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Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

As an Instrument in International Relations

by

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PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AS AN INSTRUMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

from

REMARKS ON AN ATOMIC POWER DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM ABROAD

by

ROBERT MCKINNEY

to

THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB
New York, New York

May 17, 1956

and to

THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
Congress of the United States
Washington, D. C.

May 28, 1956

The Argument:

Military aid, conventional economic and technical aid, are no longer adequate instruments in international relations. New ways and means must be found to meet the Soviet threat.

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The peaceful uses of atomic energy can make the difference between healthy growth and arrested development in the fuel-short, energy-short regions abroad, where world leadership will be decided. Yet these regions which have the most need for peaceful atomic uses now have the least chance of getting them by themselves. If we do not provide them, others will. A broad atomic assistance program must be made an integral part of our structure of international relations.

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To keep our leadership, the United States must develop the resources of atomic energy—especially power—at high priority. This urgency does not derive from any present domestic shortage of conventional fuels or electric power, or from any need at home for a lot of power plants simply to look at, brag about and subsidize.

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Atomic power costs more today than conventional power in the United States. To bring costs down, "demonstration" plants must be built. We have a domestic "demonstration" program. The places to build additional demonstration plants, now, is in those regions abroad where conventional power is high cost and where atomic power is most likely to pay its own way.

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An International Atomic Power Demonstration Program would salvage at moderate cost the billions we have invested in foreign aid, would help meet the Soviet threat, and would provide the powerful new instrument in international relations which the United States now seeks.

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy as an Instrument in International Relations

Recently I had the privilege of hearing the President deliver his foreign policy address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. In this address, the President proposed the establishment of a non-partisan citizens' commission to review our international policies and to recommend additional ways and means of meeting the new aspects of the Soviet threat.

The various Administrative agencies and Congressional committees concerned have likewise been giving deep study to the many facets of this grave problem — as have all those in private life to whom other cares seem trivial when considered in the light of America's changing place in the changing world.

Mr. Eisenhower made specific point that any person who sees or believes he sees some of the basic factors in the problems facing the nation, and who has some little ability or opportunity to explain them to others, has the responsibility to do so.

The President's statement started me thinking about how the study of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, made by our Citizens' Panel for the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, could be brought to bear to help suggest additional ways and means to meet the Soviet threat.

In our international chapter, the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy reported that:

> "The humanitarian applications of atomic energy can make significant contributions to the health and prosperity of peoples throughout the world . . .
>
> "Atomic power may be the most tangible symbol of America's will to peace through the peaceful atom. Our domestic needs cannot be our only motivation. Otherwise, we leave without effective rebuttal the argument that America is so rich, so prosperous, that a revolutionary new energy resource can emerge

without any urgent need on our part to put it to man's use. This must seem a strange position indeed to peoples possessing neither conventional fuels nor technical capabilities to put the atom to work.

"If we fail to act to bring atomic power to the free world, other countries will do so ahead of us, or progress will proceed at a slower pace.

"Peaceful uses of atomic energy will inevitably be developed throughout the world. The United States must lead."

The Problem

The Soviet threat, of course, does not arise from any scarcity of electric power in the United States, nor from the possibility that atomic electric power may soon be generated in quantity in Russia.

The problem is not a present shortage in the United States of energy resources.

I believe the real problem is:

HOW CAN WE PUT A STOP TO DETERIORATION OF AMERICA'S POSITION OF LEADERSHIP ABROAD?—AND HOW CAN WE RESTORE THE FAITH THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD ONLY RECENTLY PLACED IN THE UNITED STATES AS A SYMBOL, NOT ONLY OF MATERIAL, BUT ALSO OF MORAL PROGRESS?

I believe that this deterioration can be stopped, this faith restored through the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I firmly believe this for one fundamental reason. The reason is that the peaceful uses of atomic energy have completely captured the imaginations of the peoples of the world.

And this fact leads to two basic propositions:

The first proposition is this: That the peaceful development of atomic energy gives the United States an opportunity such as we never had before to win respect, goodwill and friendship throughout the world.

The second proposition is: That we must grasp this opportunity *now*—and by now I mean immediately—because we will never have it again.

These are pretty broad statements. But to me they are the only conclusions which can logically flow from the demonstrable facts.

For the first of these "demonstrable facts," let us

look at where the United States stands today in relation to the uncommitted nations of the world.

In Ceylon an election is held and it is assumed that the government earnestly friendly to the United States will be re-elected. But this government is soundly beaten by an opposition which says that, because it is anti-colonial, it must therefore be anti-American. Coming elections in Iceland, Nepal and elsewhere seem to be shaping up the same way.

In the Middle East we painfully build a structure of military alliances shored up with conventional military and economic aid, along the so-called Northern Tier, feeling sure that the Arab region to the South is safe. Suddenly we find the Arab nations turning against us, and the balance of power in the area tipping toward Russia.

America is learning the hard way that the expensively and painfully won goodwill of governments lasts no longer than the governments themselves last. Only rarely does it carry over to the people.

This is true not only of former colonial countries now going through the growth pains of national, political and economic independence. It is true also of many established, industrialized nations.

It is true of countries with which we have formed defensive alliances and to which we have given billions in military aid. It is true of nations to which we have given billions in economic aid. It is a fact which has become increasingly clear in just the last few months since the Russians made a scapegoat instead of a saint out of Stalin, turned the guillotine into a maypole, and put on the market their new tactic of Soviet service with a Soviet smile.

A New Element

So the first demonstrable fact which I would like to discuss is this: We need some other element—something besides defense alliances and military aid, something besides conventional technical and economic assistance. We need it to convince the peoples of the world, as well as their leaders, of what we have been trying for the last

decade but so far have failed to convince them of—that the United States is truly their friend and deserves their respect and trust.

The second demonstrable fact is that the peaceful uses of atomic energy can provide the new element, the new ways and means we need. But the whole subject of atomic energy is one which to most Americans is a kind of hazy, indistinct Land of Pie in the Sky and Wishful Thinking.

Permit me to tell you why I think the peaceful uses of atomic energy have such a great potential as an instrument in international relations.

A year ago I had a call from my neighbor, Senator Clinton P. Anderson, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. He asked me to take the chairmanship of a non-partisan, nine-man citizens' panel which was to look into the progress being made in peaceful atomic uses, and was to measure their impact on the nation and world.

Although I did not realize it at the time, when I took this job I was getting the opportunity for an education so broad, so intense that it has amounted almost to a revelation.

Now, I am not trying to set up as an atomic authority after a nine-months course. But the work of the panel brought to bear the cumulative thinking of several hundred authoritative individuals and organizations in close to a hundred special studies.

From our research study group, led by Nobel prize winner, Dr. I. I. Rabi—to our medical study led by the eminent authority on atomic medicine, Dr. Shield Warren—to our agricultural study led by the Undersecretary of Agriculture, True D. Morse—to our power study composed of forty outstanding authorities in all forms of energy—we tried to bring to bear the collective knowledge of the whole nation on the probable impact of the peaceful uses of atomic energy at home and abroad.

Quiet Revolutions

Here are just a few of the highlights of peaceful atomic uses that these experts brought out:

Atomic electric power is here. But it will not be until the third or some subsequent generation of

atomic power plants that atomic power will be broadly competitive in the United States.

In agriculture, new plant strains have already been developed through atomic radiation—barley, oats, wheat, corn and peanuts—to name just a few. These new strains yield more, are better adapted to mechanical harvesting, and better able to resist drought, bad soil, pests and diseases. One of the most damaging pests to cattle raisers—the screw-worm fly—has been eradicated from an entire Caribbean island in a test of a new atomic radiation technique.

Hundreds of atomic applications are working quiet revolutions in almost every phase of American industry.

In medicine, two radioactive isotopes are now accepted pharmaceuticals—fifty thousand patients have already been treated with radio-isotopes—and half a million others have been given atomic medical diagnosis.

Atomic food preservation has been brought to the point where irradiated foods are being tested on human beings.

Although there are many other examples, these early accomplishments only scratch the surface.

Agricultural researchers foresee the day when we can tailor-make plants for specific growing conditions in specific regions; when we can breed color and taste and size into our food products to suit consumer preferences; when we may understand the mysterious process of photosynthesis by which plants make proteins and carbohydrates.

Within one or two decades, a large part of our ocean-going tanker and ore-carrier fleets may be running on atomic power.

Within twenty-five years we may be producing more electricity in this country in atomic power plants than we produce today from coal, oil and falling water.

These predictions may sound fantastic, but they do not come from Sunday supplement writers. They are conservative forecasts by hard-headed men. And I have been careful in relaying these things to you not to inject into them the coloring of my own enthusiasm.

As the panel's study progressed, I came to recognize a tremendously important facet of this

complex subject of atomic energy which so far has received little attention.

This facet is that it is precisely those countries which have the most need for peaceful atomic uses *now* that have the least chance of getting them by themselves any time soon.

Let me be specific. Atomic techniques can make farming productive in many areas where today it is either impossible or, at best, marginal. In the United States farm surpluses are serious problems. Atomic techniques which would add to these surpluses are certainly not essential. But in many other countries, in North Africa, Egypt, India and the Far East—hunger—the stomach instead of the head—is the only influence which motivates hundreds of millions of people.

A New Hunger

There is another kind of hunger—the hunger of nations for fuel and power, the hunger which comes from not having enough energy resources. We in America have never felt that hunger. Even without atomic energy, we will not run out of coal or oil in our lifetimes.

One of the useful by-products of the Panel report was to put our reserves of conventional fuels in their true light. A panel study group, headed by Wallace E. Pratt, and working from new data provided in confidence by twenty-eight leading oil companies, put together an estimate of domestic and world crude petroleum reserves which has had revolutionary impact not only on thinking in the oil industry, but in the chanceries of the great powers.

The previous best estimate of proved domestic crude petroleum reserves was 29 billion barrels; our Panel report increased the figure to 35 billion. As for proved reserves in the Middle East, the previous best estimate was 97 billion barrels. Our Panel report—and I believe it realistic and hard-headed—put proved Middle East reserves at 230 billion barrels.

As for coal, we found that domestic reserves, recoverable at or near present costs, equated out to around 500 years' supply at present rates of consumption.

Other countries of the world are less fortunate,

however. The same coal which costs utility plants $8 a ton in U. S. industrial centers, costs $22 a ton or more delivered abroad. Yet so fuel-short, so energy-short are other countries that English, Italian and German industrialists—to name only a few—are over here trying to make five and seven year contracts for this $22 a ton coal in quantity.

It is in the fuel-short, energy-hungry economies of these other countries—some already highly industrialized and some in process of industrialization—that atomic energy can make the difference between healthy growth and arrested development.

The Challenge

Right here is the crux of what I would like to say. *It is in this imbalance that I see our challenge and our opportunity.* We in this country are sometimes indifferent, sometimes hostile, sometimes prone to misuse to lesser ends the promise that atomic energy holds. But to the rest of the world, atomic energy looms in magnified perspective because it is the only real chance for a good life in this generation.

Whenever the United States drops some hint that we are ready to give atomic aid, the world response has surprised even those few Americans who fully appreciate the power and scope of peaceful atomic uses.

There was initially such a response to President Eisenhower's Atoms-for-Peace Plan, announced over two years ago. There was such a wave of enthusiasm when the United States pulled back the curtain of atomic secrecy a little bit at last summer's Geneva atomic conference. And yet what concrete steps have we taken?

These waves of enthusiasm show a basic fact about atomic energy. It is not just one more medium of economic aid or technical assistance—we can keep on giving conventional aid at the cost of billions, without lasting effect.

Today the United States is the most advanced nation in the development of peaceful atomic uses. But we have learned once before, to our regret, that any lead in the atomic race can be a transient thing. There is no law that the nations

of the world must always come to us for atomic knowledge and equipment. On the contrary, there is an inexorable law of human nature that if men want something badly enough, they will go get it wherever they can. And we can be certain, with the new Soviet tactic of service with a smile, that it will not be too long before the whole range of peaceful atomic applications will be made available by Russia, even if not by us.

This leaves us with only one course of intelligent action — we must make a broad atomic assistance program an integral part of our international relations.

'Secrecy'

Why, then, when we have been spending billions in economic aid abroad, have we been so backward with the most advanced, the most dramatic—even perhaps the cheapest—form of foreign aid?

The reason is one word, "security." We have been afraid that other nations might misuse the information and the materials we would give them. As a result of this fear, we have tied the hands of our government and our private businessmen with secrecy restrictions.

We cannot quote abroad the actual prices of atomic fuels. We are afraid that these prices might reveal our rate of weapons material production. Yet, without knowing these prices, no nation can come to its own conclusions as to its own economics of atomic power.

Some reactor technology we can disclose to foreign nations, but we cannot tell them whether it is the latest available. Thus, a foreign nation cannot tell whether atomic equipment it might get from us has been obsolete for years.

Under our secrecy restrictions foreign scientists and engineers, studying in our atomic facilities, can have access only to information which has been thoroughly declassified. Our newspapers are not able to give the real picture of the state of our atomic technology. All down the line, secrecy restrictions prevent us from dealing frankly and openly in peaceful atomic uses.

But Not 'Security'

But is "secrecy" really "security"? To me the

only answer is No. The time has come to stop thinking solely about what atomic energy can do *to* the world. We must think also about what it can do *for* the world.

At the present stage of world atomic development, the degree of risk involved is small—particularly because I do not call for any total disclosure in all categories of atomic information. I ask only that atomic electric power technology be shared with other nations. Specific military applications of this technology we should continue to keep secret.

Whatever risk we might run by bringing this information to bear for peaceful uses throughout the world would be infinitely smaller than the risk involved in our losing world leadership. On letting down these bars of secrecy, the road is clear for making the peaceful uses of atomic energy an important instrument in our international relations.

A Million Kilowatts Abroad

The nine members of our Citizens' Panel all felt that one of our most important conclusions was the need for immediate affirmative action in the field of peaceful atomic developments abroad. We recommended that the United States furnish nuclear fuels, give technological assistance, and permit contracts for the installation of at least one million kilowatts of atomic electric generating capacity outside the United States as soon as possible—we hoped by 1960.

These recommendations we presented to the Joint Congressional Committee January 30th. On February 23rd, President Eisenhower set aside 20,000 kilograms of nuclear fuel for use abroad. My own rough calculations, based on assumptions including material grade and reactor type, indicate some measure of equivalence between the President's 20,000 kilograms and the Panel's one million kilowatt goal.

But just making fissionable material available does not build reactors. Two years ago, the United States set aside 200 kilograms of nuclear fuel for research reactors to be built abroad. Yet today only one research reactor fueled with American nuclear fuel is in operation on foreign

soil—the one we built for the Geneva Atomic Conference and later sold to Switzerland.

Here's How

I would like to propose a way for us to go about getting atomic power reactors built abroad. To make my proposal clear, let us first look at how we are doing it at home.

We now have under way in this country what we call a power reactor demonstration program, being financed jointly by business and government. As part of this program, 7 plants totalling between 800,000 and one million kilowatts of electric power capacity will probably be finished by 1962. The total cost to the Government and participating private business groups will be in the neighborhood of 300 to 350 million dollars.

There are some who feel that this domestic atomic power demonstration program is lagging and that a crash program is required lest the United States "lose the atomic power race." In that connection, hearings are currently going forward before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy to determine whether, in effect, the present domestic demonstration program should be doubled by directing the Atomic Energy Commission to build, with public funds, six more nuclear power demonstration plants, in different geographical sections of the United States, over and above and in addition to the reactor development program now being carried out by the Commission.

Consideration of the proposal outlined in the "Gore Bill"—Senate Bill 2725—calls for three different determinations:

(1) Whether the present demonstration program is in fact lagging, and, if so, in what respect lagging.

(2) Whether additional demonstration plants would serve any useful purpose; if so, what purpose; and, if built, where they should be built.

(3) Whether enlargement of the demonstration program should be on a "crash" basis; and, if so, what are our capabilities in technical manpower and facilities for a crash program.

The nation is now looking to the statesmen on the Joint Committee to establish the real facts, to measure the real needs, and determine the best means whereby the peaceful uses of atomic energy in general, and atomic power in particular, can be brought most efficiently and beneficially to the United States and the world.

I am confident that the Joint Committee will keep the scientific, engineering and technical problem of harnessing the atom separate from unrelated political controversies.

The Present Program

Our Panel had this to say of the Domestic Atomic Power Demonstration Program:

"For the growth of any nuclear power generating capability to occur in the United States, it must be firmly based on technological knowledge, and in engineering and operating experience. The required technological, engineering, and operating data can come only from research, development, and construction of plants of experimental, pilot and full-scale size. This takes time. New accomplishments in fuel fabrication and reprocessing, as well as in the broad fields of chemistry, metallurgy and physics are required. Experience of the past 5 years makes it clear that such developments can only be accomplished in an orderly way. Frequently they hold little immediate promise for private profitability, since there are as yet no markets in which such developments can be exploited. This is the fundamental reason why Government has had to bear the initial responsibility for exploration of this potential resource. As the day draws closer when economic feasibility can be foreseen, industry has indicated an ever-increasing willingness to assume a share of the responsibility.

"Impact from atomic power can come from exploring this field technologically, as well as from its commercial application. Thus two different determinations, as yet not clearly embodied in Government policy, must be made as to the urgency of getting on with atomic power. The first relates to the need for or desirability of technological development of atomic energy as a power resource; the second, related to the first, involves the rate at which this resource should be commercially developed.

"The prospect of an indefinitely expanding national economy which may require as much as 600 million kilo-

watts of installed electric-generating capacity or more by 1980 makes it clear that the Commission must explore this nuclear resource by a continuous program as promptly and efficiently as possible. In doing so it will be necessary not only to build pilot or experimental nuclear plants, but also full-scale "demonstration" atomic power plants of each new and promising major reactor size and type. These are essential to permit development of the kind of engineering and operating data required for any intelligent decision as to how this particular resource can best serve the nation.

"Private enterprise should carry a substantial part of the burden of research and development, including construction and operation of full-scale "demonstration" plants. By "demonstration" we mean providing experimental and engineering data from which economic feasibility can be deduced reasonably. Where private enterprise does not assume the risk, we believe that the Commission should support expeditious development, if necessary, even up to and including construction of one "demonstration" plant of each major reactor size and type with public funds. In any event, we believe that continuing responsibility should rest with the Commission to encourage, and, where necessary, support basic research and development in this field . . .

"The "Demonstration" plants now underway are exclusively large—over 60,000 kilowatt-plants. Taken together, they constitute an orderly and sound exploration of atomic energy as a power resource for large integrated electric utility systems in mature industrial economies.

"An invitation has been extended by the Commission for proposals for small to medium-sized atomic-power "demonstration" plants. Such plants, on becoming economically competitive, could constitute especially suitable power sources in the United States for small, non-integrated or rural utility systems, and for single or remote industrial or mining power users. As a type, they would be far more suitable in many foreign markets than larger-sized nuclear plants.

"We recognize that small and medium-sized atomic power plants were thought less likely to be economically competitive at an early date, for technical reasons. The importance of such plants, however, on the international scene—as well as on the domestic—and the opportunity which they afford for a bold demonstration of United States technological leadership give their development a high sense of urgency. The present development program is therefore deficient to the extent that appropriate "demonstrations" of the small and medium-sized types are not now underway."

That much we said in the Panel Report.

The New Program

Now I would like to go beyond that Report and make a new recommendation, based on my own personal opinion as one private citizen.

Because there is no domestic shortage of fuels—because there is no domestic demand for electric energy that present conventional power plants cannot supply much more cheaply, there is no urgency to duplicate in the United States reactors of those types and sizes now proposed for demonstration.

I believe that there is a real urgency. It does not arise, however, from any need to have a lot of atomic power plants simply to look at, brag about and subsidize.

The paramount urgency for pressing forward with an enlarged atomic power demonstration program only stems from the need for the United States to lead in bringing atomic power to the fuel-short energy-short regions of the world—regions in which the whole issue of our world leadership will be decided.

And more specifically, I must emphasize that *these regions abroad are the places where atomic power is most likely to pay its own way now, and, therefore, where atomic plants should be built now.* I have said "most likely to pay their own way" because none of the experts we worked with could say with any certainty what would be the actual cost of generating power in the first generation of plants now under design. Clearly, they cannot tell costs of the second generation of plants not yet conceived. Each of these experts, of course, can project detailed estimated costs of any particular plant design. But when you look at these calculations, you find they depend on many assumptions as to fuel, operating, maintenance and capital costs. Inherent in these assumptions are broad uncertainties which reflect the optimism or pessimism of whoever is using the slide-rule. These uncertainties introduce into the sum total of these estimates errors large enough to offset any differentials which would result from tax-free operation or the reduced "amortization" rates of government-owned plants. From this I have concluded that, in this country, demonstration plants constructed completely at government expense will involve two new burdens on all the taxpayers of the nation:

(1) Heavy initial outlays of capital to build plants which can never be amortized, and

(2) Continuing outlays to subsidize deficit operations, continuing and perhaps increasing over the 20 to 40 years' operational life of the plant.

Abroad, however, where much higher power costs exist, present utility rate levels can come much closer to covering nuclear plant operating costs and to amortizing construction costs; and I believe this to be subject to substantial proof without resorting to wildly optimistic assumptions.

Therefore, the new recommendation I would like to make is this: *that our national interests would be better served by the United States, together with those countries needing atomic power now, moving forward at once with an International Atomic Power Demonstration Program.*

I mean a ***new*** demonstration program, expanding ***beyond*** the one currently getting underway in the United States. I mean a program providing foreign countries—not only with the latest technology—but also with designs which we may not even contemplate for use in this country. The crucial point to remember here is that our economic needs in the United States are different from those of foreign countries—and so our domestic reactors may be differently conceived. That is why we need a new, a second demonstration program, overseas.

This new program should be for the construction ***abroad*** of one atomic plant of each major type and appropriate size to be demonstrated in the United States, as well as other designs particularly adaptable to the needs of specific foreign regions.

The Cost

Let's look at the cost of such an International Atomic Power Demonstration Program.

Our domestic demonstration program, including development expenses on the specific projects involved, will cost 300 to 350 million dollars. An international program of the same magnitude—that is, close to 1 million kilowatts by 1960—will probably cost about the same; higher foreign construction costs would be offset by the fact that development costs would be minimal.

This may sound like a lot of money, but our military and economic credits to Yugoslavia alone in the past 8 years total one billion dollars.

The Administration has asked for a foreign aid appropriation of 4 billion 900 million dollars for the coming fiscal year. Compared to this, the cost of an International Atomic Power Demonstration Program over five years would be small—even in the unlikely event that the United States Government would bear the whole cost and without any reimbursement. Yet this program could salvage, it would make dynamic and productive our 50 billion dollar investment in foreign aid programs, military, economic and technical. It could serve as the keystone for a new and effective structure of international policy.

By an international demonstration program, as I propose, we would certainly gain as much technological and economic information as we would get from an enlarged domestic program. Obviously, by doubling the number of plants of each type under demonstration we would increase only moderately the usefulness of the program in advancing reactor technology and in speeding competitive atomic power. Certainly we would by no means double the technological value of the program.

New Pride, New Hope

But in addition to and more important than technological data, the international program would prove to the world that we are vigorously moving forward to help those in need; that we are giving them our latest developments, not our cast-off designs; and that world-wide application of peaceful uses of atomic energy are not being held back because our own needs for fuel, energy and food are not as pressing as in other nations.

To Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, India, Turkey, to countries in Africa, Western Europe, and Latin America, atomic power demonstration plants can mean many things. They can spell new hope for economic growth. They can be a symbol of cooperative effort which can dramatically demonstrate that there are more constructive relations possible between countries than uneasy co-existence or armed truces. Certainly they could

do more good than any number of cease-fire agreements. They could offer to other nations the immense pride of taking part with the United States as co-partners in the most inspiring challenge of our times—the conquest of the atom.

A 10,000 kilowatt atomic power plant can go further in capturing the imagination of people around the world than a 100,000 kilowatt conventional plant costing many times more. It would be especially fitting, as a start, to build one in Liberia, that democracy which sprang out of our own founding principles.

With atomic energy, cost and size are not the criteria by which gratitude of other nations is measured. The measure is the pride it breeds in the minds of men for the present, and the hope it breeds for the future.

Specific Steps

Now, I would like to conclude by suggesting some remaining specific steps to be taken to bring a one million kilowatt International Atomic Power Demonstration Program into being by 1960.

First, I would recommend that the United States call a series of regional technical meetings, to be held as soon as possible, on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

These would not be "talk" meetings for the presentation of formal papers. Their agendas should be designed to cut through the fog of generalizations that so often prevents concrete accomplishment. Their purpose would be to get down to the brass tacks of the who, what, when, where and how of applying atomic energy to the specific countries and regions involved.

Secondly, I would recommend that these regional meetings establish definite goals for research, development and practical application of atomic energy in three fields: electrical generation, medicine and agriculture. Other fields of atomic promise can wait, for the present.

Third, information now classified by the U. S.—such as, for example, reactor technology and fuel prices—should be made available to participating countries.

Fourth, I would recommend that the entire program be conducted under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission, which is best equipped to handle so technical an undertaking.

By giving the job to our engineers and scientists, backed by our industrial strength, we would convince the world that we are not using these humanitarian and economic tools cynically, as poker chips of power diplomacy, as does Russia.

The Goal

Our goal should be to bring friendly nations, and those whom we would like to be our friends, to the point where they can make sound decisions for themselves on the use of the new resources of atomic energy for social and economic progress. At the same time, we must help them acquire the physical means for carrying out these decisions. We must encourage in every way development of local scientific and technical talent, so that eventually their research reactors, power reactors, hospital, farm and university atomic laboratories will be operated by their own people. The local self-respect and self-sufficiency which will come from harnessing this new resource may end the present state of ferment and unrest in many parts of the world, where hopeless poverty and frustration now force national leaders into irresponsible positions against their own and the world's best interests.

It was in the United States that the first controlled nuclear chain reaction was achieved. It is in the United States that the greatest progress has been made toward harnessing this fundamental discovery. After having come so far in our development of the peaceful uses, we cannot now abdicate and let others bring them to mankind.

The Atomic Energy Commission must be given vigorous support in the steps it is already taking and in the news steps it should take to carry out the augmented program I have here tried to outline. Otherwise, all this Administration's fine promises since America first used the phrase "Atoms-for-Peace" will have gone only to make headlines and consume newsprint. At our own invitation, the world will judge us as to whether

"Atoms-for-Peace" was an advertising program without a product.

In atomic energy, the United States must meet, first, these crucial problems that face us—the international ones—and then go on in seeking the solution of our longer range domestic fuel and energy needs.

We must not forget, nor let the world forget, that every kilogram of nuclear fuel we send abroad for peaceful purposes can be one less kilogram available for war. If we move forward immediately on an International Atomic Power Demonstration Program, we place before the world, our challenge to the Communists to practice, not just preach, atomic disarmament.

Copies of the Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, referred to herein, may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. Vol. 1, findings, conclusions and recommendations, 155 p.p., 45¢. Vol. 2, background material, 749 p.p., $2.00.

An unofficial digest of Vol. 1 of the Report, written in nontechnical language, may be obtained without charge by writing to Frank M. Folsom, President, Radio Corporation of America, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, New York.

THE NEW MEXICAN

SANTA FE

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Inter-Office Communication

OCT 25 1955

Date Oct. 20, 1955

To Walter P. Reuther

From Paul Sifton

Subject "The Point of No Return" in Exclusive Reliance on Nuclear Warfare

Dear Walter:

Attached hereto, for possible use in discussion during or before the CIO and later AFL-CIO conventions-- and perhaps elsewhere-- are three quotations bearing on the above subject:

1. An excerpt from Chinese Nationalist Ambassador Wellington Koo's interview on the "Youth Wants to Know" program, May 22, 1955, in which he backed away from the question on the use of atomic weapons in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu as "a very grave question." (The complete printed text of the entire program is attached.) Although the printed text does not show it so strongly, the television sight and sound made it clear that the Ambassador understood that he was being asked whether or not he recommended dropping the atomic bomb on Chinese on the Mainland or coming therefrom.

2. General Omar Bradley's statement containing the sentence "Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants."

3. Marked passages in the 1955 UAW-CIO Convention Resolution on National Defense, etc. bearing on the point of nuclear warfare.

Of course, in recent months foreign policy and international conferences seem to have been conducted on an international acceptance of the impracticability of modern war but this assumption has largely been based on acceptance of the contention that we can get a "bigger bang for a buck" by the use of nuclear weapons and, anyway, any war, however small, is apt either to require the use of nuclear weapons at the beginning or will mushroom into a big and probably global war requiring the use of the ultimate weapon.

Ridgway's point that land forces and weapons short of nuclear equipment are still valid, and the other point made in our resolution regarding the possibility of having to fight limited wars with weapons other than nuclear, may still have validity. But a worsening of international tensions may again bring on demands for resort to nuclear warfare.

Anyway, I thought you might like to have the attached material at hand for possible use if occasion develops.

Fraternally yours,

Paul Sifton

Paul Sifton

PS:kh
Attachments
cc: Don Montgomery, Roy Reuther
Frank Winn, Brendan Sexton
Nat Weinberg

"A VERY GRAVE QUESTION," SAYS WELLINGTON KOO

(From Youth Wants to Know Interview with Chinese Nationalist Ambassador Wellington Koo, May 22, 1955)

"Question: Do you believe that your Government can defend the Quemoy and Matsu Islands without the aid of the United States, successfully?

"Ambassador Koo: We think we can and in the last few weeks we have greatly strengthened our defense on the island and the morale of our troops, there, is pretty good, and they are going to put up a very strong fight to hold those islands.

"Question: And in the defense of the islands, do you suggest the use of atomic weapons?

"Ambassador Koo: You know, we don't have them, so we are not thinking of using them.

"Question: Would you like for the United States to use atomic weapons?

"Ambassador Koo: That is up to the United States, really. It is a very grave question."

33

Inter-Office Communication

OCT 5 - 1956

Date October 4, 1956

To Walter P. Reuther

From Donald Montgomery

Subject

Dear Walter:

You asked for this editorial. Here is copy on Peace which I am giving to John Martin.

Best regards,

Don (per m.l.)

Enclosure
DM:ml

0075 - 1956

OUTLINE ON PEACE

The following notes are suggestions for a major campaign message on the subject of Peace, similar in form to the Milwaukee message on education.

Two approaches to this subject are available. One is to present a hard-hitting, documented attack on how Eisenhower has weakened our alliances, caused uncommitted nations to fear or distrust us, and given Russia rich opportunities to present itself to the world as the champion of peace.

Another way is to discuss with the American people the necessary conditions of peace, showing them that we do not have peace today, but an armistice only, and to involve and enlist them in the attitudes, policies and actions by which our country and its people can exert their utmost efforts to the achievement of peace.

If the American people will be aroused only by debate and conflict, then the first method can have most political effect. If, on the other hand, they hope to be spared from political controversy on the subject of war or peace, then the second approach will be more effective.

Even under this second approach, use must be made of the errors of Eisenhower policy and performance, since no realistic picture of the world situation can be drawn without it. But criticism of Eisenhower would be subordinated to the major purposes of the address, which are (1) to tell our people the truth about the gravity of the world crisis and our responsibilities with regard to it, (2) to convince them that the prospect is hopeful if we adopt and vigorously prosecute an affirmative program for achieving peace, and (3) to enlist them personally and whole-heartedly in that undertaking.

The notes which follow are based on the belief that a large majority of Americans not only devoutly hope for peace and desire it, but are ready and indeed eager to do something to win it. While they may be grateful to a President who assures them that he, in person, embodies their hopes for peace, they will respond to a candidate for the Presidency who respects them, who appeals to them as responsible citizens, and who asks them to share the national decisions and, when necessary, the sacrifices, that will make our country effective in leading the world to real and lasting peace.

Peace is not partisan. No nation, no political party, no individual has an exclusive interest in peace. The hope for peace is as large as the human family. All of us know that war with today's weapons can destroy all that

human beings have achieved in 5,000 years, perhaps the human race itself.

No shooting war is in progress today. We are grateful that this is so.

But peace is more than the absence of shooting. What we have today is much less than peace. It is at best an uneasy armistice.

We shall have real peace only when we have created the essential conditions of peace in the world. And these conditions will not just happen. They must be built up by sound policies pursued unrelentingly no matter how difficult. Peace is not given to us by Providence. It is the achievement, the highest achievement, of human effort. Good feeling, good intentions are helpful, but they alone are not enough; peace is the product of good works.

What are the essential conditions of peace? One certainly is that the power of great nations to wage war is neutralized by the assurance that resort to war in the end will damage the aggressor as much as the victim of aggression. War becomes unlikely when it becomes impractical as a means to a political end. Another condition is that the opinions of mankind, of the least as well as of the most powerful peoples, be deemed so important by potential aggressors that they prevail over national ambitions in the shaping of policy.

We do not have these conditions today.

Unity among the allies of the western world is vital to achieving the first of these two conditions of peace. The fact is that this unity has been seriously weakened. (NATO weakening, Iceland telling us to vacate. West Germany and France alarmed by unaccountable rumors of reduction of our military manpower and seriously discussing the unification of western Europe as a sort of third force between the US and USSR. Role of Eisenhower and Dulles on Suez, and the resulting disunity of the West. New York Times reporter

predicting that this disunity will result in UN confirmation of the Egyptian position at Suez.)

Compare this with the unity of the free world in earlier crises. The post-war threat of Communist infiltration and over-turn in western Europe was boldly met and defeated by our Marshall Plan and the resulting strengthening of democratic forces. Russia's move to isolate Berlin from the West was defeated by our Air Lift with the united support and applause of the free world. Russia's threat to move to the Mediterranean was forestalled by Truman's program of economic rehabilitation and military aid to Greece and Turkey. When Truman acted at once to resist the Communist invasion of South Korea, we were immediately supported by the UN Security Council and within 10 days 45 member nations, virtually the entire free world, had voted their endorsement of the Council position, and many had pledged armed forces, thus uniting the free world behind the US purpose to resist and defeat this aggression, which was done.

How far the alliance of the western world has deteriorated in the last few years is demonstrated by the votes of US newspaper editors at their (ASNE) convention last April. Polled on the question of the cold war, 54 said we were losing it, only 27 said we were not losing. These were, to be sure, opinions, but they were informed opinions, and the opinions of a group not hostile to the President.

Second, the conditions of world peace are not advanced by the stalemate on disarmament. For the courting of world opinion, Russia has advanced many disarmament proposals, cynically aware of their impracticability. But we have no less appeared/cynical, staking everything on an aerial inspection proposal which we know, or should know, is inherently unacceptable behind the Iron Curtain.

(Repeat the proposal to end testing of H-bombs, correcting and rebuking Eisenhower's misrepresentation of it, stating again its self-enforcing aspects, and, above all, emphasizing the vital importance to world hopes of taking this one, first concrete step toward disarmament. We, after all, raised the curtain on atomic warfare. Se shall begin to balance our account in world opinion if we take the first step toward its elimination.)

Finally, and perhaps most important, are the things we can do to re-establish in the opinions of mankind the true picture of America as a land and a people truly dedicated to peace. (Here again emphasize words, intentions, good feelings are not enough; there must be works.)

At the head of the list here is the need to re-dedicate ourselves to the American dream---the dream of political freedom which x hundred million people have now made their own. The words of our founding fathers have become their inspiration, but when they see us compromise with colonialism and make deals with dictators they have all too little reason to believe that we still cherish the dream which they have borrowed from us. America must again become a voice in the world, nut the voice of wealth and power only, but the voice of free men speaking the hopes of humanity.

Next we should put the importance of really understanding the x hundred million peoples of the uncommitted countries. The greatest event, the most hopeful and inspiring fact in the world today is the fact that these x hundred millions of people have come out of a past which held no hope for them and have set up goals of political independence and economic advancement they are determined to achieve.

We Americans must understand how much all of this glorious new

revolution means, not only to them, but to us. (There's a good quote on this in the report to Congress this year by the Mansfield Subcommittee on Technical Assistance and Related Programs.)

> "The broader national interests of the United States require a growth in the area of human freedom. It is perhaps significant that not since 1812 has the United States found it necessary to fight a war with a country which has standards of freedom comparable to our own. Steps which countries receiving technical assistance take to promote such a growth, either politically or economically, are in the mutual interest of the United States and of the other countries concerned. This seems to the Subcommittee the most valuable mutual assistance which can reasonably be expected from most under-developed countries--namely, a devotion to their own independence and a determination to work out their own problems. If we expect them to refuse to prostitute themselves to the Soviet Union, we must also expect them to refuse to prostitute themselves to the United States. And we are false to our own traditions if we ask them to do otherwise. A strong, free, and independent Asia is more important to the United States than a collection of weak dependents in the same area."

Surely it is clear that we misread the meaning of this most important fact of our day if we approach these people with propositions that we will help them provided they become our military or ideological allies. It is a fatal misunderstanding on our part to say that they must be <u>for</u> us or <u>against</u> us. They are, and should be, devoting all their efforts to pulling themselves out of a hopeless past into a hoped-for future. We, with our abundance of resources, our great wealth, our embarrassment of surplus production, may find this hard to understand, but we musttry. Because in a very large sense the future of the free world, the future of freedom in the world, depends on these people winning their struggle and winning it without surrendering to the false lures of Communism.

Nor do we convince these x hundred million people that we share their aspirations when we prevail on them to enter into military pacts stretched hopelessly exposed along the frontiers of the Communist world. (Develop here

the damage done by enlisting Pakistan in SEATO. See Reuther ms., pp. 26-30. Also the SNAFU on meaning of "Neutralism," Eisenhower-Dulles-Nixon, June 9-July 11, 1956.)

Based on a right understanding of the purpose of these uncommitted nations, and the importance to us of their success, economic aid programs, grants, loans, technical assistance, become vitally important in closing the gap. Despite the start they have made, the gap between their per capita income, food consumption, etc., and that of the advanced world is not closing, it is still widening. Here again the generous attitude toward our fellowmen and a wise attitude toward our own welfare coincide. The Mansfield Subcommittee was right when it said it---

> "has grave doubts as to how long economic growth can be sustained in the United States if the rest of the world continues to fall further and further behind. In connection with the advancement of our own prosperity, the prosperity of others is an important factor."
>
> There may or may not be an inexorable economic law that will not allow us to prosper out of all proportion to the welfare of the rest of the world. Certainly it has been demonstrated that there can be more gain and mutual benefit in trade between nations when they are advancing and prosperous than when they are sick and declining. Prosperity begets prosperity.

But apart from economic law, we can be sure that the world community, the family of man, will achieve full health and vigor only as we reduce the glaring injustices of opportunity that now divide us from so many other peoples of the world.

(Discuss the essential programs of economic aid: SUNFED to help these countries build the sub-structure of social investment on which indigenous enterprise can begin to build and provide expanding employment opportunities---see Reuther ms., pp. 32-42; the use of our food surpluses as capital contributions to development projects; what we might have done, for example, in Egypt, along with help on the Aswan Dam, to have brought new horizons to the Arab world and laid a basis for an affirmative American policy in the Near East.)

We must recapture the vision of the Marshall Plan and of Point Four. The former achieved its purpose and was one of the grandest investments in people and peace we ever made. Point Four, however, has been whittled down in size, and, worse, in spirit, until it has become as often a messenger of ill will and suspicion as of help and trust. The way not to build foreign economic aid on a firm foundation is to appoint to its administration a person (Hollister) whose whole philosophy and experience is hostile to the ideas and ideals which give rise to it. The way NOT to make our economic aid an instrument for peace is to promise that we shall deal generously with disadvantaged peoples when, and only when, world disarmament has been achieved. This was Eisenhower's first pronouncement as President on economic aid in April 1953, also his latest pronouncement on the subject---the speech of September 19.

How we offer our help is of first importance. Without sharing in the basic purposes of the recipient countries to win a better life through democratic means, without understanding and respecting their independence and trusting their good faith, we cannot really take part in this great new thing that is happening around the world.

Given a sound approach, the amount we can contribute may be considerable. But even at the maximum, we would still devote only a small fraction of our national income to this purpose. And we could not find a wiser use of it. (See Reuther proposal of 2% of GNP for 25 years, page 64.)

More, if not most, of our foreign economic program should operate through the UN. This removes the giver-receiver relationship from programs which, after all, are in no sense charity since our own future is so vitally bound up with the success of these other countries in achieving their goals. Furthermore, when we work with and through the UN on these programs, we can invite the USSR to do likewise, thus putting to the test whether its newly expressed concern for underdeveloped countries is to advance them toward freedom and sufficiency, or to subvert them to Communist influence.

(The intent of what is here suggested is to spell out an affirmative appeal to work for, not wait for, Peace---to make this the American people's business and purpose, not simply the hoped-for byproduct of a President's kindliness and smile---to enroll us in a high, hard and purposeful crusade on which the future of man on earth may indeed depend.)

PUTTING THE ATOM TO WORK FOR PEACE

None of Eisenhower's fine deedless words have won more hearts or aroused more hopes than his proclamation of "Atoms for Peace" before the United Nations in December 1953.

His role as peaceful protagonist of the atom will again be dramatized when, shortly before Election Day, he appears at the United Nations to subscribe to the constitution of the new international atomic agency.

"Atoms for Peace" is a slogan, not a program. It is a promise that we cannot back up with performance. A specified quantity of U235 has been pledged for the use of other countries, but we are not prepared to show them how it can be used to produce electric power.

We are conducting small-scale experiments; we know much of reactor theory; but the large-scale demonstration reactors that must be built and tested to put theory into practice are not being built. Our atomic energy program is on dead center, hog-tied by a fruitless and irrelevant controversy of ideologies, with the result that the US is going nowhere in this field while USSR and Britain forge ahead to bring the benefits of the atom to the rest of the world.

The ideological morass in which our atomic energy program is bogged down is of Eisenhower's own making. Authorized and directed by Congress in 1954 to get on with the development of atomic power, the Administration made the decision that virtually the entire burden of building full-scale demonstration power reactors would rest with private enterprise.

Now, after two years, no full-scale power reactor is actually under construction by private enterprise, years will elapse before any of the present proposals produce power and, in fact, there is no firm assurance today that any of the private projects will go through to completion. (See attached quotations of Gordon Dean and Henry D. Smyth.)

At the present state of development, the financial risks are too great to be fairly imposed on private industry, which must operate for profit and safeguard stockholders' investments. Only bold initiative by Government can marshal all our resources, both public and private, and get on with the job. It was the blending of the special contributions of Government and industry that gave America the know-how to put the atom to work for war. It will take the special contributions of each to harness the atom for the purposes of peace.

Yet only one power reactor is under construction by the Government, and it is one of the least promising types. AEC refuses to go further, because it puts the cause of private enterprise above the cause of the Nation. The only plausible explanation of its wilful misfeasance is that the private power companies, to whom the AEC has given a veto power over progress, hope to forestall this rival source of power while foreclosing the field to development by the Government, as both The Wall Street Journal and Fortune have reported to be the case.

This is another instance in which we are given balloons, banners and baloney in place of responsible performance. Great Britain is already far ahead of us in making the atom a practical source of power. Russia is reliably reported to be going ahead rapidly. Western European countries have scheduled an atom-power capacity 10 years hence much greater than is presently planned, let alone assured, for our own country.

The Gore-Holifield Bill in the 84th Congress proposed to release us from the shackles imposed by AEC by directing it to resume leadership in the development of atomic power by building large-scale demonstration reactors of promising types. AEC led the drive in Congress to defeat this Bill, with the support of private power companies and the coal industry.

We shall not be able to give leadership to other peoples if we refuse to exercise it in our own behalf. Eisenhower's promise to bring the blessings of the atom to other countries is a mockery since we do not know, and are not learning, how those blessings may feasibly and economically be enjoyed. He goes before the United Nations with one hand extended in a gesture of beneficence and his other hand bound helpless behind his back. The prophet motive and the profit motive contend for mastery within him, and neither will give rise to good works.

So we see demonstrated once again the urgent need for leadership---new leadership for the new America. Ideological bickering, timidity, the preposterous pretense that all government is Socialism---these will not give us the leadership we must have at home in order that we may give leadership in the community of nations. We must have an America in which, without fear of ghosts, we can unite the services of government and enterprise, the skills of all scientists and technicians regardless of their employment, and enlist the true genius of America in the task of making the atom the servant of man's peaceful aspirations. This is our opportunity and our obligation, our chance to make amends in the minds of men for the ineradicable fact of history that it was we, the people of America, who first unlocked the atom and introduced the peoples of the world to the age of total terror.

"That the world will be revolutionized is clear. That the United States has the capacity to bring about this revolution is also clear. But that the United States will play the leading part it could have played, is today a very serious question."

Public address by Gordon Dean, former chairman AEC, New York City, June 19, 1955

"Unfortunately, one whole part of our program is currently in a state of confusion. In 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission recognized that the time had come to build some full-scale nuclear power plants that could be run on a continuous basis supplying power to regular customers. The question arose as to whether such full-scale 'demonstration' power plants should be financed by the Government or by private industry. This question immediately involved the Atomic Energy Commission in the long-standing private versus public power question, an involvement accentuated by the unfortunate Dixon-Yates affair."

Article in October 1956 issue of Foreign Affairs by Henry DeWolf Smyth, member of AEC 1949-54; presently chairman, Board of Scientific and Engineering Research, Princeton University.

Other relevant excerpts from the Smyth article in Foreign Affairs:

"In opposing the bill authorizing it to build full-scale power reactors, the Atomic Energy Commission expressed the view 'that while it must take the lead and carry most of the burden of developing nuclear power reactor technology, industry should take the initiative and assume the major responsibility for full-scale prototype reactors.' Such a policy might be reasonable if we were concerned only with the development of nuclear power for the United States, but we are not. ****

"We cannot simultaneously make 'atoms for peace' a major part of our foreign policy and atoms for private industry a controlling part of our domestic policy. However desirable it may be to get the Government out of the nuclear power business, it is more important to back our announced foreign policy with a vigorous and fast-moving program of reactor development and construction. If money can be saved by persuading private industry to finance some power plants, well and good, but the Government must determine the program and finance any parts of it that private industry is unwilling or unable to carry.


"Clearly the decision as to what to build, where and how fast must be made by the United States Government. Only the Government can balance the importance of progress versus the cost in terms of national prestige, foreign policy and long-range needs. The principal responsibility rests with the five members of the Atomic Energy Commission. They must share it with Congress, which provides the money, and with other Executive departments such as State, Defense and Bureau of the Budget. ****

"The history of atomic energy in this country is an example of partnership between government and private industry. We cannot afford to weaken this partnership by a quarrel over public versus private power. The Government should continue research on both fusion and fission, and the construction of experimental reactors. It should not hesitate to build full-scale power-producing reactors of various types when they are technically justified. These full-scale power plants can supplement rather than duplicate those built by private companies, thus filling any gaps that might otherwise appear in the over-all program. While continuing as construction and operating contractors for the Government, private industry should be encouraged to invest its own money, both in research and development and in the construction of power reactors."

JAN 20 1956

MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE

The Gateway to Disarmament



" . . . I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

"I should address myself for a moment principally to the Delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

"I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension. Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning."

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Geneva, July 21, 1955

NEVER has disarmament been more urgent than at present. Nations have fashioned weapons and planes which can, without warning, bring incalculable devastation to any part of the world in a matter of hours. Yet, never before this nuclear age has there been greater opportunity, by calling up the constructive energy of the atom, to lift humanity to higher levels of economic well-being.

The choice between arms and disarmament is clear. But how to proceed when distrust is rampant and world tensions approach a breaking point? Each nation contends its own weapons are defensive, and none will sacrifice protective armor fearing that national survival may be at stake.

History reveals a dismal record of disarmament efforts and failures. But, if civilization, as we know it, is to survive and prosper, we must make a new beginning, a practical effort to ease tensions and thus open a gateway to future disarmament. And that is precisely what President Eisenhower's open-sky proposal envisions—a first step toward lasting peace through progressive disclosure and inspection of military blueprints by the two major world powers. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union—the only nations capable of launching great surprise attack—would reveal their military strength and establish a reciprocal ground and air warning system alerting each other and the world to any threat of aggression.

In this way we would ensure two prerequisites, without which any new disarmament plan would founder as did those in the past: a basis for building mutual trust, and a system for policing agreed arms reductions. And, until the United States and the Soviet Union are assured that the system is adequate neither would be asked to reduce its military strength.

President Eisenhower's Proposal
MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE

1. WARNS AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK

2. PROGRESSES IN STAGES

3. MAINTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY WHILE REDUCING WORLD TENSIONS

4. LEADS TO FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN ARMS

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S proposal calls on the Soviet Union and the United States to exchange blueprints of armed strength and military facilities. That is, both nations would lay their military cards on the table so that each may know of the other's armaments.

Thus we face the realism of the conclusion that no disarmament effort can succeed unless the treaty nations have full knowledge of all the facts subject to negotiation. Each side must have complete confidence that it will not bargain away its security by accepting an inferior arms position.


Even more significantly, an exchange of blueprints would lay the groundwork for an inspection system to guard against great surprise attack.

The details of information to be exchanged simultaneously by both countries would be negotiated. Under the President's proposal the disclosed information would include the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and paramilitary; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations.

MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE

--- HOW IT WORKS

DISCLOSURE



EXCHANGE OF "BLUEPRINTS" LOCATING MILITARY UNITS AND FACILITIES

TRADITIONALLY, an arms race begins with suspicion and distrust among nations. Each nation rushes ahead under forced draft, spending energy wastefully to keep ahead of another whose progress and intentions are obscure. With each passing milestone the fear of being overtaken mounts and eagerness gives way to desperation.

President Eisenhower proposed at Geneva that the United States and the Soviet Union—the two greatest military powers—establish an inspection system which could provide against the possibility of great surprise attack. If both sides were confident that there would be no surprise attack, this fact could slow the arms race and then lead to a general disarmament program.

The inspection plan outlined by the United States provides for ground and aerial inspection to verify data by both nations in their exchange of blueprints. Observer teams would be stationed at strategic military, industrial and transportation points. Aerial reconnaissance planes equipped with photographic and electronic instruments would fly anywhere over the United States and the Soviet Union taking any desired number of photographs or readings. Each inspecting country would utilize its own aircraft and equipment, but would carry liaison personnel of the country being inspected during all over-flights.

Ground observers will perform important functions of closeup inspection at key posts. But these observers cannot perform the entire task of covering vast areas on foot or in surface vehicles. Their efforts must be augmented by aerial inspection crews.

Using present-day aerial reconnaissance equipment, one plane can photograph a 490-mile-wide strip across the entire United States—a distance of 2700 miles—*in less than 4 hours*. Even from an altitude of nearly 8 miles in the air, it is possible to determine not only most of what is on the ground, but the dimensions—including height or depth—of objects. It is possible to discover the functions of military and industrial installations and, through careful analysis, to determine the approximate capacity of such installations as oil refineries and steel mills. Repeat flights over a given area can reveal the growth of various projects on the ground and discover what changes have been made. Aerial reconnaissance missions would not be confined to daylight flights under ideal conditions. On the contrary, it is possible to collect extremely accurate information at night, or under adverse weather conditions.

MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE

--- HOW IT WORKS

INSPECTION



AERIAL INSPECTION FLIGHTS PLUS GROUND OBSERVERS AT KEY LOCATIONS CONTINUOUSLY REPORT FINDINGS AND VERIFY ACCURACY OF BLUEPRINTS

GROUND and aerial inspection reports would be forwarded promptly and continuously to evaluation centers. Here they would be checked, compared and analyzed by trained technicians equipped with a variety of professional skills.


Experts in photo interpretation would be key men in the evaluation task. An able photo interpreter is capable of producing information which to the layman seems nothing short of miraculous. Photos of an airfield, for example, lead to conclusions concerning the length and width of the runway and hangars, and the types of planes able to use them. With no further data, the photo interpreter can estimate the number of aircraft the airport can handle and frequently its fuel storage capacity. If it is a steel mill photo, an expert will know quickly the type of mill it is, the type of products produced there, and the mill's capacity.

All the photographs taken during a single aerial reconnaissance flight, or from a number of similar flights, can be assembled into a mosaic, or aerial picture map of a whole city, a military or industrial complex, or a large land area. The photo interpreter armed with an array of precision tools can use aerial inspection to develop extremely accurate information. Where evidence is suspicious but inconclusive, ground observers may be dispatched quickly for pinpoint observation.

MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE

--- HOW IT WORKS

EVALUATION



TECHNICIANS INTERPRET AERIAL AND GROUND REPORTS FOR POSSIBLE EVIDENCE OF SURPRISE ATTACK PREPARATIONS OR OF MOBILIZATION

We come now to the heart of the inspection plan—the warning system to guard against surprise attack.


It is the essence of the plan that its very existence would build a new confidence among nations so that attack would never occur. But if any nation decided to launch a surprise attack its preparatory efforts would probably trip a warning signal. That is not to say that the inspection system proposed by the United States would detect all hidden threats. Although our scientists and the scientists of other nations have been working on the problem, they have not yet been able to perfect a foolproof inspection system, particularly in the nuclear weapons field.

But no nation would dare to start an attack which did not promise a knockout victory. Anything less than complete victory would expose the aggressor to instant retaliation and *both* sides would suffer disaster. If we can accept the thesis that any attack by a major power upon another would never be less than an all-out effort, then the chances of evading detection narrow considerably. The aggressor nation would be compelled to conceal not only a massive strike, probably by air, but also months-long production and logistics preparations. Consider some of the precautions necessary to conceal these from an alert aerial and ground inspection corps *inside* the country's borders: falsification of blueprints; caching stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and gasoline; covering up the priming, loading and positioning of attack craft; and, most difficult of all, silencing thousands of military and civilian personnel who know or suspect the extensive activities. These are but a few of the surprise attack measures which must elude the warning system. Would the aggressor then be so foolhardy to attempt surprise attack without first mobilizing follow-up forces, or without civil defense preparations to meet a retaliatory onslaught if the initial attempt is incomplete? Such additional steps, if taken, would multiply many times the probability of detection.

These are only informed speculations, but they suggest the terrifying risk a potential aggressor must take in preparing an attack in the presence of the proposed inspection plan. The price of detection is not only probable failure of a mission, but possible national catastrophe.

MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE

--- PROVIDES WARNING SIGNALS



1. DISCLOSURE

- DELAY IN EXCHANGE OF BLUEPRINTS

2. INSPECTION

- MILITARY STRENGTH UNDERSTATED
- KEY INSTALLATION NOT REPORTED
- TEAM REFUSED ACCESS TO AGREED OBSERVER POST
- SCHEDULED FLIGHT DELAYED OR CANCELLED
- COMMUNICATION WITH BASE OBSTRUCTED
- SABOTAGE OF EQUIPMENT

3. EVALUATION

WARNING OF:

- UNREPORTED TROOP SUPPLY MOVEMENTS
- UNREPORTED AIRFIELDS OR MISSILE LAUNCHING SITES
- CONCEALED MILITARY PRODUCTION
- UNREPORTED ABSENCE OF PLANES OR NAVAL VESSELS
- EXCESSIVE ''TRAINING'' MANEUVERS


IN the exchange of blueprints, the Governments of the United States and the USSR will each prepare lists of major military forces and establishments, revealing the deployment of forces and the locations of installations and facilities. Schedules will be drawn for phasing all exchanges in stages to assure simultaneous delivery of similar types of information by each Government, and the completion of verification by each side before progressing to a subsequent phase. Provision for spotchecking will be included.

It is contemplated that the blueprints of military establishments would include every specific detail of information relating to surprise attack. The exchange would proceed from the less sensitive to the more sensitive data.

MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE

--- PROGRESSES IN STAGES - Data

EXCHANGE OF "BLUEPRINTS" PROCEEDS FROM LESS SENSITIVE TO MORE SENSITIVE DATA




FIRST STAGE

INTERMEDIATE STAGES

THE danger of great surprise attack is of vital concern to all nations of the world. Should the exchange of blueprints and aerial reconnaissance then be confined to the territorial limits of the United States and the Soviet Union? It is the belief of the United States that a beginning should be made by agreement first, and without delay, between the two nations. Once the plan is in operation between the United States and the USSR it could then be extended to other countries on an equitable basis including those countries in which there are overseas bases.

MUTUAL INSPECTION
FOR PEACE

--- PROGRESSES IN STAGES - Area



AFTER BILATERAL PLAN IS IN
OPERATION IT CAN BE EXTENDED
TO INCLUDE OTHER COUNTRIES

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S inspection proposal would not only test the good faith of the United States and the Soviet Union, it would also test the effectiveness of the plan itself. We have much to learn about the capabilities and limitations of inspection. During the test period both nations would observe how inspection functions. But neither nation would be asked to reduce its armed strength until there was complete assurance on both sides that each portion of any proposed disarmament agreement could be verified continuously through inspection.


MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE

--- MAINTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY

BOTH SIDES MAINTAIN THEIR DEFENSES DURING INSPECTION TEST PERIOD



...BUT, SURPRISE ATTACK IS LESS LIKELY SINCE THE RISKS OF DETECTION ARE GREAT



RESULTS :

- NEITHER SIDE CAN HOPE TO WAGE WAR SUCCESSFULLY
- WAR NO LONGER A LOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
- WORLD TENSIONS EASE AS FEAR OF WAR SUBSIDES

WAR is an appalling business. We are all aware of its cost, not only in money and resources but in human life and suffering. But too few understand fully the cost of being prepared for war. On a dollar and cents basis, as much as one-tenth the value of all goods and services produced, by all nations combined, *now* goes into some form of military activity. In the United States alone, national security expenditures amount to $38 billion a year. More than 3 out of every 5 dollars of our national budget goes for *current* security expenditures, and a substantial part of the remainder represents payments to veterans and interest on war debt.


The United States disarmed rapidly after World War II, but, like other nations faced with mounting fears for national security, we were forced to rebuild much of our military strength. We disavow the classical arms race as a basis for national policy, and we would be the first to enter into an arms reduction agreement when a reliable system of inspection is proved and international tensions ease concurrently. We believe strongly that the adoption of President Eisenhower's proposal would provide a workable inspection system and then lead to a substantial reduction in arms.

We are now more than ever convinced that "there is no longer any alternative to peace." With each new day in this thermonuclear age these words by President Eisenhower become more firmly etched in our minds and hearts. They are the simple, if frightening, truth upon which rests the future of all mankind.

MUTUAL INSPECTION FOR PEACE


--- THE KEY TO FUTURE REDUCTION OF ARMS

The "COLD WAR" Period



ARMS BURDEN RISES STEADILY AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY

The GOAL



IN TIME, AS ADEQUATE INSPECTION REDUCES THE POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND FEARS RECEDE, THE ARMS BURDEN CAN BE EASED

MUTUAL INSPECTION