaut's
lip,
at
followed
—
~ecrete ry
the
the
t& meet
Reuther
asked
pay
will
hell
the
of wieR
aid
White,
satelite
who
but
probsbiy~be.done,
conference
only
is
"There
the
impressed
so
to place
aed agreed
"Tt
labor
ea
afternoon
A Sunday
can
"It
said:
bluntness,
of
resistance
the
to
usual
h&s
with
(lcGrady,
iniwstry.
automobile
how
plan;
the
confront
would
that
difficulty
great
the
srercome
with
satisfied
was
SE
p
ou
gr
the
y
kl
ic
Qu
s.
on
ti
es
qu
l
ea
eb
ah
te
enswers to his stiffest
dAchion ae
‘ofther.'s
sensed
Henderson
others.
And
an
Carmody,
eb” ‘epproval;
»slankoa
his
Cara ner
Kouther
hours,
several
Laon Henderson
aw Quotin dey
program
1e
gavel
the
Lo.
v.
:
Preside
th
Currg, ” Baul “eNutt , Tom Corcoran, Eawardzkzxer
ADA.L
EERE
H+sconsin,
of
then ghairman
a Sunday norning breskfas sf atbc
convened
for
circle
AAwide
hearing,
Frank,
Jerome
8 aie
Ne
Dealers mint
New
per
fair
a
for
argued
g e
o
a ymonth Clapper -amon
and
of
Walter
he merit.
some
had
plan
the
Lindley
Brgst
Thompson,
Dorothy
Lippmann,
thought
cde
nation! fuse
insisted
be
5
nr
only
for
mucn
teble,
the
same
eréatest
thet
odangted
there wasn’t
on the
of
side.
I was
production
a very
making
is
small
of pe rts
Tapreemet
ene
thought
this
matter
young
mistaken.""\The
man
an
Rumbha€
of
airplane
bs
“euther
industry'd
oo
pectin
;
Yc0
to -etps
came
percentage
of
on
oom
al
dissented
he
282
-S-
Sere,
go|
finelly
over athe
Knudsen,
machines,
nobile
an
YD
Sanakiy2aktE rx
what
of
a plant.
be
jnene-eiepphanor
available
machinery
he
go
we
can
defense
through
an
use
what
have
Hillman,
without
me when
who
too
was
could be/ ‘used. Sten
auto
plant
wi2th) eu
he
can't
use."
Ko
~
authority
present,
milch
WW .
Mouther
break
Reuther
to
thought
diffuculty.
give
to
,
drawn-frem—the—ranks_
any exert
Knudsen
>
gaat hex —sa3d_ho—wetd
motor.
and
prod@lction,
didn't
Sidney
arranged
Yay
Piney
we
| what
(asserted
might
agree.
prints
and
through
expedition
didn't
ARR
manesement
ea
such
"Suppose
|4irector of the nation's
:
9
proposed:
that
His fartner
a set
of
——
down Woke pans
job and
agreed.
take
tnaveste
Hwes-pei
eee
that the beeP ove
were
military
2
Gm,
vay
“
or
SCA
eaeand
to
See
come.up
eH
for
#e
to
the
work
re
eee
invitation
conference
An
ae
= —.
OPM and
“Wark | At
Before
hey
at
the
OPM
orAWE
aay et eee
still waiting
be
couldi
at
to
on
the ae
prints
OPM
the
hat
t
poppinwou
g ldls -
ans. national
deflonse
k new
exactly
how
There
would
x
Mr.
ee
=n
*
<
-
prophsme|
oe
ow
He
C
—
has
iia ellie: be
Pope
many
Knudsen
—;
a
up “euther
ra|sed
CRrAwk
&
LJ
Cue
now
A
eminent
is wa
t
s
e
b
,
d
e
t
a
circul
Fae
Papedichiren
the
.1.
standing
ee
ee
could
the Mazh
25th,
1940,
ik>=
for
him
turned
out
his
the
dia
plan
was
of
am
tweet
VR,
It was
on
this
scdre.
— 4,500,000
He
said
was
his
the
U.S.
he
figure.
>6
title
oon
UCAS
as
tO Co OE
of
4
py
Lieutenant
LLU
a technician
dias
the
DAWA,
issue of Defense,
General
*
-
phe
in
steel
reassure
be
nr
obvious <i
laste»
Jin
nérmal sutomotese proswebton
Rel
eri,
holds
ae
sufficient
to
b
bs .
broke
ane
1942 Models
of
plenty
be
be
sour
ee
a
see
Reuther
ae
civilien production of automobiles. An important aapesh of
ee
<igef unemployment of the auto workers.
Briss ee the cimingt xgx
ee
mermnebemnleee Stl
to Win stem,
office.
c&
rahe
LAM
and
s
i
eet
wars
in
2
CA,
os
oS ka
as an AmeGican,
@
JU
Army:
U
ei
On
le=ae—oi
version
questions
e
are
panne
and answers
organ of the Offiée
are
q
ASMA
printed
for Emer gency
could
he
that
incorrect
slightly
a union
as
shop
had
machinery...We
the
present
the
for
be
couldn't
it
come
down
and
-
them
study
a little
into
onipet
to lve
proved
to go into
that
over
lo@k
to
motor
one
for
drawings
of
set
a
agreed
He
handled.
and
drawings
us
get
to
that
say
and
A
that
on
stall
to
but
fixtures
acon
to
try
and
committee
It
wanted
of Cadillac.’ They
case
in the
claimed
was
know.
machines,
standard
to
fixtures
make
you
him
to
talked
i
in here
him
had
0
Welst
in part?"
it
or accepted
Pyam,
rA.
us
tell
you
Can
"gy.
ghia
have
you
whether
“‘euther
the
rejected
or
closer."
Tewha:
Ot
ake
J
a
bl
:
standard motor,
Through
yD
acute
more
fighting
Ra
in sian
and
Vogue
r=
rfusckorwD
A
some -sertritmmat new
fi,
Tolan
of
one
WV
great
Mr.
told
his
Aa
automotive
dealfof
Nelson,
the
vw
? ely
complt
isn't
why
the
committee.
change
as
machinery
present
"When
to
we
what
sse
forum
we
ca: n
do
wth
converted
the
7
preset
revive
ti faking
Taub,
defense?
defense materials oe
and Allocations
program,
machines
John
thensuijeat
national
( dsQree)
A
Ale"x
and
ag
Prioritigs
of
em,
Nelson
to
a"
a
by sie ruetets ive
provided
new
omneale
howeve
industry pn
be
the
became
Arig K —
engineers | began
can
on
resistance
=
Dy na ld M.
size
the
—
materials
war
and
summer,
Supplies,
the
of
director
then
automobile
the
i
cee
investigating
Britany’ s best—esweea
ico
the
"A
and
the
Before
support.
A
¢
to
thamx—over
closer
Ree
busy 2.
the~end of the
erthergh o
memory, Toward
came
crushed
sumed
saa
war
7 Nazi
as
for
ae
GOIRD
Os
5
J
ae
sal
j
J
bs
a
lett)
dk Yoon
pet ie
es
war
the
1941
of
on
*
jo
(NT RS
wv
ie
\
needs
Brite irtts
States.
United
the
summer
the
+
eed
fall
and
ss—propes-ne—to—duniicste—ir
a
poe
ae
Pd
y
athe
iu
=
S
:
car gee
3
«(vena
2
ct.
mI
eeeeror
3
~
eee
eTTTe
=
ns
Saks
m
ow
«
en
~
-
a
e
5
=
AT
ere
hes
our
rather
ideas
than
Biard,
will
buying
tee
:
a
,
f
Vine™
aw
A
a
——
v, Age
”
A é¢
x
5
<%
:
~~
:
Pi .
,
r
7
io
j
f
po
“
will
completely
rather
than
change
as
to
what
we
can
do
with
present
machines
buyi
new too
ng
ls."
i
Taub
had
testified) that | ‘in
Nico
insisted
ten
months
breeekred { that
for
is
freely
with
a
15
per
cent
WILE
ALD YL
of
"today,
admitted
possibility
tingPELE AEG
AME RO
“After
seneral
o
Nobers
design
hens
50
some
areas
[engines
had
to
and
per
Beaverbrook
to
by
P
and
Sabre
let
Mr.
OFM s
was
70
sent
him
at
Ltd.,
GM's
er
puiit
Britedn'
him
ipdenseintin
where
as
Mr
and
were
by
certain
by
the
being
newsmen.
to
ruffle
Tolan
convertible
thrown
at
"Taub"
the
committee
Mr.
Mr.
and
to
machinery,
Mr.
as
Knudsen
"Reuther"
8.
defense
get
constltant.
gery va
in
as
deci aed
Assigne
7
of |
and™ ‘indep
os
Walter
names
on
Taub'ts
Mr.
growled:
"Mr.
a
a
hearings
which
giant.
estimate
Taub
aaty,
Reuther's
congressional
became
that
the
with,Qdlum
aggressive
well
He
producu
into
quickly
production
Knudsen
help
motor,
~—
war
Churchil 1
production
to
Knitdsen
the:
consultant /on
the
gentle
comment
chevrolét,
him neither ees
Taub's
otherwise
defense,
subsidialy
aa
Taub,
dent, found that Mr. Odlum would erent
long
of
conversion
on
premises,
eatoresy’ ‘of
States
Mr.
the
for
criti
a | technical
to work
division,
fo
views
the
atzplane
available
—~experrence™
and-designed
S best
OPM,
used
Board” ‘as
Oe
f@ United
to |
division
Before
cent."
@
helpful, to Bfitish
Hilimeat‘have
labor
per
Ejgland
ga
He
be
division
Mechent zation
aa
loaned to
a.
to
on
can
emieneoie
¢ngine
Vauxhall,
so
Engine,
was
OPM
the
for
industry
were
curtailment
cent
of
the
him
carburetionx
Lora
He
sent
i
engine
tion.
ie
with
the British
tank
Napier
years
engihes
loanéd
:
ten
facilities
with
that
in
its
ennai
i
aon
auto
ihintdnimieniapeiamenn %s
‘\
production,
defense
it
only
GROANS
the
revious
ep
cei
October\ whereas
were
Asked
of
used
to
be
:
12
an
employee
of
mine."
Meanwhile
of
those
There
no
with
promises
conversion
was
be
and
aggressive
of
the
Mr.
Knudsen.
production
but
he
pounding
car
away
his
automobile
October
model
changes
program,
months
tion
for
press
4d
save
the
and
industry
the
one.
nine
profit
Wilson,
his
corporation's
1941
was
"just
tion
under
all-time
produced
it
Wilson
army
trucks
Cap hae
:
Pe
ke
conceded
%
4
that
rose
while
of
the
to
of
the
$330,000,000
required
the
worth
no
re-tooling
pledge
of
produc-
promissory
more
than
4,300,000
Civilian
all
of
Motors,
same
of
of
essential
a
tidy
1940.
has
estimated
production
Mr.
Wilson
period
the
defense
any
companies
non-defense
and
Six-
$430,604,778,
which,
leading
subordinate
models.
in
was
Automobile
automotive
of
was
of
labor
was, the highest
General
volume
During
with
sold
$408,212,589
of
the
there
battle
these
'4i
1941
$2,000,000,000,"
which
of
large
of 1941
dollar
record.”
some
three
of
public
all
year
president
that
"an
of
months
their
E.
the
necessities
and
trucks,
its
among
resolved
‘to
issuance
produced
calendar
Profits
over
C.
doing
and
the
all-out
was
But
conference
another
the
commercial
in
first
increase
Between
the
production
Nelson
the
association/ made
cars
which
OPM.
A
2
ranks
defense.
support
later,
releases,
year
M.
losing
at
plan?
to
in
the
specifieceity-to-aviation—procurementy’
defense.
pleasure
own
>
national
President.
was
1940
within
program"
industry
in
automotive
the
nation
met
Manufacturers
of
The
for
gathering
around
manufacturers
teen
was
men
Reuther
on
brewing
Donald
steadily
its
defense
for
plank.
holding
the
was
"victory
for
work
car
was
was
huge
was
budging
What
a
a basic
he
row
responsibility
of
to
advocate
more
tremendous
entrusted
came
chief
a
add gt,
corpora-
articles
conversion.
conversion
the
in
- much
Mr.
corporation
-
|
at
ers
be
t
4
Vi
a4
5k
Ahr
of
at
plants
Motors
report-
materials
defense
that
interview
General
of
rolling. out
end
e
a Washington
assured
“e
a year.
of $2,000,000,000
rate
at the
materials
defense
producing
be
months,
ten
within
Fite
would
the
by
rate
that
1942.
"We were sort of doing the automobile business with our
| left hand (in 1941) and going ahead with anything we could
| get to do," said the president of General Motors.
| your
mean
"Yes
sir."
hand?".
left
4
to
apply
were
busy
the
AMA
national
been
models
with
agents
press
ami
by
not
in
auto
cancelled.
were
to
defense,
were
show,
the
make
a
cautious
in
had
1941,
seen
fit
but—tte
out
out
to
party
that
mean
for
'42
merely
appearance.
offered
handout
One
active.
announced
of 1941
turned
This
isn't
RR
the
coming
with
operation,
industry
production
exceedingly
spring
the
automobile
war
to
hand
left
its
the
that
in
keep
to
hand
good
pretty
hope
can
One
a
is
"That
Y
zur
<4
business
greatest
your
doing
were
you
"You
the
annual
models,
had
the
new
that
eo
a trae
“eff
ss ty
$
\
A
hie
px
rPatis
é
ug
é
»
f
;
Instead
of
making
term
the
new
shows
pubon
prG4
by
something
and
a
die
dear
of
makers
—
a
placed
have
materials
"open
y
ohtive
eumsemest
had
for
at
"making
and There
ae
Glncame
nation
time
ready"
lack
house"
models
as the
consumed
whose
York, exhibit
country;
such
spent
New
view
the
were
There
showy
on
throughout
production
might
and
at
"bright work"
Their
production,
were
show.
to
seen.
debut
dealers
profusion
never
and
models
he
was
their
the
had
that
for
tool
defense
Que
Le
BAS
nation
has
nated |
The
'42
models,
Vst_pay more
ell
oe ‘The industry ass
ae eID
ey
said
Mr.
(Chat
LONEE SECA
ERE IR eG
there
é
eR RCTS
would
pisialeis
s
'
y
r
t
s
u
d
n
i
not
a
be
boom
heard.
By
A
year.
of
more
"40
industry
with Mr.
of
auto
"curtailed"
and
year
of
a
business
when
,
schedule
e
t
a
u
q
e
d
a
suggested
it,
than
trucks
vehicles
at
that
defense
that
by
permit
was
were
might
it
program
voluntary
on
POA
"curtailment."
it
vehicles.
would
different
curtailment
announced
4,224,152
was arrived
manufactured
slightly
only
enforced
4,094,554
and
s
n
o
i
t
s
e
sugg
by
an
of
—
commenti cal
frozen
Korhfe ,
Knudsen it
to
models.
Os nscietibeakina,
promptly
models
industry
cars
model
'42
Talk
'43
be
be
e
s
o
p
m
i
r
e
p
su
business
The
no
d
e
b
r
u
t
s
i
d
be
to
production
the
to
eae
agreement
as
dream
ASCE
eeee) Penne
than
be
would
through 1943. Ns frever Cby
The
RARE
would
reduce
"Curtailment",
the
turned
manufacture
out
in
produced.
"estimating"
that
the
This
the
wie
ee
industry
This
on
would
imposed
its
War
on the
"est ima
began
istration
cent
cut
for
aes
These
treme:
to
Week
to
and
industry
no
the
entire
of
'41
"estimated"
20
output.
Henderson
it
'42
was
says.
The
model
ae
of
cent
cut
until
that
Office
was , are
per
not
intervened
the
"eurtail-
Price
Admin-
Se. announce
on,
yeary
the
that
“—=
curtailment
outlook
it
would
in
defense
orders,
for
defense
soon
be
of
labor's
‘gesrnheiss ATE
pooling
there
ideas
a
bearing,
Pearl
Harbor.
ment.
came
more
as
Mr.
was
would
was
Business
‘nt
profitable
for
cemr ena
agree
for
to
NINERS SIRES
the
Nevertheless,
no mention;
there
——s
production.
production.
indication)that the industry
Then
It
models.
d
e
p
p
M
am
t
a
o
C
(
Naor prt kekety
improve
to
an
"41
what
enforced
conversion;
giving
mean
5,289,974
Civilian a
observed
—_——
industry
Leon
ya
sell
preemie
Department and
ment"
was
"probably"
eo
there
wholesale
the
nothing but
idea
\
of
resent-
ss
nate
that
intervened
;
y
of
soon
VfL
;
g
eo
B
—
for
“Wag 2
t
Sebel]
;
and
Novemberg
é
é
i
ey
SI
thera was
5
COM ,
*
that
—*
no
pool fi ie’
of
age
a
ideas
——.*
OM
obses ved
engage
conversion;
giving
oy
Week
to
e. ‘industry
Ke
?
Business
ony
taperrs
a
ort
OBE
~~
of
idea
the
ons | Itor
mery
no
cen
:
HBO
whol¢sale
to
agree
industry ySurf
. Iwas
KY
ritdemw,
production, sH@mpa7
defensd
we
more jp; éfitabdle
be
wesee i.
would be. a-26 ver
y
for December.
agg
whcag
of
wate
meee:
de¢ree
a
followed
there
oar,
entfire Swe wager”
Ot
La
figcseQ Cryo Wauwur
pire
,
A ioe Vey
end
Civilian
octeber“ind
j
per
direc ting, a Ab Ka
ee
PA
and
there
that
§=for hugust,, Bepsonber,
out roe
om
AdmiAi
stration
Paul,
i
sy
4S,
Ces
on Aigust\Z1st
aynounce
gppeieeen
oO yer
20H
Office
to
in
cub
curta
coisas sitio
or OEER he tere
wei Tne
p |
vl
( Mere’)
As
Japanese
Shillipines
crash
Oxnaundh.
shelis
Se*fixginess)
stege—wieh with
great
Saal
(Wr?
“th
pred
the
be
fully
—~
|
;
capacity
in
war
fell
the
(of
on
Wake
verbal
bombs
finding that
the
effort."
converted
J
to
declared
military
industry)
that
the
and
resentment
"only a negligible
automobile
It
of
+iand
is
the
bean
wd
| wey: woscangaat
part of this
presently
industry
to
could
employed
and
production."
"Iwo major obstacles
impede war production," the Tolan
reset declared.
"llanufacturers have been re luct ante-to
their product ion facilities from civilian to military
;
production;
have
The
not
industry.
machine
i
committee
Reuther
tools
committee
the
required
i
Truman
and
was
ak
conversion
the
em
“ "
even
more
severe
oyster ement
that
the
o
available
found
defense
such
with
for
the
"must
defense
result
in
that
its
iftdustry
production
"instead
a
Federal
Government
indictment
had
had
thousands
been
Ln DAL p
convert
of
the
of
ignored,
of requiring
thy,
the
wz
|
utilization
of
announcements
not
produce
such
were
made
tanks
and
necessary
to
huila
industry,
it
found,
Excluding
cars
only
tools
to
the
the
defense
effect
airplanes,
new
and
for
ait “7
largely
trueks,
it
was
th
but
|
plants
advisable
for
separate
entire
further
automobile
Defense,
a
the
that
and that
plants...."
Wa s
program,
could
and
automobile
Ord
cent
of
the
imdustry's
acific
issue
tools
out posts,
of what
letter
Very
importan
)
had
produced
in 1941
industry,
had
addressed
the
won
to
for
could
be used
CIO
natok.
the
to
make
moment
to
re-open
Sag
"MR.
Clumsily,
know why
acca
CIO
beforea
A bitter
b
"
Comege" appeared
they
had
was
big
A
nation
been
wh|ch
in
wanted
forthcaming,
interested
only
all
the
Pm ft
the
planes
dailies.
industry.
®
and
.
+
ides)
) go
automotive
the
Mr.
management,
eae eee
Nelson,
program
for
Nobody
wrose
:
of
ont,
—
-®eese
puvlicly
Wilson
»
OPM
iniincd
and
governmental
OPM's
doom
ae ae
bringing
to
rangely
sefogu
Roarad—prot
es its—om
cars
Tie
gpg
re-tooling,
contribution SS
doors
labor
cha\enge
his
C
experts.
discussed
the
mien
and\for
the
ore
~ Ho
i ~erte
wate
Mr,
the
(
ft
oma
eo
up
an
6@ual
,
»
TO
of
The
conduct
appointment
of
coordinatew®
to
date.
offered
eselator
for
es
Pe
a
a
outside
right
quotas
a
“ilson
Glamor
for
«
sa: make
number
— =e Te
his
the
clause
bey,
«00,000
Hehbruany,
ee
from
to
replied
nae
conference
v
preamiac:
'
—
pregented.
hip, Then
&
.
=
original
Wamewsesemant
contracts,
a
br ought
Reuther
moFelthan had been specitized in
|
:
Later five spokesmen of industry met
a
and
,
wanted
i,
Q
—
ete
and
manufacturers
SN
*
om
tanks
enly Mer tecye tute
NC
i Se
open
weshington
automobile
Cr ion
in
enwcines,
the
een,
of
ideline."
airplane
It demanded to know what OPM now proposed for the automobile
1,
WoAAe
$266,303,000 worth of defense materials,
Under Secretary of,
by OPM and the industry
Robert P. \atterson had been falsely informe
at
only ten per
war
Ip
a
1942.
tive
*
|
_—
We
labor,
|
four
Re
from
|
meetrinists urtem
participate
"Ss
tie
in
oR
aioamcs hat
li sis
oY
give
and
4
“ilson
on
Cwmmiwet
a
a
would
dismal
a
note,
compromise
have
the
right
Pe
job
which
to
from
a
A wr
a
"If
to-wowk
the
|
iir,
mn
Rev the
you
fod
a
acu.
es
are
us,"
oe
although
by
a)
Ete
politely
ended
one
Lary.
techniques.
tS
ID
pw
UAW-CIO
ing
QadrosrDarnrsa
mA
eng ey
the
Mr.
as ty
{| BPi
ch a
in
saeent
knud
lab
orre
a
gore t BARA CeeR
"assist"
aes
converting
the
industry.
When
Reeser,
the
first
all
meeting
concerned
from
OPM.
that
By
acadam#ic
the
(Steet was
would
\y
sao
time
ne, poner
the
have
no
nor , any
committee
erry
eubey
non-existant;
ea
for
sat
was
exPLicit
down
for
obviously
instructions
its
second
x meee
?
now
to
Silas
7
sof
3
aC.
and ur. Rit
K\ es
peeing
WW ADAUR
the Spetreigied
else
—
it
Sa pw
fs
it had
virtuaily
nothing
on
sub-committee we convened
cet
errnoa8"
Meanw ile
is
the
discussion, _ OFM an ¢2dtexpanxpisine
ene ee ee
he
of
Mr.
A
Ey
of
|
cocitios,
conversion
.
tJ=
oy
oe
Sa
a GA:
.
ia
Knudsen]a 28
n
—
|
decfdea:
been
we
a
ieee —<tedeoete d
pPlaintively}
pe
a
age
rs
that
"There
\\ Ber.
*
gee
ener
—.,
A
:
be
pooled
in
the
for
i
ee
cooperative
defense
air ;
Lon
r
ideas,
) n
maintained,
ee.
duction
bah
a
aes
reception
ina ted
Arete: whet
was
9
exenan ge
given
running
a War
perpen
was
sphitesmen
agreed
of
—
a )rplane
defense
Mant
had
around
in
circkes
at ee
orders,
eeement
more
than
,
parts.
the
On
" pipe
ignore
. e
S
Kokvend
asked
to
mms
itie
that
the
automobile
oto WONECMIes an additional
orth
still
ST tga
“eBron
completely
for
faci,
of
jet fort
indust
°anuary
)
8th,
twice
as
Back
in
volunteer
pukn
Knudsen
much
$4,000,000,000
work
October,
offers
cailed
as
_
it
had
lir,
on poduet ion
the
attention
on
of
to
~/G~—
:
Worth
y
of
war
wnt
Mr.
‘
Knudsen
can
make
an
which
be
un just ifjed
indust
r&
Glide
&
wa
for
|
Reuther
ex cE 2h
rsenel
of
Oss:
knew
as
;
aluminum
PASo®
well
pa"
as well
did
as
|
if you
|
do you
stymied
time
it
manufecture
have
to
be
rits™own
labor
that
pea
:
Pim
itical
of
told
tet
systems
an
and
att emp
must
lost.
temts
of
labor
curtain
th
be
peo einem
tur cAum
given
by its
on
a voice
positive
critical
cannot
desire
approach.
be explained
rr-ehy
ere
eee
cars
ani
by
that
‘(emmampeps-eitiee
paegemmes.,
m
hope
civilian
labor
knew
would
teas
of
hein
Vietwememeteier will]
the
its
clash
President's
Lifted
conversion
the
outmoded
valueable
perhaos
necessary,
of
war
be
justify
engineers
there
to
that
its
to
on
|
“A
basic
must
as through
by sextet
7
asked
labor
than
cr
yet
is
INU
the dates
reading,
the
The
indag
pes’? to war
eget
rivalries,
A
that
for
thought,
own rthee
O14
resigtance
not
and other
he
immediately
democracy.
one.
Which
profits
puta
of
year
precious
é
otherwise
*
from,"
to know
notice
interesting
More
a
obstructive
industry's
It
make
plan\ tiation
:
trucks,
sade
patterns
than
:
boom-year
of
given
cannothe [ses ity lerPadicated.
definitely
The
will
more
short
fears
contributions
\
flow
cai't,
you
if
indus tr y
advantages.
more de
eemsasn
will
"We want
them.
per sonal
inquiry
evaluation
a qeomeene
The
things
pointedly
eke
practical
is
has
place
Such en
an
Ngee
Aun
that Teg tocol
not
to
conve re
some
ideas,
committee
seek
ion.
however,
these
make
to
try
to
want
Truman
selma.
bring
of
ii
who can?"
will
product
some
.
—CAg anh Aah
the(/heads of the industry.
or
them
it
kno > Where
told
The
a
uf
to
anyone
know
A
§H,000 000 ,000
for
list
—s
articles.
Y
"We
.
navy's
and
army
the
to
industry
the
—
be
«
:
that
to
a Shortage
These
things
Lace
be
a
fact.
It
of steel,
it does
not
now
mee S:
=~
deny.
| Aside
from
its
red-herring
blame
on
the
Wer
"The
did
accusing
itself.
OPM
Knudsen.
The
department
told
it
a year
was
tir
possible;
—R
wayo
have
acted
at
sekz
said,
"here
produce
new
an
There
and
are
planes
and
plants."
as
The
know
could
in
boldly
our
as
A
the
why
and
and
would
not
have
Gun
ai
industry
insi stea&
in
could
it
guns
merely
.
except
fac ilities,
When
.. Mr.
industry
labor,
motors
OO
industry
feasible
the
industry
is
on what
tremendous
nation
orders
Spe rne: t
hands
only
not
why
it
the
conversion,
:
the
no
the gee ere
act
was
were
~
of
places
canversion,"the
was
reason
tanks
"There
however,
yo
guardly,
is no
least
not
production
although
f°
OPM.
control,”
tweak
alibi
justified
army,
the
amd
and
have
government
OPM
accuses
it
Department
t would
available
“labor
currenf
its
indnb.tedoe. daceneek.
of
not
could
we
not
have
can
without
thought
aw
waiting
twice
about
for
such
offer
y
The
Reuther
plan's
secomi
plank,
pooling,
agually
s
as fundamental
as
the
Socal
BROIL
vane
as
the
du Pofits
con anaee ak
meant,
completion
7
25,
engaged
which
of some
the
in
biggest
a
pwrely
Ogura be Liodoeeds.
reg
Yeacral
together.
bombers
“otors
that
"ord
and
cities job
Fd
uld
such
ww
and oe
would
iP
have
program for
be waiting for
while
best,tool
taba
elsewhere,
the
would not
4,000 newfdies
and
Compe rereten
Practically, this
of this year,
of heavy
eee,
or
sem
in (jamary
construction
Fisher
and
anette
e
or
aeeP
henlieacnata
-
General
die
shdp
Cectattean
webs
.
ae
a
Motor's
in
the
world,
gun-mounts
that
tool
.
ee
’
:
¢
p
sh
Q-
:
e
_
other
dane
ee
companié
casting
1
ie
-
a
cylinder
of
—
turn
out |
job,
bet
ple te
ies.
ee
it,
suppliers.
The
mamm@th,
have
GM,
to
only
now
of
and
teu ther
0%<taee
Cc
deisive
granted
K Ars
only
problem.
creative
to
veto
to
let
voice,
because
labor
production.
factor,
There
and
of
a
is
threats
Fee
industry
their
ic
ask
OH, t-
better
them
that
to
of
in
to
threat
of "fabor
thu
labor
the
having
shall
—o
of
not
labor
a | Perse
suse, is ais
suggestions
labor
threat
the taemex
government
ie
it emm make
way
Sg
The nation
awn
bugaboo
- with
pw
pre-conve ived
war,
has
tri-partite
jobs,
that
in
respgctive
- the
Comeest
for
its
the
now
combining
Beha ss ee
of mast In
K
plans
‘aie
no
UL
that
longes
increase
iv was
\
up"
dé@wn
aH
43
hors,
demonstrate
In
praernn
Who eak
Labor's
break
vast
raised
government
and
a
iiatemesegecrpespad
"mopping
wages
oes are
would
automotive
The ¥ ainpmaageicy
the
4
of
oe
Sopcns
ee
teen
and
two
plansjeally
voice.
6 Saeed
ne t
the
and
and
Pooling
competive
industry."
Wena gemart,; 1s bar
the
art-ap,ieecboestibient’
between
to
GM
possible
pool
Hitlerign,
domination
A
08
peace-time
come
of
or a
Motor
“ord
Chrysler
argument
decide
victorious
gg
oe
ee
the
Ford,
competitive
traditional,
the
making
speaking
co-“OPh tee
traiitional
ed
alia forte,
tanks.
thws
pools;
large
We
for
identice
three
a
—
production
Pooling
the
to
Ford,
Generally
of
Base
on
oe
production.
will
'
hth ahah
i
eh
one
“nm
wen
?.
;
es
fics
ron
efforts \niendet “Ss sien
industry's
eo
MO rking
| A
b
, While] omeder (se
or maintanance
the
not
would
makers
die
and
a
: re -
Pe
emma
kel
e
:
A
morale
establish
shall
shall
not
supply,
unemploybe
given
be
sub ject
or ohenrmer
a contribution
will
and
be
an
be
a Sear
to
important
maintain
that
—
—~22-
ga
scons
a
th
omn.
it
labor soca
By
Pe
comparison
with
defenseGi c
efa
fort
ma
enlarged
role
display
of
for
our
own
changing
Philip
A
h
tome
responsibility
ment
of
of
ae
be
which
no
labor
ami
executing
slogans
or.
that
my
military
Under the
it
for
which
it
and
play
general|zations:
te chnical
convimecing
contributions
exper iened|ard
proof
that
-_
exists.
isto
labor
-AQ-=
a
in
es
that
the
continuagys
continuogs ly
to
democracy
alliances
the
leadership
cannot
for uninterrupted
Boami
grant
allegiance
Labor
labor
to
will eit
what
bringx
defeuxexpmmdmetiax
and
Yet
single
Wio
llmieemn arene
if
heroic.
maturity. Fao
its
On He; thd. « realization
understand
almost
|
e fyrst
asks
matter
war
necessity
ChoA
robe
CA
clear
MBQR
War
labor's
hew=teen
tiie
the
recérd,
A
nation,
er
imPerative
is
of
egageer:
make
tides
Will
ud\
responsibility
crenertaesingke
and
industry's
date
eee
on
share
ee
x
eR
the
of
be
doubted
that
must
realize
the
pro duct ion;
voluntary
éstablish-
no-strike
pledge
Gonore te ly, labor must
a
them,
it
part
it
must
i
pRuduEtinnz be youd
cannot
be
proposals.
is
prepared
ae
ewido)
able
The
to
to
Keu ther
rely
céntri bute
plan
make such g/
an
new
tools."
Taub
ten
months
testifiedtheat
previous,
auto
industry
were
available
premises,
it
defense,
LA
WO
had
ten
sent
at
.
"
hs
1
VV
.
Re
mi
WAIL
Zs
a
pasion
inten
himself, had
years
him
with
to
to
the
the
in
some
eenrmcmeoicnorstante
gin
the
where
Unite
to
siiaesicie
a
airplane
oo
Knudsen
A
consultant.
motor,
é
decided
m
Assigned
the
gne
help
authority
and
production, meme .
to
let
Mr.
Hillmen
by
the
OPM
lsbor
found
——
he
that
be
used
on
.
:
fei
that
He jase
to
ok
a
the
was
sent
him
eel
to
OPM,
technical
SR CoV
work with
A
ane
with
and
Britain's
Mek
wn
division
remained
engines
engine
Engine,
Odlum
on
Beaverbrook
Sabre
:
Motors~
Ltd. ,¥euxhetl
tank
Wns
On,
1 llamieetitie.
consultant
him as
Mr.
aie
GEneral
Vauxhall,
a
the
for
we
OPM, which sre
as
on
cent,"
have
dusty
facilities
Chevrolet,
Napier
mamas.
independent,
nor
the
can
See
time
curtailment
cfjurent11
AM
ores
get
=
for
dea
its
with
ee
of
broached,
70 per
with
=>
dec]
of
cent
=
Board
OrM's pry - Corkins
aggressive
Ma
is aug,
defense
into
7
my
% ede
design
butlt
Sta tes” ho
per
wroveea as
first
"today,
50
that
cent
areas,of
‘
engine
A
He
that
was
per
some7experience
To
Hho re
15
production,
admitted
Quod
streeesfal—s
Ya,
Mr.
n
only
October
plan
Goth
best
v
ceme
freely
a.
to
ok
defense
in
Reuther
thet
a possibility
n
Taub
After
so
is
the
inisted
for
with
Te
‘v
had
when
whereas
te
y
Ane
Odium
Taub,
would
grant
Odlum
division
him
neither
for
day,2
Befére
oe
taubSp
Mr.
congressional
SW
weo—words
giant.
hearings
which
Asked
convertible
by
were
the
and by newsmen.
certain
Tglan
machinery,
Mr.
to
ruffle
committee
Kjudsen
to
"Taub"
the
Wn.
on
7
Knudsen
"Keuther"
otherwise
comment
\
end
Hf
gentle
Taub's
x
long
in
became
production
estimate
sees
"Mr,
Taub
of
+4
how
-ll-
.
used
to
those
of
be / an
employee
of
mine,"
Meavwhile
ajtremendous
entrusted
withynationa
a huge
a basic
"victery
plank.
steadily
arounc
program"
Donald
gathering
the
row
M,
5
Nelson
But
S€,
in which
support
President.
was brewing
was
there
Grmemcas=
all-out
its
among
the
was
‘olan
withinthe
Phere
Whatiwas
was
Py
pounding
conference
and
the
~
away
of.
resolved
chief
advocate
more’egrressive
no Budgin
ir,
committee,
Automobile
defense.
industry
industry
its
A
the
"to
necessities
procurement."
for
the
of
with
doing
bf
promises
was
and
of
to
be
he
was
the
men
Knudsen,
not
S] spetial
a
a
radilcal
report)
or
on
ae
Shentamgertite-peme-catven)
labor
IO,
plan?
See
Vn October,
1940, -eae
leading car manufacturers
met infe—hewetork el
e
subAdinate work on automotive model changes
to
K
the defense PE SET Sm. See
specifically to aviation
Sixteen
3
Manufacturers
Between
produced
Keuther
teetes
conversion
&
\
wanks
and
months
later,
the
‘
manufacturers,
through
amn
ahe
Association,
fut
An
another, pledge
issuance
or
the
sold
more
of
then
,these
43 oo, 000
);-@es=s=e)
of
the
production
AekaoArra
- the
pleasure
cars
.
—
and
|
)
7iNy
.
was the
en
calendar CaN
betaine
. “Sel iien
Bt
rr the
first.
any
of
highest
nine
car
mhonths
yeer
|
of
$43
, 669 9
1°, ¢ Geempekxliobars2 C.E, Ria pent,
Daksrskad
Rot bio
a
nadnainebarney—eimcad
Sheth
production
n
r
Rionstive —
save
one,
1941
rose
presiéent
b
to
of General
Corporst fon!
dollar
volume
of noh-detenee profuction in i941 was "just Wnder $2,000,000 » 000,"
|
Mr Wilson add@@M, was "an all-time record,"
which,
some $330,000,000
€ corporation produced
uring the same per
worth
of
defense
essential
arti@les
conversion.
Mr.
atwith-re=t6o0lin:
months,
year,
He
rolling
out
a
1942,
y
-
Met S2
materia
C-OTES
8-Ge
trucks
the
defense
that
at
that
ACCA
"You
mean
you
were
by
STIT
end
TTS
Of
our
to
"That
ays
apply
of
your
business
greatest
Left
Xe
do,"
s
with
your
lef t
el
a D
is s
enh: ena
——__, oboe’
owe
its
AiR
NeW
34
|
:
sir,"
conclusive that
mn Fe urban Laws
of a boom year
YY
SULULT ers
Our
|
heed
good
hand
that
the
hand
eX
to
war
to
keep
automobile
both
On
Dp
=
hands
ant:
were
a
2
operation,
in
had
seen
1941,
but
the
Poca
extreye
o%
ly busy
pee
wiewh
rem
isn't
industry
7
e
Qoad,
be
a
"Veg
Pp
ten
would
the
Motors,
doing
within
materisls
mate
OF
ce,
$2,000,000, 900
of
Nanny
no
.
feould,
rate
henw
e
required
hana"
wy
~
which
i
at
plants
Motors
army
the-corporation
repowfers,
General
of
pres\dent
WY
wit
SO
it
"We were sort of doing the automobile business with
(in 1941),
er
and going shead with anything we could get
the
|
conceded
aX
<a
General
whieton
Wilson
defense
assured
of
of
andiconversion
producing
be
- mich
resping
fit
facts
the
to
are
.
benefits
“1g-..
make
a
cautious
This/
merely
Geman
appearance.
ese
were to
cancelled.
EO
models
been
EN
new
had
8
'42
REARS
models,
for
&
ee
CRT
that
annual
Be
annouqeed
the
that
the
istead
New
York
exhibit
attention,
shows
which
tha
put on
new
by
time
as
the
that
fense
models
dealers
AXLAG
something
such
would
nation
had
have
of
been
Pore
certain
[|e
pede
the
sArtnd Ano
?
wqoAvek
chages
never
seen
to
and
7
country:
, soem
&
SPREE I
Costly
|
at
ofa
at
a showy
Area”
i
3
a. profusion
Agen
Bee
arousei.
ees]
thr opehgout
odel
their
making
of
Peo Hats ch
ETRE
.
was
"bright
work"
a raeorert
LOG
NEN BMI re 8 9it re
time
prfrrrd
and
matéPrars
piety
atone
ares gems
ts
%
tool
and
production,
die
makers
and
‘3
iis, have
materials
FOD
3
>
pent
"
ry
Ly a
:
.
=
*y
DVR
for
Weenie,
EE
ths tlabheas would be no MEM
models.
The
'42 models,
b.
U
ad be meme frozen and mamfac tured
through
1946,
1)
z
said
Mr,
ae
A
-
Wm,
ae
ne
q
ae
“NS sturbed
ORES paneer
me git
) Praline
S
Fr eduction
bi“y
of
>
:
4
42
Wieeweeebertmodels
&
oermit
a
and
SS}
\
—>
d@awm
the
~
commercial
* Car AorKest '
FOERSTER
that
the
4,224,152
manufacture
aan
trucks
a
Ae
% :
industry
would
ne
.
would
Ciel
.
vehicles,
was turned
AN SEh_ot
n
ane
5
es
aa
Zz
bat
tha
inl Se
‘Wass
@ieupue.ataceneenbe
ee
5
,
~/
to
are eeeen
announced
is
194 Biel
curtailment °
‘voluntary
f
ay
‘I
reed
7
of
a
a
the
Seppe
the
Aa
'40
ee —
model
pes
estimating
modeis.
T,is
ene
will
completely
rather
than
buying
Taub
hed
for
it
is
ten
that
defense
a
After
General
Motors
design
was
had
to
and
the
engine
Lord
Beaverbrook
Napier
and
Sabre
tion.
He
was
by the OPM
labor
found
that
a technical
and
were
by
certain
by
the
staff.
day.
newsmen.
to
ruffie
Tolan
convertible
him
Odlum
He
long
thrown
at
"Taub"
the
committee
machinery,
would
Mr.
and
otherwise
to
Mr.
States
grant
with
the
as
Knudsen
“Reuther"™
gentle
comment
Knudsen
on Mr.
help
motor,
get
into
quickly
with
neither
as
Taub's
growled:
"Mr.
He
Assigned
Odlum
and
Walter
of at©
indepen-
for
nor
less
Reuther's
hearings
which
giant.
estimate
Taub
that
the
authority
names
on
produc-
division
production
war
decided
congressional
became
the
Churchill
consultant.
well
in
of
production
to
Odlum
with
consultant
aggressive
him
defense,
subsidiary.
the
Knudsen
Taub,
oremises,
Chevrolet,
a
conversion
Taub's
Mr.
as
defense
a technical
Mr.
of
designed
Mr.
for
British
airplane
the
outbreak
Board
and
on
on
first
available
experience
the
British
to work
were
used
division
United
remained
was
cent.”
aé*s
where
as
plan
per
Ltd.,
best
OPM,
Reuther
be
at
the
industry
can
England
to
division,
Before
being
to
auto
illuminating
built
helpful
to
70
engine
to
He
him
Mr.
machines
the
curtailment
Mechanization
division
dent,
views
him
have
sub-contracting
of
the
Britain's
OPM's
sresent
facilities
cent
some
with
loaned
Hillmen
a
areas
so
Engine,
to let Mr.
than
some
British
its
ver
Vauxhall,
sent
with
the
with
50
sent
was
of
that
carburetion.
tank
do
whereas
when
cent
has had
for
can
October
"today,
years
engines
loanéd
engines
ten
in
per
in
himself
we
previous,
15
possibility
OPM.
that
months
only
what
tools.”
admitted
Taub
to
new
to
production,
freely
with
as
testified
insisted
broached,
change
were
Asked
of
used
to
be
12
an
employee
of
mine."
no
production
but he was
manufacturers
met
in
October
1940
model
chanses
to
automotive
on
Manufacturers
tion
for
press
defense.
releases,
pleasure
the
cars
and
production
year
save
one,
increase
C.
E.
industry
the
months
nine
their
profit
Wilson,
his
corporation's
1941
was
"just
"an
tion
of
all-time
produced
it
“Wilson
under
army
trucks
conceded
large
rose
of 1941
$330,000,000
reuxired
with
sold
more
the
the
worth
tic
re-tooling
all
Mr.
Civilian
of
tetanee
essentiai
any
a
tidy
of 1940.
has
estimated
production
Wilson
adds,
the
corpora-
same period
of
4,500,000
companies
non-defense
and
than
$430,604,778,
which,
oroduc-
of
highest
automotive
of
Six-
promissory
General Motors,
volume
During
pledge
these
of #$408,212,569
in
of
the
Automobile
the
was
to
subordinate
of
*41 modele.
1941
$2,000,000,000,"
which
that
all
year
three
dollar
record."
some
and
trucks,
president
that
was
of
of
leading ©
the
procurement."
public
issuance
produced
calendar
Profits
over
the
commercial
in
first
the
for
Between
to
resolved
through
another
made
Association,
of
necessities
the
manufacturers,
the
later,
months
teen
and
was
labor
while
conference
aviation
to
specifically
program,
defense
doing
A
Reuther
of
battle
the
was
there
But
at OPM.
plan?
its
work
car
own
for
away
pounding
car
his
eutdmobile inkcetes
the
was
What
holding
losing
was
nation
The
Knudsen.
Mr.
budging
the
among
support
President.
the
around
men
the
of
aggressive
more
its
was
Nelson
M.
gathering
steadily
wes
he
and
advocate
chief
Donald
plank.
basic
a
be
to
was
conversion
all-out
which
in
ocrogram”
“victory
huge
of a
promises
came
There
defense.
national
for
responsibility
with
entbusted
those
of
ranks
the
brewing within
wes
row
a tremendous
Meanwhile
articles
conversion.
conversion
the
in
+ much
Mr.
corporation
~13producing
be
ten months,
could, within
be
end
rate
that
it
plants
General Motors
of
out
rolling
would
materials
defense
that
interview
as Washington
at
ers
report-
“e assured
a year.
at the rate of $2,000,000,000
materials
defense
the
by
1942.
of
"We were sort of doing the automobile business with our
left hand (in 1941) and going ehead with anything we could
get to do," said the president of General Motors.
your
"You
left
mean you
hand?"
"Yes
sir.*
it?*
to
ing
benefits
the
were
not
and
press
by the
models
in
auto
cancelled.
were
to
of a boom
were
show,
the
This
make
a
out
out
cautious
One
active,
to
party
mean
for
'42
merely
appesrance.
reap-
the plants
experts
handout
that
announced
of 1941
turned
If
cars.
corporations’ sles
the
coming
busy
extremely
were
fit
the
but
1941,
in
in urban
exceedingly
spring
the
hands
year
defense,
with
agents
AMA
national
been
busy
both
that
conclusive
are
facts
seen
had
industry
production
war
to
hand
left
its
apply
automobile
the
that
hope
can
One
isn't
in operation,
to keep
is a pretty good hand
"That
with
business
greatest
your
doing
were
the
offered
annual
models,
had
the
new
thet
~13A-
which
would
tion,
the
new models
shows
put
on
have
something
and
a profusion
never seen.
and
@
industry
yet
that
Sloan,
There
the
usuel
work”
have
also
there
spent
for
such
as
"making
whose
announced,
would
hopefully,
here
and
model
changes
the netion
had
ready”
lack
the
for
defense
nation
has
paid
as
be no
would
2
contribution
to
nation-
'43 models.
be
frozen
The ‘42
and
models,
manufactured
,
industry's
began
dream
to
be
to
boom
business
year.
The
production
of
auto
of more
"curtailed"
'42
Mr.
and
year
business
disturbed
Talk
Knudsen
to
when
enforced
suggested
it,
defense
than
vehicles
permit
was
were
might
began
on
to
be
“curtsilment."
it would
reduce
“Curtsilment",
vehicles,
would
it
program
voluntary
thet
different
thet
curtailment
announced
trucks
slightly
suggestions
4,224,152
4,094,354
only
adequate
it
plenned
commerical
by
an
of
promptly
models
industry
cars
model
with
of
superimpose
industry
By agreement
*40
country;
pay more.
possible
the
the
"bright
be
as
“open house”
at
throughout
were
atten-
1943.
usual
heard.
unfriendly
view
on
placed
were
might
The
The
not
arouse
and materials
al defense,
than
of
will
through
to
show.
and
Mr.
certain
exhibit
Their production had consumed time that tool
production,
said
a
dealers
to
die makers
dear
been
by
was
«t
York
New
showy
debut
their
meking
of
Instead
the
manufecture
turned
out
produced.
schedule was arrived at by Pestimating”
in
the
This
that the
wo | hw
industry
on
War
to
began
ment"
the
for
cent
cut
eree
directing
to
week
was
no
to
conversion;
giving
*'42 model
cent
outlook
that
it
would
engage
in
defense
indication
of
labor's
that
pooling
the
there
a
came
Pearl
Harbor.
Admin-
on
per
50
4
de-
a
followed
for December.
defense
production.
soon
be more
profitable
was
no
«gree
mention;
there
was
Business
for
the
Nevertheless,
production.
would
noted,
Touf
as Mr.
orders,
for
bearing,
ideas
*eurteil-
announce
and
there
the
Price
of
to
November,
cut
cent
per
that
Office
year:
models.
not until
was
compelled
industry
ment.
Then
The
and
curtailment
the
improve
observed
industry
a 48 per
enforced
These
began
entire
It
intervened
was
October,
, September,
August,
20
says.
it
Supply
Civilian
and
istration
what
mean
"estimated"
Henderson
and Leon
Depertment
*41
output.
*41
probable
"“estimal"
its
an
industry
the
on
imposed
This
of
5,289,974
sell
"probably"
would
to
for
nothing
there
wholesale
the
but
ides
of
resent-
SOO PLANES A DAY
A Program for the Utilization of the Automobile
Industry for Mass Production of Defense Planes
By WALTER
FOREWORD
REUTHER
by PHILIP
INTRODUCTION
American
P.
Council
MURRAY
by GEORGE
On
WASHINGTON,
Public
D. C.
SOULE
Affairs
FOREWORD
a
nt
me
rn
ve
Go
the
to
n
ve
gi
has
s
on
ti
za
ni
ga
The Congress of Industrial Or
has
ect
aff
e
at
di
me
im
e
Th
ft.
cra
air
e
ns
fe
de
of
on
ti
proposal for mass produc
alic
pub
ad
re
sp
de
wi
h
ug
ro
th
e—
ns
fe
de
al
ion
nat
for
lift
been an encouraging
m
ra
og
pr
the
t
tha
d
ce
in
nv
co
are
we
is,
s
thi
as
tion and discussion. Valuable
on.
ati
lic
app
al
me
eec
pi
and
ise
pra
bal
ver
n
tha
merits more
J.
R.
of
t
ues
req
the
and
t
ues
req
my
at
d
fte
dra
The CIO’s proposal was
d
ate
ili
aff
a,
ic
er
Am
of
s
er
rk
Wo
le
bi
mo
to
Au
ed
it
Un
the
Thomas, president of
mo
to
au
d
lle
ski
of
p
ou
gr
a
of
ce
en
ri
pe
ex
the
of
ult
with the CIO. It is the res
for
m
le
ob
pr
s
thi
d
die
stu
o
wh
r,
he
ut
Re
P.
er
lt
Wa
by
bile workers, headed
gs
din
fin
r
ei
Th
.
ort
rep
the
in
d
ne
ai
nt
co
s
on
si
lu
nc
co
months and arrived at the
O.
CI
the
of
d
ar
Bo
e
iv
ut
ec
Ex
the
of
al
ov
pr
ap
s
ou
im
an
un
bear the imprint of the
le
sib
pos
st
mo
ut
its
ke
ma
to
ire
des
S
O’
CI
the
of
out
rn
bo
was
Our program
on
ti
uc
od
pr
ss
ma
for
m
ra
og
pr
ic
cif
spe
e
Th
e.
ens
contribution to national def
low
kn
s
or’
lab
d
ze
ni
ga
or
h
ic
wh
to
ent
ext
at
gre
the
tes
ica
ind
of defense aircraft
e
Th
y.
nc
ge
er
em
al
ion
nat
t
sen
pre
our
in
ed
liz
uti
be
y
ma
ies
lit
abi
edge and
a
for
O
CI
the
by
ed
in
tl
ou
y
ead
alr
m
ra
og
pr
l
era
gen
a
ts
en
em
program impl
y.
nc
ge
er
em
s
thi
in
es
iv
at
og
er
pr
s
and
tie
ili
sib
pon
res
s
or’
lab
n
of
io
it
gn
co
re
larger
utit
ins
ic
at
cr
mo
de
our
t
fec
per
and
ve
ser
pre
to
y
tr
un
co
our
of
s
The effort
air
r
Ou
or.
lab
an
ic
er
Am
of
ks
ran
the
in
n
tha
se
on
sp
re
r
ate
gre
no
ds
tions fin
ks
ea
sp
be
o
als
it
and
t;
fac
t
tha
of
ce
en
id
ev
te
cre
con
m
is
ra
og
pr
on
ti
uc
od
pr
ft
cra
the logic of our desire for a greater recognition of organized labor's role in
national defense.
PHILIP MURRAY, President
Congress of Industrial Organizations
AUTHOR’S
NOTE
This program is an outgrowth of the American automobile workers’ conviction that the future of democracy and all that our people hold dear are
dependent upon the speedy and successful prosecution of our national defense.
I have discussed the general outlines of the program with Assistant Secretary
of War Robert Patterson; Philip Murray, President of the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations; Sidney Hillman, member of the National Defense Advisory
Commission; and R. J. Thomas, President of the UAW-CIO.
the
te
ple
com
to
r
labo
and
t
men
ern
gov
of
ers
lead
e
thes
by
Upon being urged
survey, I consulted with a number of highly-skilled designing engineers, tool
and die makers, jig and fixture men, and pattern and model makers, employed
for years by General Motors, Chrysler, Packard, Hudson, Briggs, Murray Body
nd
t-ha
firs
e
mad
we
tly,
join
and
ally
vidu
Indi
.
ies
pan
com
e
bil
omo
aut
and other
e
thes
of
All
es.
mbli
asse
lage
fuse
and
g
win
and
s
part
or
mot
raft
airc
of
studies
as
ts
men
age
man
by
d
ize
ogn
rec
are
and
O
-CI
UAW
the
of
s
ber
mem
are
men
mufor
the
to
ted
ribu
cont
have
y
The
ans.
nici
tech
er
mast
as
on
uni
the
by
as
well
tion
ribu
cont
r’s
labo
of
part
as
ent
pres
now
we
ch
whi
m
gra
pro
this
lation of
toward the solution of a grave national problem.
WALTER P. REUTHER
INTRODUCTION
By GEORGE
SOULE*
Here is a plan to speed up warplane production to aid the defense of Britain
and the United States. It asserts that within six months the automobile industry
could be turning out 500 fighting planes a day, in addition to whatever the
airplane industry itself may beable to do. Such a plan is certainly worth
careful investigation.
The plan is sponsored by men who have an intimate technical knowledge
of the automobile industry. It is proposed by Walter P. Reuther, an official
of the United Automobile Workers of America, after consultation with designing engineers and highly skilled specialists employed in numerous auto plants.
Any proposal by such a body of men deserves a hearing. Again and again it
has been demonstrated in American industry that suggestions arising from
those who do the work, and through long personal experience understand
industrial problems, are immensely valuable. —
The plan points out indubitable facts that few Americans know. The automobile industry is operating at only about 50 percent of capacity, largely
because of seasonal production. If its output were spread evenly throughout
the year, half its plant and manpower could be used for something else. Could
this something else be warplanes? Here is where serious disagreement arises.
Some connected with the plane industry say it could not, because plane engines
and bodies are more complicated and require more exact and refined processes,
This report answers the objection by detailed facts and figures. Machinery,
plant and manpower, it asserts, are available to do the necessary jobs. To the
layman, it offers convincing evidence that if we want mass production of warplanes, the automobile industry can give it to us.
The layman, of course, is not qualified to decide the technical questions at
issue. But all of us, as American citizens, have a right and duty to insist that
the questions be carefully investigated and decided by those competent to
judge, without the influence of private interest or prejudice. We cannot be
satisfied with a negative response on the part of the aircraft industry itself,
which has an obvious interest in avoiding competition. Nor can we be satisfied
with the judgment of army experts who through experience only with special
production of frequently changed models do not understand the quality poten-
tialities of mass production.
Nor, finally, can we be satisfied with a reluctance
of certain automobile employers to sacrifice competitive advantage by planning
production for the whole industry as a unit.
It would seem that little could be lost even if the plan were unsuccessful.
At present half our productive capacity in automobiles is going to waste.
Let us not permit this plan to be shoved aside by the inertia of vested interests.
* Editor, New Republic; Chairman, National Economic and Social Planning Association; Director-at-Large, National Bureau of Economic Research.
5OO PLANES A DAY
A Program for the Utilization of the Automobile
Industry for Mass Production of Defense Planes
By WALTER
P. REUTHER*
England’s battles, it used to be said, were won on the playing fields of Eton.
This plan is put forward in the belief that America’s can be won on the
assembly lines of Detroit.
In an age of mechanized warfare, victory has become a production problem.
The automotive workers for whom I speak think our industrial system a pro-
ductive giant capable of any task, provided it is not forced into battle with one
hand tied behind its back. They also believe that we need send no men to a
future conflict with the Axis powers if we can supply enough machines now
to our first line of defense in Britain. The machines we and the British need
most are planes, and the survival of democracy depends on our ability to turn
them out quickly.
The workers in the automotive industry believe that the way to produce
planes quickly is to manufacture them in automobile plants. The automotive
industry today is operating at only half its potential capacity. This plan proposes that the unused potential of the industry in machines and men be utilized in the mass production of aircraft engines and planes. It is our considered opinion that it would be possible, after six months of preparation, to
turn out 500 of the most modern fighting planes a day, if the idle machines
and the idle men of the automotive industry were fully mobilized and private
interests temporarily subordinated to the needs of this emergency.
Time, every moment of it precious, its tragic periods ticked off by bombs
falling upon London and the Midlands, will not permit us to wait until new
mass production factories for aircraft and aircraft engines finally swing into
action late in 1942. Emergency requires short-cut solutions. This plan is
Labor’s answer to a Crisis.
Mr. William F. Knudsen says that airplane production is 30 percent behind
schedule. It will continue to be behind schedule so long as we continue to
rely on the expansion of existing aircraft plants, and on the construction of
new plants. Expansion of existing aircraft plants means the expansion of
plants utilizing the slow and costly methods of an industry geared to handtooled, custom-made production.
New plants cannot be built and put into operation in less than 18 months.
In 18 months Britain’s battle, for all her people’s bravery, may be lost, and our
own country left to face a totalitarian Europe alone.
* Director, General Motors Department, United Automobile Workers of America,
CIO; member, Committee on Training in Industry, National Defense Advisory Commission.
t
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
)
Packard and other companies are still digging the ditches and pouring the
concrete for their new airplane engine factories. The Axis powers will not
wait politely until these factories are finished.
New plants, when finally erected, must be filled with new machinery and
this new equipment largely duplicates machinery already available in our automobile plants. The machine industry is overtaxed. The emergency of war
cannot be met in the normal time necessary to construct new plants and equip
them with the required production machinery.
We propose, instead of building entirely new machines, to make the tools
required to adapt existing automotive machinery to aircraft manufacture.
We propose to transform the entire unused capacity of the automotive
industry into one huge plane production unit. Production under this plan
would not replace the output of the aircraft industry proper, which would
continue to construct the large bombers and planes of special design.
Fifty Percent of Automobile Industry’s Potential Capacity Is Unused
No industry in the world has the tremendous unused potential productive
capacity of the American automotive industry, and no industry is as easily
adaptable to the mass production of planes. A careful survey will show that
the automobile industry as a whole is not using more than 50 percent of its
maximum potential capacity if that capacity were properly coordinated and
operated to the fullest degree.
The automotive industry could produce 8,000,000 cars a year. It is producing approximately 4,000,000. These unused plant reserves, as shown by
the figures given in the Federal Trade Commission’s report on the motor
vehicle industry, are greater than the total motor plant capacity of England
Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Japan combined. Adapted to plane ptoduction, this unused potential capacity would give us world plane supremacy
within a short time.
At present the automotive industry never operates at more than 80 to 90
percent of its maximum potential capacity, and then only for a few months
each year. The rest of the year it operates on reduced schedules, and many
plants shut down completely. If automobile production were spread evenly
over a 12-month period, it would be possible, without reducing the total output of automobiles, to convert a large portion of this machinery to the manufacture of planes.
During the automotive year ending August, 1940, Nash used only 17 percent of its productive capacity; Dodge used 3614 percent. Nash, working at
maximum capacity, could have manufactured its total output for the 12
months in 4914 working days; Dodge, in 111 working days. Chevrolet, the
largest single producer of motor cars, turned out over a million cars diting
the last model year, and yet used less than 50 percent of its potential productive capacity. The main Chevrolet Motor plant at Flint, Michigan, produced 380 completed motors per hour at the peak of the 1937 produdcion
season, utilizing all four of its complete motor machining and assembly lines.
At the present time, at the peak of the 1940 production season, the Chevrolet
500 PLANES
6
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
Flint plant is producing 282 motors per hour, with one motor line standing
completely idle, while the three remaining lines are operating on a two-shift
basis.
Since
1937, Chevrolet has built a new motor
plant in Tonawanda,
New York, which at the present time is producing 65 complete motors per
hour, with a plant capacity of 90 motors per hour. This would indicate that
at the peak of the production season Chevrolet is only building 347 motors
per hour, with an actual capacity of 470 motors per hour. With an unused
capacity of 123 motors per hour at the peak of the production season, it is
obvious that Chevrolet has an unused reserve which becomes tremendous during the month of reduced operating schedules.
The availability of automotive production facilities for plane production in
Chevrolet is again shown in the case of the Chevrolet drop forge plant in
Detroit, the largest drop forge shop of its kind in the world. If this shop
were operated at full capacity, it could produce all the drop forgings required
for the production of 500 airplane motors per day, and still supply the Chevrolet company with sufficient drop forgings for 1,000,000 Chevrolet cars a year.
Skilled labor to operate this shop at full capacity is available. Other forge
shops, including the Buick and the Dodge forge shops, are also working at far
less than capacity. (See appendix for shop equipment and production schedules. )
Automobile Motor Building Facilities Can Be Adapted to Make Plane Motors
Are the facilities used in manufacturing automobile motors adaptable to the
manufacture of airplane motors? The answer is that they are.
Both the automobile and airplane motors are combustion engines, essentially
the same mechanism for generating power by exploding gas. Both motors
contain cylinders, carburetors, pistons, crankshafts, camshafts, valves, spark-
plugs, ignition systems, etc.
The same basic machinery is utilized in the manufacture of these basic parts
common to both motors.
True, there are differences between the automobile
and the airplane engine, as there are differences of a lesser degree between the
engine of the Chevrolet and the engine of the Cadillac. These differences
between different engines are produced by adding certain tools, dies, jigs or
fixtures to the basic machine in order to make a difference in the product. The
same “tooling” process adapts the same basic machinery to the production of
the airplane engine. Graphic proof of this statement is even now being supplied by General Motors. Many of the most difficult and precise parts of the
Allison aviation engine are being manufactured in the Cadillac plant in
Detroit, much of it with retooled Cadillac machinery.
The new Allison plant
in Indianapolis, still in process of expansion, is being used largely for assembly.
The experience of General Motors in making Allison parts with retooled
Cadillac machinery should also dispose of the bugaboo of “tolerances.” “Tolerances” are the allowable fractional variations in size of engine parts, and they
must be far finer in the plane engine than in the automgbile engine. But these
more precise dimensions can be obtained by more precise tooling.
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
7
When the contemplated airplane motor plants are completed, it will be
necessary to equip them with the same kind of basic production machinery
already standing idle half of the time in the nation’s automotive factories.
This basic machinery will be duplicated, and after it is duplicated it will still
be necessary to construct the special tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures required to
adapt this machinery to the manufacture of plane engines.
In the process of duplicating basic machinery, lies the most serious delay.
This lag, which from all indications may continue, may well defeat our national
defense program. An additional burden is placed on the already over-loaded
machine tool industry. We propose to short-cut the process by building only
the tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures necessary to convert idle automotive machinery
into plane engine machinery. A few special machines will be necessary, but
these will be but a small part of the total equipment. In this way a job that
will otherwise take at least 18 months can be done in six months.
Certain basic machines are necessary to build both automobile and aircraft
types of engines. These include gear cutters, gear shapers, screw machines,
bullards, drill presses, punch presses, broaching machines, turret lathes, various
types of milling machines, various types of lathes and Fay machines, lapping
machines, various types of grinding machines, die casting machines, forge
presses, header machines, foundry equipment, welding and riveting equipment.
Automobile Industry Adaptable for Stamping of Wings and Fuselage
The plane has three main parts: engine, wings and fuselage. Just as there is
unused capacity for the production of motors, so there is unused capacity for
the production of the wings and fuselage. The large body plants and the parts
plants have metal stamping equipment now used for stamping out parts for
the body of the automobile which can be adapted to stamping out the parts
which make up the wings and fuselage of the plane. Proof of this is provided
by the tentative plans being made by the automotive industry at the suggestion
of Mr. Knudsen to manufacture parts of the wings and fuselages for large
bombers.
A survey of the large body plants will show that their equipment for press-
ing and stamping metal parts are also not being used to full capacity. Murray
Body, Briggs and the Fisher Body plants show a 50 percent overall unused capacity in their pressrooms. Striking is the example of the Fisher Body plant in
Cleveland, which contains one of the largest pressrooms in the industry. At
present it is operating at but 40 percent of capacity, although automobile
body production is now at its peak. In 1936-37 this plant made all the
stampings for Chevrolet bodies, employing 9200 employes. Today it employs
but 3500, for Fisher has built a new plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan, further
adding to body capacity.
(See appendix for equipment in the Cleveland
Fisher plant.)
Technical problems are involved, of course, in constructing new dies to
stamp the lighter aluminum alloys used in plane production. That these problems are not insuperable is shown by the fact that Murray and Briggs are
already stamping wing parts for Douglas bombers.
8
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
Skilled and Production Labor Available
Skilled labor is necessary to turn out the
these various types of automotive machinery
industry has the largest reservoir of skilled
REUTHER
500 PLANES
PLAN
in the Automobile Industry
tools and dies required to adapt
to plane production. The auto
labor in the world. More than
25,000 tool and die workers, jig and fixture men, pattern makers, draftsmen
and designers, and allied craftsmen are employed in the auto industry at the
peak of its tooling program.
Tooling is even more seasonal than production. Each year thousands of the
industry’s most skilled craftsmen work at top speed for a few months to complete the necessary tooling work to adapt the old machinery to the new models.
When the tooling program is completed, only a skeleton crew of these skilled
craftsmen are retained for maintenance and duplicate tooling. Three or four
thousand skilled craftsmen are shifted to ordinary production jobs while more
than 10,000 are laid off entirely until their labor is needed for the next tooling
season. During the past five years more than half of the tool and die makers
in the industry, or more than 10,000, averaged less than six months work per
year. At the present time there are approximately 3,000 tool and die makers
unemployed in the auto industry; some 2,500 have been transferred to ordinary machine-tending production jobs. Many of the remainder are on a short
work week.
on
ucti
prod
on
ing
work
e
thos
ed,
ploy
unem
are
who
men
the
to
tion
addi
In
men
die
and
tool
0
2,00
least
at
are
e
ther
time,
part
and those employed only
work
short
the
of
use
beca
jobs
on
ucti
prod
into
gone
tly
anen
perm
who have
of
out
ed
comb
be
d
coul
s
anic
mech
e
Thes
.
stry
indu
die
year in the tool and
.
work
die
and
tool
for
n
agai
e
labl
avai
made
and
nts
rtme
production depa
Thus in manpower, as in machines, we have unused capacity; the highly
do
to
e
labl
avai
are
ers
work
die
and
tool
0
7,50
of
s
skill
specialized and valuable
the necessary tooling for the plane production program here outlined.
on
ing
work
now
is
rs,
Moto
ral
Gene
of
sion
divi
a
ion,
orat
Corp
Body
Fisher
wood models for a new body design. Chrysler also is working on new models,
stry
indu
le
mobi
auto
the
If
way.
r
unde
wise
like
is
work
die
for which some
die
and
tool
ed
ploy
unem
rb
abso
will
it
ls,
mode
new
for
s
plan
with
d
ahea
goes
stry
indu
auto
the
in
ls
mode
new
of
tion
oduc
intr
the
if
workers. However,
s
anic
mech
ed
skill
00
15,0
to
00
12,0
from
hs,
mont
six
for
could be delayed
for
res
fixtu
and
jigs
dies,
,
tools
y
ssar
nece
the
d
buil
to
e
labl
avai
made
could be
.
basis
on
ucti
prod
mass
a
on
ship
uit
purs
l
meta
all
an
of
on
ucti
the prod
die
and
tool
the
like
,
stry
indu
ve
moti
auto
the
of
s
shop
die
The tool and
in
s
shop
ing
jobb
die
and
tool
90
The
idle.
ally
parti
are
es,
selv
workers them
s
urer
fact
Manu
Die
and
Tool
ve
moti
Auto
the
with
iated
affil
area
oit
the Detr
.
city
capa
full
at
ated
oper
when
ers
work
die
and
tool
0
7,00
Association employ
tool
al
tion
addi
75
some
are
there
ion,
ciat
Asso
the
in
s
shop
these
In addition to
on.
ucti
prod
city
capa
at
ers
work
die
and
tool
0
1,50
oy
empl
h
whic
s
shop
and die
die
and
tool
large
are
e
ther
ses,
rpri
ente
ent
pend
inde
these
to
And, in addition
wn
kno
are
e
Thes
er.
prop
ts
plan
parts
and
body
auto,
the
departments within
have
s
shop
die
and
tool
”
tive
“cap
great
e
Thes
.
shops
die
and
tool
”
as “captive
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
?
a capacity beyond the available manpower if all the skilled men in the entire
industry were employed on a full-time basis.
A typical example of the tremendous unused capacity of these captive shops
is that of Fisher Body No. 23 at Detroit. This is the largest tool and die shop
in the world. It builds the sheet metal dies, welding bucks and fixtures, and
special machinery for all Fisher Body plants in the General Motors Corpora-
tion.
In 1931 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 4,800 tool and die makers
at the peak of the tooling program. In 1940 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 1,400 tool and die makers at the peak of the tooling season. In December, 1940, this plant employed only 175 tool and die makers and even
these few were on a reduced work week.
As important as the tool and die worker is the engineer who designs the
tools and dies. Here, too, the same situation repeats itself. There are in the
Detroit and metropolitan areas about 2,100 designing engineers. Their drawings would be needed for the new tools and dies required to adapt automotive
machinery to plane production. Designing engineers, like tool and die workers, are largely unemployed between tooling seasons. Here, too, a six months
delay in new automobile models would make available an ample supply of
the necessary skilled men.
Just as there is no shortage of skilled labor in the automobile industry, so
there is no shortage of unskilled labor. Despite the defense program, there is
a minimum of 100,000 former automobile workers unemployed or on WPA,
not to speak of the thousands of young people in automobile production areas
who would welcome an opportunity to work in plane production.
The Program in Operation
We propose that the President of the United States appoint an aviation
production board of nine members, three representing the government, three
representing management and three representing labor. We propose that this
board be given full authority to organize and supervise the mass production
of airplanes in the automobile and automotive parts industry.
The first task of the board would be to organize a staff of production and
tooling engineers and assign them to make a plant-by-plant survey of the
industry to determine the capacity of each plant, and the extent to which it is
being utilized.
The next task of the board would be to break down a blue-
print of the type of plane chosen for mass production into its constituent
parts and allocate the various parts of the engine, wings and fuselage among
the different automotive plants in accordance with their unused capacity and
the kind of work to which that unused capacity is being adapted. Work is to
be parcelled out with an eye to spreading it as widely as possible, for much
quicker results will be obtained if each plant has to cope with but one or two
probelms of design and tooling. As contrasted with the present method,
which dumps half a hundred technical problems into the lap of one manufacturer who must build an entire engine or plane, this method has all the advan-
tages of division of labor.
10
500
PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
500 PLANES
The production board should have power to allocate the tooling and designing necessary among the various tool and die shops in accordance with their
capacity and their specialized qualifications.
Power to appoint inspectors for each plant in accordance with its part in
the general plan should be given the production board and there should be
close inspection of each part manufactured before its release.
We propose the establishment of a central motor assembly plant to which
all complete parts shall be shipped after they pass inspection.
The automotive industry has unused floor space as it has unused men and
machines. We suggest that the Hupmobile plant in Detroit (a plant which
produced only 371 cars in 1939, and which at the present time is completely
idle) be leased by the government for a central motor assembly plant. The
plant is large enough for five assembly lines with a daily total production
capacity of 500 complete aircraft engines a day. The plant could be operated
on a three 714 hour shift basis and the unused machinery now in the building
could be placed in other plants in accordance with the general production
plan.
Similar methods can be applied to the manufacture and assembly of the
wings and fuselage, and here, too, there is ample unused floor space for new
assembly lines. Six complete floors of a building one block long and a half
block wide are available at Fisher Body Plant No. 21, Detroit, which formerly made bodies for Buick.
(This work has now been transferred to
Fisher Body Plant No. 1 at Flint, Michigan.) Several floors are also available
at the Fisher Body Plant No. 23 in Detroit, and there is also floor space available at the Briggs Highland Park plant and at the old Ford Highland Park
plant.
Outstanding example of idle floor space is the Murray Body Corporation
in Detroit, the third largest body making corporation in America. Since
its loss of the Ford body contract, Murray is not producing a single automobile
body. There are 234,375 square feet of floor space in Building 107 in Murray
Plant No. 1, 300,000 square feet available in Building No.
121 and 20,000
square feet available in Building No. 129. This available space will probably
be needed for the contract Murray has obtained to stamp the metal parts and
assemble the wing sections for Douglas bombers, but there is still 200,000 feet
more of modern floor space in the Murray plant which is now being used for
storage. This could be turned to the uses of this production program.
Similar is the situation at the Fisher Body plant in Cleveland. The third,
fourth and fifth floors of this building are now being used for storage, and
could easily be made available for assembly lines. This plant at one time made
all metal stampings for Chevrolet bodies. Additional floor space is also available in the Cleveland area.
A final assembly plant would also be needed for the job of assembling the
engine, wings and fuselage into the completed plane. For this purpose we
suggest the construction of cheap flat hangars in the open space around the
Wayne County airport. Completed engines, wings and fuselage would be
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
11
trucked from the sub-assembly plants to these hangars and the completed
planes could be flown from the airport. Similar flat hangars could be erected
for final assemblies at the Cleveland airport.
We suggest that the sub-assemblies and the final assemblies be placed under
the control of men carefully selected upon the basis of skill and experience
from the various assembly staffs in our motor car and body plants, and that
these picked men be used as the core of the assembly staffs to be developed
under this plan. Provisions for protecting the seniority of these men must
be guaranteed.
The first few thousand planes produced will not meet 100 percent performance requirements, for in mass production of planes as in mass production of
automobiles a few thousand jobs must always be run before the “bugs” (technical problems of machining and assembly) are worked out. This is not
serious since the first few thousand planes will more than meet the requirements as training ships.
Management Responsibility and Labor Cooperation
The automotive industry workers believe that this plan is the only one
which offers hope of quick production of planes. It seeks solution of our
problem not in the costly and lengthy work of erecting entire new plants, but
in the efficient organization of existing idle man-power, machines, skill and
floor space.
By dividing the parts among many manufacturers, the greatest possible
number of minds is brought to bear on the production problems involved.
Though we propose payment of a fair profit to each manufacturer in accordance with his share in the work, we can foresee the fears this plan may arouse
on the part of some managements. They may prefer a method whereby the
government finances entire new engines and aircraft plants. Aviation companies may look with misgiving on a production program that would inevitably
cut the cost of planes by putting their production on a mass production basis.
But we believe the average management executive would not put forward
these selfish considerations at a time of crisis.
Labor offers its whole-hearted cooperation. All that Labor asks is intelligent planning, a voice in matters of policy and administration, recognition of
its rights, and maintenance of its established standards.
The merit of our plan is that it saves time, and time is our problem. Normal methods can build all the planes we need—if we wait until 1942 and 1943
to get them. This plan is put forward in the belief that the need for planes
is immediate, and terrifying. Precious moments pass away as we delay. We
dare not invite the disaster that may come with further delay.
Appendix III
Appendix I
NUMBER
NAME
OF CARS AND
TRUCKS
OF COMPANY
BN
ae
CR
Buick
Da
SEPT. ’°36 THRU
orci
COOP IOT IT BROCE
BI
RMON
on spent
5
a oleate cet neues
lect eee en
enantio ea
1,149,662
235,065
seenemnasrer
suai oavoptasene
ors
pnbbylaes
ici
edbaptcer
eas
liicieme
le a
eel Coe a
lat
Cavities Labelle
UPR
PRODUCED
ne tak
i
sob aar
ia ae
ee
te ht
eg i oe
552,610
cae iece i s
81,390
a ae
WGRAPA
oe
So
s
WhttecTMne
re
a
© CATOD
RO
el
Total General Motors...
"Petal CUPWAIeE csi
on
a
OMAN RO oe
date gansta
ital
* Grand
ie
Se
total
also
includes
ee
Harvester, Mack Truck, Reo Truck, Stutz
Source:
Ward’s Automotive Reports.
Note:
Canadian production represents
378,510
304,455
103,210
1,279,003
83,680
913,900
21,067
125,207
2.547
97,632
86,695
57,216
22,681
371
90,674
104,931
114,682
65,302
32,930
12,727
‘ope sex
1,115,720
1,311,716
ge
’869,980
936,581
4,334,204
of
and
Diamond
19
PSS
12
9
6
A>
11
5
69,660
5,06
ee
production
412,545
14,035
ee,
mately 60% of capacity used.
Size of Machines
Number of Machines
52.275
121,301
a ae
ae etd hee oe tee
.
38,032
300
ae
ce usinehens ilananauey
oa
196,732
291,021
32,803
eee
ROTEL
1,044,100
224,475
56,410
iret ce ee
ee
Hudson-Terraplane. __.____
Rimioniile
SEPT. ’39 TH
45,668
I
ag
nae as ae
peiaeooraabat lies
FIC
i ike eagle
ep cieetinioinulnaimmntennaandtiatee:
MC
AUG. ’37
CANADA
199,569
220,214
peeeioacati ees tade ic i ah er sedsics sadlsashssnglidcsedeass
aatesttt bari ete ect aidintetncnnmsadlec ebay
IN U.S. AND
3,653,376
T
Truck,
miscellaneous
approximately
not
4%
of
Federal
listed
the
Truck,
separately.
total
Int’l
production.
Appendix II
6
3
=
Co.
ct on
os
B<
3
ae
eS
4
be
#g
=
ve
2"
8a 3
‘3
v
EZ,
Cadillac
Dodge
Studebaker
Plymouth
|
ae
os
Chrysler and
22
361
31
43
w
Bo
oa
5m
= 3
a
S<
os
as
gg
>“=
N2s
2
eet
Ad
a)
J. 38
Bo
<a Om
oak
mo
Q
a &
sie Bee
S
s
.
wey
ae
e606
Lom
aes
Y
on
Sst
e
aoe
Cte
ag
cy
Saou
ae
Pan
Pern
134,768
530,745
221,318
552.295
foe
172,800
835,200
336,000
964,800
23ers
118,368
216,000
13514
Nash
Chevrolet
Buick
17
49
42
345,600
2,136,000
721,500*
49144
147
121
On basis of 13-hour day.
es
32
78
40
* Note:
Se
Ge
45
udson
288,384
1,091,900
430,479
=a
8
97,642
167
41
441,600
#2
O-5
o
19
50
360,000
240,000
217,125
8h
=
2,
ae
°
75
50
163,268
207,070
51
Bae
Bs
8
cm
Le
=
196,732
32,930
5414
17
Pontiac
8
46o8
ae
or
36
174
70
201
648,000
wae
“i
38,032
304,455
114,682
412,545
494,660
ismobile
Willys-
q
hp
2 &
sa
eo
“3B
~
66
~—-:108
103
128
24
os
o-*
ga?»
aR
62”
88
USss
a
2=
a
ag
é
Present Production of Completed
© Motors per Hour
o
PLANTS
75
147
153,340
224,475
135
92
S7.216 6 72
1,044,100
445
291,021
185
Wo
&
POSSIBILITIES OF MAJOR
174
10oa |
NNO©S
PRODUCTION
AVAILABLE FOR PLANE PRODUCTION IN THE
CHEVROLET FORGE PLANT, DETROIT
The following equipment in the Chevrolet Drop Forge plant at the present
time—the peak of the plant production program—is operating at approxiFACILITIES
172
347
179
1
1
Z
4
11
1,500
2,500
3,500
5,000
12,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
lbs.
lbs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
lbs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
250 ton
950 ton
1,000 ton
1,600 ton
1,500 Ibs.
Types of Machines
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Board
Board
Board
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammers
Hammers
Hammers
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Forge Press ( Hydraulic)
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Board Hammers
In addition to the hammers and presses listed, numerous large and small
upsetting (header) presses are available. If the above equipment were used
at full capacity, this plant alone could produce all the necessary drop forgings
required for the production of 500 airplane engines per day, and still supply
the Chevrolet Motor Car Company with sufficient forgings for 1,000,000
Chevrolet cars in the coming year. Skilled hammermen are available to operate these forge hammers at full capacity.
In addition to the Chevrolet Forge plant, there are many other forge plants,
such as the Buick Forge plant, Dodge Truck and Forge, etc., which have considerable unused capacity.
Appendix IV
FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY FOR STAMPING METAL SECTIONS FOR WINGS AND FUSELAGE
The following stamping presses in the Cleveland Fisher Body Plant are at
the present time—the peak of the body production season—operating at less
than 50 percent of capacity.
es
hin
Mac
of
e
Typ
es
hin
Mac
of
ber
Num
Double Crank Presses
.
74
Toggle Presses
19
No. 78 Single Crank Presses
26
Numerous small blanking and stamping presses
t
mus
one
,
ent
ipm
equ
of
list
ve
abo
the
of
nce
ica
nif
sig
full
the
e
iat
rec
app
To
ld
wou
it
e
tim
the
and
,
cost
r
thei
ses,
pres
se
the
of
size
s
dou
men
tre
the
ize
real
require a new plant to get delivery of such presses.
A big Toggle press, for
14
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
example, stands 40 feet from the base to the top of the press and is large
enough to hold and operate a draw or flange die which itself weights from 70
to 80 tons. Such presses cost from $150,000 to $175,000 and it would require
years to get delivery of the number and type of such press equipment that
a now standing idle more than 50 percent of the time at the Cleveland Fisher
plant.
Present employment in the Fisher Cleveland press room reflects the extent
to which the presses are now idle. There are 600 men on the day shift, 300
on the afternoon shift, and 67 on the midnight shift.
In addition to Cleveland Fisher Body, every major body plant in the automobile industry has unused press room capacity which can, with the necessary
special dies, be adapted to plane production.
Appendix V
REPLY
TO
OBJECTIONS
Virtually all of the criticisms of the program have been anonymous—aircraft and automotive industry executives refusing, for some reason, to lend
their names to their printed views. The criticisms do not in any case run
against the feasibility of the program. By and large, they indicate either a
sad lack of imagination or an insistence by automotive interests to continue
with “business as usual.” However, since some misconceptions of the program have gained credence it is advisable to discuss and dispose of these
matters.
BOMBERS
OR PURSUIT
SHIPS
It has been wrongly assumed that the program contemplated the production
only of pursuit ships. Our reference to the possible production of 500 fighting
planes a day was used only to indicate the over-all productive capacity of an
automobile industry whose idle machines and idle men were fully mobilized
and whose private interests were temporarily subordinated. The productive
capacity we have indicated can as readily be adapted to the production of
medium-sized or heavy bombers. If these latter types are built rather than
pursuit ships, the daily production would be scaled down in proportion to the
increased amount of work required on each plane. Nevertheless, our program
could build many more bombers, large or small, than are now being built or
are contemplated, and in much shorter time.
MAN-HOURS
REQUIRED
Some sources in the automobile industry assert our plan is impractical
because of the relatively small percentage of machine hours in manufacturing
an automobile as compared with the total man hours required to build a plane.
These sources contend that out of 18,000 man-hours necessary to build a
pursuit ship, 10,000 are devoted to construction of air frames, work on which
is usually done by hand.
In attempting to prove their point, these sources
simply multiply 10,000 man-hours by 500 planes a day which gives them a tremendous and impressive figure. It would be as logical to take the number of
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
15
s
thi
ly
ip
lt
mu
en
th
d
an
nd
ha
by
car
t
le
ro
hours required to custom-build a Chev
e
ov
pr
to
ure
fig
us
do
en
em
tr
t
tha
use
d
an
on
figure by Chevrolet's daily producti
g
in
ld
ui
-b
om
st
Cu
.
day
a
s
car
0
00
6,
e
uc
od
pr
ly
ib
ss
po
that Chevrolet could not
.
rk
wo
of
s
ur
ho
n
ma
0
10
1,
es
ir
qu
re
d,
te
ma
ti
es
en
be
has
of an automobile, it
e
uc
od
pr
to
s
ur
ho
n
ma
0
00
0,
00
0,
40
4,
ed
ir
qu
re
ve
ha
d
ul
wo
it
t
This means tha
s
tic
cri
our
of
on
ti
en
nt
co
the
ry
car
To
l.
de
mo
39
19
the 4,000,000 cars of the
0
00
0,
20
2,
ed
ir
qu
re
ve
ha
d
ul
wo
it
:
on
si
lu
nc
co
l
ica
log
ir
on this score to the
00,
4,0
r’s
yea
t
las
e
uc
od
pr
to
r
yea
a
s
ek
we
ty
fif
ek
we
a
s
ur
ho
40
g
men workin
000 automobiles.
use
but
es
titi
quan
n
tio
duc
pro
mass
of
k
spea
thus
e
The persons who argu
y
tar
men
ele
an
is
It
s.
hod
met
n
tio
duc
pro
ilt
-bu
tom
cus
of
the mathematics
the
to
ed
ar
mp
co
as
d
han
by
ngs
thi
ng
doi
nt
spe
fact that the number of hours
r
eve
in
ies
var
)
rs
ou
-h
ne
hi
ac
(m
es
in
ch
ma
ing
rat
number of hours spent ope
roint
are
s
que
hni
tec
n
tio
duc
pro
s
mas
t
tha
ent
ext
the
to
n
increasing proportio
ng
ldi
bui
in
nt
spe
rs
hou
of
er
mb
nu
The
s.
ces
pro
n
tio
duc
pro
the
duced into
d,
rte
sta
ry
ust
ind
the
en
wh
was
it
t
wha
of
xth
-si
one
n
tha
s
les
an automobile is
per
in
se
rea
inc
rs
hou
e
in
ch
ma
the
se
rea
dec
rs
hou
n
ma
ll
r-a
ove
and as the
rn
de
mo
a
o
int
go
can
e
On
d.
han
by
e
don
rk
wo
the
to
ed
centage as compar
continuous strip steel mill and see this in its sharpest form.
FLOOR SPACE REQUIRED
s
ic
at
em
th
ma
the
in
nes
pla
of
n
tio
duc
pro
s
mas
of
ng
nki
thi
of
This mistake
of
ity
cal
cti
pra
the
of
on
sti
que
the
ses
rai
o
als
n
of custom-built hand productio
y
tar
men
ele
r
he
ot
An
k.
wor
ly
emb
ass
for
ce
spa
or
flo
ary
css
providing the nee
le
cyc
n
tio
duc
pro
the
te
ple
com
to
ary
ess
nec
s
fact is that the number of day
rtsho
is
ft)
cra
air
and
os
aut
as
h
suc
s
rie
ust
ind
ng
ati
ric
fab
(in machining and
d.
lie
app
is
que
hni
tec
n
tio
duc
pro
s
mas
t
tha
ent
ext
the
to
n
tio
ened in propor
e
tru
is
s
Thi
.
ded
nee
is
ce
spa
or
flo
less
the
le
cyc
n
The shorter the productio
m.
mu
ni
mi
a
at
d
hel
is
n
tio
duc
pro
of
s
ces
pro
the
in
s
because the number of job
e
sam
the
by
day
a
s
car
00
6,0
ld
bui
to
had
y
an
mp
Co
r
to
Mo
let
If the Chevro
and
r
we
po
n
ma
al
tot
the
,
nes
pla
ld
bui
to
d
use
ng
bei
w
no
methods that are
n
tur
to
te
qua
ade
be
not
d
ul
wo
ry
ust
ind
le
bi
mo
to
au
ire
ent
the
of
ce
spa
floor
out its present production.
t
t—a
fee
0
,00
785
ce—
spa
r
floo
of
ity
bil
ila
ava
the
d
cite
ort
rep
Our original
r
the
fur
A
.
ors
mot
of
g
lin
emb
ass
the
for
t,
roi
the Hupmobile plant, in Det
an,
hig
Mic
g,
sin
Lan
at
nt
pla
Reo
the
is
ce
spa
or
flo
ble
ila
striking example of ava
are
squ
7
,23
553
nt,
pla
ue
en
Av
pe
Ho
Mt.
ce:
spa
ant
vac
ing
low
which has the fol
feet; Building No. 4800, 247,931
square feet.
production
motors per
senger cars
square feet; Building No. 4700, 104,247
h
wit
ed
pp
ui
eq
ly
ful
is
t
fee
are
squ
0
,00
500
nt
pla
in
ma
’s
In Reo
machinery. Starting January 13, 1941, Reo will be producing five
pas
125
and
ck
tru
160
ed
uc
od
pr
e
tim
one
at
t
tha
nt
pla
a
day in
in one eight-hour shift.
DIFFERENCES
IN
ENGINES
Doubts have been expressed on the adaptability of automobile production
machinery to production of aircraft motors because of the reduced weight of
aircraft motors. These doubts are without foundation.
16
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
The reduced weight of an aircraft motor per horsepower as compared with
automobile motors is secured firstly by the difference in the design of the
motor and secondly by the fact that all parts of an aircraft motor are reduced
to a minimum weight by removing all surplus metal. This is done by a process
of machining. The same basic machinery is used to machine parts for an
aircraft motor as for an automobile motor, excepting that a more complete and
precise machining job is done in the case of the aircraft motor. The available
machinery in the automobile industry can be retooled to turn out aircraft
motors of 1,000 or 2,000 horsepower of either the air-cooled or liquid-cooled
design.
The objection has also been raised that aircraft engines must be made in
more precise dimensions than automobile engines. As our program points
out, more precise parts are obtained by more precise tooling.
SHORTAGE
OF
ARMAMENTS
Any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc., is not a legitimate
criticism of our plan.
Such bottlenecks can be met if production of such
armament, instruments, etc., is spread over existing industries whose machine
capacities and production facilities are adaptable to such production. The
pooling of such productive capacity with central assembly plants using the
same approach we suggest for aircraft production will make it possible to
eliminate any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc.
SIMILARITY OF BASIC MACHINERY
In our program we state that basic machinery used for automobile production can be adapted for producing aircraft parts. We point out that precise and
difficult parts of the Allison engine are being made in the old Cadillac plant
in Detroit with machinery which duplicates existing unused automobile plant
machinery. These statements have been challenged in some quarters. Herewith is a list of machinery, newly constructed and installed in the Allison
division in Detroit, which duplicates existing automobile plant machinery:
Grinding machines:
Cincinnati centerless, Exlo internal and external,
Bland, Norton, Landis, Blanchard, Brown and Sharpe, (Bryant) and Held.
(These machines are used to produce the following parts which are common
to both aircraft and automobile motors: camshafts, crankshafts, bearings, connecting rods, wrist pins.) Milling machines: Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Sunstrand and Brown and Sharpe. Keller machines: Wickes lathes, Greenlee
lathes and Cincinnati lathes. Spline machines: Sunstrand, and Brown and
Sharpe. Hones: Exlo and Wickes.
PRESENT
USE
OF
FACILITIES
It is argued that the facilities of the automobile industry are already being
employed for production of aircraft parts. Our surveys indicate that not ten
percent of the available facilities are being brought into play for defense purposes. The present plans do not contemplate the coordination and full use of
facilities which alone can produce a large number of planes within a comparatively short period.
”
900 PLANES A DAY
A Program
Industry
forthe
Utilization
of the Automobile
for Mass
Production
of Defense
By
WALTER
FOREWORD
P. REUTHER
By PHILIP
MURRAY
UAW-CIO
International Education
Department
Detroit, Michigan
;
oeSE™ 95
Planes
500 PLANES
A DAY
500 PLANES
hours required to custom-build a Chevrolet car by hand and then multiply this
figure by Chevrolet’s daily production and use that tremendous figure to prove
that Chevrolet could not possibly produce 6,000 cars a day. Custom-building
of an automobile, it has been estimated, requires 1,100 man hours of work.
This means that it would have required 4,400,000,000 man hours to produce
the 4,000,000 cars of the 1939 model. To carry the contention of our critics
on this score to their logical conclusion:
it would
have required
The reduced weight of an aircraft motor per horsepower as compared with
automobile motors is secured firstly by the difference in the design of the
motor and secondly by the fact that all parts of an aircraft motor are reduced
to a minimum weight by removing all surplus metal. This is done by a process
of machining. The same basic machinery is used to machine parts for an
aircraft motor as for an automobile motor, excepting that a more complete and
precise machining job is done in the case of the aircraft motor. The available
machinery in the automobile industry can be retooled to turn out aircraft
motors of 1,000 or 2,000 horsepower of either the air- -cooled or liquid-cooled
design.
The objection has also been raised that aircraft engines must be made in
more precise dimensions than automobile engines. As our program points
out, more precise parts are obtained by more precise tooling.
2,200,000
men working 40 hours a week fifty weeks a year to produce last year’s 4,000,000 automobiles.
The persons who argue thus speak of mass production quantities but use
the mathematics of custom-built production methods. It is an elementary
fact that the number of hours spent doing things by hand as compared to the
number of hours spent Operating machines (machine-hours) varies in ever
increasing proportion to the extent that mass production techniques are introduced into the production process. The number of hours spent in building
an automobile is less than one-sixth of what it was when the industry started,
and as the over-all man hours decrease the machine hours increase in percentage as compared to the work done by hand. One can go into a modern
continuous strip steel mill and see this in its sharpest form.
SHORTAGE
feet; Building No. 4800, 247,931
square feet; Building No. 4700,
sca
ssp
eases
aa
SIMILARITY OF BASIC MACHINERY
In our program we state that basic machinery used for automobile production can be adapted for producing aircraft parts. We point out that precise and
difficult parts of the Allison engine are being made in the old Cadillac plant
in Detroit with machinery which duplicates existing unused automobile plant
machinery. These statements have been challenged in some quarters. Here-
(These machines are used to produce the following parts which are common
to both aircraft and automobile motors: camshafts, crankshafts, bearings, connecting rods, wrist pins.)
Milling machines: Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Sunstrand and Brown and Sharpe. Keller machines: Wickes lathes, Greenlee
lathes and Cincinnati lathes. Spline machines: Sunstrand, and Brown and
Sharpe. Hones: Exlo and Wickes.
104,247
PRESENT
USE
OF
FACILITIES
It is argued that the facilities of the automobile industry are already being
————
a
ENGINES.
Doubts have been expressed on the adaptability of automobile production
machinery to production of aircraft motors because of the reduced weight of
aircraft motors. ‘These doubts are without foundation.
eliminate any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc.
Grinding machines:
Cincinnati centerless, Exlo internal and external,
Bland, Norton, Landis, Blanchard, Brown and Sharpe, (Bryant) and Held.
————
IN
ARMAMENTS
with is a list of machinery, newly constructed and installed in the Allison
division in Detroit, which duplicates existing automobile plant machinery:
square feet. In Reo’s main plant 500,000 square feet is fully equipped with
production machinery. Starting January 13, 1941, Reo will be producing five
motors per day in a plant that at one time produced 160 truck and 125 passenger cars in one eight-hour shift.
DIFFERENCES
OF
Any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc., is not a legitimate
criticism of our plan. Such bottlenecks can be met if production of such
armament, instruments, etc., is spread over existing industries whose machine
Capacities and production facilities are adaptable to such production. The
pooling of such productive capacity with central assembly plants using the
same approach we suggest for aircraft production will make it possible to
FLOOR SPACE REQUIRED
This mistake of thinking of mass production of planes in the mathematics
of custom-built hand production also raises the question of the practicality of
providing the neecssary floor space for assembly work. Another elementary
fact is that the number of days necessary to complete the production cycle
(in machining and fabricating industries such as autos and aircraft) is short- _
ened in proportion to the extent that mass production technique is applied. ahs
The shorter the production cycle the less floor space is needed. This is true
because the number of jobs in the process of production is held at a minimum.
If the Chevrolet Motor Company had to build 6,000 cars a day by the same
methods that are now being used to build planes, the total man power and
floor space of the entire automobile industry would not be adequate to turn
out its present production.
Our original report cited the availability of floor space—785,000 feet—at
the Hupmobile plant, in Detroit, for the assembling of motors. A further
striking example of available floor space is the Reo plant at Lansing, Michigan,
which has the following vacant space: Mt. Hope Avenue plant, 553,237 square
A DAY
employed for production of aircraft parts. Our surveys indicate that not ten
percent of the available facilities are being brought into play for defense purposes. The present plans do not contemplate the coordination and full use of
facilities which alone can produce a large number of planes within a comparatively short period.
500 PLANES
A DAY
Packard and other companies are still digging the ditches and pouring the
concrete for their new airplane engine factories. The Axis powers will not
wait politely until these factories are finished.
New plants, when finally erected, must be filled with new machinery and
this new equipment largely duplicates machinery already available in our automobile plants. The machine industry is overtaxed. The emergency of war
cannot be met in the normal time necessary to construct new plants and equip
them with the required production machinery.
We propose, instead of building entirely new machines, to make the tools
required to adapt existing automotive machinery to aircraft manufacture.
We propose to transform the entire unused capacity of the automotive
industry into one huge plane production unit. Production under this plan
would not replace the output of the aircraft industry proper, which would
continue to construct the large bombers and planes of special design.
Fifty Percent of Automobile Industry's Potential Capacity Is Unused
No industry in the world has the tremendous unused potential productive
capacity of the American automotive industry, and no industry is as easily
adaptable to the mass production of planes. A careful survey will show that
the automobile industry as a whole is not using more than 50 percent of its
maximum potential capacity if that capacity were properly coordinated and
operated to the fullest degree.
The automotive industry could produce 8,000,000 cars a year. It is producing approximately 4,000,000. These unused plant reserves, as shown by
the figures given in the Federal Trade Commission’s report on the motor
vehicle industry, are greater than the total motor plant capacity of England,
Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Japan combined. Adapted to plane production, this unused potential capacity would give us world plane supremacy
within a short time.
At present the automotive industry never operates at more than 80 to 90
percent of its maximum potential capacity, and then only for a few months
each year. The rest of the year it operates on reduced schedules, and many
plants shut down completely. If automobile production were spread evenly
over a 12-month period, it would be possible, without reducing the total output of automobiles, to convert a large portion of this machinery to the manufacture of planes.
During the automotive year ending August, 1940, Nash used only 17 percent of its productive capacity; Dodge used 3614 percent. Nash, working at
maximum capacity, could have manufactured its total output for the 12
months in 4912 working days; Dodge, in 111 working days. Chevrolet, the
largest single producer of motor cars, turned out over a million cars during
the last model year, and yet used less than 50 percent of its potential productive capacity. The main Chevrolet Motor plant at Flint, Michigan, produced 380 completed motors per hour at the peak of the 1937 production
season, utilizing all four of its complete motor machining and assembly lines.
At the present time, at the peak of the 1940 production season, the Chevrolet
500 PLANES
A DAY
ng
ndi
sta
line
or
mot
one
h
wit
r,
hou
per
ors
mot
282
ing
Flint plant is produc
ift
-sh
two
a
on
ing
rat
ope
are
s
line
ing
ain
rem
ee
thr
the
le
whi
,
idle
completely
,
nda
awa
Ton
in
nt
pla
or
mot
new
a
lt
bui
has
let
vro
Che
7,
193
ce
Sin
basis.
per
ors
mot
te
ple
com
65
ing
duc
pro
is
e
tim
t
sen
pre
the
at
ch
whi
New York,
t
tha
te
ica
ind
ld
wou
s
Thi
r.
hou
per
ors
mot
90
of
ty
aci
cap
nt
pla
a
h
hour, wit
at the peak of the production season Chevrolet is only building 347 motors
sed
unu
an
h
Wit
r.
hou
per
ors
mot
470
of
ty
aci
cap
ual
act
an
h
wit
per hour,
is
it
,
son
sea
n
tio
duc
pro
the
of
k
pea
the
at
r
hou
per
ors
mot
123
of
ty
aci
cap
s
dur
dou
men
tre
s
ome
bec
ch
whi
e
erv
res
sed
unu
an
has
let
vro
Che
t
tha
s
iou
obv
ing the month of reduced operating schedules.
in
n
tio
duc
pro
ne
pla
for
es
liti
faci
n
tio
duc
pro
e
tiv
omo
aut
of
ity
bil
ila
ava
The
in
nt
pla
ge
for
p
dro
let
vro
Che
the
of
e
cas
the
in
wn
sho
in
aga
is
Chevrolet
p
sho
this
If
ld.
wor
the
in
d
kin
its
of
p
sho
ge
for
p
dro
t
ges
lar
Detroit, the
were operated at full capacity, it could produce all the drop forgings required
vro
Che
the
ply
sup
l
stil
and
,
day
per
ors
mot
ne
pla
air
500
of
n
tio
duc
pro
for the
.
year
a
cars
let
vro
Che
000
00,
1,0
for
gs
gin
for
p
dro
t
ien
fic
suf
h
wit
y
let compan
Skilled labor to operate this shop at full capacity is available. Other forge
shops, including the Buick and the Dodge forge shops, are also working at far
less than capacity. (See appendix for shop equipment and production schedules. )
Automobile Motor Building Facilities Can Be Adapted to Make Plane Motors
Are the facilities used in manufacturing automobile motors adaptable to the
manufacture of airplane motors? The answer is that they are.
Both the automobile and airplane motors are combustion engines, essentially
the same mechanism for generating power by exploding gas. Both motors
contain cylinders, carburetors, pistons, crankshafts, camshafts, valves, sparkplugs, ignition systems, etc.
The same basic machinery is utilized in the manufacture of these basic parts
common to both motors.
True, there are differences between the automobile
and the airplane engine, as there are differences of a lesser degree between the
engine of the Chevrolet and the engine of the Cadillac. These differences
between different erigines are produced by adding certain tools, dies, jigs or
fixtures to the basic machine in order to make a difference in the product. The
same “tooling” process adapts the same basic machinery to the production of
the airplane engine. Graphic proof of this statement is even now being supplied by General Motors. Many of the most difficult and precise parts of the
Allison aviation engine are being manufactured in the Cadillac plant in
Detroit, much of it with retooled Cadillac machinery. The new Allison plant
in Indianapolis, still in process of expansion, is being used largely for assembly.
The experience of General Motors in making Allison parts with retooled
Cadillac machinery should also dispose of the bugaboo of “tolerances.” “Tolerances” are the allowable fractional variations in size of engine parts, and they
must be far finer in the plane engine than in the automobile engine. But these
more precise dimensions can be obtained by more precise tooling.
500 PLANES
A DAY-
500 PLANES
be
will
it
,
ted
ple
com
are
ts
plan
or
mot
ne
pla
air
ted
pla
tem
con
When the
necessary to equip them with the same kind of basic production machinery
already standing idle half of the time in the nation’s automotive factories.
This basic machinery will be duplicated, and after it is duplicated it will still
be necessary to construct the special tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures required to
adapt this machinery to the manufacture of plane engines.
In the process of duplicating basic machinery, lies the most serious delay.
This lag, which from all indications may continue, may well defeat our national
defense program.
An additional burden is placed on the already over-loaded
machine tool industry. We propose to short-cut the process by building only
the tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures necessary to convert idle automotive machinery
into plane engine machinery. A few special machines will be necessary, but
these will be but a small part of the total equipment. In this way a job that
will otherwise take at least 18 months can be done in six months.
Certain basic machines are necessary to build both automobile and aircraft
types of engines. These include gear cutters, gear shapers, screw machines,
bullards, drill presses, punch presses, broaching machines, turret lathes, various
types of milling machines, various types of lathes and Fay machines, lapping
machines, various types of grinding machines, die casting machines, forge
presses, header machines, foundry equipment, welding and riveting equipment.
Automobile Industry Adaptable for Stamping of Wings and Fuselage
The plane has three main parts: engine, wings and fuselage. Just as there is
unused capacity for the production of motors, so there is unused capacity for
the production of the wings and fuselage. The large body plants and the parts
plants have metal stamping equipment now used for stamping out parts for
the body of the automobile which can be adapted to stamping out the parts
which make up the wings and fuselage of the plane. Proof of this is provided
by the tentative plans being made by the automotive industry at the suggestion
of Mr. Knudsen to manufacture parts of the wings and fuselages for large
bombers.
|
|
A survey of the large body plants will show that their equipment for pressing and stamping metal parts are also not being used to full capacity. Murray
Body, Briggs and the Fisher Body plants show a 50 percent overall unused capacity in their pressrooms. Striking is the example of the Fisher Body plant in
Cleveland, which contains one of the largest pressrooms in the industry. At
present it is operating at but 40 percent of capacity, although automobile
body production is now at its peak. In 1936-37 this plant made all the
stampings for Chevrolet bodies, employing 9200 employes. Today it employs
but 3500, for Fisher has built a new plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan, further
adding to body capacity.
(See appendix for equipment in the Cleveland
Fisher plant.)
Technical problems are involved, of course, in onstructing new
dies to
stamp the lighter aluminum alloys used in plane production. That these problems are not insuperable is shown by the fact that Murray and Briggs are
already stamping wing parts for Douglas bombers.
A DAY
Skilled and Production Labor Available in the Automobile Industry
Skilled labor is necessary to turn out the tools and dies required to adapt
these various types of automotive machinery to plane production. The auto
industry has the largest reservoir of skilled labor in the world. More than
25,000 tool and die workers, jig and fixture men, pattern makers, draftsmen
and designers, and allied craftsmen are employed in the auto industry at the
peak of its tooling program.
Tooling is even more seasonal than production. Each year thousands of the
industry’s most skilled craftsmen work at top speed for a few months to complete the necessary tooling work to adapt the old machinery to the new models.
When the tooling program is completed, only a skeleton crew of these skilled
craftsmen are retained for maintenance and duplicate tooling. Three or four
thousand skilled craftsmen are shifted to ordinary production jobs while more
than 10,000 are laid off entirely until their labor is needed for the next tooling
season. During the past five years more than half of the tool and die makers
in the industry, or more than 10,000, averaged less than six months work per
year. At the present time there are approximately 3,000 tool and die makers
unemployed in the auto industry; some 2,500 have been transferred to ordinaty machine-tending production jobs. Many of the remainder are on a short
work week.
In addition to the men who are unemployed, those working on production
and those employed only part time, there are at least 2,000 tool and die men
who have permanently gone into production jobs because of the short work
year in the tool and die industry. These mechanics could be combed out of
production departments and made available again for tool and die work.
Thus in manpower, as in machines, we have unused capacity; the highly
specialized and valuable skills of 7,500 tool and die workers are available to do
the necessary tooling for the plane production program here outlined.
Fisher Body Corporation, a division of General Motors, is now working on
wood models for a new body design. Chrysler also is working on new models,
for which some die work is likewise under way. If the automobile industry
goes ahead with plans for new models, it will absorb unemployed tool and die
workers. However, if the introduction of new models in the auto industry
could be delayed for six months, from 12,000 to 15,000 skilled mechanics
could be made available to build the necessary tools, dies, jigs and fixtures for
the production of an all metal pursuit ship on a mass production basis.
The tool and die shops of the automotive industry, like the tool and die
workers themselves, are partially idle. The 90 tool and die jobbing shops in
the Detroit area affiliated with the Automotive Tool and Die Manufacturers
Association employ 7,000 tool and die workers when operated at full capacity.
In addition to these shops in the Association, there are some 75 additional tool
and die shops which employ 1,500 tool and die workers at capacity production.
And, in addition to these independent enterprises, there are large tool and die
departments within the auto, body and parts plants proper. These are known
as “captive” tool and die shops. These great “captive” tool and die shops have
500 PLANES
500 PLANES
A DAY
The production board should have power to allocate the tooling and designing necessary among the various tool and die shops in accordance with their
capacity and their specialized qualifications.
Power to appoint inspectors for each plant in accordance with its part in
the general plan should be given the production board and there should be
close inspection of each part manufactured before its release.
We propose the establishment of a central motor assembly plant to which
all complete parts shall be shipped after they pass inspection.
a capacity beyond the available manpower if all the skilled men in the entire
industry were employed on a full-time basis.
A typical example of the tremendous unused capacity of these captive shops
is that of Fisher Body No. 23 at Detroit. This is the largest tool and die shop
in the world. It builds the sheet metal dies, welding bucks and fixtures, and
special machinery for all Fisher Body plants in the General Motors Corporation. In 1931 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 4,800 tool and die makers
at the peak of the tooling program. In 1940 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 1,400 tool and die makers at the peak of the tooling season. In December, 1940, this plant employed only 175 tool and die makers and even
these few were on a reduced work week.
:
As important as the tool and die worker is the engineer who designs the
tools and dies.
Here, too, the same situation repeats itself.
The automotive industry has unused floor space as it has unused men and
| machines. We suggest that the Hupmobile plant in Detroit (a plant which
produced only 371 cars in 1939, and which at the present time is completely
idle) be leased by the government for a central motor assembly plant. The
plant is large enough for five assembly lines with a daily total production
capacity of 500 complete aircraft engines a day. The plant could be operated
on a three 714 hour shift basis and the unused machinery now in the building
could be placed in other plants in accordance with the general production
:
plan.
Similar methods can be applied to the manufacture and assembly of the
wings and fuselage, and here, too, there is ample unused floor space for new
assembly lines. Six complete floors of a building one block long and a half
There are in the
Detroit and metropolitan areas about 2,100 designing engineers. Their drawings would be needed for the new tools and dies required to adapt automotive
machinery to plane production. Designing engineers, like tool and die workers, are largely unemployed between tooling seasons.
Here, too, a six months
delay in new automobile models would make available an ample supply of
the necessary skilled men.
Just as there is no shortage of skilled labor in the automobile industry, so
there is no shortage of unskilled labor. Despite the defense program, there is
a minimum of 100,000 former automobile workers unemployed or on WPA,
not to speak of the thousands of young people in automobile production areas
who would welcome an opportunity to work in plane production.
block wide are available at Fisher Body Plant No. 21, Detroit, which formerly made bodies for Buick.
(This work has now been transferred to
Fisher Body Plant No. 1 at Flint, Michigan.)
Several floors are also available
at the Fisher Body Plant No. 23 in Detroit, and there is also floor space available at the Briggs Highland Park plant and at the old Ford Highland Park
plant.
Outstanding example of idle floor space is the Murray Body Corporation
in Detroit, the third largest body making corporation in America.
Since
its loss of the Ford body contract, Murray is not producing a single automobile
body. There are 234,375 square feet of floor space in Building 107 in Murray
The Program in Operation
We propose that the President of the United States appoint an aviation
production board of nine members, three representing the government, three
representing management and three representing labor. We propose that this
board be given full authority to organize and supervise the mass production
of airplanes in the automobile and automotive parts industry.
The first task of the board would be to organize a staff of production and
tooling engineers and assign them to make a plant-by-plant survey of the
industry to determine the capacity of each plant, and the extent to which it is
being utilized. The next task of the board would be to break down a blueprint of the type of plane chosen for mass production into its constituent
parts and allocate the various parts of the engine, wings and fuselage among
the different automotive plants in accordance with their unused capacity and
the kind of work to which that unused capacity is being adapted. Work is to
be parcelled out with an eye to spreading it as widely as possible, for much
quicker results will be obtained if each plant has to cope with but one or two
probelms of design and tooling. As contrasted with the present method,
which dumps half a hundred technical problems into the lap of one manufac-
turer who must build an entire engine or plane, this method has all the advan-
tages of division of labor.
A DAY
Plant No.
|
1, 300,000 square feet available in Building No.
121 and 20,000
square feet available in Building No. 129. This available space will probably
be needed for the contract Murray has obtained to stamp the metal parts and
assemble the wing sections for Douglas bombers, but there is still 200,000 feet
more of modern floor space in the Murray plant which is now being used for
storage. This could be turned to the uses of this production program.
Similar is the situation at the Fisher Body plant in Cleveland. The third,
fourth and fifth floors of this building are now being used for storage, and
could easily be made available for assembly lines. This plant at one time made
all metal stampings for Chevrolet bodies. Additional floor space is also available in the Cleveland area.
A final assembly plant would also be needed for the job of assembling the
engine, wings and fuselage into the completed plane. For this purpose we
suggest the construction of cheap flat hangars in the open space around the
Wayne County airport. Completed engines, wings and fuselage would be
500 PLANES
Appendix I
A DAY
trucked from the sub-assembly plants to these hangars and the completed
planes could be flown from the airport. Similar flat hangars could be erected
for final assemblies at the Cleveland airport.
We suggest that the sub-assemblies and the final assemblies be placed under
the control of men carefully selected upon the basis of skill and experience
from the various assembly staffs in our motor car and body plants, and that
these picked men be used as the core of the assembly staffs to be developed
under this plan. Provisions for protecting the seniority of these men must
be guaranteed.
The first few thousand planes produced will not meet 100 percent performance requirements, for in mass production of planes as in mass production of
automobiles a few thousand jobs must always be run before the “bugs” (technical problems of machining and assembly) are worked out. This is not
serious since the first few thousand planes will more than meet the requirements as training ships.
Management Responstbility and Labor Cooperation
The automotive industry workers believe that this plan is the only one
which offers hope of quick production of planes. It seeks solution of our
problem not in the costly and lengthy work of erecting entire new plants, but
in the efficient organization of existing idle man-power, machines, skill and
floor space.
By dividing the parts among many manufacturers, the greatest possible
number of minds is brought to bear on the production problems involved.
Though we propose payment of a fair profit to each manufacturer in accordance with his share in the work, we can foresee the fears this plan may arouse
on the part of some managements. They may prefer a method whereby the
government finances entire new engines and aircraft plants. Aviation companies may look with misgiving on a production program that would inevitably
cut the cost of planes by putting their production on a mass production basis.
But we believe the average management executive would not put forward
these selfish considerations at a time of crisis.
Labor offers its whole-hearted cooperation. All that Labor asks is intelligent planning, a voice in matters of policy and administration, recognition of
its rights, and maintenance of its established standards.
The merit of our plan is that it saves time, and time is our problem. Normal methods can build all the planes we need—if we wait until 1942 and 1943
to get them. This plan is put forward in the belief that the need for planes
is immediate, and terrifying. Precious moments pass away as we delay. We
dare not invite the disaster that may come with further delay.
t
“.
NUMBER OF CARS AND TRUCKS PRODUCED IN U.S. AND CANADA
SEPT. ’°39 THRU AUG. 40
1,044,100
224,475
196,732
291,021
38,032
52,275
SEPT. 36 THRU AUG. ’37
1,149,662
ermine iicecivelepeescieeaselioielennionetontii
235,065
eeemnincoen
ig tacit
199,569
rereenticienentne
iran
Ce
220,214
a
ee
Die
45,668
invitee teenie .
TO
COTTA
56,410
General Motor: Truck. Fl.
NAME OF COMPANY
ri
I
ceed
he
i
I
General Motors_...____..____
5,068,803
1,906,588
4,228,706
1,846,815
bis esiheiee nme Saracens
ie eee
1,311,716
4,334,204
936,581
3,653,376
Ct
‘FOCAL
Oe
Total “Big
* Grand
Harvester,
Source:
Note:
69,660
83,680
913,900
22,681
2,547
97,632
371
57,216
90,674
114,682
12,727
32,930
81,390
103,210
1,279,003
32,803
21,067
125,207
300
86,695
121,301:
104,931
14,035
65,302
it rent criti
a neipeieesteellenecenceomiastniown
Le
i
ror
ent npeicncinincnitllcnnlrenene’
ea
erento
a ar
SR
ces ontiernieinmaeinennioet
RR
iinet
irene ile
TE rariteen eerie
ee
PC
ae reese tennessee ction ea
......
Whoite-Inu eee
aa cate einen pete 2
De
Total
412,545
304,455
552,610
378,510
alter ereetiteinsieeneniniesirwrintiorrtemcenii
serene be netcenctners
IG
recreate
aarti
Ta
RIOR
orice
869,980
1,115,720
ees
oo in
total also includes production of Diamond T Truck, Federal Truck, Int’l
Mack Truck, Reo Truck, Stutz and miscellaneous not listed separately.
Ward’s Automotive Reports.
Canadian
approximately
represents
production
the
of
4%
total
production.
Appendix II
e
o38
Feet
-a
BtetA onOO
ih
a Oy
e
Vo wv
i
Eg
oO
c
ES
A
2ee
22
Cadillac
3614
Dodge
BS
a
Oy2
up
g ®
$<
3 oy
aq
pond oo
2g
3
25
oe
cm
134,768
530,745
N.2
of
Vid
9.°
g<
See
—+ 0 o
Bey
BS
Fico 5
Sa
ce
SA
4B
$3
Gig
oe
Ao
“3 5v
Ai
.
3
=
B
Seo
WN
a
wen
172,800
oe
w
ae
5
oe
M
a?
Taen
we
8A
S
see
Pete
66
648,000
75
o
6
ORS
oe
38,032
404.455
4m
2.o
so
©pw
Ee
she
OEE
aS
174.
174
135
87
Urry
36
Ct
36
70
‘iz
360,000
167
196,732
75
73
97,632
45
32
57,216
1,044,100
291,021
a2
445
185
63
347
179
41
240,000
Hudson
40
118,368
216,000
13514
Nash
Chevrolet
Buick
17
49
42
288,384
1,091,900
430,479
345,600
2,136,000
Pete
4914
147
«| ZI
441,600
147
153,340
32,930
224,475
9
ee
70
201
163,268
On basis of 13-hour day.
gOO
s
a,
207,070
* Note:
3bac
114,682
412,545
5414
Aiiee
=
103
128
494,660
a
ed
ote
o
2
0
=
on
co
17
Pontiac
oJ
.2
2
suo
Ou
“
ee
Be
Willys-
Overland
Ea
35
:
eae
Gyee oS
ws
A
fe ge
108
24
Oldsmobile
a
mYa 8,
835,200
336,000
964,800
31
43
=|
ees
3a
221,318
a)2,402
Studebaker
Plymouth
Chrysler and
DeSoto
qt
é
es
So
v4
es
By
4
7ao
slsco
PLANTS
POSSIBILITIES OF MAJOR
PRODUCTION
50
94
50
78
500 PLANES
Appendix II
FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR PLANE PRODUCTION IN THE
CHEVROLET FORGE PLANT, DETROIT
The following equipment in the Chevrolet Drop Forge plant at the present
time—the peak of the plant production program—is operating at approximately 60% of capacity used.
Number of Machines
Size of Machines
Types of Machines
19
29
12
9
6
15
11
>
1
1
2
3
11
1,500
2,500
3,500
5,000
12,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
Ibs.
Ibs.
lbs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
250 ton
950 ton
1,000 ton
1,600 ton
1,500 Ibs.
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Board
Board
Board
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammers
Hammers
Hammers
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Forge Press ( Hydraulic)
Forge Press ( Hydraulic)
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Board Hammers
In addition to the hammers and presses listed, numerous large and small
upsetting (header) presses are available. If the above equipment were used
at full capacity, this plant alone could produce all the necessary drop forgings
required for the production of 500 airplane engines per day, and still supply
the Chevrolet Motor Car Company with sufficient forgings for 1,000,000 ©
Chevrolet cars in the coming year. Skilled hammermen are available to operate these forge hammers at full capacity.
In addition to the Chevrolet Forge plant, there are many other forge plants,
such as the Buick Forge plant, Dodge Truck and Forge, etc., which have considerable unused capacity.
Appendix IV
FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY FOR STAMPING METAL SECTIONS FOR WINGS AND FUSELAGE
The following stamping presses in the Cleveland Fisher Body Plant are at
the present time—the peak of the body production season—operating at less
than 50 percent of capacity.
_ Type of Machines
Number of Machines
Double Crank Presses
74
Toggle Presses
19
No. 78 Single Crank Presses
Numerous small blanking and stamping presses
To appreciate the full significance of the above list of equipment, one must
26
realize the tremendous size of these presses, their cost, and the time it would
require a new plant to get delivery of such presses.
A big Toggle press, for
A DAY
example, stands 40 feet from the base to the top of the press and is large
enough to hold and operate a draw or flange die which itself weights from 70
to 80 tons. Such presses cost from $150,000 to $175,000 and it would require
years to get delivery of the number and type of such press equipment that
is now standing idle more than 50 percent of the time at the Cleveland Fisher
plant.
Present employment in the Fisher Cleveland press room reflects the extent
to which the presses are now idle. There are 600 men on the day shift, 300
on the afternoon shift, and 67 on the midnight shift.
In addition to Cleveland Fisher Body, every major body plant in the automobile industry has unused press room capacity which can, with the necessary
special dies, be adapted to plane production.
Appendix V
REPLY
TO
OBJECTIONS
Virtually all of the criticisms of the program have been anonymous—aircraft and automotive industry executives refusing, for some reason, to lend
their names to their printed views. The criticisms do not in any case run
against the feasibility of the program. By and large, they indicate either a
sad lack of imagination or an insistence by automotive interests to continue
with “business as usual.” However, since some misconceptions of the program have gained credence it is advisable to discuss and dispose of these
matters.
|
BOMBERS
OR PURSUIT
SHIPS
It has been wrongly assumed that the program contemplated the production
only of pursuit ships. Our reference to the possible production of 500 fighting
planes a day was used only to indicate the over-all productive capacity of an
automobile industry whose idle machines and idle men were fully mobilized
and whose private interests were temporarily subordinated. The productive
capacity we have indicated can as readily be adapted to the production of
medium-sized or heavy bombers. If these latter types are built rather than
pursuit ships, the daily production would be scaled down in proportion to the
increased amount of work required on each plane. Nevertheless, our program
could build many more bombers, large or small, than are now being built or
are contemplated, and in much shorter time.
MAN-HOURS
REQUIRED
Some sources in the automobile industry assert our plan is impractical
because of the relatively small percentage of machine hours in manufacturing
an automobile as compared with the total man hours required to build a plane.
These sources contend that out of 18,000 man-hours necessary to build a
pursuit ship, 10,000 are devoted to construction of air frames, work on which
is usually done by hand. In attempting to prove their point, these sources
simply multiply 10,000 man-hours by 500 planes a day which gives them a tremendous and impressive figure. It would be as logical to take the number of
FOREWORD
The Congress of Industrial Organizations has given to the Government a
proposal for mass production of defense aircraft. The immediate affect has
been an encouraging lift for national defense—through widespread publication and discussion. Valuable as this is, we are convinced that the program
merits more than verbal praise and piece-meal application.
The CIO’s proposal was drafted at my request and the request of R. J.
Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated —
with the CIO. It is the result of the experience of a group of skilled automobile workers, headed by Walter P. Reuther, who studied this problem for
months and arrived at the conclusions contained in the report. Their findings
bear the imprint of the unanimous approval of the Executive Board of the CIO.
Our program was born out of the CIO’S desire to make its utmost possible
contribution to national defense. The specific program for mass production
of defense aircraft indicates the great extent to which organized labor's knowledge and abilities may be utilized in our present national emergency. The
program implements a general program already outlined by the CIO for a
larger recognition of labor’s responsibilities and prerogatives in this emergency.
The efforts of our country to preserve and perfect our democratic institutions finds no greater response than in the ranks of American labor. Our aircraft production program is concrete evidence of that fact; and it also bespeaks
the logic of our desire for a greater recognition of organized labor’s role in
national defense.
PHILIP MURRAY, President
Congress of Industrial Organizations
AUTHOR’S
NOTE
This program is an outgrowth of the American automobile workers’ conviction that the future of democracy and all that our people hold dear are
dependent upon the speedy and successful prosecution of our national defense.
I have discussed the general outlines of the program with Assistant Secretary
of War Robert Patterson; Philip Murray, President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; Sidney Hillman, member of the National Defense Advisory
Commission; and R. J. Thomas, President of the UAW-CIO.
Upon being urged by these leaders of government and labor to complete the
survey, I consulted with a number of highly-skilled designing engineers, tool
and die makers, jig and fixture men, and pattern and model makers, employed
for years by General Motors, Chrysler, Packard, Hudson, Briggs, Murray Body
and other automobile companies. Individually and jointly, we made first-hand
studies of aircraft motor parts and wing and fuselage assemblies. All of these
men are members of the UAW-CIO and are recognized by managements as
well as by the union as master technicians. They have contributed to the formulation of this program which we now present as part of labor's contribution
toward the solution of a grave national problem.
500 PLANES A DAY
A Program for the Utilization of the Automobile
Industry for Mass Production of Defense Planes
By WALTER
P. REUTHER*
England’s battles, it used to be said, were won on the playing fields of Eton.
This plan is put forward in the belief that America’s can be won on the
assembly lines of Detroit.
In an age of mechanized warfare, victory has become a production problem.
The automotive workers for whom I speak think our industrial system a productive giant capable of any task, provided it is not forced into battle with one
hand tied behind its back. They also believe that we need send no men to a
future conflict with the Axis powers if we can supply enough machines now
to our first line of defense in Britain. The machines we and the British need
most are planes, and the survival of democracy depends on our ability to turn
them out quickly.
The workers in the automotive industry believe that the way to produce
planes quickly is to manufacture them in automobile plants. The automotive
industry today is operating at only half its potential capacity. This plan pro-
poses that the unused potential of the industry in machines and men be utilized in the mass production of aircraft engines and planes. It is our consid-
ered opinion that it would be possible, after six months of preparation, to
turn out 500 of the most modern fighting planes a day, if the idle machines
and the idle men of the automotive industry were fully mobilized and private
interests temporarily subordinated to the needs of this emergency.
Time, every moment of it precious, its tragic periods ticked off by bombs
falling upon London and the Midlands, will not permit us to wait until new
mass production factories for aircraft and aircraft engines finally swing into
action late in 1942. Emergency requires short-cut solutions. This plan is
Labor’s answer to a crisis.
Mr. William F. Knudsen says that airplane production is 30 percent behind
schedule. It will continue to be behind schedule so long as we continue to
rely on the expansion of existing aircraft plants, and on the construction of
new plants. Expansion of existing aircraft plants means the expansion of
plants utilizing the slow and costly methods of an industry geared to handtooled, custom-made production.
New plants cannot be built and put into operation in less than 18 months.
In 18 months Britain’s battle, for all her people’s bravery, may be lost, and our
own country left to face a totalitarian Europe alone.
* Director, General Motors Department, United Automobile Workers of America,
CIO; member, Committee on Training in Industry, National Defense Advisory ComMission.
UAW-CIO
International Education Department
281 West Grand Boulevard
Detroit, Michigan
194
~.
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