Inter-Office Communication

Date March 15, 1954

To Walter Reuther

From Don Montgomery

Subject More on "New Look"

MAR 17 1954

Dear Walter,

I have two more points to report on the new defense policy that seem to me important.

In the analysis of the policy which I mailed February 15 I failed to note what is perhaps its most important feature. This is that the formulation adopted by the Administration confirms and re-enforces what actually was implied in the 1952 Republican campaign; namely, that a political position has been taken against our becoming involved in any further limited military actions against localized aggression, as in Korea.

Nixon re-affirmed this in his reply of March 13 to Adlai Stevenson. (Adlai's silent violin came to life by the way!) Nixon said:

> "We found that militarily their plan apparently was to destroy us by drawing us into little wars all over the world with their satellites, however, where they, themselves, were not involved, and where, due to our inability to bring to bear our great superiority on the sea and in the air that we were unable to win those wars.
>
> "We found that economically their plan, apparently, was to force the United States to stay armed to the teeth, to be prepared to fight anywhere--anywhere in the world--that they, the men in the Kremlin chose. Why? Because they knew that this would force us into backruptcy; that we would destroy our freedom in attempting to defend it.
>
> "Well we decided that we would not fall into these traps. And so we adopted a new principle. And that new principle summed up is this:
>
> "Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we chose."

This political promise not to fight any more limited wars does more to restrict our future action than does the plan to cut down on conventional armament. (Hanson Baldwin told me when I saw him in New York four weeks ago that he

is not yet alarmed about the reductions in conventional armament, since they do not go as far as the public statements would imply. He states, however, that General Ridgway and Admiral Carney are sincerely disturbed that the Army and Navy are being cut too far and that he, Baldwin is alarmed over the reduced goal for troop transport wings.)

As I said in the February 15 report, the result is that we will meet future limited aggressions either by initiating atomic warfare and taking the risk of launching World War III or letting it pass. Stevenson said the same at Miami:

> "All this means, if it means anything, that if the Communists try another Korea we will retaliate by dropping atom bombs on Moscow or Peiping or wherever we choose--or else we will concede the loss of another Korea--and presumably other countries after that--as "normal" in the course of events.
>
> "What if we had relied exclusively on a policy of "massive retaliation" since the close of World War II? Would we have resorted to global atomic war in order to meet the Communist threat in Greece and Turkey? To counter the Berlin blockade? To resist aggression in Korea?
>
> "Instead of greater freedom of choice, does this decision to rely primarily on atomic weapons really narrow our choice as to the means and the places of retaliation? Are we leaving ourselves the grim choice of inaction or a thermonuclear holocaust? Are we, indeed, inviting Moscow and Peiping to nibble us to death?
>
> "This is the real danger. This is the real problem. Will we turn brush fires and local hostilities into major conflicts? Will our allies go along?
>
> "Using weapons short of war, and relying upon our reluctance to embark on global war, the Communist imperialism will attempt to absorb country after country, to close the ring around us, and to decide the issue between tyranny and freedom long before a final outburst of atomic fury."

Eisenhower's reply to a question along this line at his press conference of March 10 said:

> A. "I will say this: There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result of the Constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it. Now, let us have that clear, and that is the answer."

This is the second point I want to report. If Eisenhower means what he says, then, of course, the instant retaliation policy is meaningless. Will Russia stand still while Congress is asked to vote for instant retaliation? And how instant will it be?

James Reston in the New York Times went back through history to show that

military action in 5 of our 10 wars started on Executive action later backed up by a Congressional declaration of war. He notes also that the North Atlantic Treaty virtually commits us to armed action if any of the parties to that treaty is attacked. He concludes that Eisenhower simply doesn't mean what he says.

I'm glad Stevenson raised the questions he did. But it might have been better done some other time and place than as part of a political speech at a Democratic Party rally.

Regards,

Don

DM:ds 3/16/54

PS: This morning's papers report Ridgway's testimony of yesterday before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee:

* * * * *

'"In the long-range view,' General Ridgway said, 'it is contemplated that the execution of (the army's) missions may be modified by complementary means being developed within the military establishment. In the development of these new means we must not, however, lose sight of the Army's missions and commitments of today, which must properly be met if our military posture is to be maintained.'

"Senator Maybank asked the general if he was 'perfectly satisfied,' with the reduction.

"'I am not perfectly satisfied,' General Ridgway replied.

"Was he 'satisfied,' the Senator persisted. The general declined to answer directly, saying: 'I accept this decision as a sound one.'

"The Army Chief explained that when a career officer received a decision from higher authority 'he accepts the decision as a sound one and does his utmost to carry it out.'

"He had accepted the 1955 military budget as sound and he had 'no doubt the Army will be able to solve the problem it confronts us with,' General Ridgway said.

"When Senator Maybank raised the question of General Ridgway's attitude within the Joint Chiefs toward the adoption of the new budget, the General said he wanted to challenge the propriety of putting such a question at a public hearing. He asked Senator Ferguson whether he could reply later at a closed session.

"'Because it might be embarrassing?' Senator Maybank asked.

"'Yes sir,' the Army Chief replied."

* * * * *



The Army's 280-mm. atomic cannon—"Mobile defense units using tactical atomic weapons will do more to halt aggression than threats of wholesale retaliation."

A Plea for Another Great Debate

The Dulles doctrine of 'instant retaliation' raises grave foreign-policy questions, says Mr. Bowles, which call for further clarification.

In this article Mr. Bowles, who served as Ambassador to India and as Democratic Governor of Connecticut, sets out a series of questions about the policy of "instant retaliation." A reply to Mr. Bowles will appear in a subsequent issue.

By CHESTER BOWLES

TO list the Great Debates over our foreign policy since World War II is to call the roll of the historic steps America has taken to accept the world responsibilities thrust upon her. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the dispatch of troops to Europe, the refusal to expand the war in Korea—all these were basic decisions and all were made after basic debate.

Sometimes the debates were marked by shrill partisanship. But differing points of view were heard, and the essential questions were asked and answered. The debates, some feared, would split the American people. Instead, the result was new agreement and new determination.

We need another Great Debate.

We need to debate the doctrine—it might be labeled the doctrine of "instant retaliation" set out first in a speech made in New York last Jan. 12 by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations. In his address Mr. Dulles outlined clearly the "new look" of our world strategy. And in doing so he revealed what appears to be a far-reaching shift in our foreign policy.

On reading Mr. Dulles' report I braced myself for the familiar round of committee hearings, Congressional speeches, and heated public controversy. Curiously, although there has been increasing discussion, the kind of nation-wide debate this issue deserves has been slow in starting. This, to my mind, is disturbing. For there are questions, crucial questions, to be raised.

My purpose is to clarify, not to cavil. If the questions I present here help to define some of the grave and complex issues which our foreign policy-makers face, and encourage them to spell out their own views further, they will have served their purpose.

* * *

THE first question, it seems to me, is precisely what does Mr. Dulles mean?

Some passages of his speech deal with the development of a concentrated military striking force, a highly mobile reserve, armed, presumably, with tactical atomic weapons. These sections seem to suggest the freer use of our ground, naval and tactical air forces to meet aggression at threatened points. Wars would still be "limited."

These parts of the speech involve no real departure from the old policy. They simply provide a somewhat different kind of support for local resistance to local aggressions.

But in other parts of his speech—parts upon which he lays very heavy stress—he seems to propose the virtual abandonment of the local-resistance, limited-war concept. He emphasizes the "deterrent of massive retaliatory power" and says our new strategy places "more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power." Formerly, he says, "we needed to be ready to fight in the Arctic and in the tropics, in Asia, the Near East and in Europe; by sea, by land and by air, with old weapons and with new weapons." This is now said to be changed by a new "basic decision"—"to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing."

The term "instant retaliation" has always been associated with strategic atomic bombing. Retaliation at "places of our own choosing" implies places beyond the area of aggression, for that area is chosen by the enemy. The places we chose if they are to provide the most suitable A-bomb targets, are likely to have highly concentrated populations. And since it makes little sense to bomb Warsaw or Budapest in retaliation for an attack on, say, Burma or Iran, they are likely to be cities in China or Russia.

All told, the Administration seems to be saying that in dealing with future armed Soviet or Chinese aggression into non-Communist territory anywhere in the world, it proposes to rely chiefly upon atomic attack by the Strategic Air Force against the major cities in Communist countries. This interpretation is supported by off-the-record statements of high Government sources that "this is the most important speech that Mr. Dulles has ever made or is ever likely to make."

IF this, then, is the new policy, what are its chances of success—first, in discouraging aggression, and, second, in repelling aggression if it should break out? Will it, as Mr. Dulles maintains, give us "more security at less cost"?

First, it should be said that in Western Europe such a policy is neither new nor untested. From the time of our pell-mell demobilization at the end of World War II until the NATO build-up in 1950, the greatest military deterrent to a Red Army move into the vacuum between the Elbe and the Atlantic was our ability to destroy Russian cities through our monopoly of the atomic bomb.

Russia undoubtedly knows that we would consider an attack on Europe as an attack on ourselves; and that in response to such an attack we would use the atomic bomb against her, even though the ensuing general war would probably involve widespread atomic destruction in our own country. But would America be willing to accept these same *(Continued on Page 24)*


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
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
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
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
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
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
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Plea For A New Debate

(*Continued from Page* 11)

terrible risks to meet local aggressions in Asia—say, in Afghanistan, Burma, Iran or Indo-China? Our deep-felt reaction to the war in Korea and to the bare prospect of an even more limited involvement in Indo-China seems to say clearly that we would not.

THIS fundamental difference between American commitments in Europe and Asia is almost certainly apparent to the Russians and to the Chinese. If we place our principle reliance in Asia upon a method of retaliation which carries what are probably unacceptable risks, and at the same time reduce our capacity for more limited, local responses, as the new policy seems to do, will we not in fact *invite*, rather than *deter*, local aggression in Asia?

Even if, in the event of such aggression, we do prove ready for atomic retaliation and possible general war, does not the new policy tempt the Communists to miscalculate our readiness? And if, on the other hand, the Communists calculate that we will not risk general war over some small Asian aggression, and they do succeed in once calling our bluff, does not much of any deterrent value of the policy disappear overnight?

These questions assume that American strategic atomic bombing of major Chinese cities, as of Russian cities, would result in the outbreak of world war III. But suppose, for some reason, that after an American retaliatory attack on Chinese cities, Moscow decided to ignore its commitments under the Soviet-Chinese alliance and held its fire. Suppose it did not even take the next step, that of supplying the Chinese with some atomic bombs and bombers for retaliation on us. How vulnerable is vast, decentralized China to our atomic attack?

CHINA, unlike the Soviet Union, has no major industrial concentrations. The entire steel production of Manchuria is no more than one-half that of the new United States Steel plant on the Delaware. The Chinese economy is not dependent upon highly articulated transportation and communications networks. Chinese armies are mobile, schooled in guerrilla warfare and in survival off the land, and they operate without the elaborate supply and support formations of Western armies.

Against China we could not limit ourselves to the use of sea and air power, which we employed so effectively in World War II in defeating integrated, industrial nations—Japan and Germany. We cannot hope that the atomic devastation of Chinese cities would mean anything but a lengthy, sprawling, indecisive conflict in which China's main asset, manpower, might occupy most of continental Asia.

And is there not a broader issue, indeed a fundamental moral issue, implicit in this new policy, which in all conscience we should resolve with our eyes open? We are a religious people, who believe that man is sacred to God. We pride ourselves on our democratic faith in the ultimate worth of the individual. It is these beliefs that distinguish our way of life from that of the Communists.

Yet, if we threaten to bomb China's cities, we would seem to be proposing to wipe out millions of Chinese men, women and children, huddled in metropolises which, unlike those of the Soviet Union, are almost devoid of legitimate military or industrial targets. Are we prepared to exact this frightful toll of helpless people in order to punish the rulers who control them?

Communist propaganda has already convinced hundreds of millions of Asians that we dropped the atomic bomb on Japan and not Germany because we considered Asians inferior people. Would not the atomic destruction of defenseless Chinese cities—while Russian cities remained untouched—turn all Asia into our bitter and unrelenting enemies?

SO much for Asia. What of Europe? It is clear from his speech that Mr. Dulles remains convinced of the necessity of maintaining the coalition of European nations which now range themselves against the Communist bloc. Does his new policy fulfill the requirements of this most delicate diplomatic problem — keeping the coalition intact and vigorous?

We have been successful so far in keeping the NATO alliance in moderately good working order only because each nation is still convinced that the military power of communism poses a direct threat to its own survival, and, on the other hand, that the common action itself does not increase the possibility of the threat's becoming a reality. Even these convictions, however, are not completely compelling. They have not, for example, dispelled the ancient antagonisms between France and Germany. Will the new policy make our European friends more or less eager to be associated with us?

We may be willing to accept the all-or-nothing risk of a third world war which the policy of atomic retaliation entails. But our war-weary European allies, only a few hundred miles from Soviet bases, would suffer even more grievously than we from atomic counter-attack. Suspicion that our new policy incurs unnecessary risks of a third world war may further dampen their enthusiasm for the essential task of European defense.

ANOTHER fundamental question is: What effect will the new policy have on whatever hope still exists for international atomic control?

One of the most important steps we have taken to create confidence in our goals has been to press wholeheartedly and with imagination for workable international control of atomic weapons under the United Nations.


If we move toward almost complete dependence on atom bombs to keep the peace, we may kill the dream of atomic disarmament for which most human beings have yearned since the Atomic Age began. And for this we would bear the full responsibility before the world.

Still another question which I believe should be soberly considered concerns the basic structure of our Government. Under the Constitution, Congress, and Congress alone, has the power to declare war.

Of course, the President, as Commander in Chief, has wide authority to deploy our armed forces and even to commit them to battle, and this can



House Speaker Martin, left, and Senator Ferguson leave last week's Congres-



sional briefing by Secretary Dulles.

create a situation in which the declaration of war by Congress becomes a formality. But while this has always been a *possibility*, we have never adopted a policy which, in advance, turns the possibility into a likelihood. The new policy seems to me to come perilously close to doing precisely that.

IF Chinese troops invade, say, Indo-China, will the President ask the consent of Congress before he launches a retaliatory atomic attack on China itself? If so, how can retaliation be "instant," and will he not run the risk that, while Congress deliberates, the Russians will deliver their own savage atomic attacks on American cities? Or, faced with such a possibility, would he launch the Strategic Air Force bombers on his own authority, and start or invite world war III without giving Congress an opportunity to exercise its constitutional authority?

Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, at a recent Washington press conference, said, "I wouldn't think that would happen." His words are reassuring, but are they official?

Another question: In conceiving of the situation before us almost exclusively in terms of military power—and one type of military power at that—does not the new policy seriously underestimate the range and scope of the Communist threat?

ONE of the most striking things about the "cold war" is the fact that nowhere have the Communists resorted to overt action by *Russian* armies. Indeed, only in Korea has even the attempt been made to change the boundary line of the Iron Curtain by means of external *military* aggression.

Instead, we have been confronted with a wide variety of effective Soviet techniques. In Iran, in 1946, the Russians lent their support to a rebellion in the northern provinces which was clearly stimulated by the Iranian Communist party on orders from the Kremlin. In Greece, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and in China itself, the fighting has been carried on by well-trained and well-organized *local* troops or guerrillas, often supplied with Soviet arms and advised by Soviet experts.

These Communist onslaughts have been successfully resisted and defeated in every country where the government has earned the allegiance of a clear majority of its people. But where colonial power has persisted, as in Malaya and Indo-China, or where the opposition to the Communists has been led by men in whom the people had ceased to believe, massive Western military and economic aid, and even the intervention of Western troops, have not yet proved decisive.

IN other cases, notably in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union has depended upon the well-organized subversive efforts of local Communist parties. In France and Italy, the Communist strategy calls for a combination of subversion and destructive parliamentary tactics. Thus the Kremlin, seeking world domination, has always used a highly flexible strategy.

How does the new policy deal with these most frequent Communist threats, which do not take the form of external aggression?

Now, in addition to maintaining its great conventional military power, stepping up its output of guided missiles and atom bombs, and pursuing a program of internal subversion, Moscow seems to be moving into additional fields. There is every evidence, for instance, that Russia plans to use her rapidly increasing production to launch an aggressive trade effort designed not only to aid the Soviet economy, but to create new divisions in the Western world and to establish close ties with the new governments in Asia. There are even signs of a Russian Point IV program. In the face of Russia's diversified attack, can we afford to put all our eggs into a single military basket—and an atomic basket at that?

HAVE we ceased, for instance, to hope and work for the development of dynamic, independent nations in Asia, willing to fight, not for us, but for their own right to remain free?

Two-thirds of Asia remains uncommitted in the "cold war." We are right when we say that the "neutralist" nations are simply not facing the facts of world communism. But we ourselves are not facing the facts of modern Asia when we ignore the deeply rooted attitudes of anti-colonialism and Asian nationalism which motivate these 600,000,000 people.

What about Point Four, which received only half a sentence in Mr. Dulles' speech? (In his next sentence he add-

(Continued on Following Page)



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
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ed, "But broadly speaking, foreign budgetary aid is being limited to situations where it clearly contributes to military strength.")

It may be said that Mr. Dulles' speech dealt primarily with *military* policy, and that it did not presume to lay down a *foreign* policy. Why, then, was it delivered by the Secretary of State and not by the Secretary of Defense? And why has it not been followed up and amplified?

Finally, what of the pessimistic estimate of American capacities on which the new policy seems to be based? Mr. Dulles has said we must bring our commitments within limits that we can sustain "over the long haul." This suggests that, unconsciously or not, we have started with a *budget* decision and attempted to fit our foreign policy to it.

EVERY thoughtful person must agree that the strength and vitality of our American economy is the kingpin of all our plans for the defense of the free world. If a broader, more fully rounded foreign and military policy would really bankrupt us—in the sense of imposing such a strain upon the economy as would lead to collapse—then, of course, it would be untenable.

But it does not make sense to talk about wrecking our economy when our steel mills are running at 75 per cent of capacity, when we have agricultural surpluses that we can't dispose of, and when our ability to produce goods and services is increasing by $15 billions annually. The richest nation in the world should be able to afford to underwrite its own security and the continued existence of the ideas by which it lives.

The Russians, with a gross national income one-third our own, are supporting, as we have seen, a foreign and military policy far more broadly conceived than that which Mr. Dulles now proposes. We should not be talking of bankruptcy, even "over the long haul," in the face of hard facts such as these.

* * *

A GREAT DEBATE on "instant retaliation" would serve not only to air the issues raised above, but to produce something in the way of positive alternatives to the new policy. This article is designed to raise questions and to invite better questions. But it may be useful to suggest certain fundamentals for the conduct of American foreign policy in this Atomic Age.

Any substantial reduction in our burden of defense effort and expenditure is dependent upon the development of *indigenous* strength in the areas of the globe which may be threatened by Communist aggression or subversion. This indigenous strength can only arise with the growth of truly independent governments and healthy, expanding economies. Although we may hope that such governments will support our views, day-to-day agreement with us is far less important than their success in creating a dynamic faith of their own for which, if necessary, they are prepared to fight against all comers.

Stable, effective governments will not mature everywhere overnight. During the maturing period we carry an extra responsibility which cannot be wished out of existence.

ALTHOUGH atomic striking power has a vital and continuing function, it will be folly to assume that it offers a guarantee against Communist aggression, much less subversion and internal revolutions, in the tempting vacuums of Asia. When we announce to the world that under no circumstances will we become directly involved in Indo-China, for example, we are hanging out the welcome mat for the Communists to a far greater extent than it was ever hung out in Korea. Mobile defense units armed with *tactical* atomic weapons, which the world knows we are prepared to use in a crisis, will do far more to discourage aggression in such situations than threats of wholesale atomic retaliation which every informed person on both sides of the Iron Curtain knows we are unlikely to carry out.

Our diplomacy must be resolute and yet profoundly alive to the revolutionary forces in the world which are shaping the future. It must be alert to seize and exploit internal contradictions in the far-flung Communist world. It must avoid the danger of becoming hypnotized into negation by the actions of Communist nations. It must support, to the absolute limit of practicability, the aspirations of all people to be free. Most important of all, it must maintain an attitude which our forefathers in the Declaration of Independence described as "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind."

* * *

EQUIPPED with broad, patient, positive policies we may look forward to the gradual development of a free and economically healthy worldwide community, sufficiently strong to turn the balance of power eventually against the Soviet Union and thus induce a settlement which will allow all nations to develop in their own way without fear of interference.


Such policies are not to be found in a budgetary bargain basement. The continuing existence of the ideals by which we live involve substantial claims, not only on our material resources, but on our resources of will and courage and purpose as well. Out of the Great Debate on these issues we can hope to find the solutions that will enable us to meet the challenge. In any case, such debate in which the Congress and the people participate is the only enduring and proper way to develop foreign policy in a democracy.

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
A distinguished humanist opens a special 'New Leader' symposium by urging

By LEWIS MUMFORD Alternatives

THE EXPLOSION of the Soviet and American hydrogen bombs has brought to a head the grave issues originally raised by the use of instruments of random extermination (genocide). Though our country is still drugged by official secrecy, a policy that spells eventual death to our democratic institutions, no small minority now understands that the development of atomic weapons has produced the maximum of insecurity with the minimum amount of human control. If we go on piling up the blunders in judgment that began with our original exploitation of the atom bomb, not only the downfall of civilization but the possible extermination of the human race is in sight.

With the invention of the atom bomb, the United States stepped into a role on the international stage not unlike that of the Emperor Jones in Eugene O'Neill's play. We believed, officially, that the atom bomb made us invulnerable; but as we stumbled through the jungle of the postwar world, secure in this self-imposed delusion, we gradually lost our own sense of direction; presently, as night overtook us, menacing fears and specters arose in our own minds, making ever louder the ominous beat of the distant Russian war-drums. None of our wild random shots has caused these frightening images to disappear; and, at the end, we find that we have nothing left by way of an effective answer to our fears except the magic of a silver bullet: first the atom, now the hydrogen bomb. Perhaps the figure would be a little more accurate if one said that we have a whole cartridge belt of silver bullets, but, like so many of the magic gifts in ancient fairy stories, there is an unexpected penalty attached to their use: The result of using all of them might be to wipe out our friends and allies as well as our enemy. In O'Neill's play, you will remember, silver bullets killed the Emperor Jones. They were fired by savages who had copied his magic.

As the first step toward mastering the present situation, we must understand the paradox of atomic power: The greater amount of atomic power we command, the more danger there is to those who use it. This is not a moral but a physical problem, and it applies in the smallest instance as well as the largest. As much radioactive material as is used on a watch dial can be tolerated by the wearer of the watch; but if the walls and ceiling of the room where he worked and every object of furniture and dress were coated with the same radioactive material, it would be inimical to his life. Though we have begun the headlong exploitation of atomic power



Lewis Mumford, writer, educator and humanist, has been a life-long democrat and a profound critic of our industrial civilization over a period of three decades. Many readers will undoubtedly recall his prescient articles on the Nazi menace, in THE NEW LEADER and elsewhere, and on the illusion of atomic omnipotence, primarily in *Air Affairs*. An editor of several magazines between 1919 and 1936, he is the author of *The Story of Utopias* (1922), *Sticks and Stones* (1924), *The Brown Decades* (1931), *The Culture of Cities* (1938), *Men Must Act* (1939), *Faith for Living* (1940), *The South in Architecture* (1941), *Values for Survival* (1946), *Green Memories* (1947), and *Art and Technics* (1951), in addition to the classics, *Technics and Civilization* (1934), *The Condition of Man* (1944) and *The Conduct of Life* (1951). A new book, entitled *In the Name of Sanity*, will be published by Harcourt, Brace this fall. Mr. Mumford has served as professor at Stanford University and the University of Pennsylvania and has lectured widely in Great Britain as well as the United States. His article launches a series on this theme to which THE NEW LEADER has invited more than 50 prominent political, cultural and scientific leaders. Among those who have accepted our invitation are W. Averell Harriman, Senator John F. Kennedy, Denis Healey, MP, Chester Bowles, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Kohn, Edward Crankshaw and Norman Thomas.

a radical revision of both the ends and the means of present U.S. policy

to the H-Bomb

(prompted partly perhaps by the hope that the positive uses would nullify the negative ones), the fact is that we have not yet found a practicable way of disposing of the fissionable by-products of atomic energy, even in small quantities, without any ultimate fear of regrettable consequences. Each radioactive element is, as it were, a time-bomb whose operation cannot be turned off once the clock itself is wound up. In other words, man is now playing with a new kind of fire, a fire that he has the power to ignite but not to put out.

Not understanding the paradox of atomic power, our leaders have sought to achieve security for the United States by vastly increasing the production of nuclear energy and multiplying the number of atom bombs at our command. Yet, even if they established a ratio of a thousand bombs to one against Russia, their very success might defeat their ends; for the fact is that the use of enough atomic energy to lay Soviet Russia low could likewise contaminate the living spaces of the planet and, as Professor Herbert J. Muller has pointed out, might radically alter the genes in many lower organisms, even if it did not immediately destroy human life. The cobalt bomb, we are told, could achieve this goal even more directly. If we had enough instruments of genocide to make continental Russia uninhabitable, we should also automatically bring disaster to the rest of the human race, including ourselves. The childish belief that a few atom bombs dropped on the Kremlin would enable the democratic world to live happily ever after is a fairy story that should never for an instant have been seriously entertained by grown men.

The clear fact is that the increase of atomic power has brought about a decrease of real security. Used in limited quantities, the atom bomb brings no guarantee of swift, easy and certain victory; quite the contrary. Used in unlimited quantities, augmented by the hydrogen bomb, our new weapons offer as great a threat to the rest of mankind, including ourselves, as they do to our enemy.

It is not the atom bomb, but our willingness to use any instruments of genocide, that constitutes the all-enveloping danger. And it is a relatively new danger. Although throughout history mass extermination had indeed been practiced on a limited scale, it remained for



HIROSHIMA VICTIMS: GENOCIDE, NOT 'TOTAL WAR'

the Second World War to replace the ancient art of warfare with the general practice of random and unrestricted extermination. Following the theory and practice of our fascist enemies, whose moral nihilism destroyed the very principle of restraint, the democratic powers took over genocide.

The hypocrisy of our age, which has sought to make barbarism palatable by applying traditional and honorable names to its practices (the Russians call their savage despotism "democracy"), has led us to call mass extermination by a false name: total war. As was early set forth by the Italian General Douhet, "total war," seeking to make the fullest employment of air power, promised to bring about the results of military victory at the smallest possible risk to the aggressor—not primarily by engaging the enemy's armies, but by terrorizing and exterminating the civilian population. When this method was first used by the fascist powers in their bombing of Madrid, Warsaw, London, Rotterdam and Coventry, almost every American regarded genocide as the monstrosity it actually is. Up to 1942, the American

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

Army even boasted of the fact that it practiced only "pinpoint" bombing of selected military targets. But, before the war ended, the military forces of the United States had multiplied the technical weapons of mass extermination and had employed them on an even more devastating scale than the Fascists had done—if one leaves out the mass-production statistics of the Nazi crematoria. One ordinary bombing raid on Tokyo caused 180,000 casualties in a single night. The atom bomb only wrapped up this method of extermination in a neater, and apparently cheaper, package.

Not the least extraordinary fact about the postwar period is that mass extermination has awakened so little moral protest. It is as if the Secretary of Agriculture had authorized the sale of human meat during a meat shortage, and everyone had accepted cannibalism in daily practice as a clever dodge for reducing the cost of living. The failure to understand the change in method and purpose that has taken place through the transformation of warfare into genocide has given an air of specious unreality to all our plans for controlling the production of atomic energy. Decisions of utmost importance to the human race as a whole have been made as though only the interests of a single country need be taken into account; matters that affect the balance of life on this planet, a delicate balance already badly upset by the needless exploitation of nature that has been going on at an accelerated pace, have been treated solely as if they were military or economic problems. That kind of thinking is not good enough. At this point, anyone who thinks of the future of atomic energy in terms of the fate of his country alone has already betrayed his country. It is about mankind and the future of the human race that we must now be concerned. No policy conceived in narrower terms promises better than catastrophe.

After 1945, the peoples of the world had a "safe" period of three years that should have been devoted, exclusively, to transforming the United Nations into an organ of world cooperation capable of safeguarding mankind from war and atomic genocide by promoting justice. This safety derived from the fact that every country was too harrowed and exhausted to think of resuming a military offensive, and from the further fact that Russia could not in this limited period, even with the aid of public information and well-planted spies, produce an atom bomb. This valuable interval was only halfheartedly used by the United States; it gave us an excuse for the shortsighted policy of dismantling our army and navy instead of providing the incentive to take the lead in establishing an effective world government.

At the end of the safe period, we had more atom bombs and less security than ever before. To Russian hostility and aggressiveness we opposed the passive policy of military containment—as if a political idea could be contained by anything but another greater and more universal political idea. Three times, we had such an idea within our grasp: first, with the Lend-Lease program; second, with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; and, finally, with the Marshall Plan. But each time, for lack of courage and conviction, we restricted the content of what we were doing to an act of material succor and failed to grasp its ideal goal; each time, we cut our aid short at the very moment it was ready to be made into an instrument for worldwide cooperation, beyond any mere act of self-preservative national interest. At each critical point, our statesmanship, though capable of initiating a great idea, was unable, because of contradictory reservations, to follow it up. Thus, we persistently gave the ideological advantage back to Soviet Russia—despite its ruthless schemes for world conquest and world dictatorship.

Our policy toward Russia, it seems to me, has been undermined mainly by two things: (1) an illusion of power and superiority based on our original command of the atom bomb, and (2) a commitment to the cold war as the only weapon usable against Russia, which has made it impossible for our government even to envisage the conditions necessary for peace, must less produce them. This has given Russia an immense appeal to the other nations of the world, not on the basis of performance but on the basis of verbal professions of peace. It was we, not Russia, who should have waged peace on behalf of mankind against its active enemies—we who should have registered honest horror against the method of extermination; we who should have baited the Kremlin with being unwilling to take the first steps toward atomic control and should have come up with alternative proposals when Russia flatly rejected the Baruch Plan; we who should have led the fight for a genocide pact and asked for a world assize of scientific knowledge on the dangers to the planet from using atomic energy in peace and war. Instead, we have let Russia identify the United States as the proponent of war and genocide, and by our one-sided actions and preparations we have accepted that role, with a mixture of guilty anxiety and self-righteous bravado.

By now, the cold war has produced frozen minds on both sides of the Iron Curtain—minds so numbed that they are incapable of inventing alternative plans to the ones that have failed, or only partly succeeded. The great danger from this situation lies in the fact that the present stereotyped attitudes of both the American and the Russian Governments can lead, in the end, to only one outcome: total catastrophe. In this situation, it is useless to blame the Soviet leaders, encased in dogma and cut off from reality by ideological barriers more impenetrable than any physical obstacle. Their paranoid hostility and suspicion, their avowed plans for ultimate world conquest, their dependence upon terrorism and isolation to overcome their own sense of inferiority and insecurity, must all be taken as *fixed data* for future action by democratic governments. None of these data

can be teased out of existence by a mere show of good will or circumvented by any diplomatic overtures. But the fact that they exist is no excuse for American inertia and inaction. On the present terms, the United States has no other course than appeasement or intensified preparation for war—a war in which there will be no victor.

When intelligent people find themselves in the situation I have described, they do not, like an electronic calculator that has broken down, go on repeating the same frustrated operation automatically, without being able to correct it. Instead, they retrace their course and look for new openings and new approaches. The first step out of the present impasse, it seems to me, is to admit the existence of a whole series of alternatives that have not yet been explored. Instead of proceeding on the morbid assumption that we are the victims of processes we cannot control, we must produce sufficient flexibility of mind not to be irrevocably bound to old errors, and sufficient imagination to work out a fresh plan of campaign on a radically different series of premises.

Two current habits of mind stand in the way of exploring new alternatives.

The first is the notion that, if only the present showdown can be postponed, some yet undetected agent will save us from the final catastrophe. So people kept on hoping during the period when the Nazis, like the Communists today, moved triumphantly on the path of "peaceful" aggression and domination; and, despite the fact that history has completely discredited the Chamberlains and the Borahs, their ghosts go marching on. In view of the fact that the instruments of genocide will become more universal and more devastating, the sooner a showdown takes place the better—provided that we bring to the occasion positive plans and blueprints which will bring about a constructive resolution of our difficulties.

Almost as paralyzing is a kind of mental block which takes the form of saying: Politics is the "science of the possible." By this, those who take this position mean that any proposal which involves difficulties and sacrifices of a greater order than people normally accept must be carefully kept from view in order to spare the feelings of all concerned. But if the experience of the last fifteen years proves anything, this platitude is as empty as it is mealy-mouthed. In terms of the "science of the possible," England should have surrendered to Germany between July 1940 and June 1941. Actually, England was saved (and the world was saved, too) because Churchill told the English not what they would have liked to hear, but what they needed to hear in order to bear the day's burden. He told them that their lot would be all but insupportable and that he could promise them nothing in the way of immediate victory—nothing, indeed, except that they were about to live through their finest hour. If politics means anything today, it must become the "art of the *im*possible." The people who sacrifice every principle to expediency, every long-range plan to immediate profit, are the people who live in a world of slippery fantasies and self-deceptions. In terms of the "possible," we have only two courses open: suicide by appeasement or suicide by "war." Once we are ready seriously to canvass alternatives, we shall perhaps be surprised to find how wide a field is still open to exploration and action.

From 1941 onward, the United States fought a global war without identifying the real enemy and therefore without taking precautions against him when, under temporary pressure from the outside, he appeared in the guise of an ally. This enemy was and continues to be fascism. Because we failed to single him out, we made a series of shoddy deals with the enemy, disguised as Darlan, as Stalin, as Chiang Kai-shek, which culminated in the postwar period with our massive folly in rebuilding German power. We have achieved nothing, because of our persistent failure to identify the system that seeks to degrade and enslave mankind, and because instead we have centered our attack on the one element in Russia that is humanly defensible, whether or not it is desirable —its communism.



BEGGAR ON A MOSCOW SIDEWALK: 'SOVIET FASCISM IS HOSTILE TO THE MAJORITY OF ITS OWN CITIZENS'

Now fascism can be identified under all its guises by

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

three main characteristics, all of which must be present to differentiate it from slightly less poisonous kinds of authoritarianism and absolutism. *First:* a totalitarian political structure, governed by a permanent single party, using terrorism and enslavement as a method of political control. *Second:* an authoritarian ideological structure, committed to a single system of truths, not open to challenge from within or correction from without. *Third:* a monolithic economic structure organized primarily for the purpose of military ascendancy, with a policy of economic and military conquest framed solely to guarantee self-sufficiency and do away with the need for friendly international cooperation on a give-and-take basis.

On this carefully circumscribed definition, Soviet Russia has long been a full-fledged fascist state. This is the fundamental fact that made it so easy for Stalin to collaborate actively with Hitler from August 1939 to June 1941. Under the pressures and anxieties of the war, our government overlooked this critical fact about Soviet Russia; and, in the postwar revulsion, we made the mistake of identifying our enemy as Communism rather than fascism. For even the continued use of the ancient name of "Communist" is a fraud on the part of the Kremlin fascists.

If we have any serious intention of enlisting the peoples of the world in the cause of effective world government, the condition for justice and peace, we must correct the naive error we have made. It is not the communism of the Soviet Constitution, but the fascism of the Soviet Government, that presents the greatest obstacle to world cooperation. Our frozen official minds have not yet thawed sufficiently to realize that we cannot hope to transform official Soviet hostility and curb Soviet conquest without the active aid of millions of people who now loyally subscribe to the ideal of communism: the Welfare State writ large. Hundreds of millions of these people live in China, and India, and other parts of Asia, in the satellite countries, above all—one should emphasize—in Russia. Only a policy broad enough to include these great masses of impoverished and oppressed people, not by offering temporary gifts and sops but by long-term plans of world cooperation, can give us the lever necessary to dislodge the present masters of the Kremlin or, at the very least, bring about a radical alteration of their long-established policy.


The dynamic part of Soviet Communism consists of a technique of terrorism masked by an idea of human improvement. The deep appeal behind Communism is that of abolishing the exploitation of human beings through the private control of the means of production. Any nation or political group that hopes to achieve power and influence today must take this appeal as its starting point and show that there are better means of attaining it than through the technique of terrorism, suppression and party control that Russia has so efficiently perfected. To the monolithic economic system of the Soviets we should oppose, not a fictitious version of our own economy in an equally monolithic form, but the actual pluralistic system which allows the greatest variety and play to whatever economic forces and institutions, private or public, will efficiently further the common good. Just as our Constitution wisely provides for a mixed system of government, with democratic, oligarchic and monarchic features, so our own system of production has, by more empirical methods, become mixed; and the ability to change the proportions of private, cooperative and public enterprise has made it capable of meeting situations that would have ruined a more watertight capitalist system.

Though our country's educational system is as communistic in the Platonic sense as Russia's, we reduce our influence in other lands by pretending that we are governed only by the belief in private profit; if that were so, all our schools would be run privately, as they were in England early in the nineteenth century, and only the wealthy could afford an education. Similarly, the TVA is as characteristic of our American economy as du Pont or General Motors. To combat the Kremlin's false ideology, we must have something equally dynamic to give to the world; and we will awaken only jealousy, envy and resentment if we associate our international policy with the forces of monopolistic capitalism at home and reactionary class interests abroad. Eventually, we must bring forth within the United Nations proposals for promoting the welfare of humanity as a whole which will make as much sense to the Russians as to ourselves. *To contain Soviet Russia, we must include her.*

Fortunately, Soviet fascism is not merely hostile to every country outside the Iron Curtain; it is, by necessity, equally hostile to the majority of its own citizens, just to the degree that they have any tendency to act as autonomous groups or as self-directing persons. In this situation lies our strategic opportunity. What we can offer these people, through world government and peace, is not capitalism but freedom—freedom of association, freedom of speech and intercourse, freedom of travel, freedom of movement, freedom of choice. That freedom of choice involves the ability to accept or reject capitalism, socialism, cooperation or free enterprise or to determine their combination; the only freedom not open to any people is that of choosing fascism, for the sole reason that by its very nature it undermines and corrupts the possibility of human cooperation. Once we clarified this issue honestly, we could bring about a mobilization of humanity on behalf of world order; such a mobilization would shake the Kremlin worse than an earthquake. If the United States had the intelligence and spirit to lead such a campaign, it could turn the cold war into a genuine peace. Behind such a policy would be the great body of Americans who approved of such measures as Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan—people who, in view of the universal danger we share, are now ready for

far bolder measures, entailing even heavier immediate sacrifices.

Numbed by years of cold war, official Washington has not yet caught up sufficiently with the new demands of the world situation. They would doubtless excuse their backwardness by saying that they see no way of overcoming the deep Soviet hostility to international cooperation. In holding to this view, the State Department does the Russian Government the diplomatic courtesy of assuming that its present leadership is permanent and its present policy final. That view is possibly correct—but only provided the United States remains equally set



RANGE OF 1952 H-BOMB: COBALT IS MORE DEADLY

in all its present attitudes, including its opposition, more discreet but no less rigid than Russia's, toward surrendering a sufficient amount of American "sovereignty" to make world government possible. We cannot change the minds and methods of the Kremlin until we first change our own. Unless the American people brings into this situation leaders capable of halting our present fatal automatisms and making a fresh start, the outlook will grow increasingly darker.

We must replace the appeasers who have never understood fascism, in either its Nazi or its Communist forms, with militant leaders who know that we shall not prevail against the fascists of the "Left" with the aid of fascists of the Right, such as Franco, Chiang Kai-shek and the authoritarian leaders of a "united Germany." We must replace the hopeful romanticists, both military and political, who so consistently underrated Soviet Russia's and Communist China's present military strength by more able realists who do not make this error, but who also understand the nature of the Kremlin's potential political weakness. We ourselves must offer the choice, not between fascist domination by the Kremlin or capitalist domination by the United States, but between all forms of domination and the true alternative, active world cooperation, with the advanced nations lending their resources, their wealth, and above all their more mature political and technical leadership toward the uplift of the depressed and impoverished masses of mankind. We must reinforce the Voice of America, which can be easily muffled, with the Acts of America—acts so broadly conceived that they will make allies and co-partners of those who under present fascist (alias Communist) leadership have regarded themselves as inevitable enemies. To achieve this state, we must cleanse ourselves of the *counter-fascism* we have developed in responding to Soviet Russia's challenge. Above all, we must rid ourselves of fascism's secret weapon—the cult of official secrecy, with its menacing immunity to intelligent scrutiny and moral appraisal.

Any effective alternatives to catastrophe must be generously conceived: They must lead our one-time enemies, the Russians, no less than ourselves, to a common freedom and an open world. Such alternatives cannot be conceived in terms of furthering capitalist enterprise or national interest; but if we require a reminder of the imperative need for a more disinterested approach, we need only ask ourselves how much free enterprise would be left after a total war between Soviet Russia and the United States, or how much of the "American way of life" would remain operative in a world left totally in cindery, radioactive ruins? Between our present negative policy and one more generously conceived there is the difference that there is between fighting a disease and promoting health. Once the American people realize that there are active alternatives to our present policy, and a better strategy than containment and watchful waiting, they may turn the heat upon the frozen minds that have, in all good conscience, helped to create the present impasse.

In the utter hopelessness and panic of the depression in 1933, the audacious measures undertaken by the Roosevelt Administration, often in contradiction to preelection commitments, restored public confidence, encouraged enterprise and brought about production through hitherto unthinkable uses of public credit and public aid to the unemployed. That, in its way, was a miracle—comparable to the one needed today. So, too, the transformation of the skeptical, cynical, debunked, mainly pacifist younger generation of Americans into tough fighters who beat the Nazis at their own game; what was that, whether viewed as a technical or as a moral achievement, if not a gigantic miracle? No change that these young men underwent to prepare themselves for combat is harder than that which we must now collectively make under equally dire compulsion in order to lay the foundations for peace.

Countries that possess our present instruments of unlimited genocide must either bring about *an open world* or perish within a closed world. The miracle of stopping our present war with Russia and averting total catastrophe is still within human scope. It will require intelligence, imagination and audacity, all on a heroic scale but by no means of a superhuman order. These qualities exist in every country. Let us put them to work before it is too late.

Revd

[Reprint January, 1954]

DECLARATION OF THE DUBLIN CONFERENCE

Dublin, N. H., October 16, 1945.

OWEN J. ROBERTS, *Chairman*

1510 Morris Bldg.,
Philadelphia 2, Pa.

ROBERT P. BASS,

Peterborough, N. H.

GRENVILLE CLARK, *Secretary,*

Dublin, N. H.

THOMAS H. MAHONY,

70 State St.,
Boston, Mass.

Sponsors of the Conference.

ALAN CRANSTON, Chairman of
"The Dublin Conference Committee"
(Appointed October 16, 1945)

120 C St., N.E.
Washington, D. C.

DECLARATION OF THE DUBLIN CONFERENCE

Dublin, N. H., October 16, 1945

A conference of some 50 men and women, interested in world peace and world organization, met at Dublin, N. H., from October 11 to 16, 1945, to consider the question of how best to remedy the weaknesses of the United Nations Organization. The conference was called on the invitation of Hon. Owen J. Roberts, who recently resigned as Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hon. Robert P. Bass, former Governor of New Hampshire, Grenville Clark, lawyer, of New York, and Thomas H. Mahony, lawyer, of Boston, and Chairman of the Massachusetts Committee for World Federation. Judge Roberts presided at the conference.

Whatever may have been the efficacy of the United Nations Organization for the maintenance of international peace before August 6, 1945, the events of that day tragically revealed the inadequacy of that Organization thereafter so to do.

The application of atomic energy to warfare and impressive scientific evidence as to the consequences thereof have made the people of the world realize that the institution of war among nations must be abolished if civilization is to continue. The necessity of immediate action is urgent. There is not a moment to lose.

The menace of total war is of worldwide proportions, particularly in view of the present and future international tensions. The means of preventing war, of protection against it and of control of the major weapons by which it will be waged must also be of worldwide scope if our God-given human freedom and individual liberties are to be preserved and to be promoted.

It is almost axiomatic that there can be no peace without order and no order without law. There can be no world peace until there is world order based upon principles of the limitation and the pooling of national external sovereignty by all nations for the common good of mankind. The only effective means to create such a world order is to establish a world government and to delegate to it limited but definite authority to prevent war and to preserve peace. Such a Government should be based upon a constitution under which all peoples and nations will participate upon a basis of balanced representation which will take account of natural and industrial resources and other factors as well as population. It cannot be based upon treaties establishing leagues of sovereign states in which the states retain unlimited sovereignty and act and vote as states—as in the United Nations Organization.

Since the moral law applies to nations as well as to men and justice dictates the necessity of seeking the greatest good for the greatest number, such a world government must be a World Federal Government providing a minimum of centralized control in the World Government and a maximum of self government in the separate nations. This means unity of action in those things necessary to survival and freedom of action to the separate nations in all other matters.

Believing that the mounting waves of distrust and fear that threaten mankind may engulf us in a war which, in this atomic age, would destroy civilization and possibly mankind itself; and being convinced that the United Nations Organization is wholly inadequate to prevent war, a large majority of the conference proposes:

That a World Federal Government be created, with closely defined and limited power adequate to prevent war and designed to restore and strengthen the freedoms that are inalienable Rights of Man.

The specific measures proposed to attain this goal were embodied in the following resolutions:

FIRST: That the implications of the atomic bomb are appalling; that upon the basis of evidence before this conference there is no presently known adequate defense against the bomb and that there is no time to lose in creating effective international institutions to prevent war by exclusive control of the bomb and other major weapons.

SECOND: That the United Nations Charter, despite the hopes millions of people placed in it, is inadequate and behind the times as a means to promote peace and world order.

THIRD: That in place of the present United Nations Organization there must be substituted a World Federal Government with limited but definite and adequate powers to prevent war, including power to control the atomic bomb and other major weapons and to maintain world inspection and police forces.

FOURTH: That a principal instrument of the World Federal Government must be a World Legislative Assembly, whose members shall be chosen on the principle of weighted representation, taking account of natural and industrial resources and other relevant factors as well as population.

FIFTH: That the World Federal Government should have an executive body which should be responsible to the World Legislative Assembly.

SIXTH: That the Legislative Assembly should be empowered to enact laws within the scope of the limited powers conferred upon the World Federal Government, to establish adequate tribunals and to provide means to enforce the judgments of such tribunals.

SEVENTH: That in order to make certain the constitutional capacity of the United States to join such a World Federal Government steps should be taken promptly to obtain a Constitutional Amendment definitely permitting such action.

EIGHTH: That the American people should urge their Government to promote the formation of the World Federal Government, after consultation with the other members of the United Nations, either by proposing drastic amendments of the present United Nations Charter or by calling a new World Constitutional Convention.

The signers were:

FRANK ALTSCHUL ---------- 44 Wall St., New York, N. Y.
Banker, director Council on Foreign Relations, author "Let No Wave Engulf Us."

DOUGLAS ARANT ---------- 2100 Comer Bldg., Birmingham, Alabama.
Lawyer, formerly Pres. of Ala. Bar Assn. and Chairman of Committee on Bill of Rights of Am. Bar Assn.

HON. ROBERT P. BASS ---------- Peterborough, N. H.
Former Governor of New Hampshire, farmer, student of international relations.

HENRY B. CABOT ---------- 140 Federal St., Boston, Mass.
Lawyer, Chairman of "Committee of 1000" on international organization.

MISS MARIE J. CARROLL ---------- 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass.
Research, Director World Peace Foundation.

GRENVILLE CLARK, *Secretary* ---------- 31 Nassau St., New York, N. Y.
Lawyer, author of pamphlets and articles on world organization.

REV. EDWARD A. CONWAY, S. J. ---------- 1312 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D. C.
Clergyman, authority on international relations.

NORMAN COUSINS ---------- 25 West 45th St., New York, N. Y.
Editor of Saturday Review of Literature, writer on world organization.

EDWARD W. EAMES ---------- Headmaster, Gov. Dummer Academy, So. Byfield, Mass.
Pres. New England Assn. of Colleges & Schools.

THOMAS K. FINLETTER ---------- 2 Rector St., New York, N. Y.
Lawyer, author, director Americans United for World Organization.

MRS. RICHARD T. FISHER ---------- 9 Park St., Boston 9, Mass.
Director, Mass. Com. for World Federation.

TOM O. GRIESSEMER ---------- 29 East 28th St., New York, N. Y.
Exec. Secy. of Federal World Government, Inc.

CONRAD HOBBS ---------- 162 Riverway, Boston, Mass.
Director, Mass. Committee for World Federation.

PALMER HUTCHESON ---------- Esperson Bldg., Houston 2, Texas.
Lawyer, member Am. Bar Assn. Committee on world organization.

THOMAS H. MAHONY ---------- 70 State St., Boston, Mass.
Lawyer, consultant at San Francisco, Chairman of Mass. Committee for World Federation.

J. A. MIGEL ---------- 24 West 40th St., New York 18, N. Y.
Merchant, Treas. and director of Americans United for World Organization.

EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER ---------- 3301 Garfield St., N.W., Washington, D. C.
War correspondent and author, Pulitzer prize 1932.

HERBERT F. RUDD ---------- Durham, N. H.
Prof. of philosophy, Univ. of N. H.; writer on world organization.

RICHARD B. SCANDRETT, JR. ---------- 30 Pine St., New York, N. Y.
Lawyer, writer and editor, mem. American mission on German reparations, 1945.

LOUIS B. SOHN ---------- Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.
Student of international organization, writer.

HON. FOSTER STEARNS ---------- Hancock, N. H.
Former member of Congress, former member of U. S. diplomatic service.

ROBERT WHEELWRIGHT ---------- 262 Delaware Trust Bldg., Wilmington, Del.
Landscape architect, mem. Exec. Board of Federal World Government, Inc.

MAJOR PERKINS BASS, AAF ---------- Peterborough, N. H.
Lawyer.

LT. CHARLES G. BOLTE ---------- 554 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y.
Writer, veteran of British Army, Chairman of American Veterans Committee.

LT. KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., USNR ---------- 11 Berkeley Place, Cambridge, Mass.

SGT. ALAN CRANSTON, AUS ---------- 120 C St., N.E., Washington, D. C.
Foreign correspondent, author, "The Killing of the Peace".

LT. MARSHALL FIELD, JR., USNR ---------- Peterborough, N. H.
Lawyer.

LT. CORD MEYER, JR., USMCR ---------- 11 Berkeley St., Cambridge, Mass.
Aide to Commander Stassen at San Francisco, writer on World Organization.

LT. MICHAEL STRAIGHT, AAF ---------- 162 East 92nd St., New York, N. Y.
Writer.

LT. GRAY THORON, AUS ---------- 48 Wall St., New York, N. Y.
Lawyer.

(There were also present conferees in the uniform of the United States who, by reason of that fact alone, did not participate in the conclusions of the conference.)

These resolutions and a full report of the Conference are to be sent to the President, the Cabinet, all members of Congress, the Governors of the 48 States and to the officials and the members of the United Nations Assembly.

While there was complete agreement upon the necessity for world government, there was a small minority which differed from the majority upon the matter of procedure and the timing of any steps to be taken. They reported as follows:

> We do not join in the statement for these reasons: We agree with the object and, with some reservations, with the structure of the organization envisaged in the resolutions. We think, however, that simultaneously with efforts to attain a world federal government, the United States should explore the possibilities of forming a nuclear union with nations where individual liberty exists, as a step toward the projected world government.

OWEN J. ROBERTS,
A. J. G. PRIEST,
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
STRINGFELLOW BARR,
CLARENCE K. STREIT.

In addition to those signing the majority and minority reports, the following were present at some of the sessions:

FRANK AYDELOTTE ..... Princeton, N. J.
Pres. Institute for Advanced Study and formerly President of Swarthmore College, author.

HON. STYLES BRIDGES ..... United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Senator from New Hampshire, member of Foreign Relations Committee.

LOUIS FISCHER ..... Hotel Duane, 237 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y.
Writer and lecturer, author of "The Soviets in World Affairs", etc.

CHARLES W. FERGUSON ..... Pleasantville, N. Y.
Editor, Reader's Digest.

JOHN K. JESSUP ..... 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
Editor of "Life" and "Fortune", joint author of "Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco".

LT. EDWARD F. MAHONY, AUS ..... 170 Beacon St., Boston, Mass.

DONOVAN RICHARDSON ..... Boston, Mass.
Managing Editor, Christian Science Monitor.

EMERY REVES ..... 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
Publisher and author "The Anatomy of Peace", etc.

WINFIELD W. RIEFLER ..... Princeton, N. J.
Economist, Prof. at Institute for Advanced Study, author.

BEARDSLEY RUML ..... R. H. Macy & Co., New York, N. Y.
Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bank of N. Y., author.

HENRY D. SMYTH ..... Princeton, N. J.
Prof. of physics, Princeton Univ.; author of official report "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes", 1945.

CAPT. WAYNE D. WILLIAMS, AUS ..... 3811 39th St., N.W., Washington, D. C.
Lawyer, winner of 1944 Ross medal of Am. Bar Assn. for essay on world organization.

WILLIAM B. ZIFF ..... 1319 F St., N.W., Washington, D. C.
Publisher and author "The Coming Battle of Germany", etc.

It is expected that many others invited to the conference, but unable to be present, will adhere to the majority report.

THE ATOM:
Golden Windfall for Big Business

Pamphlet No. 259—Reprinted from October, 1954, Economic Outlook

The United States has spent $12 billion creating a great new public domain: our basic knowledge, technical know-how, and materials in the field of atomic energy, or nuclear fission.

Nuclear fission has demonstrated that it holds enormous potential values in peacetime commercial fields, including electric power production. Benefits are ready to be harvested in many peacetime civilian fields. There is evidence that electric power can now be produced, on a basis of government capital costs, at a saving in half or more of the United States.

Therefore there is a great drive underway to let private interests (composed almost entirely of the nation's biggest corporate giants) take over the commercial development of the atom, leaving the nation only the field of war uses.

The big private interests will not be satisfied with the right to own and/or use nuclear materials and patent the processes for their commercial use. They also want Uncle Sam to give them subsidies as well as the nation's multi-billion dollar assets, which include access to government-developed knowledge, discoveries and processes, a government market for by-products, and government underwriting of experimental work.

The drive to take over the atom was partly rebuffed by the 83rd Congress, as a result of the heroic fight of a few Congressmen and a small band of liberal Senators, later joined by most of the Senate Democrats. But it was also partly successful, and it is certain to go on as long as there is a potential mountain of gold at the end of the atomic rainbow for whatever predatory interests manage to capture it.

$12,000,000,000 at Stake

The stake is far more than $12 billion. Private interest spokesmen try to picture it as less. They deduct the value of the A-bombs and H-bombs the government has built from the $12 billion spent. Actually, however, *trillions of dollars* (thousands of billions) are involved in the energy field. Recoverable uranium is presently estimated to hold up to twenty-three times more energy than all the coal, petroleum, gas and other conventional fuels on and in the crust of the earth. This means thousands of billions of dollars in value in uranium for fuel alone.

Energy is but one field of atomic values. Revolutionary new chemical, metal, transportation, food production and preservation, medical and



Guernsey-Montgomery for the Economic Outlook, CIO.

other discoveries are being made. Tremendous new industries appear certain to evolve from this great new domain, now owned by all the people of the United States.

New metals have been produced, and new uses created for old ones, such as uranium itself, thorium, beryllium, zirconium and some others. Exposure of certain plastics to irradiation is reported to double the tensile strength. Radioactive materials are used to treat disease, to peer through metals and determine their structural soundness, to follow the use of fertilizer elements by plants, and of food and chemicals by living creatures. Plant experts now talk confidently of uncovering secrets of photosynthesis itself, the process by which plants turn the radiant energy of the sun into the chemical energy contained in food and fuels. The processes of breeding sturdier, more productive plants and animals have been speeded; the storability of some foods without refrigeration has been lengthened.

Our problem is how this great new atomic resource—and the atomic era—shall be permitted to come into being. It can loose social, economic and political forces as powerful as the physical force of the bombs themselves.

Shall the nuclear field be a government monopoly, giving government vastly extended new power over private enterprise?

Shall it be allowed to become a big business monopoly, further swelling the power of giant corporations, several of which already hold more assets and wield more economic power than entire states of the Union? A few colossal corporations already have a big head start into the atomic domain through familiarity and experience with nuclear affairs gained on Atomic Energy Commission projects at government expense.

Shall the atomic domain be opened fairly to all big and small businesses alike, through compulsory licensing of all patents for an extended period, or permanently?

Shall there be government yardsticks, as the Tennessee Valley Authority and Bonneville Power Administration have been yardsticks in the electric power field?

Shall private interests be given the power to bar competition and say who may or may not use key discoveries and inventions through monopoly patents?

Shall suppression of atomic processes by taking out patents and refusing to develop them be tolerated?

We may yet supply the answer to some of these questions through Congressional action because Congress halted an outright Atomic Give-Away in 1954. Congress provided a preference in the electric field for public and cooperative agencies, and, further, that any patents in the nuclear field issued in the next five years shall be subject to compulsory licensing.[1]

Except for these provisions, unquestionably the relatively few giant corporations who have been "insiders" in the atomic energy program would be busily taking over the atomic domain today.

How Big Business Got Inside

The effort in the 1954 Congress was to give the Power Trust and corporate giants already on the inside a quickie, quit-claim deed to the nuclear domain, except for war uses.

Highlights of the history of our atomic discoveries are needed to understand how these private power companies and a few big businesses, many with violations of anti-trust laws in their background, got in a pot to try to grab unchallenged control over peacetime uses of the atom.

Development of the atomic bomb for the United States government during World War II was under direction of the so-called "Manhattan District" commanded by General Leslie R. Groves.

The Dixon-Yates Deal

The proposal for two private utilities to supply power to TVA, on a contract with AEC, is not directly involved in basic problem of how nuclear energy is to be introduced into our economy. It's a side-issue. By the Dixon-Yates deal, President Eisenhower proposes to have AEC pay two giant utility companies (Southern Company and Middle South) more than $5,000,000 more per year to supply 600,000 kilowatts of power to TVA than it would cost TVA to build a plant and generate the power itself.


Even the Administration admits the cost will be $3,685,000 per year more.

The Dixon-Yates deal to favor private power and stop the growth of TVA, is pertinent to the basic policy issues involved in atomic energy only as it shows how far the present Administration is willing to go—with public assets—to "take care of" its big business friends.

Even with the 25-year contract, it will take from $100 to $140 million more of tax money to pay the Dixon-Yates power bill than it would cost if produced by TVA.

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[1] Efforts to determine the number of patent applications made on atomic discoveries or processes since Sept. 1, 1954, when the new Act became effective have been futile. The Patent Office, U. S. Department of Commerce, will not even reveal the number filed to the writer. It would be extremely revealing to know whether private interests are filing for patents under the compulsory licensing provision of the new Act, or holding off hoping another Congress will give them exclusive, unrestricted patent rights.



Economic Outlook, CIO.

Nuclear physicists, most of them educators, supplied the ideas. General Groves, following the military pattern, turned to huge corporations in the war period to build and operate the gigantic plants that were required.

At the end of the war, Congress determined to turn nuclear development over to a civilian commission. The law creating the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was signed by President Harry S. Truman and became effective on August 1, 1946. David E. Lilienthal, for years head of the world-renowned and successful public agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority, was installed as its head. Most liberals, therefore, assumed that the new Commission would speed atomic development and use it, as TVA had used electric power, to stimulate a vast expansion of private enterprise and improvement of our standards of living.

What "Fortune" Said

But in January, 1949, the great business magazine, *Fortune*, published an article on "The Atom and the Businessman" which should have destroyed the complacency of every liberal and even conservatives who still believe in real competitive enterprise. *Fortune* said:

> "The Atomic Energy Commission today, like the Manhattan District before it, deals largely with the biggest of big industry.
>
> "This policy leaves it politically vulnerable to charges of favoritism, of fostering and compounding monopoly, but it solves another problem that could plague the Commission even worse. The equations are:
>
> DEALING WITH BIG BUSINESS *equals* SMALL AEC
>
> DEALING WITH SMALL BUSINESS *equals* HUGE AEC
>
> and the Commission has chosen the former. With this limitation, there are only a few companies in group Five (e.g., the great chemical and electrical industries) that can even be considered as a means of directly fostering the Commission's work . . ."

The Tennessee Valley Authority built its dams itself and has operated its large generation and transmission system. It assembled a crew of experienced power dam builders (men who had built several dams), thereby reducing costs through direct construction by experienced men.

In contrast, the Atomic Energy Commission has contracted out engineering, construction, and operation of its projects, large and small, giving its private contractors access to all atomic secrets and both knowledge and experience in the nuclear field which other American businesses do not have.

Fortune listed among the huge participating companies:

> **E. I. duPont deNemours,** which built the Hanford plutonium-producing plant.
>
> **General Electric Co.,** which operates the Hanford plant for AEC—the first nuclear chemical factory in the world. (GE gets $1 profit, but has an interesting $2,400,000 annual "overhead" allowance in its contract.) General Electric operates also the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory at Schenectady and West Milton, N. Y.
>
> **Carbide and Chemical Corp.** a subsidiary of Union Carbide, prime contractor running the gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic operation plants at Oak Ridge, as well as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
>
> **Monsanto Chemical Co.,** a prime contractor at Clinton National Laboratory (Oak Ridge) now running the Mound Laboratory at Miamisburg, Ohio, for AEC.
>
> **Westinghouse Electric Co.** operating the AEC Bettis Plant near Pittsburgh, Pa.
>
> **Sandia Corporation,** a subsidiary of **Western Electric,** which operates the AEC Sandia Laboratory at Albuquerque, N. M.

Discussing the benefits which the great corporations receive from their contracts with the AEC, *Fortune* went into such items as "overhead" in their "$1-a-year" contracts, then it adds

an example of the biggest benefit to the corporate insiders:

> "As operator of the Knolls K-2 and the West Milton pile G.E. is in the first line of benefit from future atomic-power possibilities. It is obtaining immediate experience with a host of auxiliaries, isotopes, new instruments, new plant conceptions, new gadgets of every description. *It is able to train and develop men at government expense.*" (Our italics.)

In addition to its relatively few contractors, the AEC decided in May, 1951, to let four private electric utility and chemical "teams" participate in the atomic program by making studies of the feasibility of reactors which would change nuclear energy to electric energy. These teams were:

Detroit Edison Co. and Dow Chemical Co.

Union Electric of Missouri and Monsanto Chemical Co.

Commonwealth Edison of Chicago and Northern Illinois Public Service Co.

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and the Bechtel Corp. of San Francisco

At the time these study teams were let in, the AEC announced it would stop there for a time. What the public did not know was that the four private electric power utilities involved were close relatives.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, major stockholder in many large private power companies, is among the ten biggest stockholders in Detroit Edison, Pacific Gas & Electric and Commonwealth Edison. It is also one of the ten biggest stockholders in the Duquesne Light Company, of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania, which recently became the AEC's "partner" in the construction of a huge experimental reactor near Pittsburgh for the production of electric energy.

AEC will build the reactor. Duquesne will build the steam turbines and generator. President Eisenhower waved an atomic wand in Denver to start construction on the "Duquesne" plant. It got a big play in the press as the first great private utility project with the atom. Actually, Uncle Sam is taking all the risk—the taxpayers are paying for the atomic "boiler" and Duquesne is building only the generator portion which can be switched to conventional steam.

Besides Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, New York City there will be found amongst the 10 largest stockholders in Duquesne Light Co. many silk stocking companies, with directorates interlocking with scores of private electric power utilities all over the United States.

Is Economic Electricity Already Here?

How close is economic electric power generation from nuclear materials?

This is important because America needs low cost energy. It is required to assure expanding industries, increased productivity, new jobs, better standards of living, and to assure national security.

The President's Materials Policy Commission reported in 1951 that we must double our over-all energy production during the 1950-1975 period to permit normal national growth and maintain national security. We must boost electrical output even more than that—260 percent, for it is essential to the growth of key electric-process industries, including light metals of high priority for defense as well as nuclear fuels themselves. This means an unprecedented increase in generation installations every year. But the 1975 goal is already regarded in many quarters as too low. Obviously, low cost electricity from nuclear generators is needed. (For further detail, see the February, 1954, *CIO Economic Outlook*.)

There is clear evidence that it is feasible today to build reactors that can cut power costs in a large part of the United States if they are developed publicly.

Clyde T. Ellis, executive manager of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, has alluded to this in reports to his Association's recent regional meetings. There is real substance behind Ellis' allusion.

Last May 24, 1954, at a meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum in Washington, D.C., the head of General Electric Company's Atomic Products Division, Francis K. McCune, presented a paper on water and graphite reactors on which his company is working or studying.[2] G.E. is one of the AEC's biggest "insiders."

McCune gave detailed statistics on cost of generating electric power in a 300,000 kilowatt steam reactor or a 700,000 kilowatt graphite reactor. Basing his calculations on 5.7 percent return on capital and a like amount for federal, state and local taxes, McCune showed that power could be generated for:

Steam reactor.....6.7 mills per kilowatt hour
Graphite reactor.....6.8 mills per kilowatt hour

> "The value in the estimates given in Table VII (on the graphite pile) are derived from actual construction experience," Mr. McCune wrote. "There is no guesswork. G.E. has developed the engineering over many years of technical effort, and the basic engineering is essentially finished."

Taking these same calculations and substituting government costs (such as 2.5 percent instead of 5.7 percent interest on money), Leland Olds, former chairman of the Federal Power Commis-

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[2] An article based on this paper is in the July 12, 1954, issue of *Electrical World*.

sion and now a consultant at Public Affairs Institute, found that the government could produce power in the same reactors at from 4.2 to 4.4 mills, using the same assumptions as G.E. as to load factor and depreciation allowances.

Allowing for transmission costs, the former Power Commission chairman found that REA wholesale loads, at only 56 percent load factor, could be served by REA generation reactors at from 8.1 mills per kilowatt hour.[3]

REA's in half of the states in the United States are paying 8.5 mills per kilowatt hour or more for wholesale power today. They include:

	Mills		*Mills*
Illinois	**8.5**	**New Hampshire**	**11.4**
Kansas	**8.5**	**Delaware**	**11.9**
Colorado	**8.6**	**Vermont**	**12.6**
Indiana	**8.7**	**Michigan**	**12.7**
Nebraska	**8.9**	**Iowa**	**12.8**
West Virginia	**9.0**	**North Dakota**	**12.9**
Ohio	**9.1**	**South Dakota**	**12.8**
Missouri	**9.6**	**Utah**	**13.2**
Florida	**9.7**	**Wisconsin**	**13.6**
Maryland	**10.0**	**New Jersey**	**13.7**
Pennsylvania	**11.0**	**Minnesota**	**13.9**
New York	**11.2**	**Maine**	**15.1**


Generation of power from coal-produced steam is costing 9 mills in Boston and other New England areas, 100 percent more than the generation costs estimated for a publicly-financed reactor.

Following McCune's revelation of attainable nuclear generated electric power at private costs, a new type of reactor has been announced by the AEC using a liquid-metal heat transfer agent (instead of steam.) *Electrical World* describes it as the most efficient reactor planned to date, even more economical than those upon which G.E. based its calculations.

Development of reactors is in its infancy. Many materials used in the construction, in transfer of heat from the fissioning mass to the generator, in slow-down of neutrons to breed new fuel, and in the fuel element itself, are yet to be tried. New discoveries in this field are sure to bring further economies. The research is now in progress.

By-products coming from the generator reactors will undoubtedly cut power costs. Prospective by-products include new fissionable fuel bred in the reactors at the same time they are creating heat for the electric generators, isotopes (radioactive materials) useful in industry, science, medicine and agriculture. Even the radioactive materials coming from the fuel piles, which are

[3] Olds also computed costs at 3 percent depreciation, instead of 1.8 percent allowed by G. E., a figure closer to government depreciation practice. This raises cost slightly, but would leave the nuclear generated power competitive, or better, in all the states listed above.



*ESTIMATED BY LELAND OLDS
Economic Outlook, CIO.

now treated as wastes, are being investigated for uses and values.

The revenue from by-products will of course reduce the generating bill.

There is the promise of abundant low cost energy for the nation from the atom in the future, and not too far in the future, either.

But will it be advanced or delayed by letting private power companies patent key processes, by withholding government yardstick operations and virtually surrendering this domain to the Power Trust?

Our Experience With Power Monopoly

History indicates that the advent of abundant, low cost atomic power will be greatly retarded and held back if private industry captures it.

High, private capital charges are today an obstacle to power reactors that would be economical for large areas of the United States.

Our experiences with the power companies have always been unhappy: they are intent on high rates for a scarcity of power rather than a fair rate for an abundance of power. It has required government action to break this bottleneck.

The story of how TVA, the Bonneville Power Administration and a few fine municipal systems like those in Tacoma, Washington, and Los Angeles, California, have broken the private high-cost—scarcity formula of the private companies in their areas is familiar to most Americans.

These yardstick operations have proved that low power rates mean tremendously increased use of electricity and higher revenue for power companies. For the most part, companies in yardstick areas have been slowly forced to lower rates by government yardsticks. None have gone

broke. Instead, they have increased profits, selling more units of power at lower rates.

But despite these examples, companies remote from public yardstick power plants stick to high rates. New England is an example.

A shocking example of the private power industry's reluctance to make power available to U. S. citizens occurred in the rural electrification field. The Power Trust fought creation of the Rural Electrification Administration. After it was created, the Power Trust spokesman (Grover Neff of Wisconsin Power & Light) wrote the REA Administrator that all farms which needed electricity had it. Less than 15 percent were then served.

All through the Thirties and the Forties, the power companies opposed REA appropriations in Congress on the grounds that the job was done, all farms had power which needed it. Today nearly 90 percent of farms do have power, but only because the Power Trust lost their fights to stop the job at 20 percent, 25 percent, 30 percent and every other level on the way up.

What the Liberal Senators Fought For

During the 83rd Congress, the press made it appear that liberal Senators who conducted the extended debate on the Atomic Energy Bill were fighting for a government monopoly over the atom. This was not true.

They were fighting for: 1) preference for public bodies and co-ops in access to publicly-owned nuclear materials and licenses to build power plants; 2) yardstick plants to be built by the government; 3) private licensing but with safeguards of the same sort as those in the Federal Power Act governing hydro sites; and 4) safeguards to prevent either patents or licenses from being used to extend monopoly, or to suppress and limit the use of atomic processes in a free, competitive society.

The foes of the Atomic Give-Away succeeded in amending the Act to provide the preference for public and co-op agencies, to require notice to interested public agencies when electric power licenses are pending, and for compulsory licensing of the use of any private patent filed in the next five years.

But these liberal foes of the Atomic Give-Away were unable to get amendments placing the Federal Power Act safeguards around private licenses to use nuclear materials, to authorize construction of public yardstick reactors by federal power agencies which lack such authority, and to extend the period for compulsory patent licensing from five years to at least ten years, or indefinitely.

Their victories were barely sufficient to "hold the line" against a complete Give-Away until another Congress can act.

Just how nuclear-generated electricity shall be "brought in" to our American society, by government monopoly, private monopoly, or a mixed government-private development with public recapture always possible, can yet largely be settled by Congress if it takes action when it meets in 1955 to protect the public's rights.


Who Gets the Industrial "Pot of Gold?"


The electric power potentialities of the atom are but one of many of its promises for a new era.

The public has been permitted to have some glimpses at terrific advances being made in our basic knowledge, and at some very practical results stemming from the use of radioactive materials in medicine and agriculture. More about these fields later.

There has been less public, unrestricted discussion of potential commercial developments. We know that a great new nuclear plant engineering field has been opened up; there is a demand for new types of equipment, new types of controls, measuring instruments, a whole Montgomery-Ward catalogue of new-type supplies for this $10 billion industry. As presently managed, only the insiders (some of the biggest of big business) know fully and precisely the nature of even this field.


It is known that entirely new materials are created by radiation; the new atomic fuel metals, plutonium and U-233, bred from U-238 and thorium, are examples. One AEC contractor in the plastics field has subjected plastics to irradiation. There is a report that it doubled the tensile strength of vinyl plastic. Radiation does change the nature and quality of many materials, creating both problems and opportunities.





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Will They Develop All Uses of Atomic Energy?



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The potentialities of this whole field of new materials can only be guessed by the "insiders," who are training their people at government expense and obviously getting a long head start over all competitors who are on the outside and cannot get full information. Much of the secrecy in this field is defended on the ground that its public release would aid the Communists.

There is a potentially huge industry ahead in the production of radioactive isotopes. Isotopes are chemicals made radiant by exposure in a reactor. The Atomic Energy Commission now produces many radioactive elements which are used by scientists in hundreds of research projects. Some have industrial uses, too.

Most of the isotopes go to researchers at a fraction of their actual cost. But at some point, perhaps just beyond the basic science research field, private interests want the right to commercialize this field and take over the making and selling of isotopes for profit.

In all of these fields, and others, the right to seventeen-year exclusive, private patents is sought. The toughest fight in the Congressional battle over the Atomic Act of 1954 was on this point: immediate exclusive private patents vs. mandatory licensing of any patents issued (which means letting others use, for a fair royalty, any patent obtained).

Under the Act finally passed, exclusive patents will be available in the atomic field after five years.

There will be efforts both to eliminate this time period, and to lengthen it. Some want exclusive patents right now. Others strongly contend that this should never be permitted.

Other Civilian Uses of Atomic Energy

The development of practical peacetime benefits from the atom in the medical and agricultural fields is a contrasting study.


Public agencies (universities, colleges, hospitals, and farm experiment stations) are conducting scores of projects using atomic materials. Great progress and practical, useful results have been developed.

Doctors are studying the effect of radiation on humans and human diseases, including cancer. They are using isotopes (chemicals which have been radioactive) to study every sort of body function, nutrition, the use the body makes of chemicals in foods, the effect of medicines in every subdivision of medical practice.

The same sort of work is being done in agriculture in relation to both plants and animals.

The biggest goal in agricultural research is to learn how plants turn the sun's radiant energy into chemical energy, that is into the foods and fuels that provide human strength, heat and power. Several chemical processes involved in changing the sun's energy to chemical energy have been traced. Scientists are talking confidently of unravelling this secret, which would be as important as the release of nuclear energy itself.

Many people think that controlled use of the



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energy of the sun will be more important, and come sooner than major use of nuclear power.

But while several groups of scientists work on photosynthesis, more than 150 agricultural projects are under way in 40 states in public plant and animal research centers.

Experiments include 35 on soils and fertilizers, 29 on plants and plant chemistry, many on animal genetics, nutrition, physiology and biochemistry, several on food preservation, insects, etc.

Here are some significant developments:

A new strain of oats, which resists the sort of rust which has ruined our last three durum wheat crops, was developed in one and a half years. Peanuts that resist leaf wilt and produce 30 percent more goobers have been produced.

Exposing pollen to radiation speeds up plant mutations (abnormal offspring). For example, 26,000 grains of ordinary corn yielded 28 irregulars in one experiment. But 1,600 grains from irradiated corn yielded 110.

Most mutations are bad, or deleterious. But a few are good. The scientists cultivate the mutations. If they are looking for a rust resistant plant, they expose the planting to rust. Then they pick out the stems that resist the rust, gather the seed from them and start breeding up the rust resistant strain.

Such plant irradiation is done with a slug of radioactive material in the center of a field. It is rigged so it can be lowered in the ground while workers are in the field. Plants are put in circles around it. Exposure to radiation is varied by distance from the center, or by moving potted plants in and out of the field.

Obviously, the fight on plant diseases and the search for more abundant producing crops has been speeded many years by the atom.

Our Situation Today

The Congress got caught unprepared this year by the drive for a quick, quit-claim Give-Away of atomic energy.

The old atomic energy law established a procedure for opening up the commercial atomic field. It directed the Atomic Energy Commission, when commercial processes appeared feasible, to prepare a study of social, economic, political, and international effects that the development would have.

The AEC ignored this duty. They said no one could predict the effects of releasing atomic processes to private enterprise. They pooh-poohed the idea that electric power generation would come soon, intimating that was about the only development that is even close.

It was urged that we let private enterprise in, that we could regulate the use of the nuclear arts after it was demonstrated what they would do to our society. This ignored the fact that the processes would by them all be patented and under control.

The partial victory of liberals in the electric power and patent fields has made it possible for another Congress to establish the pattern under which the nuclear arts, atomic energy, are released into our society. A little may be gnawed away under the existing act before another Congress can amend the Act of 1954. But establishing the major pattern is still possible.

The decision roughly is between government monopoly, private monopoly dominated by business giants whose power in our society will be enhanced many times over, and the sort of middle course for which the liberals in Congress battled in July, 1954.

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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

718 JACKSON PLACE, N. W. WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

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