BOOKS AND CIRCULARS

UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Inc.
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE
345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

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one world or no world — one human family or no human family

Hubert Robert

Summary Report of the Conference
held in New York City, May 19, 1965
called by the

Disarmament Information Committee of the United Nations Association

PEACE - KEEPING AND SECURITY IN THE SEARCH FOR DISARMAMENT

Joining with the Disarmament Information Committee of the UNA - USA in sponsoring this "off-the-record" conference with key spokesmen from the Administration and the UN were: Catholic Association for International Peace; Council for a Livable World; Council on Religion and International Affairs; Division of Peace and World Order, Board of Christian Social Concerns, The Methodist Church; Industrial Unions Department, AFL-CIO; International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO; National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy; National Council of Churches; National Council of Women of U.S.A.; Quaker United Nations Program; Union of American Hebrew Congregations; Unitarian Universalists Association, Department of Social Responsibility; United Automobile Workers of America, AFL-CIO; United Church of Christ, Council for Christian Social Action; and United World Federalists. The press was not invited and assurances were given to the Government officials present that the information developed would be used for background information and not for direct attribution. Seventy persons attended the all-day and evening sessions in the Carnegie International Center, and as the appended list of participants reflects, they represented a wide range of religious, labor, political, and citizen organizations. (The evening session was open to the public.)

Purposes of the Conference

1. To encourage key decision makers in Government to share their views with the N.G.O. leadership during the period that government positions will be developed regarding the work of the UN's Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations and Disarmament Commission.

2 To provide N.G.O. leadership with information on which to base organization proposals and positions.

3. To create an awareness on the part of Government that private citizens can be of real help in the formulation of policy as well as in the dissemination of information to that attentive strata of the public whose support is necessary for the acceptance of foreign policy.

Conference Summary

The Disarmament Information Committee of the UNA - USA is indebted to Dr. Arthur Larson, Director of the Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University, for his excellent summary given at the closing session. His remarks were used as the basis for this report. The following seven questions were discussed in some detail during four lengthy and stimulating sessions.

CONFERENCE FINDINGS

To what extent is it in the U. S. national self-interest that the UN enlarge and strengthen its peace-keeping activities?

One of our present needs is the defining of our national interest in such a way as will reflect our long-term goals. What kind of a world do we want? To what extent is the world we want similar to the goals of the uncommitted nations in the General Assembly? To what extent is it similar to the world which the Communist block desires?

If it is true that the Communists want to impose their own economic and political system on the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, it would seem reasonable to assume that these nations, who have struggled to be free of the colonialist yoke, will seek through the UN, to resist the threat of a new domination imposed by force. In this sense their interests and those of the U.S. are similar. In a larger sense, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have a joint interest in a strengthened UN, which prevent a military confrontation between them, and can establish an orderly world.

There was a consensus then, that it was to the U.S. interest that the UN should have a role in the settlement of all disputes which threatened world peace. However, there was some discussion as to cases in which the U.S. finds that a UN role is not feasible. It was pointed out in this connection that in evaluating the possibility for a UN intervention, the U.S. should consider its long-term as well as its short-term goals. For example, the U. S. supported the UN peace-keeping intervention in the Suez case, because it was to its long-term interest to strengthen the UN's role in such disputes, although from a short-term point of view, this intervention seemed contrary to the best interests of the Allies.

It was also recognized, that if the U.S. by-passes the UN because of what seems to be its immediate interests, the attainment of long-term goals may then be made more difficult. In this connection, the proposal was made that it would be greatly to the U.S. interest to enlarge the UN's role in the settlement of the Vietnamese war. Throughout Asia today, the unilateral U.S. action is regarded as another example of white,

Western imperialism. A greater role for the UN would not only help to minimize this anti-U.S. sentiment, but would help to convince the smaller nations that the U.S. cannot provide border controls for the whole world and that they must rely on the UN for this form of assistance. Most importantly, the UN role could halt the current trend towards escalation of the war and a military confrontation between the nuclear powers.

While there was considerable discussion as to what role the UN could play in Vietnam, there was a recognition that the UN's peace-keeping record could provide valuable precedents for whatever UN action which would be applicable. The UN has undertaken about ten major kinds of peace-keeping actions including the following listed in descending order of the amount of force involved. 1) A fighting force; e.g. Korea; the Congo. 2) Armed UN buffer force or border control; e.g. the Middle East. 3) A truce supervision force; e.g. the Middle East. 4) Control of subversive border crossings; e.g. the Greek civil war and the UN observer group in Lebanon. 5) A UN territorial administration; e.g. W. New Guinea. Many of these UN operations are still functioning, it was noted.

In addition, there are various examples of successful UN peace-keeping efforts in which the good offices of the Secretary General, or other forms of UN mediation were instrumental in pacifying the situation.

Since the war in Vietnam has become a threat to world peace, the situation, according to the Charter, has become the responsibility of the Security Council. There is evidence to suggest that insufficient support for UN action exists to permit a political settlement which would be satisfactory both to North and South Vietnam either through the good offices of the Secretary General or through other UN functions.

The point was made, however, that UN actions in the future might be less satisfactory to some U.S. groups than they have been in the past. While the U.S. has given staunch support to UN peace-keeping interventions which have, in general, served anti-Communist objectives, future UN interventions might not seem as distinctly in our interest. What would be Congressional reaction if UN forces replaced U.S. or O.A.S. contingents in Santa Domingo or in Vietnam? If Red China is invited to take its seat in the UN, will Congress become more ambivalent towards the UN? These are questions which must be considered as part of any plan to strengthen and enlarge the UN's security functions. Our commitment to the UN would be more solid if we supported the organization even if, at times, its action were influenced more by the desires of say, the Afro-Asian group, than by our own.

Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would be less afraid that their interests would be jeopardized by UN interventions if they understood that the UN's mandate demands impartiality in peace-keeping interventions. Since the Charter did not envisage the type of peace-keeping activities which have developed since 1950, certain regulations designed to insure the impartiality of UN efforts have been evolved. These include the use of national contingents most apt to be neutral in a given situation; the use of non-combat forces; the administrative role of the Secretary General, in whose office dual loyalty is ruled out; and the separation of the pacification function from the settlement of political issues. The suggestion was made that additional regulations would be useful. Moreover, there should be a greater understanding of the principle ennunciated by both Secretary General Hammerskjold and U Thant: namely that UN action is governed by policies which are separate and distinct from those advocated by individual governments.

Nations should recognize, it was said, that in the nuclear age, it is more than ever imperative to live by the Charter which prohibits the use of force except in self defense; and which advocates the practice of peaceful co-existence. If humanity is to survive, the safety of member nations of the UN must be given precedence over the freedom of action of the few.

What are the relative roles of the General Assembly and the Security Council in future UN peace-keeping activities?

There was agreement that the U.S. should not sacrifice the residual role of the General Assembly in peace-keeping operations. The Assembly's role is important, not only for the recommendation of peace-keeping operations when the Security Council is paralyzed by the veto, but also because of the reciprocal relation between the two organs. Permanent members of the Council, it was noted, were more likely to be restrained in their use of the veto, if strong sentiment for an intervention existed in the Assembly. For instance, the U.S.S.R. apparently withheld its veto on the Congo operation, because the Assembly favored UN action. In a similar situation, the U.S. could abstain in a Council vote, and even withhold payment for a UN operation which was supported by the majority of the Assembly thus permitting the peace-keeping action to go forward. In this connection, in the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, both India and Pakistan had proposed that the big powers agree to abstain in the Council if the Assembly recommended UN intervention.

Although the U.S.S.R. contends that the Security Council alone can authorize UN interventions, its policy, in general, has been a flexible one. The Russians voted for the resolution transferring the Suez case to the Assembly. They opposed the Congo operation only when Lumumba

disappeared - a development which they apparently ascribed to UN actions in the Congo favoring Western interests. And in the present crisis, the U.S.S.R. has not taken a rigid position on the payment of its arrears. It was proposed, therefore, as members of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had suggested, that the guidelines governing peace-keeping as differentiated from those covering action under Chapter VII should be more clearly understood. This project might help to reduce Cold War conflicts over the political implications of UN interventions.

The observation was made that the U.S. as well as the U.S.S.R., is exhibiting an increasingly ambivalent attitude towards the Assembly. There is no doubt that the Assembly has matured, and now votes most frequently on the issues, rather than from emotional, anti-colonial sentiments. Moreover, the non-aligned nations wish to decide their votes independently of the views of the great powers. The U.S. nevertheless is moving towards the Soviet view that peace-keeping is the responsibility of the Council. In the immediate future, it was thought, peace-keeping would be authorized primarily by the Council - following the general pattern of the Cyprus intervention. That is, on the basis of a flexible call-up system for police contingents, and of voluntary financial support. It was pointed out that under this system, the UN peace-keeping machinery would be adequate to meet any eventuality short of a confrontation between the great powers.

The suggestion was also made that it might be wise to resume the Assembly sessions, keeping peace-keeping on an ad hoc basis. If an attempt is made now to arrive at agreements governing future interventions, the nature of the conflict on these questions could leave the agreements ambiguous and open to future interpretations.

How should future UN peace-keeping operations by financed?

It was generally agreed that in its method of authorizing peace-keeping interventions, as well as in its financial procedures, the UN is in a transitional stage. While collective, compulsory financing of UN security functions is the ideal method, it is clear this procedure cannot at present be inaugurated.

There was no dissent to the proposition that a great power cannot be forced to pay for interventions to which it is opposed. Thus there was a consensus that for the immediate future at least, financing must be on a voluntary basis. In cases where a great power is unwilling to help to underwrite peace-keeping expenses, an arrangement like the Peace Fund would be useful.

It was also agreed that, since Article 19 is a dead letter for the time being, the U.S. should separate plans for financing future peace-keeping from the question of payment for past operation; and a solution of the problem of arrears should be arrived at independently.

A real sense of assurance was expressed that a system of voluntary contributions would be adequate to enable the UN to fulfill all requests for peace-keeping interventions.

What is the relation of reliable UN peace-keeping machinery to progress in general and complete disarmament?

The urgent need for disarmament, particularly for the control of nuclear weapons, was repeatedly emphasized. On the one hand, it was thought that progress in disarmament and peace-keeping go hand-in-hand and should go through the door of acceptance together, but there was also considerable support for the concept that reliable peace-keeping machinery could be the critical step towards agreement on major disarmament measures. As one speaker from the Administration put it; "If we want to make war impossible, we must first make it unnecessary."

Peace-keeping and disarmament are closely related as components of a collective security system - more so than it was generally recognized. For one thing, progress in disarmament will not necessarily lessen conflicts. Residual conflict will continue. Thus, peace-keeping is vital, not only to prevent violence in a disarming world, but also to provide those conditions under which nations will be able to sustain disarmament agreements. Similarly, without agreement on collateral disarmament measures, it will be more difficult to establish effective international peace-keeping machinery, since nations will not be prepared to endow the UN with the required authority.

A strong intimation was given that the Administration needs ideas to promote long-range plans for disarmament. For example, what kind of police force will be necessary as a condition for first steps in disarmament? It was pointed out in this connection that UN forces cannot be expected to keep the peace if nuclear weapons are involved. Rather, by preventing full-scale war, the UN can establish conditions in which peace is possible.

As trust and confidence in UN peace-keeping machinery is increased through its continued use by member nations, the establishment of the International Disarmament Organization will become possible. Provisions for the creation of this new agency are already included in the Soviet and

American plans for general and complete disarmament. The chief problems which must be solved in negotiations to establish the I.D.O. will be the determination of methods of control of a truly international police force.

It was suggested that this process might be expedited if the I.D.O. were created in stages. At first, only those measures of disarmament on which there is agreement and those methods of peace-keeping on which there is a consensus for their authorization, would be administered by the new agency. For example, the UN's peace observation functions, and the supervision and enforcement of a nuclear-free zone might be the first responsibilities of the I.D.O. Veto-free procedures might then be accepted and a stand-by police force would be adequate for enforcement. In this first stage, major peace-keeping functions would still be the responsibility of the Security Council, while major disarmament measures were still under negotiation.

What are the problems of UN stand-by forces?

Since it is generally acknowledged that it is not feasible to establish a permanent international force at this time, several of the most concerned nations have ear-marked stand-by troops and air forces for UN use. These nations include Canada, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries, where contingents are already receiving special training for UN assignments. In Oslo and Ottawa, conferences on the technical aspects of UN peace-keeping interventions have recently been held. All of these developments are extremely helpful. While the problems of organizing and deploying UN forces on an ad hoc basis have been successfully solved in the past, it has taken more time and effort than would be necessary if adequate personnel were more readily available.

For one thing, the host country must approve of the troops selected for duty. Additionally, the countries supplying the troops must approve of the objectives of the operation. Then there is the status of forces agreement which must be negotiated between the UN and the host country, providing directives for the deployment of the UN forces. Assuming these preliminary obstacles are satisfactorily overcome, there remains the difficulties of organizing troops using different languages and possessing a variety of professional qualifications into a harmonious unit.

Once the troops are deployed, the determination must be made as to what extent the use of force will be necessary. The UN's goal is not identical to that of national armed forces: namely to subdue to the enemy. In UN operations, there is no enemy, but rather two combatants

who must be neutralized. For this purpose, the force required need not be greater than possessed by the combatants, although it must be adequate for self-defense. Since 1950 the UN has gained experience in a series of successful interventions. Various methods for halting hostilities have been evolved including isolation of the combatants, observation and negotiating techniques, interposition, etc.

In the underdeveloped areas many problems arise concerned with logistics such as the procurement of adequate facilities. It is usually the big powers who possess the necessary technical equipment for such operations. Since they are not eligible for UN peace-force duty, they are asked to supply the necessary logistical support.

The hope was expressed that within five years' time, all UN members will have earmarked contingents for UN duty, and that the organization of these forces will be coordinated with the military staff at UN headquarters.

What is the relation of the UN to regional organizations?

If regional forces are allowed to take peace-keeping action without UN authorization, it is questionable whether the impartiality of their approach can be assured. For example, in Cyprus, NATO attempted to pacify the situation, but the Alliance was so closely associated with the contending parties, that it could not effectively mediate the dispute.

The U.S. with its interest in NATO, SEATO, and the OAS would appear to give priority to the intervention of regional groups. It was pointed out, however, that the Charter provides that enforcement action undertaken by regional organizations must first be authorized by the Security Council. If this provision is by-passed, a precedent could be set which could have dangerous consequences. The Arab League, for example, might then feel free to take enforcement action against Israel. In this connection, it was questioned whether the intervention of U.S. marines in Santa Domingo without UN authorization, even though they subsequently functioned under the auspices of the OAS, was not a violation of the UN Charter. Administration officials suggested that the United Nations could not have acted with sufficient speed in the Santa Domingo situation.

What are U.S. policies in regard to the process of economic and social change in the world?

A wide-spread revolution to gain independence and a higher standard of living is in process among the underdeveloped countries. The question was raised as to why the U.S. often turns up on the side of the Juntas and the rightest governing cliques in these situations. It is obvious that the support of such totalitarian movements is not only

contrary to the basic democratic principles of the U.S., but places the U.S. in opposition to the aspirations of the common people.

U. S. alliances with the reactionary elements, it was pointed out, often destroys the democratic leadership, - the potential for a democratic government - thereby increasing the influence of whatever Communist elements exist. It should be recognized that all social revolutions are not Communist oriented; and that where Communists' groups are participating, they are not all equally a threat to free nations. U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia, for example, is entirely different than towards Red China. U.S. policies which will reduce the need for violence in social revolutions are urgently required. In such a program, the UN, through its economic assistance projects as well as through its peace-keeping functions, can play an expanded role.

In conclusion, it seemed apparent to the conference that:
1. The continuing development of the United Nations as an international organization capable of effective action in peace-keeping and disarmament will provide that security necessary for the nations to raise the standards of living of their people in keeping with the new technological advances.
2. That United States day-to-day diplomacy should more clearly reflect the United States long-term goals of peaceful social change and self-determination for all peoples, and
3. That public information on foreign policy should provide a basis of understanding in the areas of peace-keeping, arms control, disarmament, economic development, and social change to the end that the interdependence of nations is accepted as the guideline to peace and security for all mankind.

Josephine W. Pomerance
for the
Disarmament Information Committee

Participation in the Conference

Spokesmen from the Administration were:

Arthur Barber, Deputy Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense; Joseph S. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; Seymour M. Finger, Deputy Counselor, United States Mission to the United Nations; Sam de Palma, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Political Division; Arthur Larson, Consultant to President Johnson and Director, World Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University; Walter Millis, Member, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Research Panel, and Staff Member, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

Speakers from the United Nations were:

Squadron Leader D. Harrison, replacing Major General I. J. Rikhye, Military Advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations; Frank P. Graham, United Nations Mediator; H. E. Chief S. O. Adebo, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations; H. E. Sverker Astrom, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations; H. E. Zenon Rossides, Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations; and Dr. Vladimir Prusa, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the UN.

Non-Government Speakers were:

Porter McKeever, Executive Vice-President of the UNA-USA, made the welcoming address.

The Chairmen of the morning and afternoon sessions were Walter Goldstein, UNA-USA Disarmament Information Committee and Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College; and Robert Cory, Quaker United Nations Program. Rabbi Balfour Brickner, Director, Commission on Interfaith Activities, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, chaired the luncheon session, and Frank P. Graham, United Nations Mediator, member of Board of Directors, UNA - USA, presided over the evening program.

Arthur Larson, Director, World Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University, and Consultant to President Johnson, gave the Conference Summary.

The five discussants invited to appraise the comments made by the chief speakers were: Mrs. Marion H. McVitty, Observer to the United Nations for the United World Federalists; John Stoessinger, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College; Ruth Russell, Brookings Institution; Roy Bennett, United Nations Correspondent for the London Tribune and Chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission, Americans for Democratic Action; and Mrs. Josephine Pomerance, Chairman, Disarmament Information Committee, United Nations Association of the United States of America.

Off-the-Record Conference as part of International Cooperation Year

"PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY IN THE SEARCH FOR DISARMAMENT"

WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 1965

Carnegie International Center, United Nations Plaza, New York City

"The basic dilemma which we have to face is a large but simple one. On the one hand, Governments and peoples generally accept the need for the United Nations and its central role as the keeper of the peace. Thus the organization is entrusted, especially in times of crisis, with great problems of incalculable importance and danger. On the other hand, we have not yet come to a stage where the necessary political or material support is regularly forthcoming which would enable the United Nations to meet these problems with the authority and the efficiency with which, for example, an effective national Government meets its responsibilities on the national level."

U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations
Address to Canadian Parliament, May 26, 1964

Called by the

DISARMAMENT INFORMATION COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.

Program

9:30 A.M. **Registration:** Carnegie International Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York City

10:00 A.M. **Morning Session**

Welcome: **Porter McKeever,** Executive Vice President, UNA-USA

Topic: "The Potential Use of UN Peace-Keeping Forces"

Moderator: **Walter Goldstein,** UNA-USA Disarmament Information Committee; Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College

Speakers: **Arthur Barber,** Deputy Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Ogden R. Reid, Member, House of Representatives (R) 26th District, New York

Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Discussants: **Mrs. Marion H. McVitty,** Observer to the UN from the United World Federalists

John Stoessinger, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College

12:45 P.M. **Luncheon Session**

Topic: "Peace-Keeping in the UN's Third Decade"

Chairman: **Rabbi Balfour Brickner,** Director, Commission on Interfaith Activities, Union of American Hebrew Congregations

Speaker: **Major General I. J. Rikhye,** Military Advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations

2:00 P.M. **Afternoon Session**

Topic: "The Control of UN Peace-Keeping Activities"

Moderator: **Robert Cory,** Quaker United Nations Program Staff

Speakers: **Seymour M. Finger,** Deputy Counselor, United States Mission to the United Nations

Sam de Palma, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Political Division

Walter Millis, Member, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Research Panel; Staff Member, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

Discussants: **Roy Bennett,** UN Correspondent for London Tribune; Chairman, Foreign Policy Committee, Americans for Democratic Action

Mrs. Josephine Pomerance, Chairman, UNA-USA Disarmament Information Committee

4:30 P.M. Summary: **Arthur Larson,** Director, World Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University

8:00 P.M. **Evening Session**

Topic: "How Can the UN Effectively Keep the Peace?"

Chairman: **Frank P. Graham,** United Nations Mediator; Member, Board of Directors, UNA-USA

Speakers: **H. E. Chief S. O. Adebo,** Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations

H. E. Mr. Sverker Astrom, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations

H. E. Mr. Bahdan Lewandowski, Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations

H. E. Mr. Zenon Rossides, Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations

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AMALGAMATED LITHOGRAPHERS LOCAL 1 OF GREATER NEW YORK

JUL 12 1965

The Ethics of Anti-Communism

GEORGE F. KENNAN

I SUPPOSE it's only fair that I should be asked to lead a discussion of "the ethics of anti-communism." The last thirty-seven years of my life have been preoccupied mostly, in one way or another, with the problem of international communism. And it seems to me that I have stood pretty much in the center of the brickbats that fly back and forth in this connection. I have a respectable collection of abusive and sometimes unprintable letters from people who think that I haven't been anti-communist enough. On the other hand, I am one of the few Americans who have had the distinction of being thrown out of Stalin's Russia on charges of being too anti-Soviet. And I can remember a certain week, in 1950, when the walls of Rio de Janeiro were decorated with hundreds of great tar inscriptions saying: "To death with Kennan." These were inscriptions put there by the local communists. I was buried repeatedly in effigy at that time, incidentally, by Brazilian communist students, who did me the moving courtesy of putting a white cross on the little black coffin they used for this purpose.

Nobody can be blamed for being exercised about international communism. There has been plenty to be exercised about. I think a healthy capacity for moral indignation is essential to understanding what communism is all about. In our Embassy in Moscow, when we got a new young officer assigned to us who had been trained in the Russian language, if, on first confrontation with the Soviet newspapers in the morning, he didn't rise from his desk and go storming around the office saying "Look what these so-and-so's have said today!"—if he didn't do this, he was no good to us. It was a case where you had first to be capable of getting angry in order to understand what was up; and then you had to learn to control your anger.

The Soviet leaders obviously do not wish us well. Their ideology forbids them to do so. If they had their way, little would remain, I am sure, of our world position or of the things we value here at home.

Photo by Wide World

First newsphoto of the author after his expulsion from Russia in 1952 shows him arriving at Frankfurt Main station in West Germany. No smile for the photographer that day.

But despite all this, I must say that I find the term "anti-communism" a very misleading one.

First of all, if you are going to talk, today, about anti-communism, you have to begin by answering the question: anti-whose-communism? Karl Marx's, or Lenin's, or Stalin's, or Mao's, or Gomulka's, or even Tito's, since he himself insists on using the term? These are by no means identical. Not even the communists themselves pretend any longer that they are. If all you say is that you are "against communism," you haven't made yourself very clear. You cannot simply say "I am against them all" because in some respects the various outlooks that go by the name of communism are not just different but are actually in conflict with each other, so that you can't be against one of them in all its aspects without being, by implication, in favor of another one in those same aspects.

Suppose, then, you pick a certain communist country—let us say the Soviet Union—and say "When I talk about anti-communism, it is this country I mean and it is the communism of this country I am against." But there are two things you could have in mind when you express yourself this way: One, the present reality of the Soviet system with its internal institutions and practices; the way the regime treats its own citizens, and so on. Or, two, its external behavior: things it does on the world scene which affect adversely our interests and those of world peace, and which strike us as unjust or deceitful or aggressive.

Now these two things are not the same. We may not like the internal practices and institutions of the Soviet system, but so long as they don't have external effects that damage our interests, they are not really our business. Unless we have such dreams of grandeur that we picture ourselves as fit to rule the world, which I think very few of us do, then the golden rule is obviously going to apply here: We must agree to let Russians be Russians, and not try to substitute our conscience for theirs.

Perhaps you simply like to use the term "anti-communism" to record your abhorrence of the theory and practice of government which you understand to prevail in Russia. You can't mean, surely, that you are against *all* the institutions and practices of the Soviet system. There are a great

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George F. Kennan, Princeton '25, is former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and to Yugoslavia. Now at the Institute for Advanced Study, he is also Visiting Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton. His latest book is "On Dealing with the Communist World," Harper and Row, 1964. This article was adapted from a talk he gave on campus for the Student Christian Association.

many things that take place under the authority of, and in the name of, that system that are not at all reprehensible: Schools are taught, people heal the sick, scientists pursue the quest for knowledge. Perhaps these things serve communism to some degree; the regime has often tried to make them do so. But this is not all they serve. Teachers teach, as they do here, because this is their pride and their profession and they feel it important that young people should be taught. Doctors heal for similar reasons. And scientists pursue their research because, like scientists everywhere, they have learned the nobility and the excitement of the quest for knowledge.

Obviously, it is not *all* features of communism that we are against—only certain ones. But the sweeping term "anti-communism" does not suggest this.

And if we take just those things that we do definitely dislike in a communist system—such things as governmental hypocrisy, denial of civil liberties, the deliberate use of the big lie, automatic abuse and denigration of fallen statesmen—then we have to recognize that it is not in communist countries alone that such things are to be found; nor are they made any worse, just because they go under the banner of communism. Yet this, too, the term "anti-communism" does not suggest. It is, in fact, definitely misleading in this case; because it seems to carry the implication that we think these evils are confined to a single political system in a single part of the world, and that all other civilizations are wholly immune to them.

But suppose we turn for a moment to that aspect of international communism about which we do have a right to protest: to the behavior of communist regimes as actors on the world scene. Here again, we come up against great variations among communist governments. We have our problems with the Yugoslav government, but I am here to testify, after just spending two and a half years in that country, that the way it conducts itself in international affairs is as different from the conduct of the Chinese Communists, or of Yugoslavia's Albanian neighbors, as night is from day. The attitudes taken towards us by such diverse regimes as say the Soviet one, the Cuban, the Chinese, the Hungarian, and the Polish represent quite different problems for U.S. policy. To try to sum up our response to all of them by saying that our policy is one of "anti-communism" is simply not meaningful.

I can think of certain non-communist governments whose behavior towards us and towards the international community generally in recent years has been by no means superior to that of certain communist governments I could name. Do we really wish, by using the term "anti-communist" to obscure all this: to leave the implication that falsehood, malice, cantankerousness, irresponsibility, territorial expansionism, and aggressive behavior, either do not exist in the behavior of non-communist states or are reprehensible only when they go by the name of communism? If not, why use the term "anti-communist"? Why not be specific? Why not oppose these phenomena, as such, wherever we encounter them?

Now how about anti-communism as a term relating to political forces within our own national life?

Never strong in membership or even in voter support, the American Communist Party nevertheless gained considerable moral influence, especially in intellectual circles, during the 1930's. This was primarily a result of the shattering effect of economic crisis and the loss of confidence in established American values which that crisis occasioned. The communists were greatly aided by their ability to identify at that time with anti-fascist groups, generally, particularly in the case of the Spanish Civil War. They capitalized extensively on the revulsion to fascism which swept over the liberal West.

With the development of the so-called cold war in the late 1940's, the strength and influence of the American Communist Party began to decline rapidly. Even at the time of the anti-communist hysteria in the early 1950's, it already was a very minor force in our society. Today it is a tiny and pathetic little band of people embracing, I suppose, not much more than five thousand members, if that, or something less than one hundredth part of one per cent of our adult population. It is no exaggeration to say that the influence of the American Communist Party today in our society is negligible. If you were to comb the country, you would have a hard time finding a less influential group.

I have had many occasions, in the past 40 years, to know and observe people who were communists. Some of them were indeed brutal, treacherous and dangerous people. But others were idealists: people acting out of the deepest bewilderment and despair and misguided courage and desire to find the right answer. I must confess to you that deeply as I have disagreed with these people, and profoundly as I have deplored the methods and tactics to which they were led to subscribe, there have been many instances where I have had more respect for them, in all their error and all their hopelessness, than for many pillars of respectable American society, vegetating in the smugness and selfishness and superficiality of their particular brand of philistinism.

To err, as we all know, is only human; and there is not one of us who does not do it with the greatest of regularity. To err with courage, with conviction, with self-sacrifice, and out of the agony of the soul, can at least be said to be tragic. But to err out of cowardice, of complacency, of jealousy, of vindictiveness, or of greed, has not even this to be said for it; and I am not prepared to believe that error of this sort is any more acceptable in the sight of God just because it clothes itself in "anti-communism."

The Marxist-Leninist ideology was based on some serious misconceptions; and the methodology embraced by its adherents, under Lenin and Stalin, was in many respects evil and inexcusable. But no movement of our time, I am sorry to say, has more to show in the way of dedication, hard work, and selflessness, than does the movement that goes by the Leninist-Marxist name. We should not forget this; and when it comes to the American Communist Party, in particular, we should not be too self-righteous in our condemnation of men who have been made what they are by the stamp of circumstances—and circumstances, in many instances, for which every one of us in my generation, at least, bears a share of the blame.

Now there are many people who, when they use the term "anti-communism," have in mind not the little American Communist Party of this day but a whole variety of tendencies and conditions they associate with the word communism: tendencies and conditions supported by far wider circles than just the members of the Com-

munist Party: such things as the increase in the powers of the central government, the high degree of paternalism which seems to them to be reflected in the existing social-security arrangements and other programs of social benefit, an inadequate degree of military aggressiveness in foreign policy, absence of demonstrative patriotic fervor, and so on. And to this I would just like to say that these are of course views you can hold: these tendencies and conditions do exist in our society, for better or for worse, and it is perfectly all right for an American citizen to be against them, if this is the way he sees things. But what all this has to do with communism is not apparent.

Communists, it is true, can be construed as being in favor of these things to some degree, but no more so than millions of other people; and to suggest that all of these tendencies in our society—most of which, to the extent they have been realized at all, have been realized through the operation of our democratic processes, and largely by act of Congress—are simply the result of some refined and diabolic Communist intrigue, by means of which tens of thousands of influential citizens, government servants, and legislators are affected without knowing it, is not only to propagate a preposterous absurdity, but it is also to do a profound disservice to the national cause.

In individual psychology the sense of being the innocent victim of unseen conspiratorial forces is often the beginning of, and a symptom of, mental illness. In political life it is the beginning of totalitarianism, which is only a form of mass psychosis: the social equivalent of mental illness. So true is this, and so dangerous are the consequences of yielding to this sort of escapism, that one ought to reject such suggestions even when the available evidence might seem to support them. I cannot warn too strongly those of you who are students against associating yourselves, ever, with the suggestion that your personal troubles or those of the society to which you belong are attributable only to dimly-sensed conspiratorial forces, wholly external to yourselves, beyond your power of comprehension or influence, whose hostility you have done nothing to deserve. To accept such suggestions is a sure path to irrationality, to illusion, and to disaster.

Photo by Wide World

Arriving in New York with Mrs. Kennan and their two children after their forced departure from Moscow, the Ambassador now produces a tight smile while Christopher flourishes not one but two American flags.

Evil is an omnipresent substance of human life: around us and within us as well as without us. In a way, it is all of a piece, just as love and truth are all of a piece. When we struggle against it we must always regard that struggle as in part an overcoming of self. We cannot for this reason identify ourselves self-righteously with all that is good and clothe whatever opposes us in the colors of unmitigated evil. But this we tend to do when we try to make out of an impermanent semantic symbol, such as "anti-communism," the expression of a personal and political philosophy.

We all have in mind the events that have taken place in Moscow in the recent past. They have constituted in effect a third great crisis in the transfer of personal power from one set of hands to another in the history of a regime which has no adequate constitutional means of achieving such a transition. I have naturally had to think about this, and I have talked with friends, who, like myself, have spent many years in the study of Russian communism. All of us, I think, have the impression that this recent series of events really marks the end of an epoch. It marks the final fading, as a political reality, of that aura of excitement and inspiration and authority which Moscow was able to radiate, in the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1917, over restless, discontented elements in the western world.

Russia remains, today, a great power, as she was before 1917. She remains a problem to us, as she would have been before 1917 had we then been an active participant in world affairs. But the importance of Moscow as a source of inspiration and authority for the communist parties of the West, and even for the communist parties now in power in Eastern Europe, has been extensively and probably decisively shattered.

Whoever, then, tries to make anti-communism into a political or ethical philosophy is addressing himself to the past. He is talking about things that were, not things that are. This is, as we all know, an unbelievably endangered world in which we live. The ultimate problems created by nuclear science and by overpopulation—by man's new-found ability to destroy his habitat entirely or to make it intolerable by multiplying himself within it beyond the point of endurance—stare us in the face. To neither of these problems does mere anti-communism even suggest an answer; and the morbid preoccupation with this term can scarcely be explained otherwise than as the reflection either of an inability to free one's self from the anxieties, the seizures, or the nightmares of the past, or a lack of the requisite manliness to face the reality of the present. I think it is high time that we, all of us, threw off these shackles, emancipated ourselves from the power of vague semantic symbols, and turned our faces resolutely, with all the realism and the honesty we can muster, to the problems of the present and the future. □

Saturday Review

July 3, 1965

WHAT IS "REALISM" DOING TO AMERICAN HISTORY?

By Archibald MacLeish

WITH A REPLY BY McGEORGE BUNDY

SOMETHING NEEDS to be said about the position in which the United States has been placed in world opinion by the events of the last few weeks and months. The events themselves have been discussed at length by critics and defenders of American policy; their effect on the general attitude toward the United States of the peoples of the world is of equal if not greater importance. In its first public act after independence the American nation acknowledged "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." The reasons which moved the Continental Congress to adopt that phrase in its famous Declaration are still operative today.

What has happened in these months and weeks is simply that the conception of America—the conception, at least, which has held throughout my lifetime—has changed. I do not say that it has changed everywhere, but it has been altered certainly in the minds of many of our friends in Europe and Latin America, in the official statements of one government allied to our own, and in the actions, as well as in the words, of some at least of our own people, particularly the generation now of college age.

It is not easy to put the change into words. No man knows precisely what others think of him or of his nation. Those in my generation, for example, who fell in love with France in their youth were not in love with the same France that Frenchmen think of, and no American can even guess at what the French thought of this republic back in the days of the First World War. We were their allies, yes, and they liked us for that, though they thought we might have come a little sooner. But we were also a nation given to enormous words and lofty ideas and humanitarian theories. We had Fourteen Points on which we meant to build a League of Nations to save the world and we went up to the front talking about a war to end war—a war to make the world safe for democracy. The French didn't smile—not then at least: too many Americans died with those words in their mouths. But they had their own notion of us and they kept it. We were a young nation and we fought quite well once we got the hang of the fighting, but our thoughts were too large for our mouths; we believed too much in humanity and such abstractions as international justice and international organizations and the possibility of universal peace. It was all in Clemenceau's face as he rode beside Wilson through those yelling crowds.

And twenty-five years later, though much had changed, though the war in 1939 was a necessary war to cleanse the earth of an intolerable evil rather than a sordid commercial struggle, though our part was a greater part, though we led now and no longer followed, the conception was much the same. Again we were a nation that fought well—better perhaps. Again we died—more of us this time, many more. But still we talked in the old way about freedom—Four Freedoms this time—about human decency, about the hope for an enduring peace. And this time, when the war ended, we not only proposed an international organization; we presented a plan already hammered out in preliminary talks with our principal allies, and the plan was adopted. We were still the innocents, the idealists. We even believed, for as long as events would let us, in the good will of those on the other side of the Carpathians who had fought beside us to bring Hitler down.

So that the composite picture somehow endured. It survived Hiroshima, though not unaltered. It was enhanced by the Korean War, where the aggressor was self-confessed and where most of the nations of the United Nations were on our side. It was not harmed—if anything it was helped—by twenty years of the most persistent and abusive propaganda from Moscow and Peking; to indict a nation as an "imperialist aggressor" in a vocabulary in which "liberation" means subjugation and a "people's democracy" is a police state injures it neither in its own nor in its neighbors' eyes, if I may paraphrase Mr. Yeats.

I DO not mean to suggest that this portrait of America, composed by fifty years of history and two world wars, was wholly flattering. No nation is universally admired until time has left it 3,000 years behind, and even then there will be Alcibiades in the stern of the ship and Socrates's murderers. We had our critics—as many critics, indeed, as we had contemporaries. We were too rich. We talked in a rather childish way about brinkmanship, like two boys daring each other to walk out on a railroad trestle. Our principal exports—tourists and Coca-

Cola—were not everywhere well received. Nevertheless, the essential figure was still the figure Wilson had presented —Wilson and that innocent doughboy of the First World War. We were on the side of the angels, however far below. We still talked in the vocabulary of the vast ideal and backed it up with enormous gifts of goods and money. And above all, though we had more power than any nation in the history of the world had ever had, we still refrained from the use of power except as a deterrent.

And then the picture changed. It changed first, or almost changed, at the Bay of Pigs, where, at the last moment, we did not use our planes. It changed four years later, first in Vietnam and then in Santo Domingo: we bombed North Vietnam and we occupied Santo Domingo with American troops. In both cases, of course, we explained our actions as preventive. We bombed North Vietnam because we believed the bombing would prevent the further invasion of South Vietnam by the Communists; we occupied Santo Domingo to forestall a Communist seizure of the Dominican Republic. But in both cases our explanations were overshadowed by our acts. What the world saw was the exercise of power: the use of American troops for the first time since the bad old days of gunboat diplomacy to impose our will on a Latin American country; the use of American bombers against a nation with which we were not at war.

With that spectacle the feel of America in the world's mind began to change. It is still changing. And not abroad alone but here as well. The famous "teach-ins" in universities across the country, where our normally silent students spent long, angry nights, were not, as the participants sometimes seemed to think, debates on foreign policy. They were searchings of the national conscience.

Now, of the rights and wrongs of these great questions, of the wisdom or unwisdom of our decisions, of the accuracy of our intelligence, of the effectiveness, in terms of their own purposes, of the measures adopted, the time has not yet come to speak. The necessary information is not available.

But what matters here is the *meaning* of our policy, not how it came to be. What matters is whether America has actually changed for its own people and for the world.

Do Vietnam and the Dominican Republic mean that we are no longer that idealistic nation of the First World War —no longer a people attached to those enormous phrases, those almost inexpressible aspirations which impose their own sometimes quixotic laws of self-restraint? Have our ways of thinking and of feeling altered? Are we "realistic" now? "Hardheaded"? Indifferent to those opinions of mankind which our progenitors put in the first sentence of their first communication to the world?

—*Carl Howard, Pix.*

Archibald MacLeish: "What matters is whether America has actually changed. . . ."

There are men in the United States, distinguished and influential men, who think we should be—who think we have concerned ourselves too often and too long with those opinions. We have been softened, they say, by our sensitiveness to the reactions of others. We consider, not what we have to do, but what the world thinks of what we have to do. And the result is preoccupation with the opinions of others, the kind of preoccupation which the advertising industry has exploited with such humiliating consequences.

There is truth in all this, of course, too much truth for comfort. The exploitation of a decent human concern for others to bully men and women into buying mouthwash is one of the least lovely things in American life. And the corruption of language which accompanies it is another. Take, for example, the word "image," which was once a word of art employed with rigorous precision by disciplined poets who knew exactly what they meant by it. It has now become a trade term of the advertising agencies used in a muzzy, fuzzy, girlish sort of way to mean what people think of you—or more precisely what they will think if you don't use a particular deodorant or a certain soap or the brand of China policy advocated by the Daughters of the American Revolution. Nobody thinks of a man any more—only of the "image" of a man. Nobody thinks of a policy—only of the "image" of a policy. Sooner or later no one will think of the Republic either—only of the "image" of the Republic—how the United States would look in a full-page ad.

BUT it is one thing to tell the people of the United States that they should think less, collectively and individually, about their "images" and another thing altogether to tell them that the opinions of mankind should be ignored. There is no good reason why we in this country should wish to be loved for our every action, to smell sweet in every nose, but there *are* reasons why we should want the world's respect. For the world's respect is a part, and an essential part, of any nation's respect for itself.

But the question now is not whether we *ought* to be indifferent to the opinions of mankind but whether, in fact, we are—whether our actions in Vietnam and Santo Domingo indicate that we have outgrown our old concern, our old idealism and innocence of belief, our visionary streak. It is wholly possible. Nations, like men, grow harder-headed as they grow older, more skeptical of their early aspirations, and we have lived for a long time in a climate of abstract principle, of a high and noble rhetoric.

It is possible that we have changed. But I for one would doubt that it is true; I would doubt it as an American; I would doubt it even more as an American writer. There is a great deal in American life, as there is a great deal in the modern life of any country, which its

—*Paris Match, Pictorial Parade.*

The Bay of Pigs in Cuba, 1961.

—*Wide World.*

Escalation in Vietnam, 1965.

—*Paris Match, Pictorial Parade.*

Intervention in Santo Domingo, 1965.

writers deplore. There is vulgarity everywhere. There are pockets of ignorance and hatred—and not only in the deep South. Our relations with each other lack richness and tenderness. We die without death, like modern men in other countries, after lives without living. Our cities are monstrous. Our suburbs are worse. Our countryside, one of the loveliest on earth, will be lost in another generation unless the President can save it. All this is obvious. But what is also obvious, if you look closely and listen well, is a human warmth, a human meaning that nothing has killed in almost 200 years and that nothing is likely to kill—not even the long, cold, inescapable struggle of this generation of Americans—not even the blunders they may well make in winning it.

At the darkest and most desperate moment in our history, Abraham Lincoln, on his way to Washington to be inaugurated as President of a disintegrating nation, stopped at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, the small brick building where these hopes began. He had often wondered, he said, what it was that had held these states so long together in the past. Certainly it was not war—the war of independence with the mother country. There was something else, something more, and now he thought he had discovered what it was. It was something in the Declaration, he said, which had been drafted eighty-five years before within those rooms, something which promised liberty "not alone to the people of this country but also to the world . . . ," something that promised "that in due time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men."

It was a strange thing to say, if you stop to think of it, with all that darkness on the horizon just ahead. But it was true and history proved it true. What has always held this country together is an idea—a dream if you will—a large and abstract thought of the sort the realistic and the sophisticated may reject but humankind can hold to. That idea, I think we may be certain, we will never lose because we cannot lose it and remain a nation. And the opposite is also true. As long as we remain a nation that idea will be under the portrait, the face beneath the painted face, no matter what that painted face may be.

This article was adapted from a recent address by the distinguished poet at the International Publishers Association Congress in Washington, D.C. The article on the following page, by President Johnson's able and articulate Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and former dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard, is based on his extemporaneous reply to Mr. MacLeish at an IPAC luncheon in Washington sponsored by The Reader's Digest.

The Uses of Responsibility

A Reply to Archibald MacLeish

By McGEORGE BUNDY

THE question that Archibald MacLeish raises is not directed to the particular quality or wisdom of specific present policies. His question is whether the headline events of recent months indicate some kind of fundamental change, either in the behavior of Americans or in their respect for the opinions of others. I am grateful to Mr. MacLeish for raising this question. There is no American whose honorable concern for the quality of our national and international life has been demonstrated at a greater personal sacrifice or over a longer period of time than Mr. MacLeish's. There is no friend whom I value more. There is no colleague whose expressions of concern are more deserving of attention.

Mr. MacLeish put his question this way: "Do Vietnam and the Dominican Republic mean that we are no longer that idealistic nation of the First World War—no longer a people attached to those enormous phrases, those almost inexpressible aspirations which impose their own sometimes quixotic laws of self-restraint? Have our ways of thinking and of feeling altered? Are we 'realistic' now? 'Hardheaded'? Indifferent to those opinions of mankind which our progenitors put in the first sentence of their first communication to the world?"

Mr. MacLeish believes some people think we are much too concerned about our public image, and he associates himself, as I myself would wish to do, with a certain distaste for that phrase and for the way of thinking it represents. Then he comes to a conclusion to which I will return.

Mr. MacLeish's question is understandable. In order to give it an effective answer, it seems to me, we must begin some distance back in the modern history of the United States, because the structure of our contemporary role in the world rises upon rocks that were put in place in the time of Franklin Roosevelt, in the time that followed the fall of France in that terrible spring of 1940. For it is from that moment that one must date the inescapable place of the United States as one of the great centers of power, as one of those nations inescapably drawn to difficulty and to responsibility all over the world.

My own belief is that it was Franklin Roosevelt himself who articulated, not only for his time but for the years that have followed, the three primary elements of a continuing American attitude toward world affairs. The first, and the one without which the others would not operate, was the acceptance by the United States of the responsibility of holding and using power. The great choice of 1940 was the choice to turn outward, not inward, in the face of the conquest of the continent of Europe. Since then, moments of hesitation and uncertainty have occurred, as in the period of pell-mell disarmament after 1945 and again when there was a reluctance to face a need for renewed rearmament in 1949 and early 1950. Moreover, at particular moments in particular places there have been uneasiness and uncertainty; there have been disappointments, and there have been failures. But broadly speaking the acceptance of the responsibilities of world power has existed for a generation now. There is in many, and perhaps especially among those whose concern is for ideas and ideals and those whose hope is primarily for peace and progress, a reluctance to give full weight to the role of power and its necessity in the world's affairs. And often when there is criticism or concern about a particular action from those who have these deep preoccupations, it will be because of a reluctance to recognize and to accept this element in the affairs of men.

THE second great strand in the operations of the United States in its relationship to the world dates, once again, from the time of Roosevelt. It is a commitment to peace. He was not the first to have it on his mind, but he was the first to bring into operation responsible American concern and action for the advancement of peace in the world as a whole. The reality of the American commitment to peace in his time is best symbolized by the dominant role played by American policy-makers and by American purpose in the creation and the sustaining of the organization of the United Nations. It is right to understand this country as a country of peace. It is a country built by people who came from struggle and strife in other countries, and while Americans have their own sense of power and of force, while the American tradition of battle and of warfare is strong, the aspiration of the nation, the purpose of its people, and therefore, by extension, the purpose of those who are elected by its people must be peace. What we do when there is need for force, how we act in the control and management of our power, is fairly and correctly understood, I deeply believe, only in the context of the general, sustained commitment to a goal of less war, less struggle, and above all an avoidance of the catastrophe of full-scale warfare in the age of nuclear weapons.

The third strand in Franklin Roosevelt's policy is more complex. It was an instinctive belief that the United States must concern itself with the interests of others, wherever they might be. Nothing human was foreign to Franklin Roosevelt, and as the power of the United States spread, so did his concern to see that this power was responsive to the will and purpose of people whom it reached. This was much more than simply a refusal to impose the American dream on others, more than a rejection of the notion that we could execute our policy in terms of an American century. It was, rather, an active assertion that the dreams of others must have room to come true and that American power must be responsive to that end.

Seen from afar, on the other side of an American decision which is not approved, our conviction that our policy must be responsive to the interests of others can seem no more than cant—merely the protective cover for lower interests and lesser values. And it is certainly inevitable in the conflicts of nations that there should be differences of judgment on one action or another. Yet I would reassert, as a matter of simple fact, that we Americans do accept the obligation to judge ourselves by the results of our activities in terms of the interests of others. And we take it for granted that others should apply this unusually demanding standard to us.

These three strands—an acceptance of the responsibility of power, a permanent, passionate commitment to the ideal of peace, and a readiness to judge ourselves and to be judged in terms of the effect of our behavior on others—have been a steady part of our policy now for a quarter of a century. They continue to be the main strands of our policy today. And they all relate to the basic proposition that we must accept accountability for what we do; we expect it, we ask it of ourselves, and we respect the judgment of others.

We do not expect that there will always be agreement. We used to. That is one of the elements of our earlier approach to international affairs that we

have had to discard along the way, and in that sense, as in some others, it may well be that we are now a little more hardheaded, a little more realistic than we were at the time of the First World War. We no longer suppose that because there is cheering for Woodrow Wilson in the aftermath of an armistice, there is wholehearted concurrence with his desire to rearrange the map of Europe as he thinks best.

We do not suppose today that when we move, as we have had to move, in difficult and dangerous areas like Vietnam and the Dominican Republic there will be unanimous approval of those decisions, either. We do, however, expect to be able to defend them, to explain them, to act responsibly in carrying them out, and we expect above all to be judged in the end by the result, and to be judged not only in the terms of responsible use of our own power and the relation of that power to the general end of peace, but also in terms of the relation between what we do and the true interests of those with whom we come in contact. Each problem, in its own way, engages the three strands of our enduring responsibility. Each requires a decision to measure and to apply certain parts of the power of the United States in a situation of danger and difficulty. Each requires an awareness that the object of the exercise is peace because the object of our policy as a whole is peace. Each requires an awareness of the interests of others. So in Vietnam we have sought to have talks with the other side, thus far without response. And so in the Dominican Republic we have sought and achieved increasingly effective inter-American action under the leadership first of Secretary General Mora and now of the three-man peace-making committee. And both in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic, there is an awareness of a need to be judged in the end by how things turn out for the people there.

Moreover, there is intense and continuing action beyond the field of military power into economic, social, and political action. It is only natural, when there is shooting or a danger of shooting anywhere in the world, that the attention of intelligent men, and above all of alert and observant reporters, should focus upon the points of danger. But it is also true in Vietnam, as it is in the Dominican Republic, that a very large part of our activity, and a part too little noticed, has gone into the slower, more wearing, less dramatic work of preventing starvation or epidemic and of creating the building blocks of social, economic, and political progress. And this again, I suggest, is consistent with our twenty-five-year record.

"And to the winner we shall grant the king's esteem, the right to choose the tourney's queen, the name of champion, and a percentage of the gate."

What produces the kind of worry and questioning that Mr. MacLeish's remarks exemplify is, of course, the special circumstance that both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic have involved judgments about the threat of Communist domination over peoples whose conquest by Communism would not only be deeply against our interests but also against their own. We run a constant risk, it seems to me, of two alternate errors, and when we get into periods of debate and of a hardening of attitude on one side or another, these risks become accentuated. One is the risk of believing that because Communism poses hard and dangerous choices, it really is not there or isn't much of a danger or would go away if we would regard it more kindly. Conversely, there are a great many people in this country and in other countries who are so preoccupied with the Communist danger that they assess any given course of action on the single scale of the degree of its anti-Communism. And they are wrong. The great episodes in the last twenty-five years, the great achievements of which we are all proud, have rested upon the more mature assessment that there is a reality to the Communist danger and that it is important to deal with that reality, but that anti-Communism alone is almost never a sufficient guide to policy.

ONE of the things that struck me in my very short stay in the Dominican Republic was the tendency of observers there—not so much diplomatic and political observers as publicists and reporters—to choose sides and to come either to the conclusion that there really wasn't a problem of Communists or to the conclusion that the only solution was to find the strongest anti-Communist and put him in charge. Either of these courses of action would, I think, miss the reality not merely of the Dominican problem but of the problem of our relation to the Communists. One of the most important elements in the making of a decision today is the necessity to conduct ourselves in such a way as not to encourage those in the Communist world who believe that adventure pays off, and to give encouragement to those who believe that there are safer and more responsible courses for Communists than open or covert aggression.

There is a problem of maturity here, a problem of realism, a problem, if you will, of being hardheaded, but it is a problem that does not lead to a single black-and-white judgment. It is very plain that when there is misery and explosiveness in the streets and in the countryside, as there has been recently

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in the Dominican Republic, it is a most incomplete assessment to say that it all comes from Communist agitation. And it is a most incomplete assessment to say only that those people are not attracted by the extremists. They are attracted by hope, and one must consider the full list of what one believes to be their aspiration, as the President did in his speech at Baylor University on May 28. One must arrange one's thinking and conduct one's affairs so as not to give in to the temptation of simplistic analysis.

In that sense, I believe we have learned much over a quarter of a century. If we look back to the debates of 1945 and 1946 and 1947, we can remember that honorable men, men of high ideals, found it hard to believe that the Cold War was a reality created by the behavior of Stalinist Russia. And, on the other hand, those who saw that reality found it hard to believe how much more than a simple anti-Communism would be asked of the United States if it was to meet the responsibilities of its power and purpose. The problem, now as then, is to connect our perception of reality with the three enduring aspects of our conviction, commitment, and responsibility—our inescapable power, our persistent purpose of peace, and our acceptance of the obligation to conduct ourselves in ways that serve the interests of other men as well as ourselves. And whether the accents and actions of an Administration are those of Hyde Park, or of Independence, or of Abilene and the Army, or of Hyannis and Harvard—or the complex and wonderful set of actions and accents which I have the honor to serve today—they flow in a single stream.

So the answer I would give to my friend MacLeish is that we must expect to have differences about particular decisions and particular problems. But we can, I think, join in two propositions: first, that there is continuity and steadiness in the underlying policy of the United States; and, second, that perhaps we learn as we go along.

Movies

Continued from page 19

a quizzical dwarf, who manages to view his shipmates with both detachment and compassion. Glocken frames the film, inviting us aboard at the outset, and suggesting at the end that the foolish hopes and groundless allegiances of his fellow passengers might indeed be shared by all of us.

These characters—and others—Kramer keeps in motion with the skill and precision of a master juggler, forever revealing new facets, forever providing new insights. But as scene after scene bites itself into our sensibilities, the realization grows that Kramer is far more than a master juggler. Like all good film makers, he knows what *not* to show—such as a pet dog tossed overboard by prankish children, or a scene in which Mrs. Treadwell reveals to the ship's captain that Freytag has a Jewish wife; their full effectiveness, he has obviously grasped, lies not in themselves but in the reactions they produce in others. One of the picture's finest scenes, in fact, is that in which Freytag, as the result of Mrs. Treadwell's gossiping, is shunted off in the dining saloon to a small side table occupied by the Jew and the dwarf. Another is a beautifully wrought drinking scene involving the burly ball player and the dwarf. Kramer's timing in it is so perfect that one wonders if any other director would have dared it, much less brought it off.

But the final test for any director of a picture that deals so largely in human values is the over-all effectiveness of his



cast. One might expect, looking down the roster of international stars, that some performances might be outstanding. The fact is that all of them are, including relatively small roles by José Greco, Gita Golan, Lilia Skala, and Barbara Luna. But Vivien Leigh dancing in the ship's corridor to the remembered strains of a Charleston, Lee Marvin lamenting his inability to hit an outside curve ball, Michael Dunn's sophisticated dinner conversations with Heinz Ruehmann, and Oskar Werner's scenes with Signoret—these stick in the heart as well as the mind. They show us humanity with all its defenses down, when it is most vulnerable, most appealing, and most human. In this respect *Ship of Fools* is reminiscent of European pictures. Its accent is on people, not on plot. Its allegiance to the American screen is rather in the *number* of people—and stars—involved. Happily, in numbers there is strength.

—ARTHUR KNIGHT.

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New York Times
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r Peace: The Dream, the Reality

By CLINTON P. ANDERSON



IN July, 1946, approximately a year after the atomic explosions in New Mexico and Japan, Congress passed the first law dealing with nuclear energy—the McMahon Act. The awe and uncertainty created by the events of the previous summer were manifest in its provisions. But there was an obvious expectation, too, that man had a startling new force capable of shaping a better world. Said the McMahon Act:

> The effect of the use of atomic energy for civilian purposes upon the social, economic and political structures of today cannot now be determined. It is reasonable to anticipate, however, that tapping this new source of energy will cause profound changes in our present way of life.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki had revealed to the public the tremendous power capable of being unleashed by the splitting of uranium and plutonium atoms, and evoked a wave of popular stories that free electricity and nuclear-propelled automobiles would soon be realities. An academician at the University of Chicago was quoted as predicting the atomic age would bless all of us with a life as blissful and effortless as that enjoyed by South Sea natives.

Intending to make simple a complex subject, some knowledgeable men contributed to the man in the street's visions of a nuclear cornucopia. David E. Lilienthal, first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, on one occasion held up to a Detroit audience a softball-sized chunk of coal. "This lump of coal if you burn it," Lilienthal said, "would produce a negligible amount of energy." Then, displaying a small cylinder of uranium, the size of a spool of thread, he noted that the substance in fissioning would produce the energy equivalent of more than 2,500 tons of coal.

Lilienthal, an astute administrator, was enough of a realist to declare that "atomic power is not just around the corner; not just around two cor-

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CLINTON P. ANDERSON, Senator (Dem.) from New Mexico, has been a leading participant in atomic-energy affairs during his 16 years in office. He is a member (and former chairman) of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Science Committee.

POWER—Civilian nuclear power became a reality with the completion of this electric-generating plant at Shippingport, Pa., in 1957. By 1980, the atom is expected to provide 14 per cent of U.S. electricity.

ners." Although the massive effort of building the A-bomb endowed industry with a wide understanding of how to harness the atom, the task was formidable. There were no illusions of easy conquest in the minds of the experts.

But the scientists in the Manhattan Project laboratories were excited about the peaceful potentialities of atomic energy. Their reports expressed an eagerness to explore those possibilities as soon as attention could be spared from weapons. Some of them told me of their notebooks filled with ideas for civilian uses. Nuclear explosives, one study forecast, could be used to alter the course of ocean currents or dissipate the danger of hurricanes or volcanic eruptions. Within a quarter-century, large reactors would generate power in the Arctic and desert lands, according to another appraisal. The scientists foresaw atomic propulsion for ships. They also predicted that the unlimited amounts of heavy hydrogen in the world's waters would provide cheap, abundant sources of power through a process known as controlled thermonuclear fusion.

In many ways, though, the Manhattan Project scientists were too conservative. They did not foresee the multibillion-dollar space program and, thus, failed to perceive end uses for the atom to propel manned rockets and as a source of electric power for satellites. Nor did they grasp the full possibilities for medical and industrial applications of nuclear energy. The atom is at work today on all of those fronts.

CIVILIAN nuclear power was anticipated as a major realm for the peaceful atom. By far the largest expenditure of money in quest of nonmilitary uses of nuclear energy has been devoted to power reactors. But progress has come slowly.

The McMahon Act dictated a Government monopoly in atomic energy. Congress, holding that America's preeminence in nuclear weapons could be maintained best by a tight rein on information and materials, permitted no one but the Government to build and own reactors.

By 1954, it appeared obvious that the atom was not going to light up cities for generations, if then, unless the Government loosened its monop-



RESEARCH—Workers at the Atomic Energy Commission's Brookhaven refuel a reactor. Among its uses is the production of radioisotopes for

oly and provided inducements to industry. Congress that year—after some stiff fighting in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and on the Senate floor—accelerated the drive toward making nuclear power competitive with conventional fuels. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorized the Government to license civilian nuclear reactors. The act embodied the theory that the Government should lead in creating power-reactor technology and advancing the state of the art to the point at which economic merits would take hold and produce a nuclear power industry capable of standing on its own two feet.

As an added encouragement to industry, Representative Melvin Price (Democrat, Illinois) and I proposed a combination of Government indemnity and private insurance to cover damages to the public stemming from a possible reactor accident. The possibility of any such occurrence is, indeed, remote. But the Price-Anderson Law removed the dread of private firms that a reactor eruption in a built-up area would be financially devastating.

But though a variety of liberal Federal assistances was offered to attract private investment capital, the power utilities did not beat a path to the Atomic Energy Commission's door. Atomic power was not yet nearly competitive with other fuels, and the investment to make it so was prohibitively high. At least one round of costly prototype and experimental reactors would have to be built before the hoped-for lowering of costs could be achieved.

The nineteen-fifties were a rocky decade for atomic energy. That hardy perennial of domestic debate—private vs. public power—bloomed fully as advocates of each contested the role of the Government. The A.E.C. was damned by the utilities for doing too much; by the public-power champions for doing too little. Disillusionment afflicted many of the stanchest friends of nuclear power.

In 1956, feeling frustrated that the 1954 act was not sparking the desired activity in private industry, Senator Albert Gore (Democrat, Tennessee) and Representative Chet Holifield (Democrat, California) proposed a broadened role for the A.E.C. in the power-reactor program. The Senate, by a close vote, passed the bill. In the House, the private utilities and the coal interests made their weight felt. The House doomed the

bill by returning it to committee. Yet, looking back, I believe that the bill—although it never became law—marked a turning point. It signaled private industry that it had to get rolling on nuclear power or face an enlargement of the already prominent Federal role.

BY 1962, through a variety of approaches, the first generation of reactors had been constructed. The threshold of competitiveness had been reached.

Civilian nuclear reactors installed in the United States today are capable of generating one million kilowatts of power. Another three million kilowatts of capacity is under construction or firmly planned.

Over the past decade, the cost of generating a kilowatt-hour of electricity by splitting atoms has dropped from more than 50 mills to between 8 and 14 mills. Plants now going up or on the planning boards are estimated to slide the cost down to 4 to 7 mills, making them fully competitive in high-fuel-cost areas with large coal-burning stations. In New England, the Great Lakes region and California—if those industry estimates *(Continued on Page 13)*



ATOMS FOR SPACE—A prototype nuclear rocket engine, called Kiwi, is set up at the Nevada Test Site near Las Vegas. Heat from the reactor would vaporize liquid hydrogen, providing thrust.

Atoms for Peace

(Continued from Page 11)

prove valid — atomic power would be competitive with fossil fuels only a little more than a score of years after Alamogordo.

Tax dollars have been used to force-feed atomic development. I do not regret the part Congress, especially the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, has played in promoting peaceful nuclear power. (Parenthetically, I do not believe it was wise in all cases to provide reactors and nuclear know-how to underdeveloped nations in hope of gaining prestige and friendship. The result was to siphon off resources and technicians which those countries might have more profitably assigned to other aspects of their economies, and to complicate the problem of deterring the spread of atomic weapons.) Government investment in civilian atomic power development totals in the neighborhood of $1.5 billion. But that expenditure has meant a $1 billion saving in consumers' electricity bills, according to a recent estimate. Competition from atomic energy, in being or anticipated, has been a real factor in decreasing conventional fuel costs.

But the peaceful atomic energy program continues to meet local opposition based at least in part on fear. Plans for an atomic power plant at Bodega Bay, north of San Francisco, had to be shelved after the community vigorously contended that the site was unsafe because of possible earthquakes. Withdrawal of the proposed reactor was wise in the face of such hostility.

It is entirely possible that even the most economically alluring reactors will never be located in certain areas for just such reasons. But unending efforts to make civilian reactors increasingly safe should help overcome most objections. After all, the town where I lived as a young man, Mitchell, S. D., once banned automobiles from its streets. I believe the public will recognize the amazing degree of safety which has marked the peaceful role of the atom.

This spring I listened to Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover describe the reliability that was being designed into another reactor proposed for use on the California coast. He said that this reactor would withstand a repeat of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake or the battering shock of last year's Alaska upheaval and would be built to resist the fury of a 50-foot tidal wave, higher than any recorded in California. Those words from a man who has put dozens of reactors to work propelling naval ships under the most severe sea conditions give me confidence.

I HAVE dwelt at length on the application of atomic power to the production of electricity. But the atom has other valuable nonmilitary uses. About half of the

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Atomic Energy Commission's $2.5 billion budget for this fiscal year will be used outside the weapons program. In the six major A.E.C. laboratories and in industrial and university centers, pioneering research is under way across a broad spectrum of nuclear applications.

The atom in the form of radioisotopes is proving a helpmate in medicine. A radioisotope has the same chemical properties as a particular element, but it emits radiation which can be detected. Before the advent of the nuclear reactor, small quantities of radioisotopes were created in cyclotrons. With the successful development of reactors after World War II, it became possible to mass-produce them.

More than 2,000 hospitals and medical groups now use more than 30 different isotopes for diagnostic purposes, while a half-dozen are applied in treatment. A patient believed to have a thyroid disease, for example, can be given liquid iodine-131, a radioactive cousin of natural iodine. Iodine concentrates in the thyroid and can be traced with the aid of a scanning device. A diseased gland can be spotted if it fails to absorb iodine-131, or if it takes up an excessive amount. Some half-million of these "atomic cocktails" are served each year to trace and control thyroid functions.

The radioactive isotopes of cobalt and cesium are used to attack deep-seated cancers. Neurosurgeons use radioisotopes to pinpoint brain tumors, and ophthalmologists employ them for localizing and treating growths in the eye.

Radioactive substances will be increasingly employed by researchers hunting more precise knowledge of disturbances in the metabolism of fats, sugars and proteins. Out of this probing could come valuable advances in the control of hardening of the arteries, hypertension and perhaps even neuropsychiatric disorders.

In industry, density gauges based on radioisotopes are used widely to measure and regulate the amount of material going into a great many consumer products — such as fat in baby food, meat in soups or tobacco in cigarettes. There are no harmful effects from this process.

Automotive and petroleum engineers use radioisotopes to study various engine designs and materials and the efficiency of oils and additives. Because they then do not have to tear down an engine to examine its parts after a test run, researchers can learn facts about engine construction and wear in hours instead of days or weeks.

New consumer products such as stronger woods and plastics are being produced by irradiation from radioisotopes.

Radioisotopes give off heat which can readily be converted into a steady and long-lasting supply of electric current with a device called a thermocouple. A navigational buoy in Baltimore Harbor is operated by just such an arrangement. This radioisotope device, which replaces a chemical battery that needed constant attention, is expected to run for years without service or replacement. And the first lighthouse operated by a radiation-powered isotopic generator, designed to serve for 10 years without attention, is on duty in Chesapeake Bay.

As space probes by men and instruments stretch beyond a few days, more reliable and productive sources of power will be needed. In 1961, the United States launched a navigational satellite with a radio transmitter powered by a small amount of plutonium-238. As the radioactive material decays, it produces heat which is converted into electricity to power the satellite's radio transmitter. The 4.7-pound nuclear device does the job of five tons a year of conventional batteries. The satellite—Transit IVA—

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

ATOMS FOR DIGGING—Underground nuclear explosions, as depicted here, could excavate a new sea-level Central-American canal at less cost than conventional methods.

(Continued from Page 14)

launched four years ago, is still transmitting today.

In April, the Atomic Energy Commission put the first nuclear reactor into orbit. For 43 days it powered the extensive instrumentation in the spacecraft that carried it. A few hundred watts of power suffice for present craft; before long, however, more sophisticated spaceships will require ten times and more that much energy. Nuclear systems to fill the need are under development.

Even considering refrigeration, methods of preserving food had changed little since canning was invented in 1810 until irradiation came on the scene a few years ago. Exposure to radioactive sources sterilizes food, inhibits the sprouting of vegetables like potatoes and rids grain of insects. There are no harmful effects from irradiated foods. I have eaten them, and they have been served in Army mess halls.

Pasteurization by radiation can extend the life of fish and fruits three to four times their normal refrigerated storage period. American fisheries, for instance, will be able to sell in markets they cannot reach using present preservation methods. Consumers will ultimately benefit at the check-out counter from reductions in spoilage. For example, 25 per cent of California's strawberry crop spoils before it reaches the housewife; use of irradiation has demonstrated that it can reduce that waste by 75 per cent.

Irradiation is being used on a widening scale to reduce harmful insect populations by sterilization of male insects. Guam, for example, has been freed from infestations of the oriental fruit fly. And the cattle-plaguing screwworm has been brought under control in the Southwest by irradiation of the male flies. Such tech-

(Continued on Page 20)

"It seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form'd Matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other Properties, and in such Proportion, as most conduced to the End for which He form'd them; and that these primitive Particles being Solids, are incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded of them; even so very hard as never to wear or break in Pieces, no ordinary Power being able to divide what God Himself made one in the first Creation."

—Sir Isaac Newton.



ATOMS FOR WATER—Artist's concept of a nuclear-powered desalination plant. Heat from the reactor would distill sea water and also run electric generators. Such a plant is to be built on Long Island.

(Continued from Page 16)

niques will reduce the necessity to use pesticides.

While many of the dreams of 20 years ago have become reality, some of the expectations have not panned out. Thus the use of atomic blasts to alter the course of ocean currents or divert hurricanes remains no more than an interesting theory. The Navy has 51 nuclear submarines and three surface ships in commission, but technical and labor difficulties have caused rough sailing for the first atomic merchant ship, N.S. Savannah.

WHAT lies ahead for the peaceful atom?

In 1963 the Government estimated that the atom would be yielding 40,000 megawatts of electricity by 1980. Only a year later the Federal Power Commission was anticipating that capacity would be closer to 70,000 megawatts. This means that about 14 per cent of the electricity consumed 15 years from now will come from reactors. And most of that output, we anticipate, will be privately financed. This does not mean that the atom will supplant conventional fuels; rather, as demand for power grows, fission energy will supplement them.

Air pollution remains a source of national concern. Radioactive wastes from power reactors can be securely disposed of by burying them in containers underground. Atomic power reactors do not emit hydrocarbons, sulphur or other chemical pollutants into the atmosphere, as do conventional generating stations.

For months the banks of the St. Croix River on the Wisconsin-Minnesota border have echoed to the sounds of battle between those who want the economic advantages of a large coal-burning electric plant and those who fear the blighting of one of our loveliest spring-fed rivers. An atomic reactor offers a possible answer. It would avoid ugly slag heaps, high smokestacks and barge traffic. It would not pollute the atmosphere or the water. Atoms-for-conservation makes sense in many situations.

ATOMIC energy in the near future may prove a blessing in areas of the United States plagued by water shortages. The resident of Southern California must feel like the Ancient Mariner when his water supply is restricted, while the Pacific at his doorstep offers "nor any drop to drink." That may be changed when large atomic reactors are wedded to desalination plants. A major reason for the relatively high cost of converting salt water to fresh is the expense of heating. By applying the heat from very large atomic reactors to desalination and selling the reactors' electricity, the price of potable ocean water will be cut sharply.

"The Italian navigator has landed; the natives are friendly."—Code message of Dec. 2, 1942, announcing to scientists that the first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction had been achieved by Enrico Fermi and a group of researchers.

The potentialities of the atom reach farther. Only a small band of the seas around us is familiar; the black depths are full of mystery. Manned undersea research craft are limited by short endurance of propulsion and auxiliary power. They behave like elevators, with little lateral movement.

Man's exploration and exploitation of the ocean's resources will be advanced tremendously when the first nuclear-powered, deep-diving research submarine, already announced, is perfected. The vessel will be able to operate over an ocean floor several times the area of the United States. Below the sea, nuclear reactors one day may provide stationary power for mining.

Another area which holds considerable promise is that of peaceful nuclear explosives. Studies show that, at comparatively lower cost than called for by conventional excavation, large masses of earth can be moved by controlled nuclear detonations. Appropriately, this eight-year-old development effort is called "Project Plowshare."

At the request of President Johnson, a committee is exploring the possible route of an alternative for the present Panama Canal. The Panama Canal today cannot accommodate some of our large warships and the world's large tankers. The inadequacy will grow as larger merchant ships are commissioned. Plowshare will have a marked influence on the counsel the committee gives the President.

Similarly, the Australians have studied the possibility of digging a canal with atomic explosives to create a vast inland lake. They speculate that such an expanse of water in the arid heart of the continent might alter the desert climate. Deep underground nuclear explosions also could be used, Plowshare experts believe, to tap trillions of cubic feet of natural gas now locked in New Mexico's San Juan Basin and Rocky Mountain fields.

For the next several years

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"No one ever directly experienced an atom, and its existence is entirely inferential. The atom was invented to explain constant combining weights in chemistry. For a long time there was no other experimental evidence of its existence, and it remained a pure invention, without physical reality, useful in discussing a certain group of phenomena. It is one of the most fascinating things in physics to trace the accumulation of independent new physical information all pointing to the atom, until now we are as convinced of its physical reality as of our hands and feet."

—*P. W. Bridgman, physicist.*

(Continued From Page 20)

the moon will occupy the center of the space age. Beyond the moon, however, lie ambitious ventures to the planets and long stays in orbit. These expeditions will require propulsion systems far more efficient than the chemical ones now in being. Nuclear propulsion vehicles are the answer. Atomic systems offer two or three times the efficiency of their chemical counterparts. They can attain the high velocity and lift the heavy loads necessary for missions in the next decade. Chemical rockets would boost the atomic craft out of the atmosphere before the reactor starts, thus avoiding radioactive contamination of the earth.

IN 1937 a report entitled "Technological Trends and National Policy" was prepared for the National Resources Committee. It was a very sophisticated attempt to look ahead at "the kinds of new inventions which may affect living and working conditions in America in the next 10 to 25 years."

The report contained no hint that atomic energy might some day be used for power or for anything else. Yet, the first sustained nuclear chain reaction was achieved only five years later, in 1942. The report did not predict antibiotics, although the basic scientific discovery had already been made. The report did not predict radar, either—destined within five years to help turn the tide in the air battle over Britain.

Mindful of that intellectual nearsightedness of men experienced in science, I hesitate to look into a crystal ball to forecast the path of developments in atomic energy. It is quite evident, however, from what has taken place in the last 20 years, that exciting new accomplishments lie ahead.

THE STANLEY FOUNDATION
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A STRATEGY FOR PEACE TO PLAN CONFERENCE

REPORT

SIXTH CONFERENCE
AIRLIE HOUSE
Warrenton, Virginia
May 20-23, 1965

Conference to Plan A Strategy for Peace

SIXTH CONFERENCE
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PREFACE

"The thinking citizens of our country have an inescapable responsibility for helping our government to arrive at policies and plans which may well affect the future of all human beings."

With this conviction, Tom Slick formed the Strategy for Peace Conference in 1960 to provide an opportunity for leaders in business, government, the professions, and organizations to study and interchange views on short- and long-range aspects of comprehensive planning for a Strategy for Peace.

Six Strategy for Peace Conferences have been held, each involving more than a hundred leaders in business, government, and the professions. The five preceding conferences have dealt with a broad range of topics. The sixth conference, the subject of this report, focused attention on "A Ten-Year Look Ahead at a Strategy for Peace". Within this perspective, five discussion groups have considered Europe, Disarmament and Arms Control, the United Nations, the Far East, and the Impact of Science and Technology. We trust the reports of these discussion groups oriented to the specific date of 1975 will prove of value in thinking and planning for a strategy for peace.

The Strategy for Peace Conference is a nonprofit, non-political project and is not a membership organization. Since Tom Slick's tragic death in 1962, the Strategy for Peace Conference has been sponsored by the Stanley Foundation under the chairmanship of C. Maxwell Stanley, assisted by an Advisory Committee. The Conference is financed by The Stanley Foundation with the assistance of conference participants and others interested in study and research in this field.* With continued support of contributors and participants, we are looking forward to other conferences to plan a strategy for peace.

C. Maxwell Stanley
Chairman

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* Contributions to the Strategy for Peace Conference can be made to The Stanley Foundation, Stanley Building, Muscatine, Iowa 52761; a tax-exempt educational organization. Contributions are deductible for income tax purposes.

SCHEDULE

A CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, May 20, 1965

8:00 P. M. PLENARY SESSION

Chairman: C. Maxwell Stanley
Chairman, Strategy for Peace Conference
President, Stanley Engineering Company

Speakers: Hon. Marshall Green, Ambassador to Indonesia.

Outlook in East Asia

Garry L. Quinn, Arms Control Directorate for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.

Some National Security Problems in the Next Ten Years

Roger Fisher, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

Bridging the Gap

FRIDAY, May 21, 1965

9:00 A. M. DISCUSSION GROUPS
2:00 P. M. DISCUSSION GROUPS
8:00 P. M. PLENARY SESSION

Progress Reports by the Chairmen of the Discussion Groups.

Speaker: Amrom H. Katz, Senior Staff, The Rand Corporation.

The Vietnam Situation

SATURDAY, May 22, 1965

9:00 A. M. DISCUSSION GROUPS
2:00 P. M. DISCUSSION GROUPS

SUNDAY, May 23, 1965

9:00 A. M. FINAL PLENARY SESSION
2:00 P. M. ADJOURNMENT

TO PLAN A STRATEGY FOR PEACE

A TEN-YEAR LOOK AHEAD AT A STRATEGY FOR PEACE

DISCUSSION GROUPS

Chairmen and Rapporteurs

I. EUROPE

Chairman: Walter Goldstein, Asst. Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College
Rapporteur: Anthony J. Wiener, Asst. to the Director, The Hudson Institute

II. DISARMAMENT and ARMS CONTROL

Chairman: Dr. Donald G. Brennan, Director, The Hudson Institute
Rapporteur: Thomas C. O'Sullivan, Manager, Advance Systems Requirements, Space and Inf. Systems Division, Raytheon Company

III. THE UNITED NATIONS

Chairman: Dr. Arthur N. Holcombe, Honorary Chairman, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
Rapporteur: Larry L. Fabian, Research Asst., The Brookings Institution

IV. THE FAR EAST

Chairman: Kenneth T. Young, Jr., President, ASIA Society Former U. S. Ambassador to Thailand
Rapporteur: Col. Edward P. Foote, USAF (Ret.); Air Force Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations Inc.

V. IMPACT of SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

Chairman: Dr. Norman C. Peterson, Director, Commercial Development Program, Hughes Aircraft Company.
Rapporteur: William Leavitt, Associate Editor, Air Force/Space Digest

OPENING REMARKS

by C. MAXWELL STANLEY

Welcome to the sixth Strategy for Peace Conference.

Many of you are here for the first time, but others are back for second, third, or even more numerous repeat performances.

I should tell you what the Strategy for Peace Conference seeks to accomplish. Ten years ago Tom Slick and a group of us were in Paris for a Congress of the World Association of World Federalists. Tom expressed the idea that to get on with long-range planning for peace we needed to bring together people of more diverse disciplines and backgrounds. We agreed to put together such a program, and the forerunner to these conferences was held in 1956 at Gould House.

There followed several years during which Tom sought broader support, both financial and participating, and promoted the idea of a White House Conference to be called by President Eisenhower.

With an endorsement from President Eisenhower, the first Strategy for Peace Conference was held in June, 1960, at Arden House. Since then, we have had four other conferences, roughly one a year, which brings us to the sixth.

In these conferences, we have used a unique approach, which has succeeded. We have provided a minimum of structure and documentation, thus encouraging open and free-wheeling study and discussion among the participants. We have sought participants who are reasonably cognizant of the pertinent factors of the problems discussed and who are thus able to deal intelligently with the topics considered.

At the first conference we had four discussion groups all considering the same topic. As one person expressed it, we spent two and a half days in a rather stand-offish stance. The "peace-mongers" were suspicious of the "war-mongers" and vice versa. We finally realized that we were all present for the same purpose: to study the path by which peace and security could be achieved. We adopted definite recommendations for extensive study and research on the problems of peace. We like to think we had some influence in the creation of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and in accelerating study and research directed toward a strategy for peace.

At the January 1961 conference, two discussion groups considered arms control, two studied short-range components of a strategy for peace, and two studied long-range components. The conference as a whole adopted no recommendations.

In October of 1961 we met here at Airlie House for the first time. As a matter of interest, we christened Airlie as a major conference center. All four discussion groups dealt with the same topic. The working document was "FREEDOM FROM WAR, the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World". This document had been published by the State Department just prior to our meeting and had been presented to the United Nations General Assembly in an address by President Kennedy. Starting with this document, we studied how it should be altered, particularly in its longer range aspects to serve as a strategy for peace. After three days we adopted recommendations with a surprising consensus. Only three participants supported a minority report which took no exception to the end objectives, but urged emphasis on immediate problems rather than long-range ones.

The January, 1963, conference was a Memorial to Tom Slick, whose death in an airplane accident the preceding October had saddened us all. During this fourth conference we operated with five discussion groups: the Nth Country Problem, Nuclear Sharing - NATO, Outer Space, The Role of the United Nations in an Armed and in a Disarmed World, and Independent U. S. Initiatives.

In February, 1964, we held our fifth conference, with six discussion groups: one each on Asia, Europe, Arms Control and Disarmament, Economic Aspects of a Strategy for Peace, the United Nations and Peacekeeping, and Space - National and International Policies.

The philosophy of those who have continued the Strategy for Peace Conference is that there is inadequate long-range study and planning to guide our foreign policy in our quest for peace. High aspirations for a world of peace, law, order and justice have been expressed by Presidents and others, but much greater attention needs to be directed to the long-range strategy of achieving such aspirations. Man faces the most difficult task he has ever encountered. Secure peace requires a change of patterns of national thinking and action which have been accepted for centuries. A complicating factor is our habit of dealing only with short-range objectives. We like to set up a target and achieve it quickly. But the achievement of a secure peace with freedom is a long and difficult task.

Over the years our conferences have reached a considerable consensus as to the major elements of a suitable strategy for peace, which I will re-state:

1. We must maintain adequate military strength providing us the maximum security which can be obtained with armaments and providing us with time to seek alternative security.

2. We must strengthen our domestic economy.

3. We must assist the developing nations toward a position of independence, economic strength and freedom oriented toward democratic processes.

4. We must achieve acceptable arms control and enforceable disarmament.

5. We must strengthen the United Nations so that it can provide a rule of law in the world.

6. We must seek political accommodation and settlement of some of the crucial outstanding international issues.

7. We must educate the United States public on the difficult and long-range aspects of achieving peace.

In this conference our study and interchange of views will take a somewhat different approach than in others. We have set the theme as "A Ten-Year Look Ahead at a Strategy for Peace".

At the last conference someone said we are like a group of people standing on one side of the Grand Canyon, all desiring to reach the other side. Some see only the first difficult steps on the path leading down into the canyon. Some have only the rosy view of the other side beyond the difficult crossing. There is soundness in this observation. Many of our participants are concerned primarily with immediate problems. These like to call themselves the "realists". Others insist on emphasizing longer range goals. Called "Utopians" by the realists, they insist they are the realists, claiming that without long-range plans for a peace structure we cannot set our direction even for the first steps.

In this sixth Strategy for Peace Conference we will focus on a ten-year look. This may require those "realists" concerned with short-term steps to look further ahead and view the larger plan. It may also compel those "realists" concerned with long-range objectives to face an important intermediate stage through which we must pass to reach our goal. By focusing on a ten-year period we seek to avoid both the stumbling blocks of immediacy and of utopian concepts.

With your cooperation, I trust such a ten-year look will aid in our study of a strategy for peace compatible with our national aspirations.

DISCUSSION GROUP I - EUROPE

Chairman: PROF. WALTER GOLDSTEIN
Rapporteur: ANTHONY J. WIENER

What will be the political and military shape of Europe ten years from now? Our crystal ball did not show us a steady picture. Instead, we saw a kaleidoscope, in which elements continually shifted position and took on new forms and coloration in each new context. Certain items, such as the presence or absence of German reunification, the cohesion of the alliance systems, the increase of economic integration, and the stability of the U. S. - Soviet détente, remained crucial variables for almost every alternative future in Europe. These four factors seemed nearly "independent" variables; yet even these, on examination, carried little meaning unless placed in more detailed, hypothetical contexts.

Obviously the present situation is in flux. Great changes are already under way, but even these cannot be safely extrapolated, since their limits are uncertain, and successful and unsuccessful responses and reactions may be expected. The major conclusion for U. S. policy, it was agreed, is the need to maintain flexibility and wariness toward untimely commitment. This implies neither withdrawal nor isolationism, but a sparing and selective use of U. S. bargaining power.

In spite of the extreme uncertainty of prediction and the difficulty of prescribing policies for the European future, the group was not pessimistic. On the contrary, prospects for peace in Europe seemed, on balance, to be improving, even though important problems remained perplexing, dangerous, and perhaps insoluble.

The discussion centered about eight areas of concern in Europe during the next ten years:

(1) Conventional Defense

Force levels, especially of conventional capability, seemed likely to remain "adequate" relative to the threat, at least in the short run. Furthermore, it was felt that changes at this point might generate unwelcome consequences or close options that should remain open. By the middle term (roughly 1969), however, the infrastructure and the conventional strength of NATO would have to be modernized in order to preserve the organization. Ways can and should be found for doing this without entailing excessive costs or impairing the East-West détente. In the long run, neither the conventional war-fighting nor the strategic deterrent potential of the alliance seems likely to become inadequate, since the Soviets seem likely to

continue to avoid incurring inordinate risks. However, new procurement policies should allow room for new types of political and military organization to be established, since changes probably will be required. Specifically, a military basis should be laid for the possibility of an eventual European defense organization, independent of defense arrangements in which the U. S. participates, which would include its own joint deterrent force. Deployment, procurement, and planning should begin now to take this possibility into account so that if the required political agreements are reached, the organization will be militarily feasible without unnecessary delay.

(2) A European Deterrent

Developments seem to favor the establishment of an independent European deterrent, to be jointly owned and collectively controlled by the leading powers of Western Europe. The conditions of its establishment include the merging of the British and French nuclear strike forces into the new deterrent, the relinquishment of separate national forces, the agreement among European powers not to indulge in national nuclear proliferation, and the stability of political and economic institutions of integration. The U. S. could encourage the building of this joint force by transferring nuclear resources and technology to Europe. (Under de Gaulle, French attitudes toward U. S. offers requiring renunciation of purely national forces would probably be so negative that U. S. initiatives would be counterproductive, but this situation seems likely to improve within the decade.) U. S. cooperation would be especially appropriate with regard to kinds of technology that would make the force more invulnerable, safer from accidents and unauthorized firing, and under more effective command and and control. Consultations towards this arrangement should be private. To the extent that there is any open U. S. support for this proposal, care should be taken to emphasize that we are no longer discussing an MLF. The panel concluded that the MLF failed as a proposal intended to resolve issues before the alliance.

(3) The Role of France

France seems likely to cause increasing difficulties, but does not seem likely to leave NATO completely, if only because the threat to quit is itself a source of considerable diplomatic bargaining power, which would be lost if the threat were carried out. Should France continue to be obstructive in NATO, a shift of some of the support and control installations of NATO to other countries, and particularly to Germany, would be helpful, since it would serve to reduce the power of de Gaulle's threat to leave NATO. This shift should not be carried out

abruptly or offensively, since it is much more important in the long run to consolidate the alliance than to isolate France.

(4) Arms Control in Europe

It was agreed that the probability of a central war's erupting is now relatively low. However, Soviet doctrine derogates the possibility of keeping a war limited, especially in Europe. The Soviets have shown little enthusiasm for any nontrivial arms control agreements in which the West is interested, often contending that such agreements would serve to maintain Western strategic superiority. A majority believed that the Soviets would be likely to enter into meaningful arms control agreements in Europe only if the German problem threatened to get out of hand, or perhaps if the Soviets suffered in a confrontation with the U. S. outside Europe. Nevertheless, it was agreed that European initiatives towards the framing of arms control measures, and especially of those measures that would inhibit escalation, could in any case be strengthened were NATO and/or an appropriate European defense community to establish its own arms control and disarmament agency.

(5) European Settlements

It was concluded that agreements for disengagement and a thinning out of troops were neither likely nor urgently needed, but were most plausible if France had moved out of the alliance or if the U. S. had greatly decreased the strength of its commitment. No large-scale agreement on the part of either the Soviets or West Germany was expected unless some progress had been made in dealing with the German problem. No definite prediction could be made as to the timing and extent of this agreement, nor could it be anticipated whether the Soviets would participate in it without insisting on a recognition of the DDR.

(6) Germany

The status quo that has lasted for twenty years in Germany cannot be depended upon to survive for another ten years. While Germany cannot be "locked up" as a nonnuclear but extremely powerful nation for an indefinite period, the resolution of the German problem need not destroy the East-West détente.

(6a) German Nuclear Ambitions

Most of the panel believed that any West German government would have sufficient reason to decide against acquiring nu-

clear weapons within the next decade (though it was suggested that they might well start a program that would fall short of testing a device, but that would reduce the lead time required to a negligible period). First, the lead time between the beginning and the materialization of a serious nuclear weapons system would be sufficient for the protection afforded by Germany's neighbors and allies to be put into question. German leaders are aware that among the serious consequences of the comparative ostracism that would follow would be the reduction of the moderating influences of NATO, WEU, and perhaps even EEC, on German internal politics, as well as probable economic and diplomatic losses. Secondly, the building of a nuclear program would foreclose several possibilities for reunification. Thirdly, the nuclear armament of Germany might tend toward a "Balkanization" of the European alliance system and a world of many nuclear powers, which would be dangerous for the security of Germany, as well as the security of the rest of Europe, the U. S., and the U.S.S.R. The only overriding reason for the Germans to buy a nuclear system would be some severe new threat, such as might stem from a withdrawal of the U. S. commitment or from an effective proliferation of nuclear strike forces in other European countries, in combination with a renewed high level of international tension. This combination did not seem a dominant prospect for the next decade.

(6b) German Reunification

It was agreed that, despite the continuing commitment of the U. S. to German reunification, the U. S. and all the other powers concerned (even to a great extent West Germany itself) have other, more important interests that seem likely to take precedence over German reunification under most realistically foreseeable circumstances. The German government itself needs, for various reasons, to maintain a high level of popular aspiration towards reunification, but there are not many diplomatic concessions that it could offer the Soviets in order to achieve this purpose. It was suggested that the Soviets seemed likely to agree to some form of German confederation, rather than full-scale reunification, if it could be accomplished within a United European framework from which the U. S. had withdrawn. A minority urged that the Soviets would consider reunification in order to resolve an otherwise desperate political crisis in the DDR, if the Germans would permanently renounce nuclear weapons.

(6c) A German Settlement

Since the timing of progress towards reunification cannot now be anticipated, the Western powers should consult privately as

to the conditions necessary for a comprehensive peace treaty, which would include a settlement of the German problem, with appropriate guarantees of independence, unification, and security for the Germans. Such a settlement would be far more comprehensive than the proposed nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers. To facilitate movement towards this goal, trade with the DDR should be extended and the Federal Republic should be asked privately to consider what reasonable concessions, if any, it might be able to obtain in return for renouncing its claims to the former German territories now under Polish and Russian administration.

(7) Economic Integration and the Growth of Political Community

It was agreed that economic integration would probably continue to make good progress in Western Europe, and it was hoped that closer economic relationships could be worked out between the Common Market on the one side and the U. S. and the Outer Seven on the other. The admission of Britain into the Common Market poses a serious dilemma for the development of European political institutions. While the movement towards supranational cooperation in Western Europe has gained great momentum, the same cannot be said of Eastern Europe, where there is considerable lack of regional cohesion. Not only have relations among many of the countries of Eastern Europe been continually disrupted by territorial disputes, traditional ethnic enmities, and economic conflicts, but there is also a powerful attraction exercized over the area by the economic and cultural pulls of Western Europe. The Soviet Union cannot prevent the further erosion of its dominance over Eastern Europe. The panel viewed the possibilities of extreme "Balkanization" or breakdown of political controls in Eastern Europe with mixed feelings, since an eruption in the area might involve either the Soviet Union or the U. S., or conceivably both; if an unstable and turbulent Eastern Europe were also confronted with an aggressive and risk-taking West Germany, there would be great opportunities for pressuring the Soviets into a favorable settlement, but the dangers -- for all the countries concerned -- would make the situation quite unattractive.

(8) U. S. Policies and Style

After considerable dispute, the panel concluded that diplomatic initiatives and confidence-building moves should in the future come more from European than American sources. If the U. S. were to assert too vigorous a leadership over European problems, it might unnecessarily foreclose options that the Europeans -- or even the Americans -- would have preferred to keep open. On the other hand, all were agreed that the U. S.

cannot afford to maintain a posture of indifference or passivity towards the outcome of issues affecting the prospects for peace in Europe; the U. S. has no real alternative to continuing to consult with European powers and continuing to try to persuade its allies to adopt policies that seem desirable in the U. S. view of the best interests of the alliance as a whole. However, if such attempts at persuasion are not to fail, a change in role and style is now required. In the earliest years of the alliance the relative economic and military strength of the U. S. was such that it was called upon to exert unilateral and aggressive leadership over Europe, in the interests of all, and was welcomed in this role. Europe has now revived, and its willingness to remain dependent is greatly reduced. Over the next decade the influence of the U. S. must be used with much greater restraint and selectivity, since European politics are likely to become increasingly complex, fluid, and elusive, and increasingly resistant to U. S. domination.

DISCUSSION GROUP II - DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

Chairman: DR. DONALD G. BRENNAN
Rapporteur: THOMAS C. O'SULLIVAN

Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

I

The group began by considering at length how various motivations could operate in various particular countries to influence their perceived desires for nuclear weapons. Countries considered were India, Pakistan, Germany, Israel and the Arab States, and Indonesia. The possible motivations analyzed for these countries were:

a. defense against aggression or undue influence;
b. prestige;
c. ability to influence negotiations or policy;
d. independent or assertive foreign policy;
e. support aggressive foreign policy;
f. acquire nuclear technology.

It was noted that some of these factors could operate in opposing directions. For example, some loss of prestige of a certain kind would attach to India if that country initiated a weapon program. Other motivations clearly operate with differing force in different countries.

II

The group members did not have identical views about the nature and degree of importance of the problem. Some felt that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries was inevitable, and the first priority problem was to learn how best to live with this process, while others felt that there was some hope the process could be retarded for a long or indefinite time and that it was worth substantial effort to limit the size of the "club" as much as possible. All agreed that delay was important.

The magnitude and nature of the risks incurred from proliferation would vary with the particular cases involved. Some of the problems identified were regional arms races that could absorb scarce resources in countries such as India and Pakistan, the possibility of miscalculation and/or escalation of local conflicts, and the possibility of strengthening undesirable trends in the evolution of world order (such as a heightened sense of nationalism). Some participants stressed the intensification of these risks that would likely ensue if the spread of nuclear weapons ultimately went as far as latter-day Castros or Lumumbas, or even less responsible governments or revolutionary groups. Since these risks bear even more directly on secondary powers than on the superpowers, the secondary powers should take (and some have taken) the initiative in pressing for measures to retard proliferation. However, if the smaller states continue to exhibit such statesmanship, the great powers should also find it in their interest to make substantial efforts to help retard the spread.

It was felt that, for the long term, the proliferation problem depends critically on the general international climate and sense of international security. In part for this reason, it is important to evaluate all pertinent foreign and military policies for their possible impact on proliferation. But it is also important for the near term to consider specific measures aimed at retarding proliferation. The group examined five:

(1) Nonproliferation Agreements

A general nonproliferation agreement (i.e., a treaty obligating the nuclear states not to give, and the nonnuclear states not to accept, nuclear weapons) was thought useful for its possible contribution to the tone of the international climate, its expression of the general sense of international desires (assuming a large amount of consensus could in fact be reached), and for the possibility of adverse political consequences attendant on its violation by any given country. In this sense, it was felt that such an agreement might be a useful adjunct to the limited test ban treaty or a more comprehensive test ban treaty, if one should be concluded. Some sentiment was expressed that an investigation of possible sanctions to be included in such a

treaty could prove useful, and some participants felt that such a treaty might have a positive value even without Soviet participation, or without the participation of one or more other nuclear powers.

(2) Nuclear Sharing Arrangements

Sharing arrangements such as the MLF were generally viewed with skepticism. There was doubt as to whether an MLF could sublimate desires to acquire an independent force and some feeling that it might stimulate interest where none had previously existed. A possible Asian version intended to head off nuclear ambitions in Japan (among others) was thought to be particularly unwise. The group did not consider a purely European nuclear force (using French and British nuclear contributions) of the type examined in Discussion Group I.

(3) Nuclear Power Controls

If the independent acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states is to be most reliably precluded, controls on the production and handling of fissile material would be desirable. An international inspection and control system should pay particular attention to plutonium separation plants and possible uranium enrichment facilities. The problem would be greatly simplified by confining the processing to international or regional facilities where possible. In certain instances, this might also have economic advantages.

(4) No First Use

There was discussion of the utility and effect of a "No First Use" proclamation by the U. S. (i.e., a statement that the U. S. would not *initiate* the use of nuclear weapons) even in defense against nonnuclear aggression. Such a proclamation might effectively serve to play down U. S. dependence on nuclear strategy for a group of nations receptive to and possibly awaiting such assurance. However, for another category of nations (in which Germany figures predominantly) such an announcement might well be taken as weakening strong existing U. S. defense commitments. France might use the U. S. proclamation as a final vindication for her independent nuclear path.

(5) Guarantees

Some concern was expressed that unilateral U. S. guarantees of nonnuclear states against nuclear attack may raise problems for U. S. policy that are out of proportion to the achievable benefits. At the same time it is important that nonnuclear nations feel and be secure against the threat of

nuclear attack. To this end, if arrangements beyond those already existing seem desirable to the nonnuclear states, their most promising form might be one that saw all the present nuclear powers together making such a guarantee, possibly by separate parallel statements within the context of existing international institutions.

III

A subcommittee formed to consider certain aspects of the problem reported its strong concern with China as a continuing problem. The influence of a country on the proliferation problem does not necessarily remain fixed after its first test, but depends on its developing attitudes and actions concerning nuclear weapons. The subcommittee report included two specific recommendations:

1. An objective international group should be established to study the problems of arms control and disarmament, to propose specific actions, to conduct tests of inspection systems, and so on. The conception was of an international analogue of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

2. When and if possible, we should begin extended dialogues with the Chinese, as a series of conferences, out of the public eye, and sponsored by a country not thought to be dominated by the U. S. or the U.S.S.R.

IV

An attempt to assess the relative priorities that the group would assign to different objectives in connection with proliferation was unsuccessful. For example, it was clear the group was willing to sacrifice an MLF to the objective of retarding proliferation, but this had no significance in view of the low esteem attached to the MLF by the group. Some members stressed the view that one should not pay more for nonproliferation than it is worth, while others felt that there were few other specific national policy objectives of equal importance.

DISCUSSION GROUP III - THE UNITED NATIONS

Chairman: DR. ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
Rapporteur: LARRY L. FABIAN

By the end of the next decade, no radical change can be expected in the extent to which the international community will need the United Nations as a keeper of the peace, as an instrumentality for narrowing the gap between the economically advanced North and the less devel-

oped South, and as a catalyst for scientific and technical cooperation. We are of course disappointed and concerned over the impasse that deadlocked the 19th General Assembly, but we are not dismayed. The constitutional and financial "crisis" does not portend the imminent demise of the organization; rather, it compels us to reevaluate, as dispassionately as possible, the adequacy of U. N. machinery, authority, and resources, particularly in the light of demands likely to be made upon them during the next ten years.

To facilitate our appraisal, we make three assumptions:

1. By 1975, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council will have been enlarged in accordance with the Charter amendments now pending, but the formal relations between major powers and other members of these organs will have remained essentially unchanged. We do not preclude, however, a restructuring of these relations as a result of institutional alterations less formal than outright amendment.

2. There will have been no "great power" hot war that would destroy the international system as we know it.

3. There will have been some proliferation of nuclear weapons that could alter the structure and dynamics of "middle powers" politics without, however, ending the material dominance of the two major powers. Conceivably, this could generate pressures within the United Nations for changes reflecting the new distribution of influence and for measures to circumscribe its potentially adverse effects. New forms of organization (for example, in peaceful settlement procedures and peacekeeping) might be devised to give greater representation and authority to these middle powers; intensified efforts might be made to state with greater precision the permissible and impermissible uses of such weapons; and additional types of executive activity (one member of our group suggested the preemptive purchase of uranium materials) might be spurred by a desire to control further proliferation.

Although virtually every topic on the agenda of this Conference bears directly on the future of the United Nations, none is so obviously crucial as the character of U. S. - Soviet relations. It is at least possible, and perhaps probable, that their mutual recognition of common interests (which has already led to cooperation in certain functional activities) will develop into a rapprochement that can roughly be described as somewhat more intimate than peaceful coexistence, but less intimate than today's relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.

A rapprochement probably would operate both outside and within the United Nations. On matters of their more or less exclusive concern,

the two major powers may seek to reach agreements outside the organization. This is already the course generally preferred by the Soviet Union, and it may become increasingly acceptable to the United States. Opinion in our group was divided on the question of whether, from the point of view of the purposes of the United Nations, this would be a desirable tendency. When, however, strong third party interests are at stake, especially in matters relating to the economic and political priorities of the developing nations, the United States and the Soviet Union are likely to strive for leadership within the United Nations. At some time in the future, rules might emerge, for example, from what probably would be a series of tacit and largely *ad hoc* agreements providing for "consensual abstention" of great powers from "third world" conflict situations. The United Nations could perform a useful function by helping to create conditions conducive to the reaching of such agreements.

Some members of our group, citing recent political confrontations that have resulted in bitter competition in the United Nations between the great powers, and expressing the opinion that no over-all improvement in relations will be forthcoming until certain basic issues (many relating to mainland China) are first resolved, cautioned against expecting major changes in great power policy toward the United Nations. Greater reliance on the organization, however, could further United States policies, enable both major powers to compete favorably in the eyes of the "third world", and perhaps provide the Soviet Union with a vehicle for reconciling ideological pressures with pragmatic national interests. Such reliance should, therefore, be encouraged by: 1) increasing the representation of the Soviet Union and its allies on ad hoc committees and other subsidiary organs, and in the U. N. Secretariat; 2) inviting cooperative participation by the great powers in "standard-setting" legislative activity within U. N. organs; 3) urging additional great power use of negotiating and dispute settlement machinery available in the organization; and 4) giving the United Nations the types of functional responsibilities that would require great power leadership and collaboration.

The great powers, by relying whenever possible on broad constructions of relevant provisions of the Charter, should encourage the responsible, long-term growth of United Nations legislative powers. Political organs such as the General Assembly and the Security Council are, we admit, severely limited in their ability to enforce "legislation" prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons so long as there is no way to ensure compliance by mainland China. A disarmament treaty remains the most potentially effective law-creating instrument in this regard. Indeed, since great power agreements in the field of disarmament can only be enforced ultimately by the great powers themselves, it may be counter-productive to add a dimension of parliamentary and third party intervention via the United Nations.

But the paucity of legislative powers on this type of question need not

detract from an appreciation of the full range of available legislative capabilities which the United Nations can employ to formulate norms and standards that effectively regulate and order the behavior of states - as has been done, for example, by the General Assembly resolution prohibiting the orbiting of nuclear weapons in outer space. What is required between now and 1975 is a concerted effort to make whatever improvements we can in the existing machinery. The task will be complex and cannot be undertaken in the abstract, for each set of problems gives rise to different legislative considerations.

Formally and operationally, the purposes of the United Nations are furthered by effective peacekeeping and dispute settlement at the regional level. The Charter explicitly recognizes the competence of regional organizations, and their successes, some members of the group believed, could in some situations serve to prevent embarrassing failure by the United Nations. But each of the regional organizations exhibit deficiencies - in membership-structure, in machinery, or in the level of available political consensus - that militate against the over-all likelihood of such successes. It is the consensus of our group that the continued functioning of regional organizations will not materially diminish either the need for the United Nations or its capacity in the peacekeeping and dispute settlement fields.

A separate but related question arises when we consider whether the United Nations will be able to control or to regulate the exercise of collective self-defense in conflict situations involving members of the "third world", especially when one of the disputants, or a regional organization, intervenes in the affairs of a state in order to prevent the establishment of what it considers an "unfriendly" government. Committed as it is to a tolerance of diverse and pluralistic political and social systems, the United Nations probably will avoid major involvement in these types of situations unless the existence of a genuine threat to the peace is established. In deciding whether to use his own initiative, a Secretary General furthermore is likely to interpret the condition "threat to the peace" more restrictively than any of the parties involved in the conflict. Yet the United Nations is competent, under Chapters VI and VII, to act when necessary and proper, and is likely to do so when there is consensus among the great powers. Consensus might be available for action similar to what is currently described as "nation-building" activities and for ancillary United Nations efforts, such as peace observation, to circumscribe the ill effects of regional or unilateral intervention. Beyond exerting these types of leverage, the United Nations role is likely to remain marginal.

The past experience with United Nations peacekeeping forces will continue to furnish the basic pattern for the development and improvement of future capabilities. While some members of our group saw as a desirable and feasible goal the creation of a standing international force composed of individually recruited members which could be

quickly mobilized and dispatched, it was believed by the majority that financial, political and psychological limitations made the realization of such a force unlikely by 1975. Although the availability of a standing international army would obviate the necessity of relying on national political decisions to provide peacekeeping contingents, even an international force could not actually be employed without the consent of at least the great powers and the host government. In some respects, recent experience has worsened rather than brightened the prospects for the establishment of a standing force, for it now appears that conflict within the United Nations might be precipitated should the major powers be unable to agree upon each other's demands for a specific level of control over the force and for its composition in specific situations. Fragile and uncertain as it may be, the dependence on conditions of crisis to induce great power agreement on the use of earmarked forces may still be the most feasible system of obtaining agreed action.

Rules governing the use of peacekeeping forces already have been developed, and every attempt should be made during the next decade to strengthen and refine them. But better solutions will also have to be found for the practical problems of logistics, communications, the need for appropriate language facility, and the like, which commonly confront U. N. forces. The United Nations currently lacks the personnel to undertake adequate contingency planning, but it is hoped that the recently established Institute for Training and Research will at least partially alleviate this serious personnel shortage.

Above all, improvements will have to be made by 1975 in the actual operation of peacekeeping forces. Command and decision-making structures will have to be devised that will shield the Secretary General from violent political and military pressures from the parties to the conflict.

It is now painfully evident that the position of the United Nations military forces is usually highly precarious when parties to a conflict are not seeking a political settlement, or are content to let the United Nations military presence freeze the political situation indefinitely. Every effort should be made, therefore, to include peaceful settlement measures as integral parts of such peacekeeping operations.

World economic development is an area where important United Nations progress during the next ten years may be feasible. An important method of developing the economies of needy areas would be the utilization of large nuclear reactors to furnish abundant power and to desalinize sea water for use in arid sections of the world. Such a step would have the additional advantages of insuring the peaceful use of vast amounts of nuclear materials otherwise available for weapons, and possibly of furnishing an independent source of revenue for the United Nations.

The group agreed that the continued vitality of the United Nations would require financial independence, not only for peacekeeping activities, but as an enduring support for all United Nations functions. However, it was recognized that the recent crisis over Article 19 was not a financial problem per se, but rather the result of political disagreement between the great powers.

At the conclusion of its deliberations our group decided to emphasize that it had reached consensus on three broad questions:

1. Essentially, the development of a general legislative power for the United Nations means that governments would have to be willing to place commitment to agreed orderly procedures above their determination to obtain objectives on which they do not agree. It was agreed that it would be desirable for the United Nations to work toward a legislative body with the authority to make laws and an executive and judicial system for their enforcement. However, while all felt this goal should be pursued with urgency, some were not optimistic that it could be accomplished by 1975.

2. The group had earlier concluded that there was a strong probability that proliferation of nuclear weapons capability would take place in the next ten years. This situation would create serious difficulties for the United Nations in its peacemaking and peacekeeping functions, as well as create serious dilemmas for U. S. foreign policy. The group assumed that during this period the U. S. would find it in its interests to continue to strengthen the United Nations through adaptation of the Charter to new situations rather than revision of the Charter. If by 1975 the United Nations had not made substantial progress in controlling the proliferation problem, then in the opinion of the group it would be essential in the interests of world safety to move as quickly as possible toward the widest acceptance of general disarmament with the rapid strengthening of international authority implicit in such a course.

3. At the outset, the group could not arrive at an agreement regarding the likelihood of the seating of the Peoples Republic of China by 1975. Toward the end of the discussion, however, a consensus developed: it would be important from an institutional standpoint to create the conditions which would make possible the seating of China. It was observed that the timing of this action might determine the extent to which the seating of China would be disruptive. For example, should it take place after a period of effective cooperation and growing trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, the seating of China probably would not be too disruptive. It was also pointed out that not only must the United States decide whether China should be in, but also that China must exhibit a greater desire for membership than apparently exists at present. This view was supplemented by the further thought, however, that if it were in the interests of the United States to strengthen the U. N. by seating China, a position which the group tended to accept, it would require of the U. S. a spirit of accommodation, of course reciprocated, which would permit the collateral political settlements which are related to China's participation in the U. N. Some concern was expressed that unless such accommodation took place, a rival international organization presently referred to by China and Indonesia could be very harmful to the interests of both the United States and the United Nations.

DISCUSSION GROUP IV - THE FAR EAST

Chairman: KENNETH T. YOUNG
Rapporteur: COL. EDWARD P. FOOTE

U. S. Policy in Asia: 1965-75

New challenges demand new solutions. A long-term substantial, and singular commitment of the U. S. to a successful strategy of peace in Asia is needed for at least a decade. The vulnerabilities and upheavals, and the tensions and threats in Asia will become so critical for world peace and so crucial for U. S. interests that the U. S. should direct increasing attention and priority to Asian issues. For this we should mobilize a new capability made up of an explicit national undertaking, a varied mixture of many resources, a willingness to continue preponderant support for Asia's development and stabilization, and a major revamping of our organization and operations. Whether Asia is to have war or peace, there is no substitute for such commitment and no understudy for our leadership. The U. S. must meet the demands of both. To fulfill these essential obligations, the U. S. will have to assess its total attention to foreign policy matters in order appropriately to forecast and program priorities among salient and critical areas of the world and to assure that Asia is urgently and adequately supported during this critical next decade.

To do so successfully in Asia over the next decade will require a greater respect for Asian initiatives and more interest in consulting fully with them in seeking "culturally-suited" solutions to Asian problems than the U. S. has shown in the past. U. S. responses and programs should be adopted to the national aspects of each Asian country consistent with U. S. objectives and interests in Asia as a whole.

If there is one key word for Asia, it is NATIONALISM. Asia is a vast

continent of many independent states, half the world's population, widespread poverty and disease, continuing and erupting tensions, rivalries and disputes - and intense demands for change, modernization, and national improvement. Although nationalism will reflect social revolution and delay Asian solidarity over the next ten years, the various expressions in each country of nationalism as a growing awareness of national identity will help to integrate groups of people and minorities into structured nations. While their boundaries and composition may vary during 1965 - 1975, the U. S. can and should work with the constructive, if sometimes revolutionary, forces of Asian NATIONALISM. Moreover, the conflicts engendered by nationalistic aspirations and the fundamental struggle between nationalist independence and communist dominance will require the ten-year continuation of an effective U. S. presence of many forms in Asia to fill the continental power vacuum or stalemate. By 1975 a satisfactory substitute in sharing of power responsibilities will probably not have yet evolved, however desirable that may be and despite diplomatic efforts to create a multilateral framework for Asian unity, security, and development.

Asia is no longer a great distance away because rapid air transport and excellent communications have brought the capitals of Asia timewise near Washington and Moscow. We can feel the heart beats of Asia and vice versa. The rising power of the Chinese People's Republic and its apparent ambition to dominate its neighbors comes into focus almost on an hourly basis. The myriad and serious problems for maintaining peace in the area require urgent attention and formulation of plans for a strategy for peace these ten years.

In this context, the positive and constructive goals and objectives of the U. S. in Asia for the next decade should be to:

1. Encourage the achievement of positive nationalism in all Asian countries through constructive popular resurgency.

2. Support the development of national leadership and institutions responsive to the spiritual, economic, and general welfare of the people, based on the principles of human rights, social justice, and self-determination. Such ideals should be interpreted by the people of each country in accordance with their ethical values.

3. Foster integrative processes by aiding cooperative regional development.

4. Apply advancing technology toward meeting the human needs of the area.

The ability to pursue positive programs of political advancement, economic development, and social improvement in all Asia will depend, in large measure, on constructive containment* of Communist China's military threat and political subversion. During the next ten years, Maoist forms of subversive warfare will be the most frequent pressing threat to Asian national independence and special revolution, and thus to U. S. interests. To contain Communist military power, the U. S. must:

1. Maintain adequate and sufficiently diversified military forces to create a credible deterrent to a long spectrum of warfare against the U. S. and its allies and friends in Asia.

2. Encourage free Asian nations to undertake broad measures to achieve their capabilities for self-defense against limited war threats.

3. Adapt U. S. organization and operations to the political and military requirements of Maoist subversive warfare to prevent it in advance.

The Chinese Communist leaders will continue their attitude of absolute hostility to the U. S. and their determination to expand Communist control in Asia, and to eliminate the U. S. from Asia in every respect. There is no present evidence that action by the U. S. is likely to produce a change in this Chinese Communist posture in the short run. However, constructive containment of Chinese Communist expansionism should serve, in the long run, to change that attitude and form a basis for a new and more positive U. S. policy toward mainland China. The ultimate goal is an "Asian China", not a "Chinese Asia" - a China-in-Asia, not a China-over-Asia. Thus, a Peking regime (presumably under a new leadership realizing the futility of aggressive policies in a resurgent Asia) might adopt a more reasonable and peaceful outlook. To keep open the possibility for eventual change and accommodation in mainland China's attitude, the U. S. should:

1. Reiterate its feeling of friendship for the Chinese people.

2. Continue to propose exchange of newspapermen, scholarly and scientific experts, cultural groups, and individual tourists.

3. Offer medical supplies, foodstuffs, and trade in nonstrategic commodities.

4. Maintain and, if possible, develop the ambassadorial talks in

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* This is not a satisfactory term or label to express a major component in a strategy for peace in Asia, but it is hard to find a commonly-understood term that is better. As used here it embraces two vitally interdependent parts: constructive support for positive nationalism, including China, and effective frustration of violent expansionism.

Warsaw as a channel for a future meaningful dialogue on various questions when circumstances change.

Situational Analyses and Key Issues

The conditional stability of strategic nuclear deterrence by the U. S. dictates less provocative actions on the part of the main protagonists in resolving crises by military means. During 1965 - 1975, the reduced likelihood of global nuclear war should lead to the relative lowering of bipolar world tension.

Thus, the East-West conflict, including China, will take the form of a protracted struggle of political, economic, and military warfare of new and varying forms and combinations. In Asia nationalism of both positive and extreme kinds will play the central part in a strategy for this decade. Ideals will be joined in competition for men's minds. Military confrontations will move in the direction of sublimited wars with emphasis on unconventional warfare. Both the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R. apparently want to force us to low-level struggle on this basis, below massive conventional wars.

1. Chinese People's Republic

There will be significant changes in leadership as inevitable successions in the present regime occur. These changes may be reflected in shifts in policy that will require us to be alert to a more conservative and rigid leadership adhering at least initially to doctrinaire methods. It is, of course, extremely difficult to predict, in a 10-year forecast, the complex situation of a changing China because of its closed society and its inherent high degree of unpredictability.

Yet, on balance, it seems unlikely now that China will disintegrate politically or fail economically to feed and clothe its massive population, at least on a minimum marginal level, barring an unforeseen military and nuclear confrontation with the U. S. or the U.S.S.R. While China's present and foreseeable leadership in this decade will continue to look externally for more national power, China's dominance in Asia is not inevitable. Progress by other Asian countries will significantly deter and frustrate China's external advertures by reducing her ability to control Asian situations. This is the meaning of constructive containment in resurgent Asia.

In this 10-year period it is probable that China will obtain a nuclear capability in Asia up to and including ballistic missiles and a few nuclear-armed submarines with sufficient weapon range to suit her purposes. This could have new and serious consequences. These capabilities would afford China the option of threatening to hold Asian cities in hostage to offset

major nuclear pressures which Peking leaders think the U. S. or U.S.S.R. might mount against her. New arrangements will be needed, without nuclear proliferation, to "neutralize" this Chinese capability in Asia. At some future point in time, perhaps beyond 1975, the U. S. should add to its strategy for peace in Asia whatever valid measures there may be to offset China's genuine concern for her national integrity and territorial security when and if such a national interest on China's part supersedes and replaces external expansionism and nuclear "blackmail".

Recognition of the depth and intensity of the present Sino-Soviet rift is necessary, but caution must be exercised in planning on its inevitable continuation. It could narrow. Even if it does not, it will be difficult for the U. S. to deepen this rift. However, there may be occasional opportunities for the U. S. prudently to deal with the breach on an *ad hoc* basis, by working as a "balancer" along parallel lines with the U.S.S.R. and possibly sometimes with China tc achieve specific U. S. goals, bearing in mind that such exploitations will affect our alliances elsewhere.

2. The U.S.S.R. in Asia

With both major direct and indirect interests in the area, the Soviet Union must be reckoned with in Asia. Situated directly opposite Japan and adjacent to China, along an extensive and penetrable frontier, the U.S.S.R. faces complex and difficult problems and confrontations in Asia, too. Her bilateral relations with an increasingly powerful and resurgent Japan will continue to center on competition for fisheries in the Pacific, the return to Japan of small Kurile Islands, an eventual peace treaty with Japan, and Japan's assistance, even by neutrality, if the Sino Soviet rift widens and China becomes even more difficult for Moscow. Although these are real and serious issues in the northeastern segment of Asia, they are controllable and not likely to lead to major tensions or hostilities.

Of greater significance for the U. S. strategy in Asia are the objectives and interests of the U.S.S.R. in Southeast Asia where there are so many internal tensions and weaknesses, and where the U.S.S.R. also may run headlong into Chinese Communist ambitions and competition to promote Chinese national territorial interests, get control of Asian communist parties, and try to establish Chinese political hegemony over Asia at the expense of the U.S.S.R. and the U. S. The Soviet Union will probably continue diplomatic and economic measures to maintain an influential position in South and Southeast Asia to restrain Chinese ambitions and to promote Soviet objectives in "communist transition without war". Barring a

major confrontation with the U. S., the U.S.S.R. may indirectly help to facilitate the short-run and long-run adjustments of tensions in Southern Asia caused or exploited by Chinese Communist expansion.

With respect to Soviet interests and activities in Northeast and Southern Asia, outside of Communist China, the U. S. should be ready to join in cooperative arrangements or follow parallel lines with the Soviet Government on an *ad hoc* basis which would contribute to stability and development when in consonance with U. S. national interests and objectives.

3. *Northeast Asia and South Pacific*

(Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand)

These countries, which will continue to increase their economic power, are key factors in our Asian strategy with whom we need to maintain the best possible political relationships.

a. *Japan* will (1) develop increasing trade with mainland China, probably only in nonstrategic materials; (2) accept more responsibility for defense and play an increased role in Asian affairs; (3) help pave the way for mainland China's workable accommodation and peaceful association with the rest of the world; and (4) work towards improved relations with Korea and a possible treaty with the U.S.S.R. specifically over key island issues.

b. *Taiwan* will continue as a target for increased C.P.R. military and political pressures, and a wedge in the Sino-Soviet rift in that U. S. assistance to Taiwan does not bring a reciprocal U.S.S.R. response to assist the C.P.R.

4. *Southeast Asia*

a. There is a need for rural improvement for the welfare of the people and regional unity for mutual strengthening, based on objectives that are truly "by and for" Southeast Asia. With the probably increased malaise of SEATO, consideration should be given to a newly-chartered defensive organization including the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand (PMT) for an effective military and economic alliance. Programs of constructive popular resurgency are moving ahead in Thailand which is the keystone on mainland Southeast Asia.

b. *South Vietnam* We recognize that the outcome of the present situation will determine the future of any strategy for peace in Southeast Asia and all Asia for 1975, if not much sooner. The "wave" or "domino" concept is valid for this area but

its effects would be unacceptable for the U. S. at home, in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world.

Our commitment is to the objective of independence for South Vietnam within a regional framework of security and development including North Vietnam.

While the foreseeable situation in Vietnam appears extremely difficult, South Vietnam, the U. S. and its allies can successfully cope with it, if changes and reforms are made to achieve the following immediate and long-range goals within the context of our overall objectives in Asia.

i) Reduction of aggression;
ii) Establishment of viable and acceptable government and responsive political action at all levels;
iii) Restoration of law and order throughout the country;
iv) Promotion of political reforms, social justice and economic welfare;
v) Organization of cooperative efforts for regional development in Southeast Asia, including a TVA-style Mekong project, and covering North Vietnam if desired;
vi) Establishment by negotiation of an enforceable regional settlement and a workable structure for peace, security and cooperation under UN sponsorship.

In all probability, after some progress toward successful accomplishment of immediate political and military objectives in South Vietnam, a confrontation of ideologies and political and economic conflicts will remain to be resolved. But to accomplish all these objectives we must substantially amend our tactics and modes of operation taking a hard look at political and military functions so that the organizations are tailored to fit the novel and total challenges (see Page 31). In view of these requirements, we will continue to have a political, economic and military presence in South Vietnam in 1975.

5. *Philippines*

Although one of our closest allies in the region and having enjoyed reasonable political stability to date, the Philippines are faced with increasing subversive pressures from Indonesia, which are particularly reflected in changes in the U. S. - Philippines relationship in key Filipino news media. A stable, honest and progressive Filipino government is of paramount importance to U. S. interests. Particular efforts and special attention to promote a full-fledged and reciprocal partnership with the Filipino people and their government are mandatory now.

6. Indonesia

With a population over 100,000,000 and untold natural resources, Indonesia is a potentially significant nation in Asia. Indonesia is down to a basic subsistence level economically and there are indications that this relatively indigenous economy can continue at this level for a long time. However, its present government - with its almost monolithic political structure - is responding to competitive pressures from the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R. and is pushing major expansion particularly in the Malaysian and Philippine sovereign areas. In the event of a Communist takeover and consolidation of power, which we should seek to prevent by any practical means, the U. S. should take appropriate cooperative measures to help defend nearby countries. During this period the U. S. should keep alive its desire for friendly relations with the Indonesian people and its complete support for positive nationalism for Indonesia.

7. India and Pakistan

This salient sub-continent of Asia is also vitally important to Asian stability and development, and thus to world-wide U. S. interests and world peace. We need to continue a long-term commitment in this sub-continent where these two countries are striving to modernize and develop. Whatever the continuing tensions and disputes between them over this decade, the U. S. needs to hew to the fundamental principle for dealing with this vital area that, if Pakistan and India are to survive and progress, and if our support and friendship for both are to be effective, they will each have to survive and progress together and not separately.

The lack of sufficient food to feed a rapidly-growing population will continue to be a most critical problem for India. The U. S. should continue to support India, which may include immense costs for maintenance of a constitutional and progressing environment rather than permit a default to an internal Communist takeover.

8. While any change in the representation of China in the UN for the immediate future is not foreseen, it must be assumed that China will be represented in and a member of the UN in 1975. There is some question as to whether the government of the C.P.R. wishes to represent China in the UN under any circumstances, but for the time being the U. S. should continue to support Chinese representation by the Republic of China in all international agencies including the UN.

General Recommendations Regarding a Strategy for Peace in Asia

The U. S. should:

1. Maintain flexibility in accommodating ourselves to the timing and character of any Asian or regional initiatives for creating new political, economic and military institutions or systems which would contribute to peace, security and development in Asia; and continue our reliance on or extend existing bi-lateral or multi-lateral commitments unless replaced by new regional arrangements during the next ten years.

2. Take into account the significant factor for this particular decade of an emerging new leadership from the younger generation in all Asian countries including Mainland China.

3. Help to reverse the increasingly serious imbalance between rapid population expansion and slow agricultural and industrial growth by (a) encouraging effective national programs for population control; (b) by placing more emphasis on political and social development rather than mainly economic development, particularly in the fields of health, education and training of leadership; and (c) by decentralizing and accelerating integrated development for rural areas. Recognizing the serious social dislocations caused by major socio-economic change and rapid introduction of new technology, we should carefully pursue an empirical approach and constantly measure effects of changes as may occur in order to be responsive to needs as they arise during the development process.

4. Recognize as a target for 1975 that inner space (the ocean area and continental shelves) is the last frontier on this planet and that development of inner space for aquaculture and underwater minerals will be a significant quantum improvement in the feeding of Asian populations en masse and could significantly change U.S. and Asian needs in these critical resources as total populations rapidly increase; and organize the exploitation of this technological breakthrough for Asian countries either by new regional institutions in conjunction with Japan - which could have a special role in inner space - or under UN auspices.

5. Avail ourselves whereever possible in the first instance of the UN and Specialized Agencies in cooperative efforts to assist in the development of Asian countries, in the settlement of Asian disputes between countries, and in inaugurating new multilateral programs such as river systems development, inner space, telecommunications, regional food supply and distribution systems, computer processing stations, and weather control. In particular, we should continue to channel an

increasing proportion of U. S. assistance in loans and technical training via the UN and other multi-lateral agencies.

6. Discourage atomic proliferation in Asia for non-peaceful purposes, and seek an atom-free zone east of the hundredth parllel in all Asia, including the Soviet Union and Communist China, under UN supervision and inspection.

Specific Recommendations on U. S. Organization and Operation

The new nationalism, political development, and Maoist-style warfare in Asia demand new solutions. While relatively low-level compared to the violence of large-scale warfare, wars of "national liberation" guerilla operations, terrorism, and political action are novel, involved and complex for us to cope with. They feed on inevitable social revolution. Such unorthodox struggle, skillfully organizing and integrating political, psychological and military techniques, cannot be handled by orthodox and traditional methods which are insufficient, ineffective and indeterminate. As this form of warfare and many forms of social revolution may appear more frequently in Asia - as well as in the Near East, Africa and Latin America - the U. S. had better settle down for the long pull.

The organization of U. S. effort for responding to such social revolution and preventing warfare must be urgently recast for Asia and elsewhere. While the total U. S. effort is large, it does not seem adequately focussed, analyzed, or correlated. Problems and activities called "counter-insurgency" appear to be treated separately and fragmented independently by many specialties in several civilian and military departments involved. In fact, the civilian component of the U. S. government has tended to under-estimate, and not deal vigorously enough, with the predominately political aspects of fluid situations before and during communist insurgency.

The expertise and smooth team work required for the long pull will not be obtained just by summing at random, numerous separate and fragmented governmental efforts, nor by leaving the problems to committees. Many people who have gained useful experience and competence in dealing with various insurgencies of the post war period have not yet found a congenial long-term professional environment both for analyzing and meeting these new problems with new solutions and for developing recognized specialties on a long-term career basis with secure opportunities in separate government agencies for doing so. To forge this unused material into a new tool for coping with insurgency, a new approach is needed.

When we had new challenges in atomic energy, space and arms control, we created AEC, NASA and ACDA. They have not become exclusive proprietors, but their main business is clear. Coping with threats from and preventing Maoist-style subversion and insurgency

will be at least as important and continuing a challenge for us as these others were for a long time. Accordingly we urgently recommend that serious consideration be given to three new approaches: a new agency, a new service and new training.

1. A special small agency might be established, preferably in the Executive Office of the President. It might be called a "Resurgency Corps" or something like a "National Independence Support Agency" (NISA). It would create an environment for and bring together in Washington a highly selective group of specialists to plan and direct the totality of U. S. strategy regarding insurgency in many parts of the world. NISA could also have field offices in subversion-threatened countries if they desired. Experts from the regular government agencies and departments as well as from private organizations would staff NISA on a long-term career service established for dedicated and talented men and women qualified for this kind of work.

   NISA would be the focal point in Washington and the field for collecting data, analyzing past experiences and conducting or sponsoring research in this general subject. As there are obvious problems regarding the creation of such an agency, the drafting of its charter for structuring its operations and defining its relationships, particularly with Ambassadors in the field, is too important and subtle to be indicated in this brief suggestion. Much is already being done in this matter. The problem is to pull it together better. Perhaps the matter could be better explored by a carefully selected group working full time as long as necessary to produce results in this important task.

2. For a long-range strategy of total diplomacy in Asia more comprehensive than a "Resurgency Corps", something along the lines of an "Asian Service Corps" is needed in any event throughout the U. S. government. It would be made up of men and women with special training and experience in Asian affairs in general. To overcome the adverse effects of short and irregular tours of duty and rapid rotation of personnel in all departments, more "Asian generalists" would be assigned to field posts and Washington positions for four to eight years at a time. However, all U. S. personnel in these areas would not necessarily be such "generalists". They would serve as a particular cadre. As a starter for this long-range strategy, it is suggested that a number of young Foreign Service Officers - say 20 in Class 8 - be initially assigned to field duty for political contacts and general orientation in selected Asian countries - perhaps to begin work in "Asian Youth Affairs" outside of traditional diplomatic work and in the "countryside".

3. We also suggest that consideration be given to systematic training and orientation programs for Americans and Asians in the fields of political action, rule-making and nation-building in Asian contexts. The Asians could include men and women who are "politicians" and political organizers, law students and members of the legal profession, educators, enterprise managers and public administrators. We suggest intra-Asian conferences of leaders with experience in undergoing the transition through the nation-building and society dislocating process.

DISCUSSION GROUP V - IMPACT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Chairman: DR. NORMAN C. PETERSON
Rapporteur: WILLIAM LEAVITT

A ten-year look ahead at expanding science and technology's implications for a Strategy for Peace suggests a paradox: We are not convinced that human misery (which is conceivably eradicable across the world through the intelligent and benevolent application of technology) is necessarily the prime cause of conflict. Yet at the same time we are intuitively convinced that a world in which each human being's environment is enhanced to a decent level through the application of technology will in all likelihood be a more stable and peaceful world. We believe this while at the same time acknowledging the potentially negative implications of science and technology. We know that when exploding aspirations cannot be immediately met, an inflammatory effect on people can develop - an effect that is ideologically exploitable and dangerous to the peace.

These views lead us to suggest candidly the prime motivation - from the United States point of view - for encouraging the application of science and technology to the alleviation of human misery throughout the world. The motivation is a combination of conscience and fear, a sense of guilt that we are the "haves" and a feeling that others should be "haves" also - and a sense of fear that unless misery is alleviated, our *own* safety in the world and the safety of the world as a whole will be seriously endangered. To recognize this dual motivation, we believe, is the beginning of both humility and wisdom.

We have examined a number of technical possibilities that are potentially feasible. They include, among many others, global weather prediction and eventually, control systems; global and regional communication systems; global and regional agricultural schemes; global and regional education programs using the most modern media; global oceanographic research, and technology for food and mineral production. The list is long and exciting to contemplate.

But far more important than the technical prospects, in our view, are the institutional arrangements that will be required to put science and technology peacefully and usefully to work for human advance on the global, regional, national, and local scales. To the requirement for finding the most appropriate institutional arrangements, we would add an equally significant philosophical necessity; i.e., that we must find ways of encouraging underdeveloped societies to adapt technological advances to their own cultures. This is a subtle task, because it involves helping other cultures without dictating procedures to them. Yet we are convinced that in the long-term those underdeveloped areas which, with our aid, are able to create their *own* adaptions of 20th Century technological patterns, are far more likely to develop that stability within their own societies which they must have to survive and prosper as viable national and regional units.

There is a corollary to this requirement. In the United States, we are only beginning to analyze the implications of science and technology for our own society. Our understanding of the failures of science and technology and of the dislocations that may have been caused by these forces in our own country is limited. We believe that by exploring intensively this crucial question we will find not only methods of correcting our own imbalances but also will develop important knowledge that can be offered - in a spirit of humility - to other cultures only beginning to apply science and technology to the solution of their own problems.

We suggest that in our effort to aid underdeveloped areas to reach new levels of scientific and technological achievement, a valuable technique might be the continuing use of regional conferences to which American technologists would come, not as specialized experts in the esoteric frontiers of science, but rather as partners in a dialogue. The subject of such a dialogue should be, we believe, the social problems of the developing nations in the context of their own cultural patterns and the various potential scientific and technological approaches to the solutions of these problems. Such a technique, we suggest, would be a valuable adjunct to the already successful American Peace Corps effort in which the U. S. volunteer - because he is on site in an alien culture - thinks in terms of the culture in which he is immersed.

The continuity of such a regionally-based effort should, we believe, be enhanced by the establishment of regional centers where the dialogue between local developers and their American counterparts would be on a year-round basis.

We explored extensively various international organizational approaches for encouraging the spread of and managing the use of peculiarly global science and technology. One major conclusion emerged, namely, that for such technology, the United States should search for institutional arrangements in which participating nations

can have the distinct feeling that they are partners. The nature of the particular technology, we believe, can best determine the preferred nature of the institutional arrangement. In some cases, the United Nations may serve as the best medium. In other cases, quasi-public international industrial consortiums may be the answer. Regional arrangements which are associated with a global authority may be suitable for other technological efforts. As we embark on the search for various institutional arrangements best suited to globally-significant technologies, we should at the same time explore both in detail and in general the potential conflicts inherent in the use of such technologies. Regional weather-modification capability is an obvious example. The ability to modify weather, even slightly, in one area of the world, might have rather sizable and deleterious effects in other parts of the world. Such problems are manageable only on an international cooperative basis.

We recognize the obvious difficulty of predicting not only the exact nature of future science and technology but also the various potential social, political and economic implications of the change that lies ahead. Yet the difficulty does not relieve us of the duty to attempt to provide guidelines for the future. If we avoid this duty, then both the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world may, in a decade or two or certainly by the end of the century, be at the mercy of an imbalanced technological environment which will have had an essentially malignant effect on the world.

Therefore, we make, with full realization of the incompleteness of the list, the following recommendations:

1. That the United States, on the national, regional, and local level, make a maximum effort to understand the impact of science and technology on the past development and future potential of our own society. With such understanding, we may better counsel and cooperate with others.

2. That the United States government - as a matter of public policy - commit itself to the utilization of the country's highly-developed industrial systems-engineering capabilities, which have already been so successfully used in the development of military strength, for the solution of major national social problems. We believe American industry is willing to take the attendant risks in such an effort within our competitive system.

3. That in the field of global communications the United States be willing to compete openly with its ideological opponents.

4. That the United States expand significantly its rather limited existing research and development effort in the field of education and the nature of learning, not only to enhance social

advance in our own country but also to develop tools and understandings that may be offered to underdeveloped areas.

5. That the United States government sponsor a continuous program of regional conferences and work centers in underdeveloped areas for the promotion of technology utilization. The cooperation of industry and foundations and universities should be solicited in the setting up and operation of such regional institutions.

6. That United States technological counsel to underdeveloped areas should be designed - in cooperation with local leadership - to serve *local* requirements. We should avoid assumptions that either the most modern technology, or technology that we ourselves have surpassed long ago, are necessarily ideal for others. Each case has its own optimum solution.

7. That the United States government explore the developing imbalances in our own scientific technological cadre of basic research workers, applied-science specialists, and engineers. There is evidence to suggest that while basic research and line engineering currently enjoy high prestige and investment, the development of an adequate supply of applied-science personnel whose business it should be to search for applications of science to be put to work solving social problems is being neglected. This has important implications not only for our own society but also for our ability to offer useful counsel to those other societies with which we are anxious to cooperate in the effort to apply science and technology beneficially to social purposes.

CLOSING REMARKS

by C. MAXWELL STANLEY

As has been the case in previous conferences, I feel both pleasure and disappointment as this meeting comes to a close: pleasure that it has been a good conference, and disappointment that now we must go our several ways with important things left undone and unsaid.

At this Conference you have been asked to experiment by looking ten years ahead, thus taking a view beyond current crises, but short of ultimate objectives. It can be seen from the reports of the discussion groups that you have responded in two ways, both appropriate. The first has been to appraise the world situation ten years from now, assuming no basic change in the trends, policies and forces shaping its development. The second has been to consider desirable changes in policy and direction which may result in a more secure and stable world in ten years. As we review more leisurely the discussion group reports, I predict we will find the ten-year look has been a useful device.

It is perilous to summarize the judgments of a conference, such as this, for we view the facets of a Strategy for Peace from so many angles. Nevertheless, I suggest that there is a high order of consensus on the following:

1. The achievement of a secure peace with freedom will be neither easy nor simple; rather, it will be difficult and complex.

2. The achievement of a secure peace with freedom will be a long, slow process.

3. A suitable Strategy for Peace for this country requires multiple elements. There is no simple panacea. We must work simultaneously on a number of approaches: political, economic, social and military.

4. A major gap in this nation's foreign policy is our hesitance to think and act boldly on the long-range concepts of peace planning. It is in this area that these conferences have sought to make a contribution. We need a route map, or alternate route maps, to set our direction in the quest for a secure peace.

5. Our quest for peace will be aided by a greater commitment to research, study, and experimentation, as elements of peace planning. We are shocked at the great difference in the resources committed on the one hand to our military establishment and on the other to planning for peace. A military establishment is required so long as we are in a world of anarchy, and it must be substantial. However, the minimal resources, both money and people, devoted now to peace study, research and planning give little encouragement that we will find the answers.

One factor which has disturbed me at this and at previous Strategy for Peace Conferences is the complacency with which many participants view the world situation. I have a much deeper sense of concern and urgency. Perhaps it is because I am a generalist instead of a specialist, an activist more than a scholar, a free enterpriser rather than a bureaucrat.

I can only say that if I were as complacent about the world situation today as are many of our participants, there would be no further Strategy for Peace Conferences. At least I would not devote my time, energy and money to maintain them.

Certainly we must develop a strategy for peace using intellect rather than emotion, but should we not let a bit of urgency show through?

Are we satisfied that the threat of nuclear war is as far removed as some have indicated here? Are we complacent about our nation's role as the policeman of the world acting unilaterally with the resulting complications? Are we satisfied, great nation that we are, that we can police the world, enforce the peace, and do this job alone? Are we, arrogant and egotistical, because we are a powerful and affluent nation, to tell the rest of the world what to do? Can a western nation, largely consisting of citizens of white skin, bring this world to peace? Have we so little empathy with the rest of the world, so little understanding, that we believe this? Why, in this nuclear age, when nations cannot solve security problems individually, do we put so little effort in the international or supranational approach? Are we satisfied that we devote so little of our resources to peace planning?

I do have a feeling of urgency, and I shall endeavor in future Strategy for Peace Conferences to convey it to our participants. As a Conference, we need not only to encourage study and interchange views with one another. We need also to stimulate our participants as individuals to prod others, including our government and its various agencies, to get on with the job of peace planning. Planning for peace is a big task which deserves a larger commitment of money and men than is now being devoted to it.

With such thoughts of urgency, I close this conference and look forward to seeing many of you at the next conference.

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Speech Notes for Staff Members

(Developing The Underdeveloped Has Impact On Jobs At Home)

Help To Them

Is Help To Us.

One Per Cent A Year . . . Might Mean 3 1/2 Million Jobs . . .

Paul G. Hoffman, the distinguished American who contributed so greatly to an understanding of the needs of the developing countries, wrote:

"If per capita income in the underdeveloped world were lifted by only one per cent per year more in the 1960's than they rose in the 1950's, export markets for the entire industrially advanced world would expand by billions of dollars. For the United States--assuming it continues to retain its current share of the international trade flow--such an increase would amount to an estimated additional $7,000,000,000 in the United States exports per year by 1970. In man-hours alone an equivalent of more than 4,500,000 jobs in the United States depend on foreign trade. Of these, more than 1,750,000 jobs depend on United States exports to the underdeveloped areas of the world. By 1970, this number may well double to the equivalent or more than 3,500,000 full-time jobs. Assuming a growth of an additional one per cent per year in per capita incomes in the underdeveloped countries, the total exports for this ten-year period as a whole can reasonably be expected to reach $320,000,000,000 from the developed to the underdeveloped world. This is good business. Economic development is not charity; it is sound business management in exactly the same sense that product or market development is sound business management."

Source: The Peace Race, by Seymour Melman

For related materials, look for Speech Notes under categories:

C-III-d	Full employment
C-III-i	Economic forecasts
C-V-d-3	International productivity
D-I-a-3	Industrial relations

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October, 1965

'66 Convention

National Council of Churches Commission on International Affairs

DRAFT - For use in the Sixth World Order Study Conference, October 20-24, 1965.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Vietnam

We confront the profound and widespread war-suffering of the people of both Vietnams with sorrow. In a world of revolution, rapid change and sharp conflict of ideologies, Christians have an opportunity and duty to seek, while upholding their basic principles, to be a reconciling and healing force between nations and peoples and races where possible.

We acknowledge with repentance that the war in Vietnam is in part the outgrowth of the struggle for the restoration (continuation) of French colonialism which the United States aided during the Indo-China war with billions of dollars, of the failure of all countries to carry out the Geneva accords, and the failure to apply fully the United Nations Charter.

Another major factor is the decision of the Communists to carry on "wars of liberation" by violent means with the aim of overthrowing non-Communist governments. In Vietnam we have a special case of this.

The issues in the war and possible solutions are very complex and there are sincere differences among us. Some believe that the military effort should be continued and that unless the spread of communism by violent infiltration is checked by further military means, liberties of not only South Vietnam but of South East Asia are imperiled. In this view the war must go on until the military results bring the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese to the conference table.

Others believe that a continuance of the fighting will not facilitate negotiations and will not serve the cause of peace or justice or freedom. It will mean a rising toll of death and sorrow for the Vietnamese people and increasing disillusionment and division in both nations; there is the grave possibility that a prolonged war will escalate further and spread, thus jeopardizing all of mankind. The struggle is now delaying progress in improved relations with the USSR and in agreements for arms control and disarmament. Within the United States we also see the de-personalization of life and increase in immorality associated with all wars.

We note with approval that:

(1) The President of the United States has publicly committed the Administration to the principle of unconditional discussions leading to the negotiation of the cessation of hostilities and a peace settlement, has expressed readiness to utilize mediation efforts by U.N. members, and especially by U.N. Secretary General U Thant; and that he has proposed a billion dollar development fund for Southeast Asia.

(2) The United States Armed Forces have avoided bombing the population centers of North Vietnam.

(3) The Secretary General of the United Nations has indicated his readiness to use his good offices to bring about the cessation of hostilities.

(4) North Vietnam has shown somewhat greater flexibility in its demands.

We recommend that the United States should now consider the following suggestions in the interest of bringing peace and growing justice and freedom to the territories of Vietnam:

1. Request the government of South Vietnam and other interested parties immediately to begin negotiations for a cease fire agreement (including cessation of terrorist activities) under UN supervision with representatives from the National Liberation Front and from the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam on the basis of the mutual interest of sparing the population further and frightful suffering.

2. Halt the bombing of North Vietnam for an indefinite period in an effort to create more favorable circumstances for engotiations to begin. At the same time efforts should be made to induce the North Vietnam government to stop sending military personnel and material into South Vietnam.

3. Alleviate the desperate plight of non-combatants in South Vietnam by immediately restricting aerial bombardments within the country to military targets.

4. Request the UN to convene a peace conference, with participation by all interested governments, with representation for the National Liberation Front, to explore the bases of a settlement of the long-term issues, and the means to give such a settlement effective international guarantees.

5. Make clear that the object of such a settlement is the independence of South Vietnam from outside interference, with complete liberty to determine the character of its future government by the result of a peaceful, free and verified choice of its people. The choices might include whether it wishes to establish a coalition of Nationalists and National Liberation Front, or whether it wishes to be united with North Vietnam (perhaps through a plebiscite) or to operate as an independent, neutral and non-aligned state, or whether it wishes to constitute with Cambodia and Laos a buffer-zone between the Communist and Western spheres of influence, freely trading with both.

6. Declare itself in favor of the phased withdrawal of all its troops and bases from the Vietnamese territory, if and when they can be replaced by adequate international peace keeping forces, composed of military contingents capable of maintaining order while the peace settlement is being carried out.

7. Appropriate immediate reconstruction assistance and long range economic development funds for the several associated states of Indochina, to be made available through an effective international organization in which the beneficiary governments fully participate.

The churches and voluntary agencies in the United States should prepare to expand greatly their services to refugees and to those injured or affected by the war, and to play their full role in the gigantic task of reconstruction and reconciliation.

We support the following recommendations of the Division of Christian Life and Mission to the General Board of the National Council of Churches to help heal the growing rift between Asian Christians and United States Christians due to the Vietnam War:

(1) Promoting major, high-level dialogue between Asian and U.S. Christians on the social, economic, and political questions affecting their respective countries.

(2) Pleacing in the crisis area of Asia a permanent representative of the U.S. churches, possessing political expertise as well as Christian understanding, to serve as a U.S. Christian presence in the area and to interpret Asian points of view to the churches in the U.S.

(3) Working directly and through the World Council of Churches on means for bringing about more meaningful and continuing relations with other churches across lines of political and cultural conflict.

Looking to the future, the rebuilding of the Vietnam area calls for goals and programs big enough to enlist the support of all the people of Vietnam. The task of reconciliation and of the maintenance of peace calls for statesmanship of the highest order on the part of both churches and governments.

3. China

We recognize that Communist China espouses a form of Communist doctrine which makes her outspokenly aggressive toward some of her neighbors and an opponent of peaceful coexistence with the non-Communist world. We favor resistance to this aggression. But the present enmity between the United States and the Peoples Republic has a history for which both sides share responsibility. As Christians, and therefore as witnesses to a lord who reconciles us all, we recommend from our side of the conflict the following actions:

1. That the United States should publicly and unilaterally take steps in the direction of free travel between the United States and China, regardless of any immediate response.

2. That the United States should permit the sale of food and other non-strategic items to the Peoples Republic of China through commercial channels (as do Canada and Britain).

3. That the United States should be alert to possibilities for cultural and student exchanges as they may arise.

4. That careful study be given by the United States to regularizing diplomatic communication with the Peoples Republic of China and to the conditions under which diplomatic recognition may appropriately be extended.

5. That the Christian churches of the United States should seek every opportunity for communication and contact with their fellow churches in the Peoples Republic of China and for the arrangement of exchange visits by churchmen as soon as these may become possible.

6. That every effort be made to involve the Peoples Republic of China in international negotiations regarding such issues as disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a complete nuclear test ban, etc.

7. That the United States demonstrate its concern for the national well-being of China by suggesting formally and informally areas of technical collaboration, such as exchange of information on food production, population control, irragation and water development.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED

November 17, 1965
48th GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
The Union of American Hebrew Congregations
San Francisco.

WORLD AT PEACE

As heirs to a great Jewish tradition, we reaffirm our faith in man's capacity, as co-partner with God, to fashion a better world. We believe that, in this age of thermonuclear weapons, man must put an end to war. We do believe that the children of God can create a process in which inevitable conflicts in a world of dynamic change can be resolved without resort to armed conflict. To strive toward such a world order, the delegates to the 48th Biennial Assembly of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, meeting in San Francisco, November 1965:

1. Reaffirm our belief in the necessity of coexistence of all nations and social systems. Coexistence requires a willingness to negotiate issues and to accomodate differences. We reject the false belief that negotiations need mean appeasement or surrender.

2. Renew our commitment to the United Nations and to the need to strengthen this indispensable instrumentality of the family of nations. We believe that universal membership in the United Nations should be encouraged, thus opening new possibilities for improved understanding among all nations. In addition, we urge that the United Nations convene an early conference to consider revisions of the Charter so as to make the United Nations more responsive to the vast and profound changes which have occurred since its creation.

3. Urge the United Nations to press for extension of the nuclear treaty ban to include underground explosions and to pursue, as an item of highest priority, a systematic, enforceable, general and complete disarmament. We endorse the purposes of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and we urge the strengthening and expansion of this important body.

4. Appeal to the United States to take renewed leadership in calling for the pooling by all nuclear powers of fissionable material and knowledge in the pursuit of peaceful purposes under appropriate international controls.

5. Warn with all solemnity against the danger of proliferations of nuclear weapons. We urge that the United States and Canada pursue the initiative in pressing for a program of inspected mutual military withdrawal and the development of a program leading to political settlements coupled with disarmament and disengagement steps. These should be linked with greater economic and cultural interchanges between eastern and western Europe, leading toward an all-European security system, guaranteed by the members of the British Commonwealth, European powers, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.

6. As representatives of a religious people within whom there dwells the deep hunger for peace among men and for whom a supreme value is the preciousness of human life, we are profoundly troubled and perplexed by the dilemma posed by the military, economic, and political conditions surrounding the war in Vietnam. Along with the Central Conference of American Rabbis and other religious bodies in many lands, we are greatly distressed over the growing violence and the mounting loss of life of all the peoples involved. Faced with this dilemma, we call for an act of moral courage and,

A. Ask the President of the United States, subject only to the requirements of the safety of our armed forces, to declare to the world that as of a given date, our armed forces will cease firing, our planes will cease bombing and that our representatives are proceeding forthwith to a designated neutral place prepared to meet with the representatives of the opposing forces in Vietnam and of the United Nations and to implement such declaration with a view toward finding a peaceful solution to the differences which have brought about this horrible conflict and to call upon the representatives of the opposing forces to join us in this unselfish determination to demonstrate our commitment to peace in our time and for all time.

B. Negotiate with any and all parties to secure a ceasefire and an agreement which will vouchsafe through the U.N. independence, freedom and self-determination for the people of Vietnam.

C. Work with the UN to reduce the area of conflict by border control and internal policing undertaken by a multi-national force of the U.N., and,

D. Enlarge grants by all nations of substantial economic and technological assistance to countries of Southeast Asia, including North and South Vietnam. The effective joint cooperation already manifest in the MeKong-Delta project suggests the great blessings which peace can bring to this area.

We call upon the agencies of the Union to join with the like-minded religious bodies, Jewish, Protestant and Catholic, east and west, which share and have expressed these same moral concerns.

7. Commend the increasing cooperation of all religious groups in pursuit of a just and peaceful world. The voice of faith, the message of salvation through righteousness, must again speak to a torn and separated mankind. Reaffirming our belief in the sovereignty of God over all humanity, we renew our pledge to join with all men of good will in achieving man's final opportunity for redemption:

A WORLD AT PEACE.

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