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Debate; Reuther Plan ‑ WPR and C.E. Wilson
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Debate; Reuther Plan ‑ WPR and C.E. Wilson
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box: 540
folder: 8
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1942-03
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7
500 PLANES A DAY
A Program for the Utilization of the Automobile
Industry for Mass Production of Defense Planes
By WALTER
FOREWORD
REUTHER
by PHILIP
INTRODUCTION
American
P.
Couneil
MURRAY
by GEORGE
On
Public
WASHINGTON, D.C.
—
SOULE
Affairs
FOREWORD
The Congress of Industrial Organizations has given to the Government a
proposal for mass production of defense aircraft. The immediate affect has
been an encouraging lift for national defense—through widespread publication and discussion. Valuable as this is, we are convinced that the program
merits more than verbal praise and piece-meal application.
The CIO’s proposal was drafted at my request and the request of R. J.
Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated
with the CIO. It is the result of the experience of a group of skilled automobile workers, headed
by Walter
P. Reuther, who
studied this problem
for
months and arrived at the conclusions contained in the report. Their findings
bear the imprint of the unanimous approval of the Executive Board of the CIO.
Our program was born out of the CIO’S desire to make its utmost possible
contribution to national defense. The specific program for mass production
of defense aircraft indicates the great extent to which organized labor’s knowledge and abilities may be utilized in our present national emergency. The
program implements a general program already outlined by the CIO for a
larger recognition of labor’s responsibilities and prerogatives in this emergency.
The efforts of our country to preserve and perfect our ‘democratic institutions finds no greater response than in the ranks of American labor. Our aircraft production program is concrete evidence of that fact; and it also bespeaks
the logic of our desire for a greater recognition of organized labor's role in
national defense.
PHILIP MURRAY, President
Congress of Industrial Organizations
AUTHOR’S
NOTE
This program is an outgrowth of the American automobile workers’ conviction that the future of democracy and all that our people hold dear are
dependent upon the speedy and successful prosecution of our national defense.
I have discussed the general outlines of the program with Assistant Secretary
of War Robert Patterson; Philip Murray, President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; Sidney Hillman, member of the National Defense Advisory
Commission; and R. J. Thomas, President of the UAW-CIO.
Upon being urged by these leaders of government and labor to complete the
survey, I consulted with a number of highly-skilled designing engineers, tool
and die makers, jig and fixture men, and pattern and model makers, employed
for years by General Motors, Chrysler, Packard, Hudson, Briggs, Murray Body
and other automobile companies. Individually and jointly, we made first-hand
studies of aircraft motor parts and wing and fuselage assemblies. All of these
men are members of the UAW-CIO and are recognized by managements as
well as by the union as master technicians. They have contributed to the formulation of this program which we now present as part of labor’s contribution
toward the solution of a grave national problem.
WALTER
P. REUTHER
INTRODUCTION
By GEORGE
SOULE*
Here is a plan to speed up warplane production to aid the defense of Britain
and the United States. It asserts that within six months the automobile industry
could be turning out 500 fighting planes a day, in addition to whatever the
airplane industry itself may be able to do. Such a plan is certainly worth
careful investigation.
The plan is sponsored by men who have an intimate technical knowledge
of the automobile industry. It is proposed by Walter P. Reuther, an official
of the United Automobile Workers of America, after consultation with designing engineers and highly skilled specialists employed in numerous auto plants.
Any proposal by such a body of men deserves a hearing. Again and again it
has been demonstrated in American industry that suggestions arising from
those who do the work, and through long personal experience understand
industrial problems, are immensely valuable.
The plan points out indubitable facts that few Americans know. The automobile industry is operating at only about 50 percent of capacity, largely
because of seasonal production. If its output were spread evenly throughout
the year, half its plant and manpower could be used for something else. Could
this something else be warplanes? Here is where serious disagreement arises.
Some connected with the plane industry say it could not, because plane engines
and bodies are more complicated and require more exact and refined processes.
This report answers the objection by detailed facts and figures. Machinery,
plant and manpower, it asserts, are available to do the necessary jobs.
To the
layman, it offers convincing evidence that if we want mass production of warplanes, the automobile industry can give it to us.
The layman, of course, is not qualified to decide the technical questions at
issue. But all of us, as American citizens, have a right and duty to insist that
the questions be carefully investigated and decided by those competent to
judge, without the influence of private interest or prejudice. We cannot be
satisfied with a negative response on the part of the aircraft industry itself,
which has an obvious interest in avoiding competition. Nor can we be satisfied
with the judgment of army experts who through experience only with special
production of frequently changed models do not understand the quality potentialities of mass production. Nor, finally, can we be satisfied with a reluctance
of certain automobile employers to sacrifice competitive advantage by planning
production for the whole industry as a unit.
It would seem that little could be lost even if the plan were unsuccessful.
At present half our productive capacity in automobiles is going to waste.
Let us not permit this plan to be shoved aside by the inertia of vested interests.
* Editor, New Republic; Chairman, National Economic and Social Planning Association; Director-at-Large, National Bureau of Economic Research.
SOO PLANES A DAY
A Program for the Utilization of the Automobile
Industry for Mass Production of Defense
By WALTER
Planes
P. REUTHER*
England’s battles, it used to be said, were won on the playing fields of Eton.
This plan is put forward in the belief that America’s can be won on the
assembly lines of Detroit.
In an age of mechanized warfare, victory has become a production problem.
The automotive workers for whom I speak think our industrial system a productive giant capable of any task, provided it is not forced into battle with one
hand tied behind its back. They also believe that we need send no men to a
future conflict with the Axis powers if we can supply enough machines now
to our first line of defense in Britain. The machines we and the British need
most are planes, and the survival of democracy depends-on.our ability to turn
them out quickly.
The workers in the automotive industry believe that the way to produce
planes quickly is to manufacture them in automobile plants. The automotive
industry today is operating at only half its potential capacity. This plan proposes that the unused potential of the industry in machines and men be utilized in the mass production of aircraft engines and planes. It is our consid-
ered opinion that it would be possible, after six months of preparation, to
turn out 500 of the most modern fighting planes a day, if the idle machines
and the idle men of the automotive industry were fully mobilized and private
interests temporarily subordinated to the needs of this emergency.
Time, every moment of it precious, its tragic periods ticked off by bombs
falling upon London and the Midlands, will not permit us to wait until new
mass production factories for aircraft and aircraft engines finally swing into
action late in 1942. Emergency requires short-cut solutions. This plan is
Labor’s answer to a Crisis.
Mr. William F. Knudsen says that airplane production is 30 percent behind
schedule. It will continue to be behind schedule so long as we continue to
rely on the expansion of existing aircraft plants, and on the construction of
new plants. Expansion of existing aircraft plants means the expansion of
plants utilizing the slow and costly methods of an industry geared to handtooled, custom-made production.
New plants cannot be built and put into operation in less than 18 months.
In 18 months Britain’s battle, for all her people’s bravery, may be lost, and our
own country left to face a totalitarian Europe alone.
* Director, General Motors Department, United Automobile Workers of America,
CIO; member, Committee on Training in Industry, National Defense Advisory Commission.
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
3
Packard and other companies are still digging the ditches and pouring the
concrete for their new airplane engine factories. The Axis powers will not
wait politely until these factories are finished.
New plants, when finally erected, must be filled with new machinery and
this new equipment largely duplicates machinery already available in our automobile plants. The machine industry is overtaxed. The emergency of war
cannot be met in the normal time necessary to construct new plants and equip
them with the required production machinery.
We propose, instead of building entirely new machines, to make the tools
required to adapt existing automotive machinery to aircraft manufacture.
We propose to transform the entire unused capacity of the automotive
industry into one huge plane production unit. Production under this plan
would not replace the output of the aircraft industry proper, which would
continue to construct the large bombers and planes of special design.
Fifty Percent of Automobile Industry’s Potential Capacity Is Unused
No industry in the world has the tremendous unused potential productive
capacity of the American automotive industry, and no industry is as easily
adaptable to the mass production of planes. A careful survey will show that
the automobile industry as a whole is not using more than 50 percent of its
maximum potential capacity if that capacity were properly coordinated and
operated to the fullest degree.
The automotive industry could produce 8,000,000 cars a year. It is producing approximately 4,000,000. These unused plant reserves, as shown by
the figures given in the Federal Trade Commission’s report on the motor
vehicle industry, are greater than the total motor plant capacity of England,
Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Japan combined. Adapted to plane production, this unused potential capacity would give us world plane supremacy
within a short time.
At present the automotive industry never operates at more than 80 to 90
percent of its maximum potential capacity, and then only for a few months
each year. The rest of the year it operates on reduced schedules, and many
plants shut down completely. If automobile production were spread evenly
over a 12-month period, it would be possible, without reducing the total output of automobiles, to convert a large portion of this machinery to the manufacture of planes.
During the automotive year ending August, 1940, Nash used only 17 percent of its productive capacity; Dodge used 3614 percent. Nash, working at
maximum capacity, could have manufactured its total output for the 12
months in 4914 working days; Dodge, in 111 working days. Chevrolet, the
largest single producer of motor cars, turned out over a million cars during
the last model year, and yet used less than 50 percent of its potential productive capacity. The main Chevrolet Motor plant at Flint, Michigan, produced 380 completed motors per hour at the peak of the 1937 production
season, utilizing all four of its complete motor machining and assembly lines.
At the present time, at the peak of the 1940 production season, the Chevrolet
6
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
7
PLAN
Flint plant is producing 282 motors per hour, with one motor line standing
completely idle, while the three remaining lines are operating on a two-shift
basis. Since 1937, Chevrolet has built a new motor plant in Tonawanda,
New York, which at the present time is producing 65 complete motors per
hour, with a plant capacity of 90 motors per hour. This would indicate that
at the peak of the production season Chevrolet is only building 347 motors
per hour, with an actual capacity of 470 motors per hour. With an unused
capacity of 123 motors per hour at the peak of the production season, it is
obvious that Chevrolet has an unused reserve which becomes tremendous during the month of reduced operating schedules.
The availability of automotive production facilities for plane production in
Chevrolet is again shown in the case of the Chevrolet drop forge plant in
Detroit, the largest drop forge shop of its kind in the world. If this shop
were operated at full capacity, it could produce all the drop forgings required
for the production of 500 airplane motors per day, and still supply the Chevrolet company with sufficient drop forgings for 1,000,000 Chevrolet cars a year.
Skilled labor to operate this shop at full capacity is available. Other forge
shops, including the Buick and the Dodge forge shops, are also working at far
less than capacity. (See appendix for shop equipment and production sched-
When the contemplated airplane motor plants are completed, it will be
necessary to equip them with the same kind of basic production machinery
already standing idle half of the time in the nation’s automotive factories.
This basic machinery will be duplicated, and after it is duplicated it will still
be necessary to construct the special tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures required to
:
adapt this machinery to the manufacture of plane engines.
In the process of duplicating basic machinery, lies the most serious delay.
ules.)
types of milling machines, various types of lathes and Fay machines, lapping
machines, various types of grinding machines, die casting machines, forge
presses, header machines, foundry equipment, welding and riveting equipment.
Automobile Motor Building Facilities Can Be Adapted to Make Plane Motors
Are the facilities used in manufacturing automobile motors adaptable to the
manufacture of airplane motors? The answer is that they are.
Both the automobile and airplane motors are combustion engines, essentially
the same mechanism for generating power by exploding gas. Both motors
contain cylinders, carburetors, pistons, crankshafts, camshafts, valves, sparkplugs, ignition systems, etc.
|
The same basic machinery is utilized in the manufacture of these basic parts
Automobile Industry Adaptable for Stamping of Wings and Fuselage
The plane has three main parts: engine, wings and fuselage. Just as there is
unused capacity for the production of motors, so there is unused capacity for
the production of the wings and fuselage. The large body plants and the parts
plants have metal stamping equipment now used for stamping ou parts for
the body of the automobile which can be adapted to stamping out the parts
which make up the wings and fuselage of the plane. Proof of this is provided
oy the tentative plans being made by the automotive industry at the suggestion
of Mr. Knudsen to manufacture parts of the wings and fuselages for large
common to both motors.
True, there are differences between the automobile
and the airplane engine, as there are differences of a lesser degree between the
engine of the Chevrolet and the engine of the Cadillac. These differences
between different engines are produced by adding certain tools, dies, jigs or
fixtures to the basic machine in order to make a difference in the product. The
same “tooling” process adapts the same basic machinery to the production of
the airplane engine. Graphic proof of this statement is even now being supplied by General Motors. Many of the most difficult and precise parts of the
Allison aviation engine are being manufactured in the Cadillac plant in
Detroit, much of it with retooled Cadillac machinery. The new Allison plant
in Indianapolis, still in process of expansion, is being used largely for assembly.
The experience of General Motors in making Allison parts with retooled
Cadillac machinery should also dispose of the bugaboo of “tolerances.” “Tolerances” are the allowable fractional variations in size of engine parts, and they
must be far finer in the plane engine than in the automobile engine. But these
more precise dimensions can be obtained by more precise tooling.
This lag, which from all indications may continue, may well defeat our national
defense program. An additional burden is placed on the already over-loaded
machine tool industry. We propose to short-cut the process by building only
the tools, dies, jigs, and fixtures necessary to convert idle automotive machinery
into plane engine machinery. A few special machines will be necessary, but
these will be but a small part of the total equipment. In this way a job that
will otherwise take at least 18 months can be done in six months.
Certain basic machines are necessary to build both automobile and aircraft
types of engines. These include gear cutters, gear shapers, screw machines,
bullards, drill presses, punch presses, broaching machines, turret lathes, various
bombers.
A survey of the large body plants will show that their equipment for pressing and stamping metal parts are also not being used to full capacity. Murray
Body, Briggs and the Fisher Body plants show a 50 percent overall unused capacity in their pressrooms. Striking is the example of the Fisher Body plant in
Cleveland, which contains one of the largest pressrooms in the industry. At
present it is operating at but 40 percent of capacity, although automobile
body production is now at its peak. In 1936-37 this plant made all the
stampings for Chevrolet bodies, employing 9200 employes. Today it employs
but 3500, for Fisher has built a new plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan, further
adding to body capacity.
Fisher plant.)
Technical problems
(See appendix for equipment
in the Cleveland
are involved, of course, in constructing new
dies to
stamp the lighter aluminum alloys used in plane production. That these problems are not insuperable is shown by the fact that Murray and Briggs are
already stamping wing parts for Douglas bombers.
8
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
Skilled and Production Labor Available
Skilled labor is necessary to turn out the
these various types of automotive machinery
industry has the largest reservoir of skilled
REUTHER
PLAN
in the Automobile Industry
tools and dies required to adapt
to plane production. The auto
labor in the world. More than
25,000 tool and die workers, jig and fixture men, pattern makers, draftsmen
and designers, and allied craftsmen are employed in the auto industry at the
peak of its tooling program.
Tooling is even more seasonal than production. Each year thousands of the
industry’s most skilled craftsmen work at top speed for a few months to complete the necessary tooling work to adapt the old machinery to the new models.
When the tooling program is completed, only a skeleton crew of these skilled
craftsmen are retained for maintenance and duplicate tooling. Three or four
thousand skilled craftsmen are shifted to ordinary production jobs while more
than 10,000 are laid off entirely until their labor is needed for the next tooling
season. During the past five years more than half of the tool and die makers
in the industry, or more than 10,000, averaged less than six months work per
year. At the present time there are approximately 3,000 tool and die makers
unemployed in the auto industry; some 2,500 have been transferred to ordinary machine-tending production jobs. Many of the remainder are on a short
work week.
In addition to the men who are unemployed, those working on production
and those employed only part time, there are at least 2,000 tool and die men
who have permanently gone into production jobs because of the short work
year in the tool and die industry. These mechanics could be combed out of
production departments and made available again for tool and die work.
Thus in manpower, as in machines, we have unused capacity; the highly.
specialized and valuable skills,of 7,500 tool and die workers are available to do
the necessary tooling for the plane production program here outlined.
Fisher Body Corporation, a division of General Motors, is now working on
wood models for a new body design. Chrysler also is working on new models,
for which some die work is likewise under way. If the automobile industry
goes ahead with plans for new models, it will absorb unemployed tool and die
workers. However, if the introduction of new models in the auto industry
could be delayed for six months, from
12,000 to 15,000 skilled mechanics
could be made available to build the necessary tools, dies, jigs and fixtures for
the production of an all metal pursuit ship on a mass production basis.
The tool and die shops of the automotive industry, like the tool and die
workers themselves, are partially idle. The 90 tool and die jobbing shops in
the Detroit area affiliated with the Automotive Tool and Die Manufacturers
Association employ 7,000 tool and die workers when operated at full capacity.
In addition to these shops in the Association, there are some 75 additional tool
and die shops which employ 1,500 tool
And, in addition to these independent
departments within the auto, body and
as “captive” tool and die shops. These
and die workers at capacity production.
enterprises, there are large tool and die
parts plants proper. These are known
great “captive” tool and die shops have
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
9
a capacity beyond the available manpower if all the skilled men in the entire
industry were employed on a full-time basis.
A typical example of the tremendous unused capacity of these captive shops
is that of Fisher Body No. 23 at Detroit. This is the largest tool and die shop
in the world. It builds the sheet metal dies, welding bucks and fixtures, and
special machinery for all Fisher Body plants in the General Motors Corporation. In 1931 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 4,800 tool and die makers
at the peak of the tooling program. In 1940 Fisher Body Plant No. 23 employed 1,400 tool and die makers at the peak of the tooling season. In December, 1940, this plant employed only 175 tool and die makers and even
these few were on a reduced work week.
As important as the tool and die worker is the engineer who designs the
tools and dies. Here, too, the same situation repeats itself. There are in the
Detroit and metropolitan areas about 2,100 designing engineers. Their drawings would be needed for the new tools and dies required to adapt automotive
machinery to plane production. Designing engineers, like tool and die workers, are largely unemployed between tooling seasons. Here, too, a six months
delay in new automobile models would make available an ample supply of
the necessary skilled men.
Just as there is no shortage of skilled labor in the automobile industry, so
there is no shortage of unskilled labor. Despite the defense program, there is
a minimum of 100,000 former automobile workers unemployed or on WPA,
not to speak of the thousands of young people in automobile production areas
who would welcome an opportunity to work in plane production.
The Program in Operation
We propose that the President of the United g§tates appoint an aviation
production board of nine members, three representing the government, three
representing management and three representing labor. We propose that this
board be given full authority to organize and supervise the mass production
of airplanes in the automobile and automotive parts industry.
The first task of the board would be to organize a staff of production and
tooling engineers and assign them to make a plant-by-plant survey of the
industry to determine the capacity of each plant, and the extent to which it is
being utilized. The next task of the board would be to break down a blueprint of the type of plane chosen for mass production into its constituent
parts and allocate the various parts of the engine, wings and fuselage among
the different automotive plants in accordance with their unused capacity and
the kind of work to which that unused capacity is being adapted. Work is to
be parcelled out with an eye to spreading it as widely as possible, for much
quicker results will be obtained if each plant has to cope with but one or two
probelms of design and tooling. As contrasted with the present method,
which dumps half a hundred technical problems into the lap of one manufacturer who must build an entire engine or plane, this method has all the advan-
tages of division of labor.
500
10
PLANES
A DAY—-THE
REUTHER
PLAN
500 PLANES
The production board should have power to allocate the tooling and designing necessary among the various tool and die shops in accordance with their
capacity and their specialized qualifications.
Power to appoint inspectors for each plant in accordance with its part in
the general plan should be given the production board and there should be
close inspection of each part manufactured before its release.
We propose the establishment of a central motor assembly plant to which
all complete parts shall be shipped after they pass inspection.
The automotive industry has unused floor space as it has unused men and
machines. We suggest that the Hupmobile plant in Detroit (a plant which
produced only 371 cars in 1939, and which at the present time is completely
idle) be leased by the government for a central motor assembly plant. The
plant is large enough for five assembly lines with a daily total production
capacity of 500 complete aircraft engines a day. The plant could be operated
on a three 714 hour shift basis and the unused machinery now in the building
could be placed in other plants in accordance with the general production
plan.
Similar methods can be applied to the manufacture apd assembly of the
wings and fuselage, and here, too, there is ample unused floor space for new
assembly lines. Six complete floors of a building one block long and a half
block wide are available at Fisher Body Plant No. 21, Detroit, which for-
(This work has now been transferred to
merly made bodies for Buick.
Fisher Body Plant No. 1 at Flint, Michigan.) Several floors are also available
at the Fisher Body Plant No. 23 in Detroit, and there is also floor space available at the Briggs Highland Park plant and at the old Ford Highland Park
plant.
Outstanding example ofgjdle floor space is the Murray Body Corporation
Since
in Detroit, the third largest body making corporation in America.
its loss of the Ford body contract, Murray is not producing a single automobile
body. There are 234,375 square feet of floor space in Building 107 in Murray
Plant No.
1, 300,000 square feet available in Building No.
121 and 20,000
square feet available in Building No. 129. This available space will probably
be needed for the contract Murray has obtained to stamp the metal parts and
assemble the wing sections for Douglas bombers, but there is still 200,000 feet
more of modern floor space in the Murray plant which is now being used for
storage. This could be turned to the uses of this production program.
Similar is the situation at the Fisher Body plant in Cleveland.
The third,
fourth and fifth floors of this building are now being used for storage, and
could easily be made available for assembly lines. This plant at one time made
all metal stampings for Chevrolet bodies. Additional floor space is also available in the Cleveland area.
A final assembly plant would also be needed for the job of assembling the
engine, wings and fuselage into the completed plane. For this purpose we
suggest the construction of cheap flat hangars in the open space around the
Wayne County airport. Completed engines, wings and fuselage would be
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
11
trucked from the sub-assembly plants to these hangars and the completed
planes could be flown from the airport. Similar flat hangars could be erected
for final assemblies at the Cleveland airport.
We suggest that the sub-assemblies and the final assemblies be placed under
the control of men carefully selected upon the basis of skill and experience
from the various assembly staffs in our motor car and body plants, and that
these picked men be used as the core of the assembly staffs to be developed
under this plan.
Provisions for protecting the seniority of these men must
be guaranteed.
The first few thousand planes produced will not meet 100 percent performance requirements, for in mass production of planes as in mass production of
automobiles a few thousand jobs must always be run before the “bugs” (technical problems of machining and assembly) are worked out. This is not
serious since the first few thousand planes will more than meet the require-
ments as training ships.
Management Responsibility and Labor Cooperation
The automotive industry workers believe that this plan is the only one
which offers hope of quick production of planes. It seeks solution of our
problem not in the costly and lengthy work of erecting entire new plants, but
in the efficient organization of existing idle man-power, machines, skill and
floor space.
By dividing the parts among many manufacturers, the greatest possible
number of minds is brought to bear on the production problems involved.
Though we propose payment of a fair profit to each manufacturer in accordance with his share in the work, we can foresee the fears this plan may arouse
on the part of some managements. They may prefer a method whereby the
government finances entire new engines and aircraft plants, Aviation companies may look with misgiving on a production program that would inevitably
cut the cost of planes by putting their production on a mass production basis.
But we believe the average management executive would not put forward
these selfish considerations at a time of crisis.
Labor offers its whole-hearted cooperation. All that Labor asks is intelligent planning, a voice in matters of policy and administration, recognition of
its rights, and maintenance of its established standards.
The merit of our plan is that it saves time, and time is our problem. Normal methods can build all the planes we need—if we wait until 1942 and 1943
to get them. This plan is put forward in the belief that the need for planes
is immediate, and terrifying. Precious moments pass away as we delay. We
dare not invite the disaster that may come with further delay.
Appendix Il
Appendix I
NUMBER OF CARS AND TRUCKS
PRODUCED
IN U.S. AND CANADA
SEPT. 39 THRU AUG. °40
1,044,100
224,475
196,732
291,021
38,032
§2,215
412,545
304,455
69,660
83,680
913,900
22,681
SEPT. ’36 THRU AUG. ’37
NAME OF COMPANY
1,149,662
ia ices carn atedsconbiniemasicondenneianninieids
235,065
semen tbigidacbstak poliniatienineneueeal
aor
a
I
199,569
sonata
icici enanceenndiniecledeniesandalnen
i
220,214
a cule ceataksaniniereniaanapiniel
45,668
NO ok nics. rein ntieeoonebieniebiies
i
56,410
eesti cinsenrerterncersnctnsbcetnianintiontn
Ee Gk ON
OS
552,610
snekeealee sha sinue abana
ce
378,510
no sent tha wiikdccaiedonedgiccdiaelaaendaeti-inctnenonnuanelanoaie
BI
81,390
cae neieailiena
aS Fa pacchcannc ieee
ie
103,210
Dh stitesietah eee shanigniesineneeniasieninoansibaniled am
picnics
1,279,003
ne
ok
Pee ener
32,803
dias
ah asseusiiganhietelieeandamtiatelciibeee
a
ar
NN
2,547
21,067
arin eamnteiecndunnboneoie meee mainte
Nocera
ia
siete
ime
CET NNN
Sa
hs acer pension tmmrnepeeaiiocinte
I
125,207
300
97,632
371
lene
hee net scene oem
ra
he ets deerdsincrcnionangar
cephalad
resistence nines scceneioripumcaneies
ieee
I
setvnncnein eeeptieonerntincnheeniettencepltlnlaeneeteoaceo
Ne ici
121,301
104,931
14,035
65,302
90,674
114,682
12,727
32,930
NE aici chico ances d cts tacedemeasineiinerenecanniaeh
t20nere MOT...
REE MOE allarciceeitccncsiecncraichnsstivcincchdencenmenitcenininotine
ii se nsecscedeiesniecinshnceta
biden nedeinannarens Sedans
ST
i kta vdisictn tn bee viinned cio ceen ithe
5,068,803
1,906,588
1,115,720
1,311,716
4,334,204
4,228,706
1,846,815
869,980
936,581
3,653,376
Tt
LO
icc
wks pncreecnboren
86,695
I
Tse
FR
57,216
* Grand total also includes production of Diamond T Truck, Federal Truck, Int’l
Harvester, Mack Truck, Reo Truck, Stutz and miscellaneous not_listed separately.
é
Ward’s Automotive Reports.
Source:
Canadian production represents approximately 4% of the total production.
Note:
Appendix II
POSSIBILITIES OF MAJOR
PRODUCTION
p
uM
gLO
a
6
2
to
a
23
2
ot
Ay
ae
g<
5Ba 8
arn
=
ee:
op Oy
°
$2
q
8g
wo
sZ
Cadillac
G
5°
avec?
22
2g
as
Sm
N28
22
ce
eS
aa
=A
3 §
an
S a,
we
Os
3
¥ &
“io
go"
ata
an
32°
$<
Oo
om
v
J
og
au
Bo
es:
7.2
Bas 5
2 5t5
ea
am
3%
Ries
aa
RS
ag,
“oH
= &
ao
ae
66
38,032
So
eH
San
BaQ
8.8
Bata
172,800
qs
Se
oo
UO
=
°
aR
134,768
©
pa &
qu
3
BRS
oe
Auok
GS BS
a.8 ».
gx
a
8
Ss
Ue
oe
ABo
ae
ct
AY
3
82
Bas
384,
2edg)
SF
oe
5a
&
éUO
oe
ag
O°
acs
Be
PLANTS
3
pare,
oH
S
Tae
— fy
¢s
ga
Ory
Sy
= y
4au
ee
ae.
hE
be
36
36
24
530,745
241,918
552,255
494,660
835,200
336,000
964,800
108
103
128
304,455
114,682
412,545
174
70
201
174
70
172
Oldsmobile
W illys-
5414
17
163,268
207,070
360,000
240,000
167
41
196,732
32,930
75
50
73
50
Hudson
Pontiac
Nash
Chevrolet
Buick
40
51
17
49
42
97,632
224,475
57,216
1,044,100
291,021
45
92
72
445
185
32
78
63
347
179
Dodge
Studebaker
Plymouth
3614
31
43
Chrysler and
DeSoto
_
Overland
* Note:
118,368
21s 125
288,384
1,091,900
430,479
On basis of 13-hour day.
648,000
216,000
441,600
345,600
2,136,000
T2i00
73
13514
147
4914
147
tel
153,340
135
87
AVAILABLE FOR PLANE PRODUCTION IN THE
CHEVROLET FORGE PLANT, DETROIT
The following equipment in the Chevrolet Drop Forge plant at the present
time—the peak of the plant production program—is operating at approxiFACILITIES
mately 60% of capacity used.
Size of Machines
Number of Machines
19
29
12
9
6
15
11
5
1
:
2
:
11
1,500
2,500
3,500
5,000
12,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
250
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
Ibs.
lbs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
Ibs.
ton
950 ton
1,000 ton
1,600 ton
1,500 Ibs.
Types of Machines
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Steam
Board
Board
Board
Forge
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammer
Hammers
Hammers
Hammers
Press (Hydraulic)
Forge Press ( Hydraulic)
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Forge Press (Hydraulic)
Board Hammers
In addition to the hammers and presses listed, numerous large and small
upsetting (header) presses are available. If the above equipment were used
at full capacity, this plant alone could produce all the necessary drop forgings
required for the production of 500 airplane engines per day, and still supply
the Chevrolet Motor Car Company with sufficient forgings for 1,000,000
Chevrolet cars in the coming year. Skilled hammermen are available to operate these forge hammers at full capacity.
In addition to the Chevrolet Forge plant, there are many other forge plants,
such as the Buick Forge plant, Dodge Truck and Forge, etc., which have considerable unused capacity.
Appendix IV
PAM
ST
FOR
RY
ST
DU
IN
LE
BI
MO
TO
AU
IN
E
BL
LA
AI
AV
S
TIE
ILI
FAC
ING METAL SECTIONS FOR WINGS AND FUSELAGE
The following stamping presses in the Cleveland Fisher Body Plant are at
the present time—the peak of the body production season—operating at less
than 50 percent of capacity.
es
in
ch
Ma
of
pe
Ty
Number of Machines
Double Crank Presses
74
s
sse
Pre
le
gg
To
19
s
sse
Pre
k
an
Cr
gle
Sin
78
.
No
26
Numerous small blanking and stamping presses
t
mus
one
,
ent
ipm
equ
of
list
ve
abo
the
of
nce
ica
nif
sig
full
the
e
To appreciat
ld
wou
it
e
tim
the
and
,
cost
ir
the
s,
sse
pre
se
the
of
size
s
dou
realize the tremen
require a new plant to get delivery of such presses.
A big Toggle press, for
14
500
PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
example, stands 40 feet from the base to the top of the press and is large
enough to hold and operate a draw or flange die which itself weights from 70
to 80 tons. Such presses cost from $150,000 to $175,000 and it would require
years to get delivery of the number and type of such press equipment that
is now standing idle more than 50 percent of the time at the Cleveland Fisher
plant.
Present employment in the Fisher Cleveland press room reflects the extent
to which the presses are now idle. There are 600 men on the day shift, 300
on the afternoon shift, and 67 on the midnight shift.
In addition to Cleveland Fisher Body, every major body plant in the automobile industry has unused press room capacity which can, with the necessary
special dies, be adapted to plane production.
Appendix V
REPLY TO OBJECTIONS
Virtually all of the criticisms of the program have been anonymous—aircraft and automotive industry executives refusing, for some reason, to lend
their names to their printed views. The criticisms do not in any case run
against the feasibility of the program. By and large, they indicate either a
sad lack of imagination or an insistence by automotive interests to continue
with “business as usual.” However, since some misconceptions of the program have gained credence it is advisable to discuss and dispose of these
matters.
BOMBERS
OR PURSUIT
SHIPS
It has been wrongly assumed that the program contemplated the production
only of pursuit ships. Our reference to the possible production of 500 fighting
planes a day was used only to indicate the over-all productive capacity of an
automobile industry whose idle machines and idle men were fully mobilized
and whose private interests were temporarily subordinated. The productive
Capacity we have indicated can as readily be adapted to the production of
medium-sized or heavy bombers. If these latter types are built rather than
pursuit ships, the daily production would be scaled down in proportion to the
increased amount of work required on each plane. Nevertheless, our program
could build many more bombers, large or small, than are now being built or
are contemplated, and in much shorter time.
MAN-HOURS
REQUIRED
Some sources in the automobile industry assert our plan is impractical
because of the relatively small percentage of machine hours in manufacturing
an automobile as compared with the total man hours required to build a plane.
These sources contend that out of 18,000 man-hours necessary to build a
pursuit ship, 10,000 are devoted to construction of air frames, work on which
is usually done by hand. In attempting to prove their point, these sources
simply multiply 10,000 man-hours by 500 planes a day which gives them a tremendous and impressive figure. It would be as logical to take the number of
500
PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
15
hours required to custom-build a Chevrolet car by hand and then multiply this
figure by Chevrolet’s daily production and use that tremendous figure to prove
that Chevrolet could not possibly produce 6,000 cars a day. Custom-building
of an automobile, it has been estimated, requires
1,100 man hours of work.
This means that it would have required 4,400,000,000 man hours to produce
the 4,000,000 cars of the 1939 model. To carry the contention of our critics
on this score to their logical conclusion:
it would
have required
2,200,000
men working 40 hours a week fifty weeks a year to produce last year’s 4,000,000 automobiles.
The persons who argue thus speak of mass production quantities but use
the mathematics of custom-built production methods. It is an elementary
fact that the number of hours spent doing things by hand as compared to the
number of hours spent operating machines (machine-hours) varies in ever
increasing proportion to the extent that mass production techniques are introduced into the production process. The number of hours spent in building
an automobile is less than one-sixth of what it was when the industry started,
and as the over-all man hours decrease the machine hours increase in percentage as compared to the work done by hand. One can go into a modern
continuous strip steel mill and see this in its sharpest form.
FLOOR SPACE REQUIRED
This mistake of thinking of mass production of planes in the mathematics
of custom-built hand production also raises the question of the practicality of
providing the neecssary floor space for assembly work. Another elementary
fact is that the number of days necessary to complete the production cycle
(in machining and fabricating industries such as autos and aircraft) is shortened in proportion to the extent that mass production technique is applied.
The shorter the production cycle the less floor space is needed. This is true
because the number of jobs in the process of production is held at a minimum.
If the Chevrolet Motor Company had to build 6,000 cars a day by the same
methods that are now being used to build planes, the total man power and
floor space of the entire automobile industry would not be adequate to turn
out its present production.
Our original report cited the availability of floor space—785,000 feet—at
the Hupmobile plant, in Detroit, for the assembling of motors. A further
striking example of available floor space is the Reo plant at Lansing, Michigan,
which has the following vacant space: Mt. Hope Avenue plant, 553,237 square
feet; Building No. 4800, 247,931
square feet; Building No. 4700,
104,247
square feet. In Reo’s main plant 500,000 square feet is fully equipped with
production machinery. Starting January 13, 1941, Reo will be producing five
motors per day in a plant that at one time produced 160 truck and 125 passenger cars in one eight-hour shift.
DIFFERENCES IN ENGINES
Doubts have been expressed on the adaptability of automobile production
machinery to production of aircraft motors because of the reduced weight of
aircraft motors. These doubts are without foundation.
16
500 PLANES
A DAY—THE
REUTHER
PLAN
The reduced weight of an aircraft motor per horsepower as compared with
automobile motors is secured firstly by the difference in the design of the
motor and secondly by the fact that all parts of an aircraft motor are reduced
to a minimum weight by removing all surplus metal. This is done by a process
of machining. The same basic machinery is used to machine parts for an
aircraft motor as for an automobile motor, excepting that a more complete and
precise machining job is done in the case of the aircraft motor. The available
machinery in the automobile industry can be retooled to turn out aircraft
motors of 1,000 or 2,000 horsepower of either the air-cooled or liquid-cooled
design.
The objection has also been raised that aircraft engines must be made in
more precise dimensions than automobile engines. As our program points
out, more precise parts are obtained by more precise tooling.
SHORTAGE
OF
ARMAMENTS
Any possible bottlenecks in armaments, instruments, etc., is not a legitimate
criticism of our plan.
Such bottlenecks can be met if production of such
armament, instruments, etc., is spread over existing industries whose machine
Capacities and production facilities are adaptable to such production.
The
pooling of such productive capacity with central assembly plants using the
same approach we suggest for aircraft production will make it possible to
eliminate any possible bottlenecks in atmaments, instruments, etc.
SIMILARITY OF BASIC MACHINERY
In our program we state that basic machinery used for automobile production can be adapted for producing aircraft parts. We point out that precise and
difficult parts of the Allison engine are being made in the old Cadillac plant
in Detroit with machinery which duplicates existing unused automobile plant
machinery. These statements have been challenged in some quarters. Herewith is a list of machinery, newly constructed and installed in the Allison
division in Detroit, which duplicates existing automobile plant machinery:
Grinding machines: Cincinnati centerless, Exlo internal and external,
Bland, Norton, Landis, Blanchard, Brown
and Sharpe,
(Bryant)
and Held.
(These machines are used to produce the following parts which are common
to both aircraft and automobile motors: camshafts, crankshafts, bearings, con-
necting rods, wrist pins.) Milling machines: Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Sunstrand and Brown and Sharpe. Keller machines: Wickes lathes, Greenlee
Jathes and Cincinnati lathes. Spline machines: Sunstrand, and Brown and
Sharpe. Hones: Exlo and Wickes.
PRESENT
USE
OF
FACILITIES
It is argued that the facilities of the automobile industry are already being
employed for production of aircraft parts. Our surveys indicate that not ten
percent of the available facilities are being brought into play for defense purposes. The present plans do not contemplate the coordination and full use of
facilities which alone can produce a large number of planes within a comparatively short period.
“DEFSNSE"
-
From
statement
by
19,
March
we had
but
that
to
proved
Cadillac,
and
they
committee
and
try
was
that
to
to
agreed
of
a
set
a
little
putting
on
stall
held
conference
press
1941:
25,
March
OPM,
that
eet
us
drawings
closer."
be
fixtures
maké
incorrect
slightly
go
to
wanted
to
into “the
machines
standard
in
case
the
aS
shop
to him.
talked
and
in here
him /Reuther/
could
he
claimed
was
in
made
Knudsen
of
BLUE
HIM
1941:
"well,
It
BRING
publication
official
From
TO
OFFERED
REUTHER
SAYS
KNUDSEN
a
of
union
to
design
fixtures
for
the
machinery
the
master
mechanic
out
of
a
one
and
drawings
for
one
say
and
couldn't
it
come
motor,
to
down
look
be
and
over
job.
handled.
study
and
and
We had
He
them...
get
into
NELSON'S REPLY TO INDUSTRY'S CHARGE THAT GOVERNMENT NEVER
TOLD INDUSTRY WHAT TO DO:
From
enough
"To
those
for
them
are
You
is
it?
customer
meade
a
you
to
call
study
thorough
prepared
show
us what
Navy
to
convert
you
determine
initiative
and
and
you
of
your
can
what
ask
what
machinery
every
enterprise
at
plant
the
an
take
customer
the
There
do?
to
you
to
isn't
can
other
for
waiting
by
those
ine
What
Are
wants?
needs?
for
the
There
of
the
Have
order?
make.
end
enterprise?
your
enterprise.
free
preserving
business
get
usually
Do
to
about
is
Where
initiative?
your
talking
always
done
hasn't
Washington
-
1942
2,
March
Nelson,
say:
1
is
"Where
that
whine
who
M.
Donald
by
address
radio
re
TTC
LE
the
you
you
Can
you
Army
and
must
be
transaction."
PATTERSON TOLD ONLY 10% to 20% of TOOLS CAN BE CONVERTED
W
ea)
BEFORE TOLAN COMMITTEE IN qiilimmaieP 194.1
-
Patterson
Wr.
Can't
"IT
good
people
many
20
per
10
to
be
readily
who
remember
cent
and
of
I
got
the
converted."
told
the
tools
me
but
I
information
that
were
inquired
then
right
from
a
that
from.
there
could
1941
- FROM
REPORT
OF
THE
TRUMAN
COMMITTEL
From
ASHINGTON
STAR
February
ll,
1942
seat
St
REN
eM
ae
Fae
,
e
NE Mee
~
aE
S Tee
P
pee
.
rie
os
"
.
‘i
“
Me
>
ee
r
«
at
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e
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a ponPE
_—
Sanaa are
e
t
S
i
R
e
E
c
ON
PE
TUT RB a
PRESS
January
7,
Wilson
says
Pooling
Wilson
says
“Our
take
care
1942
the
of
billion
G.M,
for
times
we
- "just
1941
are
“It
at
a
rate
9 to
take
to
of
be
10
dollars
19
producing
defense
billion
dollars
two
20
months
22
a year,"
auto
15
under
350,000
in 1941
will
Motors
General
Wilson
in,"
record"
all-time
an
is
business
says
materials
emergency
ways
dollars”
Defense
Wilson
business
business,
G.M,-Defense
2
is Socialization
ordinary
"That
says
Wilson
D.C,
WASHINGTON,
CONFERENCE,
WILSON
says:
business
were
“In 1941 - - "we B##/doing
with
our
left
hand,"
re,
i
29
CHEW:
ORDINARY
{ CARE OF EMERGED
TIMES WE ARE I}
PRESS
MOTORS
GENERAL
PAGE 9
(C. BE. WILSON SAYS POOLING IS SOCIALIZATION)
Mr,
by
T mean
you
have
other,
a regimented
to
go
to
no
and
of
question
understand
men
you
you
words,
order
In
it,
of
the
United
part
of
one
and
responsibility
and
authority
have
what
either
or
States,
system
social
can't
You
set-up,
the
doing
way of
industrial
have
to
have
you
because
is
there
present
the
on
I
industry,
but
not,
or
that
operate
to
have
of
socialization
complete
whether
know
don't
country without
of the
the facilities
is no way to pool
.......There
Wilson:
1942
7,
Jan,
D,C,,
Washington,
CONFERENCE,
part
of
the
to
go
activity,
with
Hrttit
$C.E, WILSON SAYS
Y
THE EMERGENCWE
Mr,
somebody
under
the
Quest®on:
Mr,
can
that
present
Yes,
Wilson:
times
emergency/we
we
that
raw materials
use
but
That
is
are
in,
Now
it,
system
these
we
that
have
of
that
this
aren't
my point,
TAKE
|
WAYS
statement
present
,,,,The
Wilson:
BUSINESS
ORDINARY
ARE IN
says
that
use
can't
is the
OF
CARE
for
any
or
machinery
the war
ordinary
PAGE
facilities
we will
effort,
business
15
way
of
or
release
pooling
things
country,
ordinary
that
our
business
ordinary
times,
business
are
ways
they,
take
Mr,
care
any
Wilson?
of
the
to
NINE MONTHS
BEFORE 2 BIrpr
$ DEFENSE BUS,
i Defense Bus,
a30,000,000
4
cnetan
(Cc,
Wilson:
Mr,
Question:
Mr,
Mr.
other
country
Mr,
Mr,
in
of
cars
'29,
it
number
things
we
are
wasn't
number,
a larger
was
produced
trucks
and
cars
the
about
tag?
price
the
and
locomotives,
Diesel
like
making,
to
due
that
or was
this
in
it?
the
And
due to
partly
the
other
business?
defense
for
total
in the United States,..........
That was $330,000,000
the
Oh,
Wilson:
and
of vehicles
number
increased
the
making,
are
we
is
volume
The
Wilson:
of 1941,
1929,
- what
frit
(continued)....
Mr,
in
Yes,
Wilson;
Question:
other
the
against
as
1941
Donner;
products
Mr,
The
products,
to
due
It was
Wilson:
than
higher
sales
auto
your
Were
Question:
right,
is
That
Wilson:
business?
non-defense
purely
is
This
record,
all-time
an
is
That
1929?
since
year
best
the
that
is
compare,
that
does
How
Wilson:
right,
is
That
Wilson:
Question:
Mr,
1941?
In
Question:
dollars),
(two billion
just under $2,000,000,000
It was
1941?
in
business
non-defense
of
amount
total
the
was
What
Question:
Mr
ON G,M,
WILSON
E,
19
PAGE
BUSINESS)
DEFENSE
NON
we gave
our
for
figures
you a figure
calendar
year
it was $52,000,000,
In December
of $330,000,000,
the
for
material
defense
of
shipments
iitititit
Question:
your
Mr,
Mr,
present
Wilson:
annual basis
Wilson,
one-third
You
mean
how
....,
rate
how
to
Long
that we probably
do
you
expect
ideal
100
per
long
the
it
have
will
take
to
cent
get
will
it
for
over
take
war
the
now to the $2,000,000,000
you
to
move
from
production?
rate
of
rate?
say
En
$700,000, 000
C.E,WILSON ON
POOLING
TRANSCRIPT
M VERBATIM
ON
SUBCOMMITTEES
PROBLEMS
AUTOMOBILE
GENERAL
INDUSTRY
AND
OF LABOR
MEETING
JOINT
(Cc, E, WILSON ON POOLING)
some
for
the
what
from
a surprisingly
have
We
pooling
this
is
an
perhaps
We
best,
standings
the
ever
for
cerns
produce
best
they
to
outside
were
pooling
of
is
that
concerns
in the
automobile
I think
industry,
automotive
the
because
business
other
were
they
whether
advantage,
the
that
with
ourselves
advantage
best
the
of
some
that
one
the
us
contracts
with
con-
the
to
them
or whether
industry
this
on
get straight
might
think
couldn't
we
that
produce
to
ought
we
or who-
could
people
under-
of
Navy
materials
the
suboontract
to
expected
we
Then
materials,
war
the
of
were
people
authorized
proper
the
do
or
Army
all
concerned
can
kind
years,
‘So that
are
ones
any
or
place
to
Government
the
the
from
orders
our
get
to
expected
We
else,
anything
or
common
any
have
to
expect
didn't
for
materials,
that
been
have
we
materials
manufacturers
the
arrangements
financial
and
of war
things
the
of
principle
in
industry
parts
other
as
far
other
each
from
purchase
increased
For
a competitive
manufacture
as
to
amount
to
going
is
industry
of
nothing
each
the
is
That
now,
do
to
job
a common
different
was
sold
have
We
industry,
cooperative
years,
for
doing
been
has
industry
to
expected
industry
the
that
pooling
The
do
trouble,
future
possible
to
close
4 little
gets
that
one
the
is
that
people
us
of
a little
to make
I would like
Mr. Wilson:
about this pooling business because
statement
some
get
us
into
call
an
automotive
difficulty,
activity
The
council
to
oAutomotive
cooperation
in
our
As
our
not
and
said
competitors,
set
before,
thing
the
the
to
up
something
on
about
degree,
on
the
it
common
we
ought
the
involved
of
problems
to
automotive
that
extend
the
to
belong
processing
technica
information
pasis,
that
hagwe
that
so
practically
engineers
common
been
has
it
orderwords,
circumstances
further
industry
that
worked
have
these
under
somewhat
I know
cooperative daa
that
felt
activity
and
plants
I
all
We
engineering,
They
Engineers,
the
all
-
vale
ans
for
industry
our
in
practice
Society
war
In
‘ae
a technical
is
production,
in
recently
here
started
we
that
we
what
Detroit,
been
some
Sol
cooperative
other
thought
to
a surprising
industries
I better
and,
clear
extent
ordinarily,
that
point
for
they
with
are
you
all,
CEW PRAISES
UNION ON LABOR
RELATIONS
Wilson
It
on
Poo
simply
means
thinking
we
will
He
have
items,
as
We
in
far
as
we
facilities
or
here
him
he
and
any
of
same
for
us;
and
over,
the
other,
a good
have
that
Hoffman
aircraft
do
the
if Mr,
producing
will
than
We
tops
about
invite
doing,
thing
that
many
in
kind
the
our
of
are
whole
his
if
in
We
are
like
to
see
either
have
of
us
country
face
whole
aircraft
and
the
to
the
would
in
technicians,
organizations
concerned,
business
interested
and
industry,
various
MMMM
engines
new problems
business
is
in the
many
get
that
pool
them
the
Reuther:
When
plants
of
is
look
everything
way
he
like
we
are
doing
some-
of
of
all
these
different
people
who
certainly
the
pooling
what
“know
how™
but
not
it,
are
the
amounts
to
our
arrangements,
PAGE 50
(C, E, WILSON PRAISES UNION ON LABOR RELATIONS)
(Mr,
and
advantage
is
our
our
a better
production
So
to
what
show
technical
world,
going
will
production
we make
a deal
in General Motors,
that
becomes
a pattern
for
the
industry).
Mr,
Wilson:
than
the
I will
General
say
this:
that I
Motors
shop,
don't
know
anybody
that
is
getting
along
any
better
inti
PAGE 56
(C.E, WILSON OFFERS TO HELP FORD ON DIE Jos)
(Mr,
Frankensteen:
hearing,
Mr,
Wilson:
a business
of
“We
their
Mr,
may have
There
are
arrangement
orgahization
Wilson
made
a comment
some
die makers
only
a couple
for
for
trying
to
solicitgyng
to lir,
Ford
that
I
couldn't
help
over-
available",.........)
of
get
big
shops
this
business
of
work,
as
well
this
nature,
The
They
have
a regular
as
taking
got
other
business,
If
people
have
contract
part
have
any
we
capacity
is
in
is
what
drawings
on
right
of
plenty
I have
now,"
that
something
has
he
“If
said,
I
is
that
work
state,
design
the
in
and
stage
negotiation.
the
the
us
give
can
he
that
designed
still
it
all,
at
That
temporary,
is very
-
- 5
- continued
Job
Die
on
Ford
Help
to
Offers
Wilson
itt
Mr.
TO BUILD MORE
WILSON WANTS
$C.E.
Wilson: ...ccscone
and
WANN
tires,.....
shipping
of
way
some
find
cars
them
getting
and
them
to
helpful
very
be
would
cortainiy
71
PAGE
AUTOS)
PAGE
Mr,
I am going
Wilson:
that
fact
or
sooner
form
it
and
later,
facilitate
it will
fact
a lot
is
there
good
of
can
going
be
done
we
and
now
any
without
have
we
because
going
are
got
to
do
it
but
it,
the
need
interference
to
86
I have
and
right
about
sensitive
be
to
I'm
because
anyway
material,
program
the
it
about
am not
I
and
before,
misunderstood
talk
to
the
without
way
the
of
out
passenger
more
some
build
is
stuff
been
an
absolute
that
in
in
whatsoever,
something
with
material,
the
ah
| HE
CAN USE
JOB
$EDSEL FORD SAYS HE
HELP HIM ON BOMBER
Mr,
die
I would
Ford:
a
makers
bomber,
start
short
If there
IDLE
like
time
is
any
to
throw
ago,
die
We
DIE
this
have
capacity
CAPACITY OF
in the
got
lap
OTHER
of Mr,
a tremendous
around
with,
ririitit
in
these
He
Reuther,
program
other
PAGE
To
PLANTS
on
plants,
talked
those
that
dies
is
53
a bit
for
about
that
something
to
ae
(continued)
to
get
work
to
Walter,
Actually,
Wilson:
Mr,
54
ought
you
that
things
staff,
mechanical
the
on
PAGE
in mechanical
interested
so
are
you
WORK
TO
GO
REUTHER
3
THAT
SUGGESTION
(CC, E, WILSON OFFERS
FOR MANAGEMENT)
titiit
URGES
(EVERSTADT
Mr,
said
machine
tools,
tools,
They
on machine
of
capacity,
please
which
tools
let
us
know,
are
used
of
the
more
out
our
tool
requirements,
serious
no more
take
your
Second,
each
an
It
and
question
inventories,
make
only
tools,
get
inventory
I
if
of
tools
You
can
in
part,
do
which
us
please
at
this
that
on
you
us
you
your
than
have
tools,
any
pool
as
other,
ett
on
full
need
seriously
as
I
tools that
manpower
to
we
MRQMNMMQMER
tools
you
and
pool
that
a miracle
know
let
If
you
we
can
to
There
how,
I repeat,
spare,
your
that,
so
4zain,
can
over
used
that
moment
would
go
facilities
your
We
to
than
service
yesterday
return
being
now
not
are
greater
no
appears
urge
facing
and
any
have
you
your
on
a note
make
would
gentlemen
you
if
If
tools,
inventory
have
it
appreciate
ereatly
today,
program
our
in
thing
critical
most
the
are
has
Forrestal
made
Reuther
Mr,
remarks
the
in
interested
I was
99
Mr,
what
repeat
to
is
say
to
I want
thing
second
.,,The
Everstadt:
about
PAGE
POOLING)
us
resources
your
meet
is
please
know,
amongst
'41 AUTO BUS,
WITH
better,
or
Yes
Question:
Probably
Wilson:
Mr,
Hunt:
Nine
months,
Question:
What
will
Mr,
hand
going
Question:
Mr,
Wilson:
Question:
You
with
ahead
mean
Yes
That
were
.
...
Wiesws:
and
say,
so?
say,
ten?
to
nine
PAGE 25
1941 DOING AUTO BUSINESS WITH LEFT HAND)
KC,E, WILSON:
Mr,
I would
say
you
months,
Nine
Wilson:
we
wouldn't
months,
on
Mr,
you
doing
automobile
the
could
we
anything
were
doing
of
sort
get
greatest
your
to
with
business
left
our
do,
business
with
your
left
hand?-
sir,
is
a pretty
good
to
hand
i
7
keep
in
operation
then,
isn't
it?
ttitit
itit
;
oe
P
“LEFT
a
on
Res saePER
ae
mt
Pe
Se
Printed
COL,
Objections
JOUETT
to the Reuther
said:
"Airplanes
(N.Y, Times
Plan made when the plan was
can't
- December 24,
be
made
by mass
issued:
production
methods,"
1940)
Hitt
"Spokesmen
personnel
for
one
could
be
of
the
largest
developed
(N.Y, Times,
December
to
aircraft
make
24,
concerns"
execution
of
the
said
that
plan
not
enough
trained
possible,
1940)
ntint
An Executive
be
levelled
Sales
in
of
an
off
automobile
over
advance
an
and
company
entire
must
year
build
cars
stated
because
to
that
automobile
“The
companies
customer's
orders
production
cannot
as
to
could
estimate
body
not
their
styles
and
colors,"
(Detroit
News,
December
24,
1940)
itititirit
"Air
planes
must
be
custom-built",
(N.Y, Journal
of Commerce
- December
24,
1940)
HEE
smaller
the
industry
(automobile)
"The
planes,
army
and
(N.Y,
ririririt
could
navy
will
Journal
be
has
turned
not
generally
out
listen
of Commerce
to
on
favored
a mass
such
- December
the
production
an idea,"
24,
idea
1940)
that
basis
planes,
- but
particularly
they
say
that
to have
turned
down the
1,
Difficulty
2,
The
Reuther
of
the
0,P.M,
for
the
following
sufficient
obtaining
impossibility
of
obtaining
machine
sufficient
before
the
already
were
period
preparatory
months
Plan
are
of
experts”
production
"defense
Unnamed
Press
by Associated
reported
reasons:
tools,
either
new or
aluminum products
start
projected
of
old,
in the
six-
500-a-day plane
production,
fact
3,
The
4.
Lack of
(News
that
so
for
armament
immediate
(Detroit)
plans
auto
being
assigned
major
great
a number
of planes,
ships;
from the
automobile
defense
jobs,
- January 1, 1941)
titi
wants
government
"The
(Business Week,
bombers,
not
pursuit
January 4, 1941)
industry,"
~
tit itiit
It
lack
is
materials,
raw
of
(Business Week, January 4, 1941)
iititirit
"The
pment)
importance
of
is greatly
(Business
press
work
and
machining
(to
be
done
with
idle
automotive
equi-
over-rated,"
Week,
January
4,
1941)
HE
Production
plant
of
500
planes
a day
would
require
an
astonomical
number
of
space,
(Business Week,
(also
in
January 4,
a statement
by Col,
1941)
Jouett
of Air,
Chathber
of Commerce)
man-hours
and
"Few
automobile
engines
must
produce
least
at
(U.S, News,
"Holders
auto
of
may
1,000
January
aircraft
industry
generate
use
(From a Market
some
100 hoyrse-power,
and
véry
probably
are
not
its
particularly
facilities
for
Column - Wall Street
pleased
mass
Col,
Jouett's
letter,
$
airplane
motors
more,"
N.Y,
Times,
Jan,
27,
9
1941)
at
the
prospect
production
Journal,
tiv itt
(See
whereas
1941)
of
Gossip
than
horse-power
10,
shares
more
December
of
that
planes,"
24,
1940)
the
the automobile assembly line basis.
While the aircraft and automobile
up to a
comparable
eration necessary for
completing planes. ‘Some airplane |:
parts can E made in automobile
sYmen
spok
| plants,
said
industry
cooperative effor:
industries.
Au
The
ind they welcomed
between the two
last October
the request of I Lt
automotive
|
:
s
t
n
a
l
P
o
t
u
A
f
o
e
s
U
r
e
v
O
Talks
e
H
t
u
b
,
y
a
r
r
u
M
p
i
l
i
h
P
With
23—Presi-
was
drawings
was
ther, direc
tors Divisid
outlines
as
by
of
the
for Defense,
and
members
e
defense
r
o
f
e
c
i
f
f
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board,
Produc-
National
Defense
t
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‘|tio
idle many
seven-man
designed
those
particularly
From
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i
of
parts
the
efense
was
mG,
directed
Mr.
They
urgent
as
to
hether
weit
maintaine
stress
of
the
war,
the
foreign
\know
President|
expressed
the
with
to
the
Defense
four-|
|
|
Board
|
m
o
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| plis
|
|
he was fulfillreiterated
de-
quately represented on any deterce
board or council.
:
i
i
rde
O.
un
I.
is
C.
e
Th
t
en
id
es
pr
eink
ave quietly demurred to,
the obser vation that his defense
“cpaaaignage
plan, sent
| productionn
WI te House last week, was.
to th0 e
similar
Sohias toon.
the Admini istration’s
ion’s new |
it
na-.
four-man board
the , frequently
|
The Murray plan would create in- |
ret
ra
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vast
in-
have
automotive
in-
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England,
in
them
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which he he’ announced
New
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n
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| lish m
mands by spokesmen for organized
that labor should
|labor
be ade-
ske
for
As
the
‘ing
|
Reuther
hopes
satlepection
have
aircraft
of
countrjes—France,
| Germany—who
;
having
e
r
e
w
y
e
h
t
t
f
a
r
c
r
i
a
f
o
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o
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t
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u
d
to
the
mass-production
possible.
| other
success-
|
Mr. Roosevelt, i it was r eported,
:
|| had the impression that by palate
| Sidney Hillman one of the seven
| Defense Commission members to
n and Knox.
toward
understood
top board
feet n Beidaat
|
and
craft production.
t
p
o
d
a
o
t
t
s
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e
\th
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e
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met
i
lifetimeS$
“Manufacturers
BV.
set-up,
aircraft
made
|
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.
n
o
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c
u
d
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r
p
d
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p
ra
manufacturers
have
|
cuts
short
as many
' sible to more
; Later the conversation was said
. have veered around to the new |
r
o
n
a
l
p
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f
o
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him
.
l
i
a
t
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d
n
i
it
elucidate
n
o
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c
u
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r
P
s
s
Skeptical of Ma
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o
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come
ptical
factories
and_
*
7
a
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l
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c
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p
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t
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r
‘Murray
‘telegrams
mass pros
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n
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l
duction with the
s
a
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a
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r
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as pos-
| fully to turn out pursuit ships.
The President was said to h
to have the
his desire
gia
in made
available t o the defense
atfilie,
chiats.
associated
nation
be used
line method could
:
i
Blanae
Seindk
of
types
|
.
s
e
i
r
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t
c
a
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ods in
d
e
s
s
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v
a
h
“They
firms
«f the year
months
f
t
duction,| |
o
r
p
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v
a
e
h
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sponsible f
h
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s
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m
d
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d
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t
s
e
v
| ha
sub-assemof fabrica-
so that
re-
companies
larger
the
ticularly
| might be continued to be made in
aircraft plants, ; Mr. ‘ Murra y assertassembly
ed that the automobile
t
l
e
v
e
s
o
o
R
.
r
M
e
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In
m
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will
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all
De-
in
space
aircraft,
of
s
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t
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n
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M
‘
‘
ships a day on a mass production
basis.
While large .ombers and speciall
n
e
d
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s
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r
P
,
r
e
h
t
u
e
R
.
r
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will
,
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t
f
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s
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T
R. J.
i
40,000
the workers and the entire operation of producing 500 metal pursuit
.
n
o
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s
s
i
m
m
o
C
Advisory
e
m
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The
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n
a
l
p
of the
t
| ties,
dipslay,
|
produc-
sub-as-
that factory space is available in
the industry to house the machines,
Mr. Murray.
a resu
As
copies of th
to the
It was
s of America.
main
known
ago,
ite
f the
ASS
engaged in the automotive industry
may send spokesmen for information and observation.
Tells of Idle Plant Capacity
Mr. Murray explained to President
plan
that the Reuther
Roosevelt
proved that the maximum of available skilled automobile labor was
not being fully utilized in the airplane program; that basic production machines and tools are lying
said.
days
of
feet
are on
tion
forwarded
ht several
office
and |
e
h
t
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p
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t
re
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b >.
|
One
taken
disassembled parts and
blies in various stages
s
a
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s
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or or
hich
e
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o
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portunity
s
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.
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o
J
“
troit, where not only blueprints but
i
s
e
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,
y
a
r
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nilip M
h
t
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it
k
©O., too
,
t
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N
re sident,
has
committee
The
square
it was
o
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y
a
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h
t
s
a
,
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m
this ti
into the busi-_
ness of making pieces and
semblies of large planes.
reported today
sevelt was
| President’
l
a
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a
s
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y
a
r
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M
Mr.
stress
of
number
Page
From
Continued
J
|
.
S
E
M
I
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k
r
o
Y
w
e
Specialto THE N
firms
working
(metal
K
R
A
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S
S
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By
considerable
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.
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_ Mr.
e
z
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p
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ing th
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t
a
cre
industry, pointed out that it has_
passed out of the formative stage.
and has succeeded in bringing to-
| gether
each
in
/ industry.
blies for the aircraft manufacturing |
f
l
e
s
m
i
H
t
momi
.
c
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D
,
N
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N
WASHI
at |
of parts and sub-assem-|
production
a
m
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| poin
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s plan wou
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er
Air Defense,
aircraft
the
for
—
p
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,
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e
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“spokes
—
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n,
PMR ONT
industries were
-aft
‘J,
M.
Hall
of
.
r
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A
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Consol
Corporation,
ag
an
— speaking,
individual
and
not
he.
for
Mr.
but)
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a
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his company,
’
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‘
Reuther was
’
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.
c
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While Mr. Hail fe
.
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b
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tools and punch p
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would
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racy than those ,
to be of great
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|
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desig
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for automon
would have t
for the pres
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A spokesnigm
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belief that the
:
follow
earlier
Ford
to
me
the
reported
build @
Henry
of
plan
|
which did not
}
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This spokesman’
e
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,
0
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s
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h
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o
aircraft industry n
m
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x
000 employes, e
d
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ployed on engi
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that the present pr
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p
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0
0
0
,
0
for a roster of 60
one year.
n
o
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t
s
o
m
The experience of
o
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b
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companies is that
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said, and to build
|
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ployes in the
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on
Supermen a Problem
a
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of
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Aside from th
he
another,
and
‘rials of one kind
|
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added, there is no
)
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adequately tra
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S
.
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p
s
n
e
e
b
s
a
h
l
e
n
sory person
that
[thin
their
at
are
employers
of
m
e
l
b
o
r
p
e
th
e
v
l
o
s
wits’ ends to
d
e
n
i
a
r
t
n
u
d
n
a
w
e
n
of
[supervision
men,
“By
year,’
he said.
employment
doubling
said,
spokesman
this
|
one
in
“‘su-
d
a
e
r
p
s
be
to
e
v
a
h
d
l
u
o
w
pervisors
y
l
e
r
i
t
n
e
is
it
,
e
s
r
u
o
c
f
all too thin. O
e
th
of
n
e
m
le
id
e
th
e
possible to us
|
y
r
a
r
t
n
o
c
,
t
u
B
.
y
r
t
s
u
d
n
i
automobile
in
t
s
o
m
in
,
n
e
m
e
s
e
h
t
,
n
to the pla
e
th
r
fo
d
e
i
f
i
l
a
u
q
be
t
stances, will no
type of
factory.
“Tn
line
production
the
industry
automobile
the
plane
a
in
required
work
unskilled |
are
men
|
|
in
t
f
a
r
c
r
i
a
e
th
in
e
ar
y
e
h
t
as
just
e
v
i
t
i
t
e
p
e
r
d
e
l
l
i
k
s
n
u
n
A
dustry.
|
st
s
ju
e
r
i
u
q
e
y
r
r
t
s
u
d
n
i
e
n
o
worker in
as much
training
other.
as in the
s
u
d
n
i
o
w
t
e
th
s
e
in
r
u
d
e
c
o
r
p
The
m
o
r
f
n
a
m
a
d
n
,
a
t
n
e
r
e
f
f
i
d
e
ar
s
ie
tr
one would have to learn the pro-)|
cedure as a new job.
‘“‘tTowever, the airplane industry |’
That
can always use tool makers.
industry |
the automobile
is where
can be of use.
“Of
could
course
weld
worker |
an automobile
wings
fast,
~
op-|
this
but
the wing much
eration would make
heavier. No way has yet been found |
|
to save time in riveting by hand.
s
e
l
i
b
o
m
o
t
u
a
t
a
t
h
e
t
g
r
o
f
t
o
n
o
D
“
under
made
mass-production
tions can be changed
condi- |
as to impor-|
tant or less important details in a}
What/|
time.
short
comparatively
would happen if you tried to make |
changes
in planes
on
the
line as rapidly as changes
ing made nowadays in the
what we learn. every day?
‘‘The
plan proposes
assembly |
are be- |
light of |
complete
re-
|
engineering of the type of plane}
suggested by Mr. Reuther, the pur-|
suit
ship.
It
takes
two
to
three)
years to prove a new type of plane)
production, from the first designs to :
service
testing.
That
from automobiles.”’
is different|
_,
™
8
en
Lo
om
UR
2)
Auto Chiefs
See Flaws in
Reuther.Plan
Executives of
panies withheld coi
fmobiie
com-
- could
turn
the “Reuther pla
surplus capacity 0
an
airplane-prod
which
CIO
Walter
P.
official, estim:
out 500 pursuit ships’ d
Some spokesmen for the industry
said privately that they believed the
plan is “impratical,”
They contended that. automobile plant machinery cannot
be adapted to air-
production
,
oh
a mass
scale
y Reuther,
—
ated that
automobile
production” cor Id not be leveled off
‘lover the entire year, as Reuther
Philip Murray, CIO president, who}:
suggested, because the companies
|cannot estimate their sales far in
advance
presented Reuther’s report
dent
Roosevelt
Monday,
and must ‘puild cars to cus-
tomers’ orders: as’ to body styles and
(Murray)
|meet the
colors.
|PEAKS
|
by
To estimate the year’s production
computations
based
on
| plant capacity at Murray’s
|tions. UAW-CIO mémbers
peak-
peak
production
maintained,
Officials
one
cannot
of companies
s}plants
be
spokesman
al Motors
is General
the
of
Reuther,
| automobile and steel plants.
‘| USED FEDERAL DATA
Reuther
; automobile industry is operating at
to
comment,
until
the
declining ‘to. comment
on
plan
While
Reuther’s
at least
received. more
plan, an official
It is Reuther’s
study.
‘tonly
of the
automobile ma lufacturers will sus-,
pend product
their
facilities,
tools, “are
_jaircraft.”
models, the
auto
affect
year.
The
would
make
ut lee
‘espec
‘| year,
make
models if
‘| total
needer
50 per cent
capacity
would
production
it possible
for
this!
‘|floor space available for use in the|
manufacture of plane parts. Sc
automobile
factories
already
.
making
sections of fusele.
can
wings for airplane companic(_), %
a
for
industry
could}.
per cent of its)’
plan
nanufac-| ’
obigined
»}Government
his
é
n ates of| '
reports
on
the
12-),
*tmonth total motor production from|:
|September,
1939 through
August, ’
1940, and comparing
them
with|-
tool|:
.-| FLOOR SPACE AVAILABLE
"Tn addition,” the spokesman said,
“there
is
considerable
unutilized
over
production capacity being” used by|.
:‘|various automobile companies from| ‘
not
manufacturers and shops operated
by automobile companies to turn
out a large quantity of machinery
needed
fonj the
manufacture
of
plane parts.
capacity
that by spreading |:
over the entire|! |
equally, the
available 50
; ture.
Reuther
said,
contention that the
,;year’s time, and
-| auto production
Automobile Manufacturers’ Associa-|
tion said in
Washington today that!
oe
tracts for plane parts, were unwill-
ing
oe
said.
of the).
department
director for the- UAW-CIO,
had|
more than 10 years experience in
tool and diesdepartments of various
:|who
said.
and of the
‘| fense, which is co- ordi ating efforts
lof the industry to handle sub-con-
a
Reuther
of
instruc-|,
working’
aided ior. compilation
|statistics,
Automotive Committee for Air De-
ae
survey
in the skilled. departments
week production is not accurate be-
|cause
believes the program “will
nation’s requirements for |}
all-metal pursuit ships.”
Reuther undertook the
DECEPTIVE
to Presi-|'
said
he)
ep a
plane
. figures
|-
on peak-output of motors per | ..
-| hour.°
For examen
|the
Nash-
he
estimated
plants,
producing
that
72!.
motors
hourly at a peak
period,|:
| would require only 4914 days of two|’
‘|eight-hour
shifts to complete
its)
-|annual output of 57,216, if the lines!
-|worked at peak rate.
He said this |
.|Meant
that the Nash
factory is)
,| working at.17 per cent capacity. The|'
?,) balance, he holds, would be avail-/
‘| able for conversion
‘|production:.~
into plane
part/|
=
NEW YORK, N.Y.
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE
eeiia
DEC 24 1940
but the|
welcomed by the industry,
airplane industry feels that the two)
processes,
manutacture
of automo-|
biles and production of planes, are|
too basically different to make suc- | '
{AIR OFFICIALS DOUBT
cessful
any
attempt
for
the
complete fabrication of airplanes by car
builders, it was explained.
Airplanes,
because
of their operation in violation of the law of grav-
ONMASS
ity,
fects,
';
—Move Stirs Auto Trade
presented to President |
|
Presi-
expressed
dent Philip Murray, was
here tonight by high officials in
the airplane industry,
While declining to be quoted, ex-
the
Walter
which
months
division
and
a member
bile Workers
United
of the
‘tors
of America
(C. I. 0.)
Defense
the
|
Com-
|
| ..
industry
training, who drafted the plan, estibe
d
ul
wo
s
ne
la
rp
ai
ed
sh
ni
fi
d
te
ma
coming off the assembly lines.
on
committee
mission’s
tall
mse
as
to
le
ab
un
be
d
ul
wo
t
bu
s,
rt
pa
ble finished machines in great quantities, it was
declared.
were cited as evidence
q
4
i‘
7
;
of the imprac-|
ticability of the C. I. O. proposal,
Under the plan, it was stated, there |
be greatly increased
would
ties
of
failures,
«structural
possibiliwhicn
might not have any serious conse-|
n-—
omo
ito
oftau
"quences in the produc
‘piles, but would be fatalin an air-|
j
é
j
:
plane,
qr
a
ms
4
ec
industry, through |
The automo, bile
:
nobile ‘
ag.
.
various co-ordinating committees, 1s_
‘now co-operating thoroughly with the|
.
,airplane
industry,
;
:
| suggestions
made
and
by
all
feasible’
automobile
en-|
gineers which can be incorporated in |
we
| that
Despite
men
~ |
planes.
reported
a
and declared that
the use of 7,500 tool and die makers
who are now unemployed or ‘“‘lost’’
in automobile production work, plus
the use of part-time workers would
make available from 12,000 to 15,000
for the job of making
skilled men
by
fixtures
and
jigs
dies,
tools,
in
the
until
survey
nity
in full.
Off
that
study
to
the
there
the
record,
were
Most
report.
they
the
on
officially
had
-.an
text
of
it
was
many
lin
ters
automotive
tion to normal
into
the
defense
job
full
|
the
executives
force.
pitch |
of
te
ma
ti
es
s
r’
Reuthe
Although
15
s
ie
or
ct
fa
s
ou
ri
the capacity of va
ly
ar
ne
in
gh
hi
o
to
to be
declared
tmi
ad
y
il
ad
re
is
every instance, it
g
n
i
k
r
o
w
t
no
is
ry
st
du
ted that the in
ad
is
It
.
ty
ci
pa
ca
today at its full
0
fy
on
as
se
is
th
at
mitted also that
s
r
e
k
a
m
e
di
d
an
ol
to
e
m
o
s
ar
ye
the
e
ar
e
or
"m
y
n
a
m
d
an
d
e
y
o
l
p
m
e
n
u
are
)
cfa
t
s
o
M
s.
le
du
he
sc
t
or
sh
g
n
i
k
wor
e
es
th
ep
ke
to
g
tories are endeavorin
|
n
o
k
r
o
w
e
c
n
a
v
d
a
h
t
i
w
y
s
u
b
men
1942
As
models.
to Reuther’s
suggestion
d
e
n
o
p
t
s
o
p
be
1942 models
s
er
rk
wo
ol
to
e
il
wh
months
that
six
for
concen-
out
be turned
basis, but “they
of
do
get
not
far.
think Reuther’s
production,
of
e
h
t
of
d
r
o
c
e
r
e
h
t
point to
the
second
year,
new
of
each
in
years,
first,
of
a
and
a
with
fourth
quar-
letdown
for retooling,
models
which
would
do
in
Klimiaway
d
n
a
k
c
a
l
s
r
e
t
r
a
u
q
third
the
with
e
th
in
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
p
l
ve
le
| would help to
:
.
te
ra
r
e
w
o
l
a
at
s
d
other perio
in
e
h
t
in
n
o
i
t
c
a
e
r
e
th
In general,
conceded
and
the
| nation
clu
con
the
d
che
rea
ely
vat
pri
have
the
off
t
cas
to
e
tim
is
it
sion that
uperr
int
‘‘no
of
a
ide
Government’s
production’’
planes—
the third quarter
|)
report
in
has gen
levelling*®off
three
liast
opports-
truths
will
| spokesmen
Reuther
the
they
to
As
of airplane
for production
wings and fuselages.
to comment
of@
details
the
e
N
d
n
a
y
m
r
A
e
h
t
that
”
.
a
e
d
i
n
a
h
c
u
s
to
listen
proposal
be
could
plants
automobilé
receiy
been
that
ingly,
partially
now
machinery
these
of
industry
|say
not
in
work
die
J
impatient
as
more
very
that
prior
top
d
l
u
o
c
—
s
e
n
a
l
p
r
e
l
l
a
m
s
|
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
p
s
s
a
m
a
jon
shortage _ of
and
tool
for
given
to
| the
and
planes;
of
that has bee
order
not
As
and
watchword
is
have
Mich., Dec. 23.—AutoDETROIT,
mobile manufacturers today refused
;
5
Experiences in France, England and
Germany, where mass production of
fighting planes was a distinct failure,
try
Truths in Report
Many
(Special to Journal of Commerce)
as-
is ideally
industry
production of these
The
mass
semblies.
suited for
and
wings
motors,
complete
adapted
motors,
in
s,
ne
la
rp
ai
r
fo
s
rt
pa
n
ai
rt
ce
ng
| turi
cluding
peen
and BL Ways ”
first” has been
the
t
stressed
is
It
light.
| fense
that there is an adequate supply of
skilled and unskilled labor in the industry to tool up for a motor production program and for assembling
idle
the automanufac-
It-was pointed out that
mobile industry is already
mass
to
which
Parts
Making
Already
| fense
being utilized; that basic motor prostamping machinery
and
duction
used by the industry can be adapted
ing for new models
Automo-
bad
in an. unde
industry
the
put
O. report will
that the C. I.
industry
;
in
considerable
is
There
| pe
nment
Gove
if
|iy
Pproduc-
Reuther
Mr.
program,
the defense
stated, both General Motors and the
already
have
Corporation
Chrysle
for
retooling
and
éesigning
beg
new automobile models. He proposed
a six months’ postponement of tool-
P.|
e
r
e
h
t
t
a
h
t
y
a
d
o
t
d
i
|a spokesman sa
t
a
h
t
y
r
t
s
u
d
n
i
e
h
t
was not a plant in
t
n
a
t
s
n
its own
drop
ures indicating that only about 50
per cent of the capacity of facilities
in the automobile industry are now
production
some
But
f
f
o
k
r
o
w
to
g
n
i
r
o
v
a
e
are end
.
m
i
r
e
t
n
i
e
h
t
in
s
model change
cilities in the automobile industry.
Mr. Reuther’s survey quoted fig-
, skilled
Reuther director of the General Motren
ex-
, planes
be of fa-
pt
e
d
t
a
h
t
n
e
h
t
d
e
m
infor
s
t
n
a
l
p
l
o
o
t
r
i
e
h
t
for
m
o
c
s
i
h
t
e
r
o
f
e
D
would not be ready
s
t
n
a
l
p
t
s
o
m
,
y
l
g
n
i
d
r
Acco
ing spring.
an-
calle
program
program.
They were
fense orders
ent on
he pro-
any
that
stating
the Gov-
help
would
if it
entirely
ment
Deck
Murray
‘Give
unanimous:
It 1s
jobs.”
us the
s
u
d
n
i
e
h
t
r
o
f
n
e
m
s
e
k
o
p
s
o
g
a
s
h
t
n
o
m
s
l
e
d
o
s
r
2
4
9
1
o
g
e
r
o
try volunteered to f
pre-
also
Mwas
Considerable ©
of
ecutives in the industry privately exis
that there
pressed the opinion
substantial doubt that the programs |
could be effectuated, particularly in
six
}
}
ernment
tion of 500 all-metal
per day through the
into completed |
O.
in& Sez
result
The
|
concerning
today by. C, I.
a
from the White House itself.
the automobile industry for the |
e airplane parts and;
manufacturof
fabrication
|
to
posal,
practicabilityof the proposal for |
n idle facilities in |
the utilizatioof
Roosevelt
built,
}
eee
Osa
UlLaUo”
|i
while w@
Mr. Murray dee
the President’s rece]
Commerce)
skepticism
airplanes,
custom
t
automobiles @re
_
WASHINGTON, Dee. 23.—Con-
their
be
f
i
. Pressed in gi
imeles that the
_ retooling joi
ym
plished
in anywhere
ths, deto the
spite Mr. Reuther’s opinion
SS
et DEE
' contrary.
Murray, €. I. OF
siderable
must
cision job, to eliminate
(Bureau of Journal of
being
are
planes
of
construction
the
Page)
First
from
(Continued
position
is taken
that
it is distinctly
e
r
o
m
at
th
t
ul
fa
s
’
y
r
t
s
u
d
n
| not the i
y
r
t
s
u
d
n
i
e
th
d
n
a
,
e
n
o
d
jnot being
,
y
a
W
y
n
a
in
e
t
a
r
e
p
o
|ready to co
any
selfsacrifice
to
get
more
done.
is
is
at
}
‘that automobile plants|
re being assigned major |
S—the production of
hgines and of other
| Production experts said they were|
, reluctant to find fault with the plan
}
; because it demonstrated
/ Of labor to contribute
to
the desire)
the
|fense program, __
‘Defense
Experts
Out 4 Flaws
Bh
>
Point
oe
plan
for utilizing
©
K
x
| defense
The
production experts.
plan,
calling
for
rector
United
‘jeral
of
by
use
now
for
di-
CIO’s
Automobile Workers at Gen-|
Motors
plants.
It
was
mitted
to President
Roosevelt
{Philip Murray, CIO chief, |
'|was
serious
The impossibility
it
consideration|!
sufficient
aluminum
of
obtaining
products
See REUTHER—Page
2
{ for Allison
liquid
€ ooled
plane .en-
with re-,
;gines were being made
tooled machinery. He proposed that
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
id
le
m
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
{for plane-making. %
BA
‘}but today defense experts who de-|:
clined to be quoted by name listed],
?| these obstacles:
*.
1
The difficulty of obtaining sufi
ficient machine tools, either new
5 or old.
>
ns, shells. and
oa
Ri
Maps
by
Roosevelt Said then that
receiving
condition of
sub-
LIST OBJECTIONS.
Mr.
Foremost amon
they listed the -choked
permit.
:
of
Walter Reuther,
organization
picture would
by high
idle automobile plants and machinery :
to step up aircraft production, was|’
fathered
industrial
_|make planes, tanik S, 1
500 warplanes a day was reluctantly
impracticable today
|
ll
auto-
motive industry facilities to turn out
termed
would be enlisted in plane|.
production under present schedu
les
| as rapidly as other elements in
the
ay
Reuther
insisted that the facilities of auto!’
Plants
tT;
WASHINGTON, Jan. 1—(#)—The
in
}
_ But they added that the practical] |
'
difficulties ‘Mmade it impossible
, and
i
|
de-
about to receive defense orders may
|be
relied
upon
to use
existing
machinery where possible. . _
|
| 1t would be utterly impossible,
they contended, to obtain from
overloaded machine
the
tool
industry
as
declared
|
planes
As
to
a day:
aluminum,
that the aluminum
|had to expand swift
|the products for +
industry
|
has
-|put of about 25 pla:
lanes
a day. Fur-'!
ther rapid expansion of the industry
{is
planned
to keep pace
increased
|sight,
but
plane production
no official
with
now
the
in
interviewed
jbelieved it possible to step up
the
production of aluminum forgings in
six months to the 500-plane-a-day
aevel, ° & is
x
os
oa
;
—
Mt
*
Seo
,
OK
a
;
Hh
eee,
Be
sips
ey
OUTLOOK
THE
Upturn in Commodities
economics in college. Usually, when
business advances, prices also advance.
- Outstanding
President’s speech overshadows what may be a significant change in price trend. Purchasing agents continue buyingahead policy. British liquidation is factor in failure of stocks to rise.
and it is important opinion, coming as
it does from the men who control the
purchases of the country’s largest coryou now, and your children later, and
your grandchildren much later, out of a | porations. Observe that all along the
ted—
indica
lly
genera
is
ion
expans
line
of
ion
vat
ser
pre
the
for
war
ch
-dit
last
not only in inventories and business, but
American independence” reaffirms nations.
collec
in
and
ble
availa
credit
in
also
in
e
forc
nt
ina
dom
the
as
e
ens
def
tional
And even though this testimony—this
American economic life. ‘The purpose
evidence of the purchasing agents—
of production in the United States
of
jury
a
before
up
stand
not
would
war
for
e
par
pre
to
be
will
h
hencefort
comthat
icant
signif
is
it
icians,
statist
ily
mar
pri
ds
goo
e
vid
pro
to
n
tha
er
rath
firmte
defini
shown
have
prices
y
modit
this
t,
shor
In
on.
pti
sum
con
lian
for civi
preagents
sing
Purcha
cies.
tenden
ing
e
stat
ry
ita
mil
a
ome
bec
has
y
ntr
cou
their
to
s
action
g
suitin
are
ly
sumab
48).
e
pag
(see editorial,
a
to
tipoff
the
be
may
this
And
words.
l
ura
nat
but
@ Overshadowed—It was
we
than
e
advanc
price
r
broade
much
of
on
ati
lar
dec
t
igh
thr
for
a
h
that suc
rise
a
since
arly
rticul
had—pa
yet
have
inal
ion
the President’s view of the nat
ry
recove
the
g
Durin
e.
overdu
about
is
nt
pme
elo
dev
w
terest should overshado a
left
have
s
indexe
tion
produc
the
far,
so
ical
crit
of
be
may
ch
in the markets whi
is
which
,
behind
far
s
indexe
price
the
adong
str
ly
fair
A
on.
r
e
importanc late
about
d
learne
we
what
to
ing
accord
not
in
n
vance in commodity prices has bee
progress for two weeks. It has not been
spectacular by any means, but it has
President Roosevelt’s declaration of
all-out aid to Britain in order to “‘keep
been
persistent.
Since
Dec.
18,
the
Moody’s Spot Commodity Index has
advanced from 168.0 to above 171.
The attitude of purchasing agents undoubtedly is a controlling factor. Recently, Business Week noted the prevalent tendency to switch from a three
months’ stocks-on-hand policy to six
months (BW—Dec.7’40,p60). Business
men apparently are in the commodity
markets “protecting themselves’’ against
possible strikes, or delayed deliveries, or
had been
year,
of the period
the stock market.
prices have
This
anomaly
not moved
for
instance,
with
the
Here,
too,
business.
Business
Week Index advanced from a low of
104.3 in April to a current high above
140, but Standard Statistics’ average of
90 stocks dropped from a high of 100
at the beginning of the year to a low of
73 in June, and currently is around 83.
e Higher Taxes—The explanation for
this X-shaped divergence of stocks and
business (the stock-price curve goes
down while the business curve goes up)
is that during wartime the prospects
for profits are never entirely satisfactory.
For one thing, higher taxes are in the
ofing. And, of course, people do not
buy stocks to get a high level of business activity, but rather to get dividends.
There is another factor worth considering. ‘The British have been steady ‘sellers of American common stocks. And
this has acted as a market depressant.
Is it not possible that when the British
liquidation is completed (it ought not
to be too far off) that the market may
keep in closer touch with business?
IN THE OUTLOOK:
SPECULATIVE CONFIDENCE
(Ratio of Stock Prices to Business Activity)
priorities, or the multifarious vicissitudes
that may occur in wartime. The general
background for this policy is best indicated perhaps by the composite opinion
on business conditions published in the
January bulletin of the National Association of Purchasing Agents. It epitomizes what men who are in the commodity markets buying every day are
thinking about business and_ business
prospects:
East
Improved
Business
Prices
Higher
Increased
Inventories
Better
Collections
Ample
Credit
Employment Greater
Midwest
Improved’
Higher
Increased
Better
Ample
Greater
West
Improved
Same Level
Increased
No Change
Ample
Greater
‘Buying Policy 3-to-6 Mos. 3-to-6 Mos. 2-to-4 Mos.
Note: Descriptive words are
parisons with month before.
based
on
com-
e All Along the Line—Admittedly, such
opinion is not measurable or definite,
like a price index or an index of busi-=
e
eo
-
it is symptomatic;
But
activity.
ness
g
a
“a
i -.
2 e
Data: Standard Statistics ‘Co.
It isn’t in the rulebooks that the
higher business rises, the lower stock
prices go; but that is a fairly correct
statement of what’s been happening
in the last three years. Investors and
speculators are putting a low cash
value on the current high level cf industrial activity. In fact, they’re say-
ing in Wall Street that the stock mar-
ket has “coppered” the business index. Ordinarily, stocks advance with
business, but because of war fears, ex-
pectations of higher taxes, and general doubts about profits, stock prices
have not performed according to custom.
As a matter of fact, as the new
year opens, the Index of Confidence
is at a new low.
:*
aon,
‘i
Reply to Reuther
Detroit thinks auto union
leader slighted some technical
problems in his plan to add
planes to car production.
“Objection on -technical grounds,”
seems to be Detroit’s answer to the motion that has been addressed to Washington by Walter P. Reuther, director
of the General Motors Department,
United Automobile Workers of Amer-
ica,
that
the
automobile
industry
take
on his plan for adapting present capacity and present equipment for the daily
manufacture
of
Reuther
declared
500
motors and all.
the
50%
industry
is not
fighting
last week
of its maximum
using
planes,
that:
more
(1)
than
potential capac-
ity; (2) spreading car output evenly over
the year would make possible the conversion of a large portion of existing ma-
PRACTICAL XMAS GIFT
Calif., they delivered to a representa-
necessary conversion
Employees of the Lockheed Aircraft
(“Spirit of Lockheed-Vega Employees’) built by workers in the plant as
a Christmas present to England.
chinery
to
plane
production;
would
(3)
the
be limited
to adding certain tools, dies, jigs, or fix-
tures to machinery that’s basic for both
car and airplane motors; (4) metal
stamping equipment in the big body
plants,
not
now
used
to anything
like
full capacity, can be adapted to stamping out wing and fuselage parts. In sum,
the auto-union leader said that the auto
makers already have what it would take
to complete new plane plants many
months from now and, by proper planning,
could
get
those
500
fighting
planes off the line on a day six months
from now.
e Technical Objections—From Detroit’s
viewpoint, the Reuther plan ignores or
overlooks
these
facts:
(1)
The
govern-
ment wants bombers, not pursuit ships,
from the automobile industry and the
industry pledged its resources to the
bomber program two months ago; (2)
Detroit has changed its mind about the
ease with which auto techniques and
equipment can be adapted to plane pro-
duction;
(3)
the
raw-material
situation
is already pressing and promises to be
critical at a production level of 1,000
planes per month, and expansions under
way in supply plants could not provide
materials for production of 500 pursuits
per day; (4) the importance of press
work and machining (to be done with
idle automotive equipment) is greatly
overrated.
© Lack of Materials—As
Detroit sees it,
one of the chief factors preventing:
the
aviation industry from getting above the
current output of 700 planes per month
is the shortage of aluminum-alloy materials and stainless steel. The present
output of aircraft-type sheet aluminum
alloy is running about 8,000,000 Ib. per
month. But aviation men assert that
allocation of material under the present
8A
Co. rendered aid to Britain last week
when, at ceremonies in Burbank,
tive of Great Britain a bombing plane
a)
priorities system is unsatisfactory, with
the result that some plants lack vital
material.
They say that orders which were
placed eleven months ago for forged aluminum parts are only partially filled and
nothing has been received upon later
and larger contracts, that extruded aluminum shapes, ordered in October for
10 weeks’ delivery will not be shipped in
less than seven months, that present capacity for aircraft-grade aluminum castings is considered equal to 60% of next
spring’s demand, that stainless steel requires nine months’ delivery.
It is true that producers of raw materials are expanding facilities (see Stettinius’ assurances on aluminum, page
20), but aviation men are inclined to
question
whether
government
activity
in the raw-material field has had the
proper relationship to the huge plane
contracts let in the last few months.
They assert that, even though aluminum
production
is doubled,
it will take sev-
eral months for the material to progress
through various stages from the mill
into the finished plane. So Reuther’s
critics fail to see any practical aspect to
a plan which would involve the monthly
consumption
of aluminum
of at least 50,000,000 Ib.
alloy sheets, when that is
several times the amount that can be
expected during 1941.
@ Idle Machinery—The automotive industry has no quarrel with Reuther’s
statement that much idle capacity is
available for manufacture of plane parts.
But it says the union official has not
made clear the fact that} machine opera-
tions consume a relatively small part of
the total productive hours spent in
building a plane. Press work involves
less than 2% of total productive hours,
machine work about 9% to 10%. Much
more important are the assembly operations, which are done for the most part
with small tools. Sheet metal sub-assembly (fixing small parts into panels) consumes about 7% of total productive
hours, while riveting rises sharply to
20%-25%.
7
Building a pursuit ship involves about
18,000 man-hours of work, of which 10,000 are devoted to the airframe, 4,000
to the motor and 4,000 to accessories.
At the rate of 500
cated
by Mr.
ships daily, advo-
Reuther,
1,000,000
men
would have to be employed nine hours
a day. The entire automobile industry
currently employs
about 443,000. oom
@ Space
Problem
If
1,000,000
men
were given employment building 500
pursuit
planes
daily,
approximately
15,000 would be needed for press work
and perhaps 100,000 for machine work.
Says Detroit, for the purposes of argument, grant that equipment could be
found and tooled up within six months,
where will space be found for over
800,000 assembly operators? ‘The aviation industry currently uses about 100
sq. ft. of floor-space per man. If this
ratio held good in plane manufacture
by the auto plants, the floor-space
needed for assembly operations alone
under the Reuther plan would be nearly
double the entire space planned for the
aviation industry by the end of this
year. \
AUTOMOBILE lorics
Today’s
VOLUME
News
In
The
JANUARY
140
SAE
Light
of Tomorrow
6, 1941
NUMBER
11
Tackles Auto-Air Problems
Engineers Gather in Detroit With Defense Officials to See What Can Be Done About
It; Production Recovering From Holiday Hangover; Reuther Plan Goes
Pf-f-f-t; Ford Will Rehire Dewey-Recommended Men
Full discussion of the parts the automotive industry and the aviation industry
can play in aiding each other to fulfill
defense orders probably will form an
important part of the discussions this
week at the annual meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers (p. 6)
which opens at the Book-Cadillac, Detroit, today. The 21 sessions which will
be held within the next four days will
bring together outstanding production
and engineering authorities from the automotive and aviation industries as well
as representatives of the Army and Navy.
Meetings will last until Thursday.
- Meanwhile, throughout the automotive
plants production is swinging upward
this week, following a two-week’s holiday
lull (p. 5) although it is not expected
that the high levels of mid-December
will be attained. Output from now until
Spring probably will hold at high levels
in anticipation of a possible curtailment
later in the year.
Defense definitely has been given first
place in all production considerations,
but there does not seem any likelihood
that it will hamper car and truck output
at once. By and large, the program of
building
aircraft
and
Chevrolet
plants,
a vote
aircraft
three to seven cents an hour. In the case
of Ford, Conciliator James
reached an agreement with
nett under which Ford will
men Dewey determines were
for union activities.
Ford Motor Co. production
and Canada for 1940 was
F. Dewey
Harry Benrehire any
discharged
in the U. S.
1,005,494 cars
and trucks, against 885,350 in 1939. There
was also production of 35,683 tractors.
Defense and its effect upon divisions
of the automotive industry will form im-
portant discussion this month at the an-
nual meeting of the National Automobile
Dealers Ass'n (p. 8) at Pittsburgh, Jan.
20 to 23, and at the annual meeting if the
American Road Builders Ass’n (p. 17)
in New York, Jan. 27 to 31.
The roadbuilders’ group will discuss
the highway needs of the nation in connection with defense and the rapid
movement of troops from one place to
another. The dealer group will consider
the effect of present defense production
on output of automobiles and trucks for
private use, and what action should be
caken by dealers should the program lead
to a curtailment of car and truck output.
engines
proposed by Walter P. Reuther, UAWCIO (p. 4-6) and presented to President
Roosevelt recently by Phillip Murray,
CIO president, is considered unworkable
and probably will eventually be scrapped.
UAW President R. J. Thomas, on the
other hand holds an opposite view to this.
_ Proof, to some extent, of the impracticability of the idea may be gained
from a study of the production methods
' used in connection with the Allison
engine (p. 10-11) at the Cadillac plant
in Detroit.
_ During the past week the labor situation in Detroit has come to the fore in
rumors of proposed strikes in certain
authorizing
a
strike at Ford and some difficulty at International Harvester plants at Ft. Wayne,
Ind. At Packard a new contract has been
signed with UAW under which workers
will be given pay increases ranging from
That’s a man in the white suit up near the top
gives you some idea how big the plane is. Not yet
be a four motored job, with a wingspread of 212
and 18 tons of bombs or 125 fully equipped
of the Douglas B19’s rudder. It
out for flight tests, the ship will
feet, able to carry a crew of ten
men, if used as a troopship.
NEWS
AUTOMOBILE
What
About
Reuther’s
Plan?
In spite
of the
fact that defense
officials
/ taining
new
machines
and
Banner
1941
Prediction that 1941 will prove
one of the most productive years in
our history was made here last week
by Edsel Ford, president of Ford
He Says Building Unnecessary New Plants
:
Is Jamming Defense Program
the
Predicts
Ford
TOPICS
results
.
ory
—
act
isf
sat
wn
do
less
far
bs
be
um
ld
th
wou
ed
rn
tu
ve
ha
on
gt
in Washin
es
lar
dec
r
the
Reu
0
ch
50
whi
e
es,
uc
hin
od
mac
pr
ic
to
Bas
an
pl
O
on the UAW-CI
duc
pro
ve
ti
ine
mo
eng
to
au
ne
pla
air
ed
to
us
d
un
pte
ada
th
be
wi
can
y
da
a
es
an
pl
tion, include gear cutters, gear shapers,
equipment, R. J. Thomas, president of
the
t
tha
ek
we
t
las
e
lat
d
te
ic
ed
screw machines, bullards, drill presses,
UAW, pr
y
ll
ca
si
Ba
d.
te
op
ad
be
l
wil
ly
al
tu
en
plan ev
punch presses, broaching machines, turret
r,
he
ut
Re
P.
er
lt
Wa
by
t
ou
ed
rk
wo
ea
id
the
lathes, various type milling machines,
d
ul
wo
,
rs
to
Mo
l
ra
ne
Ge
at
or
ct
re
UAW di
various type lathes and Fay machines,
mo
to
au
in
al
de
w
ne
te
le
mp
co
a
for
call
lapping machines, various type grinding
of
t
en
em
ng
ra
ar
re
th
wi
t
en
pm
ui
eq
e
tiv
machines, die casting machines, forge
ng
li
du
he
sc
w
ne
d
an
es
in
ch
ma
men and
presses, header machines, foundry equipof hours of labor.
ment, welding and riveting equipment.
t
oi
tr
De
by
en
se
s
aw
fl
l
ta
en
am
nd
Fu
Referring to labor supply, Reuther says:
ve
ti
mo
to
au
t
tha
are
n
me
on
ti
produc
“At the present time there are approxon
ti
ia
av
for
le
ab
it
su
t
no
is
t
en
pm
ui
eq
imately 3000 tool and die makers unemthe
to
ms
ai
cl
s
r’
he
ut
Re
of
te
spi
in
work
ployed in the automobile industry; some
he
which
hammers
Steam
contrary.
0 have been transferred to ordinary
250
ed
gn
si
de
are
,
out
t
in
po
ey
th
,
ns
io
ment
g production jobs. Many
din
ten
e
hin
mac
differently from those needed for alumremainder are on a short week—
the
of
inum aviation forgings. The most powerleast 2000 tool and die men
at
are
re
the
ts
an
pl
ve
ti
mo
to
au
the
in
er
mm
ha
ful
gone into production jobs
ly
ent
man
per
strikes a 12,000 pound blow as against
k year in the
wor
rt
sho
the
of
e
aus
bec
in
ed
ir
qu
re
s
er
mm
ha
d
un
po
00
,0
40
the
”
ry.
ust
ind
die
and
tool
pre
sc
di
r
la
mi
Si
.
rk
wo
ne
gi
en
on
X aviati
that
es
lar
dec
also
r
the
Reu
on
iti
add
In
ancies crop up in other parts of the
of machine tool and die shops ta
ber
num
a
Reuther plan they claim.
full capacat
g
kin
wor
now
not
are
t
roi
Det
at
th
is
ea
id
r
he
ut
Re
e
th
y,
fl
ie
Br
uMan
Die
and
l
Too
the
h
wit
ck
che
A
ity.
opr
t
no
are
es
ti
li
ci
fa
ve
ti
mo
to
au
t
en
pres
to
is
this
t
tha
ms
fir
con
'n
Ass
ers
tur
fac
xi
ma
of
nt
ce
r
pe
50
an
th
re
ducing mo
h
wit
ps
sho
t
mos
but
e
tru
ent
ext
e
som
this
By rearranging
capacity.
mum
are
k
wor
e
ens
def
for
le
tab
sui
ent
ipm
equ
ve
ti
mo
to
au
s,
in
ta
in
ma
he
t,
en
pm
ui
eq
of
t
cen
per
70
ut
abo
and
ed
loy
emp
now
ty
ci
pa
ca
d
an
t
me
be
d
ul
co
ts
en
requirem
e.
ens
def
for
is
put
out
l
tota
ir
the
d
ul
co
y
da
a
es
an
pl
0
50
t
ou
g
in
rn
tu
for
at
of
job
g
cin
vin
con
a
s
doe
r
the
Reu
e.
be made availabl
e
abl
cap
is
ry
ust
ind
the
that
g
vin
pro
t
leas
Delay New Models?
auto
of
put
out
r
ate
gre
sly
dou
men
tre
of
To do this Reuther suggests that insnece
not
s
doe
it
gh
hou
alt
s,
ine
eng
ive
mot
troductions of new models next fall be
ld
cou
ty
aci
cap
ess
exc
the
that
low
fol
ly
sari
delayed at least six months; that producn
tio
duc
pro
in
ed
loy
emp
lly
ica
nom
eco
be
tion of cars be stabilized, providing a
t
sen
pre
of
s
basi
the
On
s.
ine
eng
raft
airc
of
g
in
at
in
im
el
d
an
h
nt
mo
ch
ea
a
ot
qu
n
ai
cert
by
ce,
tan
ins
,
for
llac
Cadi
s,
n
fate
tio
duc
pro
the
peaks and valleys which now exist;
k
pea
at
day
a
ts
shif
r
hou
hteig
two
ng
usi
g
in
rk
establishment of three 7!4-hour wo
in
out
turn
ld
cou
ms,
clai
he
n,
tio
duc
pro
d
le
il
sk
of
shifts daily; and the transfer
s
ine
eng
e
bil
omo
aut
ugh
eno
days
k
wor
66
re
mo
to
bs
jo
men from production
on
pti
sum
con
t
ren
cur
the
of
care
take
to
as
e
rv
se
to
n
me
e
skilled employment, thes
in
es
liti
faci
its
g
ein
fre
thus
,
year
a
w
ne
for
rate
in
tra
to
a core around which
for
year
the
of
s
day
k
wor
er
oth
the
all
workers.
ld
cou
ge
Dod
re.
ctu
ufa
man
ine
eng
raft
airc
The automotive industry, he claims,
deStu
;
days
108
in
k
stoc
’s
year
a
in
lay
8,e
uc
has a potential capacity to prod
;
days
128
in
th
mou
Ply
;
days
103
in
er
bak
g
in
uc
od
pr
is
It
000,000 cars a year.
sOld
;
days
75
in
o
Sot
De
and
er
ysl
Chr
approximately 4,000,000.
;
days
41
in
lys
Wil
;
days
167
in
ile
mob
To substantiate his statement that auto147
in
c
tia
Pon
;
days
%
135
in
son
Hud
motive equipment can be adapted to
in
let
vro
Che
;
days
4
49%
in
h
Nas
;
days
aviation work, Reuther states: “Both air.
days
121
in
ck
Bui
;
and
days
147
plane and automobile motors are comof
many
that
out
ts
poin
nalso
cyli
her
Reut
n
tai
con
h
Bot
.
.
.
s
ine
eng
bustion
the huge automobile body presses, costing
ders, carburetors, pistons, crankshafts,
valves, sparkplugs, ignition systems, etc.” up to $175,000, are standing idle. In the
there
says,
he
,
plant
Body
er
Fish
d
elan
Clev
in
men
n
tio
duc
With this statement pro
for
e
labl
avai
them
of
119
than
less
no
the
are
that
e
lar
dec
y
The
Detroit disagree.
ialum
lage
fuse
and
wing
of
on
ucti
prod
stadju
ded
nee
time involved in making
this
in
shift
day
the
On
s.
ping
stam
num
obin
ed
uir
req
that
al
equ
ments would
Motor
Co.
‘Inasmuch as the work of the Ford
Motor Co. affects directly and indirectly the prosperity of large numbers of people,” said Ford, “the company hopes to maintain its normal
operations on the highest plane cou-
with
sistent
business.
stability
and
good
“At the same time, considerations
security take priority
of national
over every other interest, and we
are mobilizing our resources and experience for the fullest participation
in the national defense program.”
plant are 600 men, on the afternoon shift
ng
ti
ec
fl
re
67,
ft
shi
ht
ig
dn
mi
the
on
,
300
the extent to which this equipment is now
idle. This, however, is not especially sen-
sational in view of frequent, though indefinite, announcements that the body
plants are about to subcontract, or are
subcontracting, the type of parts Reuther
mentions.
The Reuther plan is, at the least, an intriguing conjecture. Its value—and, simultaneously, its danger—is that it is compre-
hensible, not only to the general public,
but to the new crop of mass production
enthusiasts the emergency has created in
Washington. It lays the program open to
amateur tinkering which may muddle the
situation, may tie the hands of production
experts such as Knudsen.
Plane Potential
Expect
16 to 17 Thousand
During 1941
A year ago, the aircraft industry covered 12 million square feet of floor space;
today it has 22% million. In the same
time it broke in 105,000 new workers, in-
creasing personnel from 60,000 to 165,000. Notwithstanding the unavoidable
turmoil accompanying such expansion, the
aircraft industry delivered a dollar volume
in 1940 two-and-a-half times that of 1939.
Current production is about 700 planes a
month; in August, when many new facilities now abuilding are in production, it
is conservatively estimated that output
will hit around 1750.
It is reported that between 16,000 and
17,000 military aircraft, more than double
the output of 1940, will be produced in
1941. Production of aircraft engines of
1000 hp. or higher simultaneously will
run to about 35,000 according to the same
source.
(Continued on page 6)
an
of
lt
su
re
e
th
ts
en
es
pr
re
e
cl
(This arti
nd
ta
ts
ou
of
c
pi
to
a
on
ch
ar
se
re
e
iv
ns
te
ex
)
y.
da
to
s
ir
fa
Af
al
on
ti
Na
in
ce
an
rt
po
im
g
in
Title
Reg.
N
A
L
P
R
E
H
T
U
E
R
INSIDE OF
Y
A
D
A
S
E
N
A
FOR 500 PL
ty
ci
pa
Ca
t
an
Pl
to
Au
le
Id
e
Us
to
al
os
op
Pr
ew
Vi
s
rt
pe
Ex
e
ns
fe
De
How
fact that Allison airplane engine parts are
being produced in the Cadillac shop, but
from the Defense Commission has come information that special machinery was installed for the work.
Evidence is strong that the Army, Navy
and Defense Commission cling to the belief that new plants and new machinery
are preferable to converted automobile
factories for the needed airplane speed-up.
However, defense experts and Mr. Reuther
appear to share confidence in the automobile industry. The War Department is now
negotiating contracts for a $70,000,000 airplane expansion program, and the largest
slices will go to Studebaker for Wright
“9600” engines, and to Buick for Pratt &
Whitney “1830” engines.
Wisdom of ‘freezing’
present aircraft models
questioned by air officers
to
d
de
ci
de
es
at
St
ed
it
Un
e
th
e
Ever sinc
e
th
d
te
ai
aw
s
ha
ic
bl
pu
s
ou
xi
an
an
m,
rear
d
ul
wo
ns
gu
d
an
s
nk
ta
s,
ne
la
rp
ai
day when
of
d
ee
sp
e
th
th
wi
s
ne
li
ly
mb
se
as
off
roll
t
gh
li
ic
tr
ec
el
d
an
ns
ca
n
ti
automobiles,
s
ha
ns
io
at
ct
pe
ex
e
es
th
of
s
cu
fo
e
bulbs. Th
ec
sp
st
mo
,
ry
st
du
in
le
bi
mo
to
au
e
th
been
r
fo
us
ni
ge
s
a’
ic
er
Am
of
on
si
es
pr
ex
tacular
mass production.
When the defense program was devised,
the Government went to the automobile
m
ia
ll
Wi
ed
ct
le
se
d
an
er
ad
le
a
r
fo
ry
indust
rs
to
Mo
l
ra
ne
Ge
of
t
en
id
es
pr
n,
se
ud
S. Kn
Corporation. Now Mr. Knudsen’s aides
in the Office for Production Management
ry
so
vi
Ad
e
ns
fe
De
al
on
ti
Na
e
th
on
d
an
Commission are studying a thought-provoking proposal from Walter P. Reuther,
young executive of the CIlO-United Auto
Workers Union. The plan proposes to
“transform the entire unused capacity of
ge
hu
e
on
to
in
ry
st
du
in
ve
ti
mo
to
au
e
th
plane production unit,” and to turn out
500 pursuit planes a day within the next
six months.
A Conflict of Views
This plan was presented to defense experts a fortnight ago, and since that time
no official comment has been made. Out of
the
Defense
Commission’s
staff, however,
have come conflicting reports, cautiously
hinting that the plan is bold and imaginative but impracticable, or that it has
much merit. Why has the plan received
such a cool and guarded reception in official circles?
Principal explanation for the official
silence is that the Reuther plan appears to
overlook few details in pressing its argu-
ment that the automobile industry has
enough factory space, plenty of idle ma-
chines and sufficient skilled labor to perform the job. Companies are named and
examples cited to demonstrate that within
six months automobile tools could be refashioned for airplane production. Yet defense experts recall the confident statement
of Henry Ford that his plants could produce 1,000 planes a day and ruefully consider that, at the moment, American plane
28
Pursuit Planes vs. Bombers
WALTER P. REUTHER
Method . .. not principle criticized
month.
production is less than 1,000
Another source of doubt about the Reuther plan is the prevailing belief that airplane engines and automobile motors are
of different species. Pointed out is the fact
that few automobile engines generate more
than 100 horsepower, whereas airplane motors must produce at least 1,000° horsepower and very probably much more. Aua
tomotive engineers are aware that annual
changes in engine design require many
months of preparation and, therefore, are
the Reuther
about indorsing
cautious
statement that existing plants and _ tools
could be adapted quickly to produce an
entirely different motor.
The point also is made that, when Ford
accepted a contract to turn out airplane
engines, the firm had the choice of converting present capacity or building a new
plant. The new plant was decided upon.
The Reuther
proposal made
much
of the
The Reuther plan also runs counter to
present defense policy in assigning to the
automobile industry the task of producing
parts for bombers. The labor leader suggests that motormakers concentrate on
pursuit planes, whereas Mr. Knudsen has
asked his former colleagues to devote their
attention to bombers. The OPM director
has stated that bombers form the chief airplane bottleneck and has called upon the
automobile industry to break it. In response, the industry’s Committee for Air
Defense is currently engaged in placing
$20,000,000
worth
of
“pilot”
with
orders
automobile and auto parts firms for the
production of airplane parts.
To assemble these parts, the War Department has announced plans for construction of four aircraft assembly plants
at Kansas City, Mo., Omaha, Tulsa and
Fort Worth to. be operated by the Martin,
| North American, Douglas and Consolidated aircraft concerns. Adoption of the
Reuther plan thus would appear to call for
a major overhauling of present defense
production plans, which may be another
explanation for its cautious reception.
Then,
some
defense
experts
point
out,
there is the problem of supply. To produce
500 pursuit planes a day would require
huge supplies of aluminum forgings, and
shortages in aluminum and magnesium are
reported already to be appearing.
Furthermore, the question is still undecided whether present plane designs should
be “frozen” into mass production, whether
THE
UNITED
STATES
NEWS
e
ar
we
d
en
e
th
in
st
le
the aggressors,
’
n.
gu
zi
Na
a
of
t
in
po
e
th
t
‘a
ve
forced to li
s
it
in
m
s
i
n
a
c
i
r
e
m
A
to
al
pe
ap
an
His was
finest essence.”
rk
Yo
w
e
N
e
th
es
gu
ar
,”
ve
ha
“Here we
of
e
on
y
sl
ou
vi
ob
is
t
ha
“w
,
.)
nd
Post (I
e
th
in
e
os
rp
pu
of
ns
io
at
ar
cl
de
r
jo
ma
the
s
wa
or
nd
ca
s
Hi
.
ic
bl
pu
re
e
th
history of
”
y.
da
to
is
it
as
d
rl
wo
e
th
in
ng
si
surpri
es
at
st
,”
ch
ee
sp
l
ra
ut
ne
a
t
“Tt was no
s
es
pr
Ex
g
in
en
Ev
)
e.
(M
nd
la
the Port
of
y
og
ol
in
rm
te
w
ne
e
th
in
(Rep.) “It was,
.
ch
ee
sp
’
nt
re
ge
li
el
-b
on
‘n
a
,
world politics
me
so
in
n
io
at
rn
te
ns
co
ed
us
ca
It may have
s—
ct
fa
ed
at
st
it
t
bu
a,
ic
er
Am
in
rs
quarte
re
su
be
to
,
em
th
of
me
so
s,
ct
fa
unpleasant
w.
no
ce
fa
st
mu
a
ic
er
Am
h
ic
wh
s
ct
fa
—but
nmo
de
e
th
to
on
si
es
pr
ex
ve
ga
The speech
”
s.
an
ic
er
Am
of
ty
ri
jo
ma
e
th
strated will of
“The
fireside chat,” concludes
adelphia Inquirer
summons
it
to
the
d
ue
rs
pu
be
ll
wi
es
ci
li
po
e
os
th
world that
le
op
pe
e
th
of
se
on
sp
re
e
Th
.
ly
vigorous
of
y
it
un
d
an
on
ti
ac
of
y
it
un
e
th
be
will
t
el
ev
os
Ro
t
en
id
es
Pr
h
ic
wh
r
fo
purpose
appealed.”
“The President has given the lie forer
ur
Co
)
y.
(K
le
il
sv
ui
Lo
e
th
s
er
av
ever,”
ny
de
o
wh
e
os
th
all
o
“t
,
.)
em
(D
l
na
Jour
re
ir
is
a
ic
er
Am
of
es
at
St
ed
it
that the Un
d
an
,
rs
ne
rt
pa
is
Ax
e
th
to
d
se
po
op
vocably
ap
e
th
all
to
r
ve
re
fo
lie
e
th
n
ve
gi
he has
peasers who would betray us.”
to
e
ag
nt
va
ad
y
an
of
be
d
ul
wo
“Tf it
”
r,
wa
e
th
of
t
ou
es
at
St
ed
it
keep the Un
.
nd
(I
st
Po
)
s.
as
(M
on
st
Bo
e
th
ds
conten
nt
wa
t
no
es
do
ly
nt
re
pa
ap
r
le
Dem.), “Hit
d
me
ar
e
th
to
e
ag
ss
me
’s
ar
Ye
w
Ne
it. His
t
en
id
es
Pr
en
th
ng
re
st
to
re
forces did mo
an
th
ts
en
im
nt
se
t
gh
ni
ay
nd
Su
Roosevelt’s
.
ts
is
on
ti
en
rv
te
in
e
th
om
fr
se
ai
pr
all the
ve
si
es
gr
ag
h,
ug
ro
s
wa
e
ag
ss
The Hitler me
g
in
ch
oa
pr
ap
ly
nt
re
pa
ap
is
He
y.
and surl
g
in
ow
gr
is
er
mp
te
s
hi
e
er
wh
the point
na
mi
do
d
rl
wo
of
on
si
vi
e
th
d
an
t
or
very sh
os
pr
d
an
ss
re
og
pr
e
Th
.
..
tion is receding
en
be
ys
wa
al
ve
ha
s
le
op
pe
ee
fr
perity of
vgo
ed
nt
me
gi
re
by
e
us
ab
of
the target
ernments.”
e
th
s
in
ta
in
ma
”
s,
rd
wo
s
t’
el
ev
“Mr. Roos
,
)
p.
Re
.
nd
(I
e
tt
ze
Ga
)
St. Joseph (Mo.
ap
e
th
to
ng
ti
fi
om
sc
di
en
be
“must have
e
os
wh
s,
st
ni
io
nt
ve
er
nt
ni
no
peasers and the
ef
e
ns
fe
de
ze
ly
ra
pa
t
gh
mi
recent clamor
th
no
id
sa
He
.
me
lu
vo
in
forts if it grows
ng
gi
in
br
as
d
ue
tr
ns
co
be
t
ing that migh
He
r.
wa
of
k
in
br
e
th
to
er
os
cl
this nation
d
an
st
mo
ut
e
th
to
m
ar
we
only urged that
l
pe
re
to
s
on
ap
we
e
th
n
ai
it
Br
that we give
JANUARY
10,
1941
n
ow
r
ou
p
ri
st
t
n’
do
we
at
th
and, second,
We
t.
en
pm
ui
eq
e
ns
fe
de
ed
ed
ne
of
y
countr
t
Bu
d.
an
gl
En
r
fo
lp
he
in
t
ou
lal
should go
e,
ar
ep
pr
st
mu
we
at
th
et
rg
don’t let us fo
nd
la
me
ho
r
ou
t
ec
ot
pr
to
,
me
ti
at the same
“The
effects
of
the
con-
er
al
De
n
ai
Pl
.)
(O
d
an
el
ev
Cl
e
cludes th
lu
sa
er
th
ge
to
al
be
d
ul
ho
“s
(Ind. Dem.),
dra
pe
d
n
o
y
e
b
r
ea
cl
is
it
at
th
tary. Now
ld
ou
sh
it
g,
in
go
e
ar
we
venture where
s
ha
it
an
th
re
tu
fu
e
th
in
er
si
be much ea
d
an
st
fe
sa
e
th
se
oo
ch
to
st
pa
e
th
been in
ain
st
de
n
o
m
m
o
c
r
ou
to
se
shortest cour
tion.”
mco
”
b,
jo
t
en
ll
ce
ex
an
d
di
lt
“Rooseve
n
io
Un
.)
if
al
(C
o
t
n
e
m
a
r
c
a
S
e
th
ments
e
th
e
m
o
h
g
n
i
r
e
m
m
a
h
f
“o
),
(Ind. Rep.
t
Bu
a.
ic
er
Am
in
ss
ne
ed
ar
ep
pr
of
y
necessit
aip
ic
rt
pa
n
a
c
i
r
e
m
A
le
ib
ss
po
his hints of
by
d
e
m
o
c
l
e
w
be
t
no
ll
wi
r
wa
e
th
tion in
no
s
nt
wa
es
at
St
ed
it
Un
e
Th
s.
an
Americ
|
war.”
e
th
by
ed
iz
gn
co
re
as
”
t,
en
id
es
“The Pr
d
ol
“t
),
p.
Re
.
nd
(I
l
na
ur
Jo
.)
(O
Dayton
ey
th
at
th
gs
in
th
w
fe
le
op
pe
n
a
c
i
r
e
m
A
the
ng
ki
ea
sp
by
t
bu
,
ow
kn
y
ad
re
al
did not
y
el
os
cl
re
mo
em
th
d
n
u
o
b
he
y
nl
ai
pl
t
ou
”
d.
ea
ah
es
li
at
th
le
gg
ru
st
e
th
r
fo
together
AES ue
yA
HY#
4
wy
U
Se
and
assurance
opr
to
lp
he
d
an
e
ic
if
cr
sa
,
rk
of us to wo
,
es
an
pl
e
th
le
ib
ss
po
as
y
duce as quickl
ra
pe
im
t
en
pm
ui
eq
r
he
ot
d
an
ships, guns
es
or
sh
n
ow
r
ou
t
ec
ot
pr
to
tively needed
we
If
h.
is
it
Br
d
re
ue
ag
le
be
and to aid the
of
l
na
se
ar
t
ea
gr
e
th
s
ve
el
rs
ou
ke
are to ma
at
th
t,
rs
fi
,
re
ca
ke
ta
st
mu
democracy, we
r
wa
al
tu
ac
to
in
us
t
ge
t
n’
es
the arsenal do
broadcast,”
t
ha
“t
,
.)
ep
(R
pt
ri
sc
an
Tr
)
‘Boston (Mass.
to
as
it
ic
pl
ex
re
mo
t
no
s
wa
t
Mr. Roosevel
t
ea
Gr
to
d
ai
al
on
ti
di
ad
r
ou
rm
what fo
.”
ke
ta
to
ly
ke
li
be
t
gh
mi
n
ai
it
Br
dg
ju
e
th
in
,”
ow
kn
ld
ou
sh
le
op
pe
“The
r
ge
ed
-L
ar
St
.)
.J
(N
k
r
a
w
e
N
ment of the
si
bu
or
s
in
ga
al
ci
so
r
he
(Ind.), “that neit
gru
st
d
rl
wo
a
in
t
an
rt
po
im
ness profits are
gle to maintain freedom.”
.
ted,
contained
to all
to industry, to labor, and
the
CSS
it
mm
co
y
ad
re
al
e
ar
le
op
pe
an
ic
er
the Am
a rousing
was
concludes
SOS SSS SRS
S SS SSS
LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN
(Ind.), “was
the Phil-
“Tt
unfortunate,”
E
EE
I
ATH Gee
27
the United States and England still have
not time to produce superior planes. in
fewer quantities, rather than clouds of
planes that might be obsolescent when
they take to the sky. These issues must be
decided before any plan of mass produc-
tion can go into operation.
More fundamental, perhaps, is the fea-
ture of the Reuther plan that calls for a
revision of normal automobile production
schedules so that airplane production can
be imposed above it. This would necessitate a steady turnout of automobiles
throughout the year instead of in peaks
and valleys.
Such
obviously
a program
vide more steady employment
pro-
would
to automo-
doubt that it
bile workers, but executives
could be applied easily. Automobile production is geared closely to the buyers’
market, and, although the industry may
as 4,000,000 new automobiles
sell as many
a year, production schedules are so arranged that inventories seldom are higher
than 500,000 cars at a time. Factory output, in fact, is closely dependent upon
orders from dealers. To revise this schedule
might require higher inventories and, consequently, high storage costs.
Suggested Board Criticized
Some
privately
objection
also
has
proposal
to
of this board
is
the Reuther
about
voiced
been
superimpose an aviation production board |
of nine members on the industry. This
board would be charged with surveying
available plant capacity and allocating
parts orders to firms best able to fill them.
It would be composed of three representatives of Government, three of management and three of labor.
Prospective
efficiency
in some
doubted
quarters.
Reuther
Mr.
claims that the board could parcel out the
work in a better manner and that “contrasted with the present method, which
dumps half a hundred technical problems
in the lap of one manufacturer . . . this
method has all the advantages of division
of labor.”
another
Doubt
persists,
Government
agency
however,
to
that
supervise
airplane production would do much except
add confusion to the program.
The automobile industry already is experienced in parceling out orders for parts.
This method,
in fact, is advanced
as the
secret of the industry’s efficiency. General
Motors, for example, has 22,000 suppliers,
with whose productive ability and capacity it has long been familiar. The same situation is said to prevail among other auto
producers, and the industry is confident
that this system of supply could be adapted
to defense more efficiently than by imposing a new directing agency from above.
In agreement, however, are automobile
managers, automobile workers and Government officials that in the automotive
industry lies the key to mass production
for defense. In essence, critics of the Reu-
ther plan diverge over method rather than
principle.
JANUARY
10,
1941
29
NEW YORK, N.Y.
TIMES
shop
employes
ing
and
in the
final
assembling
manufactur-
process
alone.
It
would mean as Many
more employed in
providing
raw materials
and
preliminary processing—in o
ther words, from
j President
of Aeronautical Chambe
r
Commerce Cites Impractica
lities
two and a quarter to th
ree million men,
of
Ae
premise
leads
impossible
i
rea
tion program.
means at |
airplane, —
means 4,00
F studied the objecE.O.’s aircratt produc-
Aside from
ment, Virtually all of the
criticism has
been anonymous.
Aircraft and automo.
t
would
duction
| States
ive industry executives
have refused
for some reason to lend
their names to.
their printed views.”
all other
tion
of
an
interested
address
persons
delivered
@ por-
by
me
be-
|
fore the National Press Cl
ub on Jan, 15.
Thi
s
address
was
heard
and many highly placed
government officials.
It was subsequently mad
e public property through
dissemination to
the press and radio for u
nrestricted publ
|
plan I |
this
tain
|
cable,
“We have every reason to
believe that |
less than 10 per cent of
the machine |
tools in the auto plants are
usable in air- |
plan
e
manufacturing.
We understand
that every one of those m
achine tools
production—at
a
day
would
$50,000
¢ost
each,
this
500
$25,000,000
type
a
can
assume
tHat ;
ment
0
Jae
aluminum, mag-
aterials
includ-
8, the plan leads to
ae
any plan for accelerafa defense item,
|
production,
|
day.
Difficulties
would require the servic
es of |
one and a.half and two mil
lion
and
they
they were given the
opporinspecting all the 8
00 com-
that their automotive equip
-
was
suitable
to the
efficient
pro-—
led
them
to believe
that
be necessary
|
to retrain
aircraft engine plant
was:
‘My friend,
all we have to offer
you is floor space
and personnel that
can be trained, but
we distinctly are of
the opinion thateyou
can get together f
loor space and trai
n
personnel
|
more
rapidly and
effectively
than we can,’ ”
,
My simple purpose
in writing this letter is to keep the re
cord correct. In dis
cussing the so-called
Reuther plan s,
we |
plan.
I seriously doubt the pos
sibility
of getting together the n
umber of men
in one
locality
required
to produce
5,000 airplanes at the rate o
f 500 a day.
facilities,
their entire Shop pe
rsonnel and make
Such extensive change
s in their machine
|
planes
one
to produce even those
three components
it
This means 5,000 planes of t
hat type, or
10 days of production by the
Reuther
“That
between
f
increased
study
cent will be gin
Employment
sit idle until guns
duction of only three
of those 800 parts,
Further
fovided for all types
nsider a 50,000 mil-
(annual
of
first would
of
Carrying this thought to the
absurd, at
300 working daysa year, the
re would
be required an appropriati
on of seven
and a half billion .
one model, asc
about one billio;
pro-
ponent parts that went i
nto the aircraft
engine involved.
“After careful study the
ir first conclusion was
|
|
taken out of auto produ
ction would render others idle.
“Assuming
that
the
comparatively
simple and less costly s
ingle-seater pursu
for
annual
of machine guns in the U
nited
re
f the plane produc-
and
the offer
tunity of
in the Detroit area,
Laudable as
plan appears to be, there
are cerphases of it that seem
impracti-
chosen
present
Engineering Opinion
committee of engineers
from
need
day, produced with unused facilities
and
|
personnel in the motor
car industry— |
largely
was
in acThat
of the most reputable
automotive organizations in the world n
ot long ago came
to one of our larger
aircraft engine factories.
They knew this factor
y to be in
said:
“Another. plan—the
so-called
Reuther plan—has stimulated
much discussion.
Its objective appears laudable,
because it contemplates
500 planes a
plane
ve
ing tools a
Slmilar diffic
“A
i
Practicable
With reference to the Reuther
it
re to be armed
nt procedure.
national security, _
ication,
Wholly
presume
by several hun-
dred of the country’s leadi
ng journalists
Not
eat
“In conside
tion of prod
|
must
2% days such a program
could be provid
“In the produc
:
and
We
tion would ha
nesium
astronomically
t machine guns per
planes a day that
ine guns a day.
In
other word 7
editorial com-
similar
figures.
that these
cordance 3
“I have
to
Regardless,
my
discussion
certainly
could not be labeled
“‘anonymous.”
|
| President,
|
!
JOHN
Aeronautica]
Commerce
Washington,
H,
Jouerr,
Chamber
of America,
Jan, 23, 1941.
of
REA
|
|
.
Some Engineers and Econo| mists Call It Practicable,
Disputing the Critics
TOOL
ae
|
3
SHC
said that thi
|
the contention that the
Special to THe NEW YoRK Tres.
WASHINGTON,
plans
were
conferences
Reuther,
United
America
being
between
completed
for
of
the
chief
(Congress
of
in connection
with
neers
some
and
management
economists
the,
Defense
National
the
Commission said today
|
to |
_
The
basis of the mass
?
jately
#
F
the Reuther plan would go into the |
high-speed production of 500 planes.
day.
This statement,.it
was
argued
by ||
dissident defense attachés, showed |
lack of imagination. The Defense
Commission, it was explained, was |
working out plans whereby thous- ||
ands
of smal!
machine
shops
in all | '
parts of the country could fabricate
parts. A number of such shops are
believed to be in the Detroit area.
Taking up the objection that the
automotive industry was doing its
share by making thousands of en-|
gines and other plane parts, it was
bac
a
I
|
the automobile industry.
| ‘The second objection which they.
sought to refute was that there’
| would not be sufficient aluminum |
a
it
passed
reported
production ;
in six months, when
heard
‘men for detailed
of
ready
hot rejected the pla
Self
in|.
plan, it was said, was that machine
tools and men accustomed to work- |
ing them were available in the au-|
tomobile industry and could readily
be adapted to airplane production|
without curtailing normal demands
=
d
said toda
I don’t know
:
jected it. 1 Beda: <f
not
ave
When it ca
.
detail by Mr. Reuther. in his orig- |:
inal statement.
[lon chief,
op Tues
jpave not seen it,
would be difficult to obtain ma-|»
chine tools to carry on the pro- | |
:
duction of the airplanes in autoanticipated
DETROIT,
Knudsen, national
“I have
They said the allegation that it
was
Awaits Re
|¢lal, to use the aut
try to increase air
|,
|’
Defense Commission attachés.
plants
ee
the President by United Automobi]
|
Advisory
that they
differed with criticisms of the Reuther plan made yesterday by other
mobile
in te
Special to Tuz New yo
engi-|
attached
apurees
‘Knudsen
union’s proposal for mass produc- |,
in automobile |
tion of airplanes
| plants,
tomorro
3
Industrial|
| Organizations)’, and government of- |
ficials
confer
fense program. PENee
of '|°
Workers
Automobile
“Dene
va pce
P.
Walter
divisional
' War
|
|
2—While |
Jan.
time.
,
|’
|:
|'
me
in, I im
NEW YORK, N.Y.
PM
1
4
9
4
5
JAN
’
e
s
p
r
o
C
‘
y
l
e
v
i
L
a
s
I
n
a
l
P
r
e
h
t
u
Re
big impression
e
c
n
e
d
n
o
p
s
e
r
r
o
C
f
af
St
WASHINGTON,
Jan.
4.—lt
“high de-
made
large
a
part
of
which
was
on
an audience, @
hostile when he
e
h
t
n
i
n
o
i
t
a
c
i
d
n
i
there was no
d
n
A
.
d
e
t
r
a
t
s
y
l
t
n
a
t
c
u
l
e
r
“
e
v
a
h
’
s
t
r
e
p
x
e
n
o
c
y
e
h
t
t
a
h
t
tense production
s
l
a
i
c
i
f
f
o
e
s
n
e
f
e
d
e
h
t
of
e
d
u
t
i
t
t
a
e
h
t
g
n
i
s
u
r
o
f
n
a
l
p
r
e
h
t
u
e
R
e
h
.
d
a
* decided that t
e
d
n
a
l
p
e
h
t
d
e
r
e
d
i
s
0
0
5
e
c
u
d
o
r
p
o
t
y
t
i
c
a
p
a
c
e
v
i
t
o
m
,
o
n
t
a
l
u
p
a
e
h
t
idle
g
n
i
t
c
e
j
e
r
of
g
n
i
k
n
i
h
t
e
r
a
y
e
h
t
Tf
as the Asso-
”
,
l
a
c
i
t
c
a
r
p
m
i
“
is
planes a day
,
d
e
t
r
o
p
e
r
y
l
t
n
e
c
e
ciated Press r
they.
e
d
i
h
o
t
e
l
b
u
o
r
t
f
ing to a lot o
Reuther’s
reception
O
I
C
e
h
t
e
r
o
f
e
b
t
s
u
J
.|
may
make
them
pause.
:
l
l
i
w
o
h
w
l
a
i
c
i
f
f
o
e
s
n
any defe
|
|
e
n
o
,
d
e
d
u
l
c
n
o
c
l
a
offici
e
h
t
a
h
t
m
i
h
to
d
e
l
l
a
c
b
u
l
c
e
h
t
of
r
e
b
m
e
m
e
m
a
c
e
h
n
e
h
w
O
I
C
e
h
had been opposed to t
w
t
r
o
f
’
n
i
a
v
in
d
e
i
r
PM has t
|
.
d
n
i
m
s
i
h
d
e
g
n
a
h
c
d
a
h
t
u
b
n
o
e
h
c
n
u
l
e
h
t
to
a
.
t
n
e
v
i
g
n
a Stateme
a
c
e
w
r
e
w
s
n
a
t
the bes
is
y
r
o
t
s
s
i
h
T
(
pe
e
m
o
s
?
s
t
e
r
e
r
p
x
a
e
e
s
o
h
e
t
r
e
e
r
h
e
t
w
o
h
W
:
n:
n
io
o
st
i
ue
t
s
e
u
No doubt
q
e
h
t
o
t
w
e
s
l
wh
e
ere
_
d
n
a
n
o
i
s
s
m
i
a
m
i
l
m
l
i
o
W
C
of
it
e
d
s
e
k
n
s
a
e
n
o
Def
s
t
r
e
b
o
R
n
a
h
t
a
N
s
’
PM
g
n
i
h
s
a
W
's
AP
e
h
t
of
L. Beale, news editor
ll
te
t
'
n
o
w
“I
:
d
e
i
l
p
e
r
e
l
a
e
B
.
r
M
.
u
a
e
r
u
B
n
o
t
d
e
t
o
u
q
e
b
to
s
e
n
i
l
c
e
d
you. When a source
.
r
M
”
.
l
a
i
t
n
e
d
i
f
n
o
c
as
it
d
r
a
g
e
r
y
l
l
a
r
u
t
a
n
e
-|w
e
h
t
e
t
o
r
w
o
h
W
“
:
d
e
Robertson then ask
to
s
d
r
o
c
e
r
e
h
t
p
u
d
e
k
o
o
l
e
l
a
e
B
.
r
M
”
?
y
r
o
t
s
,
)
t
’
n
d
i
d
t
(i
e
n
i
l
y
b
a
d
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r
r
a
c
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if
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s
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e
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.
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t
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o
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»
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p
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Nat
b
is
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r
u
o
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T
“
:
d
i
a
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h
t
d
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U
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h
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f
o
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f
o
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o
r
a
e
y
ed 33
-+9 Se
By
d
a
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v
a
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r
‘
e
W
.
tt
e
t
o
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|
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d
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e
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i
a
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p
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,
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U
s
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Automobile Worke
s
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It
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e
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sion
The top personnel
|
n
We
h
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.
,
o
t
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a
t
s
i
s
s
a
t
s
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s
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h
”
.
;
n
n
e
m
e
s
d
e
u
e
r
n
h
K
t
S.
m
a
Willi
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
t
a
P
r
a
W
f
o
y
r
a
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t
e
r
c
e
S
t
n
a
t
s
i
s
s
A
;
D. Biggers
e
d
h
g
i
h
r
e
h
t
o
d
n
a
n
o
s
r
e
d
n
e
H
n
o
e
_terson; L
-_fense officials.
e
h
t
o
s
,
n
o
e
h
c
n
u
l
d
r
o
c
e
r
e
h
t
f
f
o
n
a
It was
s
i
it
t
u
B
.
d
e
t
r
o
p
e
r
e
b
t
o
n
n
a
c
s
proceeding
r
e
h
t
u
e
R
t
a
h
t
y
a
s
o
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f
n
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f
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a
e
r
no b
t
see
\ Capitalism F acing
Job of Sa
ving Self
‘Free Press Wire
'
12
ists, and
‘NEW YORK, Jan. 8—For nearly
ican
Amer-
of
years, the captains
through an experience which has
In
shaken their self-confidence.
1929, they saw the collapse of the
structure of prosperity which they
had reared.
defense.
they have lived in the presence of
who,
executives
actively
been
not
if they have
the
to
hostile
The net result has been the feel-
ing that American business was
on the defensive—no longer trusted or counted upon to do great
:
things for the nation.
experience of all other
shows, he is right.
countries
:
most
low
LLL
enterprise, the task which was
committed last spring to American .business is by all odds the
|.
mo-
the most
and
For on the success or
mentous.
failure of the undertaking depends
the outcome of the war, the security
future
free
of America
of private
enterprise
in
and the whole
property and
the
modern
ap
a ae
world.
It is not astonishing that American business men have been slow
to believe that after 12 years of
being on the defensive they have
been called-back to leadership and
high responsibility.
Though it was the obvious fact
that the defense program was a
gigantic series of orders placed
~
with American industry, this simple truth was obscured
by the
‘memories of 12 years and by the’
more or less unavoidable but very
destructive agitation of the politi@al campaign.
Only now do we
begin to see in its true perspective
the scope and meaning of the vast
|.
undertaking.
This Is Not Business as Usual
The country will not have :seen
this thing in its full perspective
until the realization breaks upon
_ us that production for defense is
no mere matter of fulfilling faithfully the contracts made by the
Government.
It is a matter requiring,
of
not
the
industrialists,
initiative.
passive
:
but
assent
their
active
They have’ a direct personal as
well as a collective responsibility
for devising the means by which
this program is to be executed.
This is not business as usual,
but
the
Nation’s
which
they
tion’s
urgent
tiative
and
are
is only one way
urgent
doing,
in which
business
business |
and
can
there
the Na-
or will |
be transacted through private
private
ini-
management:
That is if private initiative and
private management rise to the
occasion and produce the results.
Hesitancy Means Loss
Anyone
who
tells
business
men
that they can save the capitalist
system by hesitating and holding
back is
possible
giving
advice.
them
The
the worst
system of
private enterprise can be saved
and its future insured only by
dedicating the capitalist system
unreservedly to the defense of the
nation.
This will require not merely an
unhesitating acceptance but positive insistence upon the priority
of national defense over civilian
/needs.
It will require also suspension
of
commercial
rivalry
among firms producing essential
weapons.
All Other Rivalries Must Go
In
addition
to
suspending
the
commercial
rivalry
within each
armament industry, it will be nec-
essary to suspend the commercial
rivalry among industries—for example, the aircraft and the automobile industries.
Those who know the situation
know that the ancient rivalry ex-
may
mistaken
were called upon to organize the
armory of America and, therefore,
of human freedom.
Industry’s Biggest Role
|
In the whole history of private
dramatic
Reuther
national
be
altered. radically.
suddenly
was
From having been something like
the directing
outcasts,
political
industry
of American
managers
~most
‘
to
as the
terribly what
is
and
is great.
There is no peace of mind for the
frightened and no happiness left
except among the brave.
12 years
for nearly
increasingly
false, revealing whatever
in May, 1940, the position
the American industrialists
had occupied
of
In the end, all depends upon
whether men see themselves greatly or meanly.
These are times
which try men’s souls, exposing
industrialists, certainly have had
no great friendliness for them.
But
which
whatever
in detertebertTN principle,
legislators
placed in public office
and
Mr.
has
which
movement
popular
a
why,
be the specific limitations
adapted
1933,
in
Beginning
is
ne
eee
informed obse
Tnever be satisfied with
any conclusion which holds that
the vast machine power of the
automotive
industry
cannot
be
passing
been
industry have
may
that
4
\S
(
(
TL
a
TT
SS SO
en
acme
PM,
JAN:
MONDAY,
—
r
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m
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Labor Ch
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m
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y
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a
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Threatening 500-Plane
ed
it
Un
the
of
al
ici
off
g
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yo
r,
he
ut
Re
P.
er
lt
The “500-plane-a-day” plan drafted by Wa
to
au
e
th
of
es
ti
li
ci
fa
le
id
e
th
e
us
e:
pl
ci
in
pr
le
mp
si
a
on
d
se
ba
is
n,
io
Un
s
er
rk
Wo
to
Au
d
an
e
ns
se
nt
ge
ur
d,
un
so
s
ke
ma
n
pla
e
th
ks
industry to build airplanes for defense. PM thin
F.
I.
om
fr
ch
at
sp
di
g
in
ow
ll
fo
e
th
k
in
th
We
ut who opposes it and why.
wants t
ws
ro
th
,
PM
for
t
en
nd
po
es
rr
co
l
ia
ec
sp
d
an
on
ti
Na
espondent of The
Stone,
1 of the aircraft industry to the plan.
| By I. F. Stone
y
el
os
cl
re
mo
ed
in
am
ex
is
y
n
a
p
m
o
13.—Labor chiefs _ If one c
NC
few days to plan
here will me
a battle along &
with
the
aircraft.
to
t
gh
fi
e
th
is
s
nt
ro
l
o
e
On
.
ry
indust
050
r
he
ut
Re
e
th
r
fo
g
in
ar
he
get a fair
to
t
gh
fi
e
th
is
r
he
ot
The
.
an
pl
planes-a-day
po
d
re
vo
fa
’s
ry
st
du
in
e
th
of
nt
te
ex
the full
sition will be better appreciated.
~
r
te
af
e
ar
e
ov
ab
s
re
gu
fi
The Curtiss-Martin
e
th
d
an
es
ti
li
ci
fa
w
e
n
amortization of
.
|
at
Th
is.
bas
ar
ye
ere
th
a
on
is
amortization
of
d
ir
th
eon
s
ct
du
de
:
y
an
means the comp
raise wages in the industry.
|
ivarr
re
fo
be
to
s
tie
ek
ili
se
fac
ll
wi
w
ne
fs
ie
of
ch
r
t
bo
the total cos
On both fronts la
y
ar
in
rd
ao
tr
ex
e
th
ic
bl
pu
e
th
ing at net income.
to
me
bring ho
a
,
ry
st
du
in
e
th
of
on
ti
si
po
it
of
favorable pr
s
r
e
d
r
O
f
o
t
o
L
be
y
ma
ar
fe
s
st
re
te
in
ft
ra
rc
ai
h
ic
wh
position
by
d
te
ma
ti
es
is
h
ic
wh
.
an
,
pl
in
r
rt
he
Ma
Curtissendangered by the Reut
of
h
rt
wo
sgo
0.
00
et
0,
rk
00
ma
3,
a
$8
,”
es
ld
ar
so
sh
ve
ft
Moody’s to ha
“Holders of aircra
sip column in
ported Dec. 24,
at the prospect
may use some
the Wall Street Journal re“fare not particularly pleased
that the automobile industry
of its facilities for mass pro-
la
of
hs
nt
mo
ne
ni
t
rs
fi
e
th
ng
ri
aircraft du
,00
,0
00
$6
n
ee
tw
be
of
g
lo
ck
ba
year, has a
.
rs
de
or
of
h
rt
wo
00
,0
00
,0
50
$6
000 and
ed
ar
fe
is
it
,
an
pl
r
he
ut
Re
e
th
of
Adoption
e
o
|
ge
hu
e
os
th
.”
ce
es
du
an
re
pl
of
t
gh
mi
duction
s,
st
| by aircraft intere
.
ly
se
ar
ul
ea
ic
cr
rt
in
pa
r
ei
't
th
en
ar
t
en
ey
ev
th
pr
t
on
as
The reas
backlogs—or at le
l
t
ra
gh
de
mi
Fe
it
st
te
t
la
bu
e
th
er
in
st
d
fa
un
fo
es
an
be
pl
y
ma
t
pleased
It would turn ou
|
ge
nu
hu
ma
r
ft
la
ra
mi
rc
ai
si
on
th
rt
Wi
po
re
s.
on
it
Trade Commissi
cut into aircraft prof
fig
ry
st
al
du
ei
fi
in
of
un
ft
e
ra
th
rc
d
ai
an
e
th
ns
io
r
at
wa
or
rp
st
co
la
facturing
s the
backlogin
or
at
t
th
n
e
g
m
n
in
r
br
e
v
o
to
g
re
he
on
0
ed
0
er
0
th
,
0
ga
0
ures already
collected $1,000,0
es
an
pl
e
d
=
a
m
——
n
a
c
i
r
e
m
A
.
6
te
da
19
to
up
report
\ders but only
.
ce
an
Fr
in
s
ne
li
t
on
fr
e
th
d
he
ac
er re
ev
Looks Very Good ie
in
t
ou
id
pa
t
n
u
o
m
a
e
th
es
In most industri
,
rt
po
re
on
si
is
mm
Co
e
ad
Tr
l
ed
ra
rn
de
ea
Fe
s
The
nt
ou
am
e
th
an
th
er
gh
hi
wages is far
g
n
a
a
n
ni
e
th
of
gs
in
rn
ea
e
th
of
e
on
covering the
is
ft
ra
re
Ai
by the stockholders.
ng
ri
du
s
ie
an
mp
co
g
in
ur
ct
|.
fa
in
nu
,
ma
ry
st
du
in
aircraft
r
jo
ma
ly
on
e
th
very few, if not
1938
and
1939,
shows
a record without
dFe
e
th
,
39
19
In
.
ue
tr
is
e
rs
ve
re
e
th
h
whic
e
th
s,
ow
sh
rt
po
re
n
o
i
s
s
i
m
eral Trade Com
parallel in American industrys
s
ha
e
ol
wh
a
as
ft
ra
rc
ai
e,
ac
pl
t
In the firs
t
ou
id
pa
s
ie
an
mp
co
ft
ra
rc
ai
g
in
ad
le
ne
ni
rt
mo
s
or
s
e
n
d
e
t
b
e
d
n
i
ed
nd
bo
no
lsa
_ yirtually
d
an
s
ge
wa
on
ti
uc
od
pr
in
0
00
0,
50
8,
$3
an
th
e
or
“m
tle
lit
39
19
In
g.
in
nd
ta
t
gages outs
ne
’
rs
de
ol
kh
oc
st
e
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th
wi
aries as compared
st
ve
in
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to
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of
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e
one-half of on
.
0
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,
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4
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of
e
m
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.
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t
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G
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d
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l
ment in these nine
73
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ar
ft
ra
rc
ai
in
s
e
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a
w
e
ag
er
av
y
a
d
o
T
term debt.
panies was represented by long
.
nt
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r
pe
1
of
00
/1
62
s
wa
re
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The exact fi
an hour compared
cents
with 95
cents
in
,
-}
to
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to
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ad
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Put in
hls
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d
ha
39
19
of
d
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panies at the
an
s
nt
ce
50
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t
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er
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gi
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of
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in assets
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nt
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%
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th
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which only
opr
ct
ra
nt
co
er
sl
ry
Ch
w
ne
e
Th
l.
ee
st
in
|
=~
gages or notes.
.
ur
ho
an
s
nt
ce
80
of
ge
wa
m
u
m
i
n
i
m
a
s
de
vi
rn
ea
an
is
on
ti
si
po
is
th
th
wi
g
in
In keep
en
e
ar
l
ee
st
r
no
s
ve
ti
mo
to
au
r
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it
ne
t
Ye
r
he
ot
no
by
d
e
h
c
t
a
m
be
n
ca
at
ings record th
r
e
d
n
u
is
at
th
m
o
o
b
sh
lu
e
th
e
it
qu
ng
yi
jo
in
nt
ce
r
pe
80
se
ro
s
it
of
pr
t
ne
s
It
industry.
.
ft
ra
rc
ai
in
y
a
w
al
tu
ac
on
rn
tu
re
of
te
ra
e
Th
.
38
19
er
1939 ov
e
th
at
th
d
n
e
t
n
o
c
re
he
n
e
35
m
s
e
d
k
n
o
a
p
s
38
19
r
o
in
b
a
L
nt
ce
r
pe
25
s
wa
investment
s
i
—
y
l
k
e
e
w
0
2
$
—
e
g
a
w
m
u
m
i
n
i
m
s
nt
ce
50
.
39
per cent in 19
It}
.
ry
st
du
in
ch
ri
a
ch
su
r
fo
w
shockingly lo
More to Come
ng
li
gg
ru
st
in
id
pa
s
e
g
a
w
compared with
ed
er
th
ga
g
in
be
w
no
s
re
gu
fi
y
ar
marginal industries.
Prelimin
r
fo
er
gh
hi
r
fa
be
ll
wi
s
it
of
pr
th
here show that
wi
ct
ra
nt
co
a
ed
gn
si
s
(Union leader
,
e
1940.
l
a
d
g
n
i
m
r
a
F
in
.
rp
Co
ft
ra
rc
Ai
r
e
g
n
a
R
e
th
pSe
st
la
d
e
d
n
e
s
h
t
n
o
m
e
For the nin
e
th
d
e
n
i
a
t
n
i
a
m
h
c
i
h
w
L. 1., last Saturday
r
tember:
te
af
ed
gn
si
s
wa
ct
pa
e
Th
.
m
u
m
i
n
i
m
t
en
-c
50
m
o
c
9
3
6
,
5
0
3
,
8
$
d
e
n
r
a
e
t
h
g
i
r
W
s
s
i
{ Curt
s
s
e
r
g
n
o
C
in
s
at
re
th
of
es
ri
se
g
n
o
l
k
e
e
w
a
ne
ni
t
rs
fi
e
th
in
2
5
5
.
3
4
5
.
4
sgi
pared with $
le
e
ik
tr
-s
ti
an
to
ad
le
d
l
that a strike wou
months of 1939.
|
,
)
.
on
ti
la
,88
,2
$7
e
r
e
w
s
g
n
i
n
r
a
e
ft
ra
rc
ai
s
a
€ Dougl
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
<
—
<
—
—
_
ar
—
ye
st
la
of
s
h
t
n
o
m
_ 835 in the first: nine
°
e
ne
ni
t
rs
fi
e
th
in
0
6
]
,
2
8
3
,
compared with $2
months of 1939.
in
8
6
7
,
9
9
1
,
9
$
d
e
n
r
a
e
ft
ra
rc
Ai
@ United
|
7
0
3
,
9
9
7
,
5
$
th
wi
d
e
r
a
p
m
o
| the same period ¢
|
—
| the year before.
e
r
e
w
s
g
n
i
n
r
a
e
's
in
rt
Ma
L.
n
@Glen
_
$4.-
0
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9
1
of
s
h
t
n
o
m
ne
ni
t
| 798,987 in the firs
ne
ni
t
rs
fi
e
th
in
8
7
7
,
3
1
5
,
1
$
* compared. with
~ months of 1939.
|
t
n
e
m
y
a
p
r
te
af
d
e
h
c
a
e
r
e
ar
s
These figure
_
ex
w
e
n
r
fo
e
c
n
a
w
o
l
l
a
d
of income taxes an
cess profits
taxes.
“DOMESTIC
Beiter
TRAGEDY”
m
o
T
by
es
cl
ti
ar
of
es
ri
A se
of
ht
ig
pl
e
th
g
n
i
b
i
r
c
s
e
d
O’Connor
un
,
d
i
a
p
r
e
d
n
u
“
’s
ty
Ci
New York
d
n
a
—
s
r
e
k
r
o
w
c
i
t
s
e
m
o
protected d
e
v
a
h
at
th
s
p
u
o
r
g
e
exposing th
—
m
e
h
t
p
l
e
h
to
n
io
at
blocked legisl
to
e
g
a
p
r
o
b
a
l
s
’
M
P
will begin on
:
morrow.
(a
ns
Ee
|
|
1941.
wo
MASS PRODUCTION
IN PLANES DOUBTED
of
that
Wright
much peacetime
production
t
f
will have to be curtailed to speed
the defense
program, because
of
the shortage of skilled workers.
Vinson
Chairman.’ Vinson Expresses
Opinion 50,000-a-Year Goal
May Not Be Practicable
r
Skeptical on 50,000 a Year
By The Associated
WASHINGTON,
Press.
Jan. 13—Chair-|:
man
Vinson of the House
Naval
Committee expressed the opinion today that the necessity of continually improving: military
and
naval
planes might prevent production of
50,000 craft annually, the goal set
TIMES.
YorK
Mr.
on some parts of plane production
but not on all of them.
He agreed with Chairman Vinson
ee
NEW
work,
The automobile industry, he said,
should be able to ‘‘jump right in’’
MODELS CHANGE TOO FAST
to Tn
contract
added.
'
Production is now practically on
a six-day basis, with three shifts
+ working around the clock, he said,
but remarked that maintenance of
machinery and rest for personnel
made this about the practical limit.
Burdette Wright of CurtissWright Testifies Before.
House Committee
Special
its
Jan.
lem
defense
of speeding
the prob-
production
that the parts of the program under
their direction are going as well as
can be expected. None was able to
offer the committee any particular
suggestions for expediting it.
They likewise declined to
offer
any criticism of the way in which
government agencies are handling
their end of the task, even though
|
specifically urged to do so.
Those who testified were Burdette
Wright, vice president and general
airplane
Curtiss
of the
manager
division of Curtiss-Wright Corporation; L. R. Grumann of the GruAireraft
mann
and
Corporation,
Engineering
and
F.
George
Chap-
Aeronautical
lin of the Brewster
Corporation.
There have been no labor troubles in their factories since the dethree
the
began,
program
fense
witnesses said, each adding that he
strikes
that
danger
no
foresaw
might
delay
production.
Mass Production Doubted
Mr. Wright expressed the belief
that the airplane industry never
production
mass
reach the
can
basis that exists in the automobile
industry. Lessons learned in actual
warfare
improving
require
and
changing
the
too frequently
of models
to make such production possible,
he said.
Representative Maas, Republican
of Minnesota, who was a flier in
the World War, suggested the cre-
Burdette Wright, vice president of
Curtiss-Wright’s
airplane division,|
and other witnesses said that pro-|
duction of craft for Great Britain |
had
gone
forward
more
rapidly
than had production for the Army
and Navy because the British made
fewer revisions in design.
“The British operate on the theory that half a loaf is better than
none
at all?’’
Chairman
Vinson
asked.
That’
sright,’’ Mr. Wright
replied.
A little later he said that planes
of an already approved design could
be produced in from five
months,
but that from
fourteen or fifteen months
required for ‘‘a brand new
|
ation of a director of aircraft proto|
similar
powers
with
duction
Britthose of Lord Beaverbrook,
ain’s plane production chief. Mr.
Maas told reporters later that he
a
such
offering
considering
was
bill.
He said he had made a survey of
the industry and found many comconfusion
that
complaints
pany
of
of the number
exists because
government agencies handling aircraft procurement.
Mr.
Wright
said his company
has
been successful in dealing with the
the Navy and the British
Army,
by discussing allocation problems
with their representatives.
Neither
Mr.
Wright
nor
Mr.
Gru-
mann, who preceded him, had any
present opposition on Mr. Maas’s
proposal.
said he had freGrumann
‘Mr.
ceived a cable message from Lord
Beaverbrook last night stating that
a Grumann carrier fighter had shot
down one of the latest type German bombers, a JU-88. This indicated to him that American planes
the
meet
to
enough
good
are
in air wardevelopments
newest
fare,
Tells of Plant
Mr.
Wright
said
Expansion
his
company
is
in June
as
spending $45,000,000 for three new
plants and the extension of the old
Buffalo
plant.
The
company
is
now turning out the equivalent of
eight pursuit planes a day and expects to be producing the equivalent of thirty to thirty-five a day
in 1942, when the new plants are
operating at capacity.
The plants
will be finished in June, he said.
The. company
is training many
new
workers,
between
1,000 and
2,000 for the new Columbus (Ohio)
plant
alone.
It expects to have
23,000 workers
employed
against about 3,500 two years ago.
The company is looking all the time
for subcontractors
with
idle machine-tool
equipment
and
trained
labor to which it can farm out part
sien pertain
' Committee investigating
fense program said that mass production in the future appeared very
doubtful
because
of
frequent
changes in design to incorporate‘lessons
learned
from
the
fighting
abroad.
“That means,’’ the chairman said, |
‘“‘that it will be impossible to achieve
50,000 planes of the very latest design and type because by the time
they actually went on the line they
would be obsolete.’’
ari
13—Three | hy the Administration.
Representative Vinson made the)
airplane manufacturers who have
or expeet large government orders statement after a witness at a committee
study
of
progress
on
the
des
air
Aff
al
Nav
se
today told the Hou
WASHINGTON,
|
|
to seven
eleven to
would be
type.’’
1
s”
rt
pa
y
l
b
m
e
s
s
a
b
u
s
task of making
n
e
m
r
e
h
t
O
.
e
g
a
l
e
s
i
f
the Martin bomber
g
n
i
w
s
ts
ge
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
p
will be added as
r
e
h
t
O
.
on
n
e
k
a
t
e
r
a
s
b
o
j
ing and more
cpi
e
th
o
t
n
i
t
h
g
u
o
r
b
e
b
suppliers will
ture
from
the
Chrysler
as
beginning,
.
k
r
o
w
e
th
of
l
a
e
d
d
o
o
g
will subcontract a
1s
s
r
o
t
o
M
l
a
r
e
n
e
G
—
m
a
r
eG. M. Prog
s
t
r
a
p
r
fo
m
a
r
g
o
r
p
r
a
l
i
working out a sim
of
©
production
bomber
B-25
the
on
, Beneath the.
that rises from
C amy cloud of rumor
Washington, Detroit,
and the Califormia aviation centers, the
x a FFF
»
Knudsen plan for automobile-aircraft industry cooperation in bomber produc-
tion is now boiling down to something
pretty specific.
—Jan.4’41,p7) and
expected, reduction
to brass tacks starts
ments to the three
—Chrysler,
Ford,
(BW
anticipated
e First the Big 3—As
as might have been
of the broad scheme
with definite assignbiggest car makers
and
General
Motors.
Chrysler is going to make sub-assembly parts for Glenn L. Martin’s B-26
medium
bombers;
Ford
will
do
the
same kind of job for Douglas and Con-
Motors
General
solidated bombers;
will work on North American’s B-25
bomber. And they are more likely to
start small than to bite off too large a
chunk at the beginning.
K. T. Keller, president of Chrysler,
diplomatically sums up the outlook like
this: ““Any idea that the automobile
industry can revolutionize aircraft pro-_
duction procedure is the bunk, but after |
we have learned what the airplane
people have found out by many years
of practical experience, the automobile
industry may improve and speed up
manufacturing methods.” One move |
expected of the auto makers is the
breaking down of plane jobs into simpler elements.
e Chrysler’s Plans—The general scheme
of the tieups is indicated by what has
been done by Chrysler, which seems to
be furthest ahead in its planning. For
the plane assignment, President Keller
has leased 600,000 sq. ft. of space at
Detroit’s closed Graham-Page plant and
is moving machinery there from Chrysler plants with the expectation that
tooling for these machines will be let
in about two months, production start
in the summer. Some of the corporation’s best managerial talent has already
been put on the Martin job and some
Martin people will be brought into the
plant. At the start, only about 1,000
specific
__workers will be employed on theea
Ail aes
.
E
.
C
r
e
g
a
n
a
M
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
P
d
n
a
d
r
o
F
l
e
s
d
E
t
n
e
d
i
s
e
r
P
.
o
C
Ford Motor
s
la
ug
Do
ld
na
Do
th
wi
t
en
em
ng
ra
ar
p
hi
rs
ne
rt
pa
a
s
s
u
c
s
i
d
,
)
Sorensen (right
inl
TE
s
l
o
r
t
n
o
c
it
,
y
l
l
a
t
n
e
d
i
c
n
i
,
h
c
i
h
w
y
n
a
comp
.
p
i
h
s
r
e
n
w
o
k
c
o
st
through
Definite de-
t
u
b
p
u
d
l
e
h
n
e
e
b
e
v
a
h
s
n
a
l
p
s
it
n
o
‘tails
s
b
o
j
r
e
b
m
o
b
e
h
t
t
a
h
t
d
o
o
t
s
r
e
d
‘+ is un
.
M
.
G
g
n
i
t
s
i
x
e
g
n
o
m
a
d
e
t
u
b
i
r
t
s
i
d
will be
y
l
e
r
l
l
i
w
n
o
i
t
a
r
o
p
r
o
c
e
h
t
t
a
h
t
d
n
a
plants
g
n
i
l
d
n
a
h
0
1
s
e
c
r
u
o
s
e
F
m
w
o
s
it
n
o
y
l
large
the. contract.
w
o
n
1s
d
r
o
F
—
s
e
t
a
g
i
t
s
e
v
n
I
d
r
o
F
e Edsel
the
n
o
k
r
o
w
n
o
i
t
a
g
i
t
s
e
v
n
i
n
i
d
e
g
a
g
n
e
h
t
i
w
s
r
e
b
m
o
b
s
a
l
g
u
o
D
d
n
a
d
e
t
a
d
i
l
o
s
Con
engineers
following
up
Edsel
Ford's
r
u
d
,
t
s
a
o
C
e
h
t
o
t
trip
highly publicized
w
e
n
a
p
u
g
n
i
t
t
u
p
f
o
e
k
o
p
s
e
h
h
c
i
h
w
ing
.
t
n
e
m
n
g
i
s
s
a
e
n
a
l
p
e
h
t
e
l
d
n
a
h
o
t
plant
d
r
o
F
t
a
h
t
t
r
o
p
e
r
t
n
e
t
s
i
s
r
e
p
a
is
There
g
n
i
g
n
i
r
b
n
i
d
e
t
s
e
r
e
is chiefly int
.
n
w
o
s
it
n
o
l
al
e
n
complete pla
out
a
e
h
t
f
o
e
c
n
e
r
e
h
d
a
e
s
o
l
c
s
i
h
t
y
l
s
u
Obvio
plane-auto
program
to
ordinary
com-
m
o
c
e
r
e
h
t
s
k
c
a
r
t
e
d
i
s
s
d
o
h
t
e
m
mercial
,
r
e
h
t
u
e
R
.
P
r
e
t
l
a
W
f
o
s
n
o
i
mendat
n
o
i
n
U
s
r
e
k
r
o
W
e
l
i
b
o
m
o
t
u
A
.
United
d
e
z
i
n
a
g
r
o
e
b
y
r
t
s
u
d
n
i
e
h
t
t
a
h
t
feader,
e
n
o
e
r
e
w
it
if
as
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
p
e
n
a
l
p
r
i
for a
o
l
l
a
o
t
e
e
t
t
i
m
m
o
c
l
a
r
t
n
e
c
a
r
e
frm und
cate
work.
ig
;
S
C
I
P
O
T
E
L
I
-\UTOMOB
.
A
P
,
G
R
U
B
S
D
U
EAST STRO
JAN 20 1941
Labor Grabs For the Brass Ring
Automobile Feeder Companies Afflicted
With Outbreak of Strike Rash
Scattered victories of labor over-laid
on the quickening flow of industry in
recent months last week touched off a
tempest
‘of union rows. But, while some
feeder companies were definitely in full
battle, the automobile industry proper
had comparative peace, although, in the
cases of GM~and Ford, sparring was
On Tuesday, UAW President, R. J.
Thomas and Walter Reuther, head of. the
union'g4GM department, let it be known
that x.
taise will be sought for the
corporation’s workers.
Form
of the
union’s proposal will be drafted at a
meeting of the GM council, Feb. 10
It will be similar to that to which
Chrysler recently agreed.
Ford declined toward off a UAWCIO strike already voted for the Lincoln
plant. The company refused to permit
a routine collective bargaining election
requested by the NLRB.
The strike
vote stemmed from charges that th
e
company had discriminated against the
union by dismissal of 250 to 300 worker
s.
A particularly violent strike which
started at the Saginaw plant and spre
ad
to four other plants of Eaton Manu
facturing Co. was temporarily clea
ned
up Thursday by James F. Dewey, natio
nal
labor conciliator, and Operations w
ere
resumed. The battle was primarily between the UAW-CIO and the UA
WAFL. The AFL has a contract with
the
company which will not expire till 1
942.
Since the signing of the contract,
the
CIO claims to have obtained sufficien
t
converts to hold a majority of the work
ers
Dewey
Moves
To enforce these claims, the CI
O
sev-
eral weeks ago struck. This strike
was
patched up, but the union claims
the
company failed to rehire the strike
rs as
However, secret agreement or no sec
ret
agreement, the AFL says it is stil
l top
dog and CIO strikers will be rehire
d according to the discretion of its shop
committee. The NLRB has refused CI
O requests foi an election, leaving matters
in
a rather touchy condition.
Eaton tnakes parts for Cadillac, Chrys
ler and Hudson.
Protraction of the
s
trike, it is reported, might thro
w 30,000
automotive
dition, the
tappets and
tinguishing
portance.
workers out of jobs. In adcompany is manufacturing
valve seats for planes, disthe strike with national im|
&
;
+ e
i
we
International Harvester and the CIO
Farm Equipment Workers. It seems 200
members of an independent employes
association sat down on the assembly
line, then walked out, blocking production at the East Moline, IIL, plant. The
CIO, which claims the miniature sitdown
was a phoney engineered by the company, was expected to vote a large-scale
walkout Sunday night. Real issues are
better pay and union recognition.
of the week,
3500
em-
ployes struck at Chrysler’s New Castle,
Tnd., plant, where, said company officials,
a small petcentage of production is for
defense. Union leaders said a foreman
had violated the contract by asking men
to wOfk during a 15-minute func.
period.
3
Orderly procedure was apparent in refrom
the Chevrolet plant at Flint,
the progress of grievance
the UAW-CIO.
The final
Wednesday.
the m
ion
ievances
is
not
If a settlement
soon
reached,
will be referred to the GMfe, Dr. George W. Taylor.
appealed
to
employes who strike, many
Fe now exempt because they
work in a vital industry.
Packard
Speeds
Packard is ahead of schedule with th
e
construction of the plants in which 90
00
Rolls Royce aircraft engines will be
built,
expects to have the bulk of the job
done
by March 1, reported President M.
M.
Gilman last week. During the
three
months following, about half the full
tool
order will be delivered and installed,
1400
out of the 2653 items being built for
the
job, and it is expected that by July 20
—
there
will be some production
engines.
That Man’s Here
at least, never made
such
a claim, since
dislocation of the industry is
paratively insignificant matter
Another rival union squabble threatened to wreck a temporary truce between
In the middle
CIO's argument, have claimed that the
plan would dislocate the industry, TOPIc
s,
Again
on these
CIO on Thursday tried a figurative
shot of adrenalin on the Reuther plan
for converting unused automobile facilities to war plane production.
time.
Rather,
the claim
was
a comat this
made
that
not sufficient industry facilities could be
adapted to aircraft manufacturing
to
make further consideration worthwhile
In his new sally, however, Reuther
raised an intriguing point— namely,
that
‘leveling off of production would,
for
the first time, permit manufacturers
to
plan ahead for 12 months. [It wo
uld
eliminate the tremendous peaks
and
valleys in employment which for
many
yeats have worked such hardships
on
more
than
workers.”
half-a-million
automobile
Topics does take the position tha
the real motive behind the sugge
sted
leveling of production is an attempt
o
n
}
the part of the CIO to inject itself
into
control of production schedules
by the}
backdoor route.
ot
é
LOE
Rrra ewes
I
Oe LESS
ae ASP,
we
AINE ISN
RENTED AE
ETE
ONS ELLY EAE
*
BE
OTA
Steins
Pe eR
Boral
Pepe
From
UNNECESSARY
WAS
CURTATLMENT-
SAID
WILSON
1941
25,
Detroit
Times,
September
C.
E.
Wilson
told
the
Tolan
"T
did
forsee
the
present
at
Committee
a
hearing
Detroit:
oroduction
easier
to
People
are
be
in
use
and
not
don't
dis-organize
getting
for
months
that
things
materials
and
It
necessary.
it
think
on
this
to
is
re-organize
which
priorities
is
cut
drastic
causing
a
in
auto
much
them.
will
shortage."
not
in
N
O
I
N
U
N
R
E
T
S
E
W
- Item sets