~~War, Peace and American Policy~~ The World At A Crossroads

"You cannot step twice into the same river; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you."

Heraclitus

Change has ~~always~~ ever been a law of life. Yet history in our time flows not like a river but a torrent. The whole world is in revolutionary turmoil. The pace of change has posed mounting problems to this nation, within our own society and in the world around us.

Even as we have grown relatively old among the nations, we have prided ourselves on our openness to change; we have regarded ourselves as the instigators of the new. Yet our main allegiance to the new has in recent generations gone primarily to scientific and technological innovation. We have been much less open to and ready for change in the social, political and economic realms; and we have therefore suffered from a serious lag in harnessing the science and technology at our command to human needs and aspirations. We have lagged decades or generations behind other societies in offering minimal public assistance to the social and economic victims of

change; and for the most part our people have had to improvise their own hit-or-miss adaptation to the radically new environment created by a highly organized and deliberately fostered scientific and technological revolution.

Under the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, we have begun in the past few years to move ~~again~~ to overcome this lag; yet we are only at the beginning of our labors. And while we are now beginning to ~~coming~~ come to grips with the folly and immorality of tolerating the persistence of poverty in the midst of our national affluence, we have yet to face up to the even greater and more dangerous folly of ~~expecting peace to settle over the whole planet by virtue of American firepower, with~~ an arms race in a world of clashing ideologies while half or more of the human family ~~living~~ live out lives of poverty, ~~misery~~ ignorance, disease and desperation.

Nowhere is our weakness for the short-term technological breakthrough and our relative slowness in coping with the human aspects of change more blatant - and more dangerous - than in the literally explosive domain of foreign policy. It is here that ~~our~~ any failure to live in the present

and for the future, while learing from the errors of the past, can cost us our civilization and our lives. It is here that our vaunted scientific and technological know-how can turn to ash and rubble the very society of material well-being and potential abundance it has raised so high.

Yet it is here, on the slippery terrain of foreign policy, that we Americans are least sure-footed and most prone to suffer from delusions of innocence, self-righteousness and omnipotence.

President John Kennedy, in a notable address at Yale University, put us on notice that we had long victimized ourselves by mistaking myth for reality in our domestic economic affairs. It was the same President Kennedy who in his brief tenure moved as well to bring a greater sense of reality into our conduct of ~~foreign~~ global policy.

In his Seattle speech of November 16, 1961, Kennedy said:

> "We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, that we cannot always impose our will on the other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution for every world problem."

~~Again,~~ In a historic address announcing the American-Russian talks that were to lead to the partial test ban treaty, Kennedy eleborated his concept of realism in the conduct of our foreign policy, particularly in our dealings with the Soviet Union, and spoke of a practical, attainable peace in the following terms:

> "Let us focus.. on a more practical, more attainable peace - based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions - on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned. There is no single, simple key to this peace - no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process - a way of solving problems."

President Kennedy in this American University address called not only for a new look at the nature of peace but for a re-examination of our attitude toward the Soviet Union which would balance our aversion to Communism with recognition of our mutual interest "in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race." He added:

> "Let us re-examine our attitude toward the Cold War, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing

AA

(single space this quote)

"The wise men of antiquity when they wished to make the whole world peaceful and happy first put their own states into proper order. Before putting their states into proper order, they regulated their families; before regulating their families, they regulated themselves. Before regulating themselves they tried to be sincere in their thoughts, and before being sincere in their thoughts, they tried to see things exactly as they really were."

Confucius

"blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last eighteen years been different."

Twenty Years After

insert AA

President Kennedy's call for understanding, realism and a gradual liquidation of the Cold War through a strategy of peace was issued on June 10, 1963. The call was heard not only in America but in the Soviet Union and throughout the world; and the partial test ban treaty, signed by over a hundred governments, was the result. Yet the detente ushered in by that treaty, while still alive, has not borne full fruit.

We still live in the precarious half-peace of a balance of terror. Underground nuclear explosions continue; the technological or qualitative nuclear arms race has not been halted, and its risks will grow as more nations acquire, as Red China most recently has acquired, the capability of producing nuclear weapons.

This nation is still committed to the strategy of realism and peace. We are still interested in "dealing with the world as it is";

President Johnson, in his Johns Hopkins address of April 7, 1965, eloquently expressed his administration's awareness that the world as it is calls not for military power alone but for ~~the kind of~~ peaceful development. He underlined the urgent need for peaceful development by offering a $1 billion economic development program to the peoples of Southeast Asia, regardless of their political complexion. ~~he offered in that address to the peoples of Southeast Asia.~~

The trouble is that while our intentions are of the best, we still suffer as a people from the old lag between our technological proficiency and our human responses to human need.

This country over the past twenty years has developed a tremendous vested interest in the Cold War, to the point where defense and defense-related expenditures consume annually over half of our Federal budget. Our financial ~~economic~~ and psychological investment in an economy thus ~~so~~ dominated by the drive for military security has become so vast that even former President Eisenhower, whose whole career prior to assuming the presidency was spent in the army, felt obliged after leaving the White House to alert the American people to the dangers of what he called the "military-industrial complex."

The world has changed drastically since America with her allies and Russia crushed the Nazi and Japanese war machines twenty years ago, since the United Nations was created, and since the atomic age began. Yet, very largely because our political and human responses have not altered sufficiently with events, because we have been too preoccupied with the technology of nuclear weapons and with the cold-war confrontation with the Soviet Union, we are well prepared for a war that cannot be fought without destroying civilization - and largely unprepared for the only war that's worth fighting and must be fought: the war against the mass poverty now gripping Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

Twenty years after the end of the second world war, the Atlantic community is in prosperous disarray; NATO has lost its sense of purpose and is falling apart at the seams; what we once saw as a monolithic Communist conspiracy has been fractured by a major schism between the Soviet Union and Mao's China. There has been an evolution toward national

Africa and Southeast Asia have come into emergence charged with the spirit of national independence;

forms of Communism, and a loosening of Bloc ties in Eastern Europe, along with a resumption of economic and cultural ties with the West, across the Iron Curtain.

The bipolar world of the Cold War is growing less distinct; Europe is finding prosperity and reasonable stability despite failure to move on to political union in the West and to resolve the question of Germany's division. The focus of the world struggle has shifted from Europe to the Third World of mass poverty, underdevelopment and nation-building.

Yet both West and East, ~~we in the West, particularly we Americans~~, despite a broad intellectual awareness of these changes, are still, in the realm of defense and foreign policy, stranded in the rut of theCold War. In America, particularly, we are still obsessed with NATO and with Europe. We are still mesmerized by the fixed idea that our primary enemy is Communism rather than the world poverty, misery, disease, ignorance and desperation on which Communism feeds.

We are still convinced, when we turn our attention beyond Europe, that we can ride the tiger of revolution, nation-building and development in the have-not regions by a policy mix compounded of several parts military muscle to only one part economic assistance and social imagination.

If we are to free our policies from the grip of the past and at the same time fortify ourselves by an understanding of past mistakes and achievements, we have to examine the past in perspective rather than live in a one-dimensional present of successive crises.

The Cold War — Spawned By Mutual Mistrust

~~Cold War: From the Elbe to the Mekong~~

(leave space here for a quotation - about 5 lines single spaced)

The popular American version of the Cold War is highly

rationalization,

colored by the sentimentality and self-satisfaction which we, like all nations, have so often brought to assessments of our behavior in the world arena. This version leans very heavily on the evil nature of a kind of abstract Communism devoid of local differences and frozen in some timeless absolute - and on the innocence and goodness, equally timeless and absolute, of American motives

~~But~~ the Soviets had another version, derived from long memories and security interests (or ambitions disguised as security interest) in those areas inherited from the Czars. Stalin did not have to consult Marxist-Leninist doctrine for reasons to suspect the intentions of what he called the "imperialist" and "capitalist" West.

He could look back to Allied, including American, armed intervention in Russia after the revolution of 1917, in an attempt to strangle that revolution in its infancy. He could remember that the Soviets had been excluded from the Versailles Peace Conference. He could cite Clemenceau's cordon sanitaire: the policy of non-recognition of the Soviets and the establishment of hostile governments on her borders. There was the memory of early Soviet exclusion from the League of Nations - and the fact that, once a member, the Soviet Union was the only country expelled from the League, although Italy, Japan and Germany ~~had also committed~~ were equally guilty of committing aggression.

There was the history of Western failure to show any resistance to the moves of Nazi Germany to upset the peace and the Europe of 1919, no effort was made to block Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland, Fascist and Nazi military support for Franco's rebellion against the elected government of Spain was answered by Great Britain, France and the United States through a non-intervention policy that denied Western arms to the legitimate government of the Spanish Republic.

The Spanish civil war had been the dress-rehearsal for the Nazi onslaught against all of Europe. Fearing this, the Kremlin had supplied military equipment to the government forces. In 1938, with Hitler, Mussolini and Franco moving toward victory in Spain, the Russians saw Great Britain and France sit down with Hitler at Munich and, in effect, ~~had~~ hand Czechoslovakia to the Nazis in exchange for a paper promise of what the British prime minister hopefully called "peace in our time". It was ~~hardly a fantasy of~~ not altogether unreasonable for the Russian imagination to see in the Munich settlement a clear invitation to the Nazis to move East.

Hitler ~~didn't~~ did not wait long ~~to accept the invitation.~~ The peace lasted a year. In the fall of 1939, the Nazi war machine rolled toward Warsaw; and Stalin, ~~who went to school at Munich,~~ made his own deal with Hitler over the prostrate body of Poland. Stalin's peace lasted a little longer than the peace of Munich, ~~and~~ but only long enough to enabled the Soviets to brace themselves for the Nazi attack that came in the summer of 1941.

All this was almost entirely somebody else's history to the United States. ~~although~~ Franklin Roosevelt had made his "quarantine the aggressors" speech in Chicago as early as 1937. ~~America was still living~~ but the nation did not really comprehend and continued to live in a dream of splendid isolation. We moved from strict neutrality to the bases-for-destroyers deal in support of Britain, but the war was not really our war until Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December of 1941.

Our wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union was a marriage of convenience in which little love was lost on either side. ~~The USSR was not consulted over the atomic bomb; Truman in conservation with Stalin at Potsdam made a passing reference to our possession of an astounding~~

~~new weapon~~. As soon as the war was over, we stopped lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union, ~~although~~ Russia was devastated and had lost at least 20 million lives turning back the Nazi tide. A third of the Nation's territory, including nearly two-thirds of its industrial base, had been turned into a wasteland - a loss, President Kennedy remarked in his American University speech, equivalent to the devastation of the United States east of Chicago.

All of this is cited not in defense of the Soviet Union or Communism, but in the interest of showing that the Cold War had its origins and continuance in mutual distrust ~~rather than~~ and not solely in unmotivated and unprovoked aggression by Stalin's Russia against an innocent and peaceful West.

The West ~~had~~ had to defend against the endlessly voiced intention of Communist leaders ultimately to preside over the total destruction of what they called the capitalist, and we call the free, world. We had the threatening advance of the Red Army into the heart of central Europe, the Communist coup in

Czechoslovakia, the large Communist movements in Italy and France, the infiltration of Communist activity and propaganda in the democratic West.

(A) The Kremlin had feared the long record of Western hostility to the Soviet Union, the apparent tendency of Western diplomacy in the years between the two world wars to appease rather than resist Nazi aggression and to turn the Nazi juggernaut toward the East. They had the construction of a string of American bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union, a ~~natural~~ necessary deterrent in our view, provocative and hostile ~~to~~ in the view of the Kremlin.

(A) ~~The rest was a matter of drawing unprovable conclusions from insufficient evidence.~~ There was a long record indeed of Soviet aggression and duplicity. With tongue in cheek Russia undertook and argued it was. The coup in Czechoslovakia, ~~seen in the West as evidence of Soviet agression, was viewed from the other side of the Curtain as largely~~ merely an internal matter between Bohemians and Slovaks.

(A) cont'd →

~~and for the rest a matter of anticipating and forestalling future Munichs.~~

The occupation of the satellites and the imposition of "friendly" coalition governments in which a Communist always held the Ministry of Interior, was for the West another instance of blatant agression and betrayal of trust. ~~For~~ The Soviets, ~~it was~~ (shrugged and considered the virtual subjugation of free nations) a simple defensive reflex assuring the security of the immediate approaches to the Russian state ~~(much as to the United States might intervene in Canada, Mexico, Guatemala or the Dominican Republic if we saw Communist danger from those quarters)~~, ~~approaches over which more than one aggressor had marched toward Moscow;~~ a matter of reversing Clemenceau's cordon sanitaire, making it serve Russian security interests rather than those of the Western powers.

A

Sober historical perspective must find that the clash of two opposing social and economic systems in a world ripped apart by six devastating years of war spawned mutual distrust and suspicion, And these led in turn to changes and actions by both sides which served essentially the negative forces of fear and hatred.

(B)

The Atlantic Community and the Eastern Bloc

At the end of World War II, only the United States among the technologically advanced countries had vast economic strength and a potential for production stimulated by a conflict that spared its cities and countryside (from destruction). And it alone had the formidable nuclear bomb. A weary Europe, fearful and mistrustful of Communist intentions, devastated and struggled of hope, was floundering in indecision, in an economic and social abyss. Its people needed bread, the better to retain their freedom. They needed hope to rekindle their tired spirit. They needed the tools to rebuild the wanton destruction of bombs and guns. The first essential was the peaceful redevelopment of Europe's shattered economic and social structure.

In 1947 General Marshall outlined the program for European reconstruction which was to bear his name. He stated that it would be directed not against any "ism", but against the devastation

(over)

and dislocation then prevailing on the European continent. Stalin chose to isolate Communism from the community of nations and refused to accept aid, while the western nations quickly went about the business of reconstruction with the assistance of the Marshall Plan.

In recent history no other force for the positive values of peace, bread and freedom can match the accomplishments of the Marshall Plan.

With Europe recovering, however, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion on the world scene did not abate. Under the umbrella of fear and hostility toward a Communist aggressor whose actions appeared to be bent on the conquest of all of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 and NATO was organized in 1950 to deter the Soviet Union's intentions, particularly in the light of the movement of North Korean troops across the 38th parallel. Its plain and simple purpose was to contain Communism in Europe.

Insert B

When General Marshall in 1947 outlined the program for Europen reconstruction which was to bear his name, he stated that it would be directed not against any ism, but against the devastation and dislocation then prevailing on the continent; ~~but~~ yet the Marshall Plan was swept through the Congress of the United States on a wave of fear and of hostility toward a Communist agressor assumed to be poised for the conquest of all of Europe. (Few Americans or Europens at the time evidently paused to ask themselves if a Russia still so grievously stricken by the massive casualties and devastation of a recent war would so soon have the stomach for another, ~~and the~~ a nuclear destruction (no less,) piled on (already widespread) destruction ~~it would entail.~~)

It was in this atmosphere of mutual suspicion that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 and NATO was organized in 1950 to deter ~~what were presumed to be~~ the Soviet Union's agressive intentions, particularly in the light of the movement of North Korean troops across the 38th parallel, then seen as the possible prelude to a wider conflict embracing Europe. In retrospect, there is reason to believe that the Korean agression was a

(C)

With the growing success of economic and social rehabilitation, Europe moved toward greater unity. The Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome, the beginning of the European Economic Community became symbols of a new day of coordinated and cooperative economic activity feeding the peaceful purposes of international development.

In Eastern Europe, which had rejected offers of economic assistance, a similar, but far slower, process of economic recovery was occurring under the domination of the Soviet Union. But as the scars of war began to be healed; as economic prosperity and social reconstruction inspired hope and confidence; as the threat of aggression receded and fear subsided, a gradual re-assertion of national interests and a growing restiveness sprouted on both sides of the Iron Curtain. NATO, which had been born out of fear, began to lose its sense of purpose when the fear abated.

(over)

under De Gaulle

France rejected President Kennedy's "grand design"
for an unified Atlantic Community, reasserted
its independence of United States policy, developed
its own nuclear deterrent and blocked expansion
of the ECC by vetoing England's entry. In
Eastern Europe, where we had postulated a monolithic
and single-minded communism, Soviet dominance
was challenged.

big-power move by the Soviet Union to strengthen her defense perimeter in the Far East, a move made as a result of misunderstanding American intentions. We had withdrawn troops from South Korea; and the American Secretary of State had made a speech which could have been construed as an indication that we no longer regarded Korea as falling within our defense perimeter.

The point here is not to write a summary history of the Cold War but to suggest its ambiguous and less-than-simple nature, as a guide to understanding of our present situation.

The recovery of Europe went forward (with the thrust of the Marshall Plan and of NATO,) under the ~~NATO~~ umbrella which meant, overwhelmingly, the American nuclear deterrent as offset to the Red Army, ~~while in Eastern~~ (insert C) Europe, where we had postulated a monolithic and single-minded Communism, a similar process of economic recovery went hand in hand with a gradual re-assertion of national interests and a growing restiveness under Soviet dominance. Tito bolted the Bloc in 1948 and promptly became a kind of ex-officio beneficiary of the Marshall Plan.

Stalin's death in 1953 and the Khrushchev succession and subsequent denunciation of Stalin's reign of terror produced a thaw in Russia ~~and led to~~ rebellion occurred in Poland and revolution and ruthless repression in Hungary. Both rebellions led, first in Poland and eventually in Hungary, to more "liberal" regimes; and Poland, too, became a recipient of American aid.

The Eisenhower-Khrushchev Period

In Washington during the 1950's, it almost seemed that two radically inconsistent policies were being simultaneously pursued by the Eisenhower Administration. American policy confusion in the 1950's cannot be understood without reference to the impact of two traumatic national experiences: the frustrations of the Korean War, which ended in a peace without victory; and the anti-Communist hysteria generated by the late Senator Joseph P. McCarthy of Wisconsin.

The Korean War engendered in the American people a great fatigue. A yearing for peace and a cessation of the strain and sacrifice entailed by our global commitments came over the nation. Yet at the same

time, the nihilistic force and demagogic vehemence of McCarthy's hunt for Communists (or any liberal who could be made to look like a Communist) in government, defense plants and universities prevented a true relaxation of cold war tensions and made a hard-nosed anti-Communist stance the acid test of patriotic purity.

The confused currents of the time and the different temperaments of Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, his Secretary of State, combined to create a split personality in our foreign policy. Eisenhower reflected the fatigue bred of commitment, and the yearning for peace. Dulles spoke for the crusading puritanical zeal of the self-righteous strain in our national character.

Liberation was promised to the Soviet satellites; Dulles boasted of brinkmanship and threatened massive retatiation. When Adlai Stevenson in the presidential campaign of 1956 warned of the dangers of the nuclear arms race and called for a nuclear test ban, he was cried down as an irresponsible

dreamer; and Nixon played the McCarthy game of insinuating that the Democratic Party was the party of treason.

Yet in every major showdown, Eisenhower's quietism prevailed over Dulles' nuclear bluster. Eisenhower vetoed the hard-liners when the challenge came to save the French imperial hold on Indochina. When the Hungarians revolted in 1956, he ignored Republican promises of liberation and authorized no American move to save the freedom revolution from Russian tanks. And when the British, French and Israelis the same year moved against Nasser, after his seizure of the Suez Canal, the Eisenhower Administration joined with the Soviet Union in the United Nations to throttle the Suez campaign.

Both major antagonists in the Cold War were on the horns of a dilemma. ~~It must be said to~~ While Eisenhower ~~'s credit that he~~ sensed that general war in the nuclear age was a formula for total disaster, ~~Yet~~ nevertheless his administration ~~had~~ placed all its military and diplomatic eggs in the nuclear

basket, and was not prepared to commit American troops to limited combat with conventional weapons. The Russians, too, had been reading the handwriting on the wall. A Soviet general in 1960 voiced the opinion that war had become too destructive to serve political ends. And Khrushchev the same year developed a new theory of coexistence, which flew in the face of traditional Leninist-Stalinist doctrine. Khrushchev still thought that Communism would eventually "bury" the Western nations; but he told the Soviet Communist Party's 20th conference that it would come about peacefully; that war was not inevitable and that long-term peaceful coexistence was now possible with the capitalist nations; that the Soviet Union should work to change hostile Western views of coexistence. He found that the Russian people could now look forward to a better life - provided that disarmament made it possible to release resources for improving the standard of living.

This mutual groping for peace, however, failed to arrive at a stable detente. Both powers were too firmly locked in the rigid stances

and gestures of the Cold War; the Eisenhower Administration's inept handling of the U-2 incident torpedoed a scheduled summit conference and both adversaries were off again on another round of mutual distrust and recrimination.

The nuclear arms race continued. Europe, meanwhile, had recovered, and in the decade beginning about 1953 enjoyed the growth of an unprecedented prosperity and rising living standards. The division of Europe was not healed; but the volume of trade and other contacts between the two halves of the continent was growing, while fear of the agressive designs of the Soviet Union had declined to such a degree that Gaullist France felt free to declare its independence of American policy - political, economic and military.

Kennedy's Drive for Peace

President Kennedy, in the fall of 1962, finally cleared up the doubts that had persisted in the Kremlin regarding the true nature of American policy; doubts that had arisen from the apparent contradiction between the Dulles belligerence and Eisenhower's lack of it.

Khrushchev had never been convinced that the United States would really fight for Berlin. His doubts were nourished by

Kennedy's failure to assure the success through providing air cover of the Bay of Pigs invasion. It is reasonable to assume that he thought he could get away with the placement of missiles in Cuba, thereby scoring a psychological victory that might be helpful in Berlin.

Kennedy, who had understood the essential weakness of nuclear brinkmanship and built up our conventional forces, faced Khrushchev down in the missile crisis by local superiority in conventional force in the Caribbean, a sector remote from Russia and not vital to Soviet security.

Out of that American victory, which was disguised enough to enable the Russian leader to save face (at least in the short-run) by pointing to an American promise not to invade Cuba, Kennedy plucked the test-ban talks and treaty, and the beginning of a Soviet-American detente.

The partial test-ban treaty, unfortunately, was not followed up by a sustained diplomatic effort to end the cold war and the nuclear arms race. On the contrary, the emergence of Red China as a nation with nuclear capabilities, and the Chinese rejection of coexistence in favor of a militant prosecution of what are termed "peoples' wars" or "wars of liberation" against the West, have had the effect, along with the deepening American involvement in Vietnam, of reviving cold war tensions and of rendering both more difficult and more urgent the search for genuine disarmament.

The Rim of Hell

"Peace cannot be kept by force; it can be achieved only by understanding"
Albert Einstein

Were it not for the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations - 20 nations may have them by 1968 according to some experts - it might be plausible to suggest, as some analysts have indeed suggested, that the United States and the Soviet Union have learned, if not to love the Bomb, at least to adjust to the nuclear environment.

Walter Millis suggests that the Cold War was produced primarily by the advent of the Bomb and that rather than being regarded as a prelude to a hot war, it can be seen as a "conflict situation" in which the parties seek to avoid hot war by working out problems without mass bloodshed. Millis calls the Cold War an "oddly effective form of peace" and says that it is "fearfully dangerous in its potentialities but in actual fact rather remarkably successful over the past fifteen or twenty years as a system for regulating the international power struggle without precipitating total disaster."

This seems like a roundabout way of saying we can all be thankful we're not already dead. Raymond Aron says,

> "Perhaps the most truly effective, if also the least visible, influence of these weapons is reflected in the extreme caution that the Big Two have exercised in relation to one another, although the Americans have certainly been conspicuously more careful than their rivals..."

Mr. Aron also says:

"The sole purpose of this brief survey is a reminder...of the almost inconceivable horror implicit in the notion of a total war fought with the thermonuclear weapons now available. A single bomb of a few megatons will wipe out a large city. Radiation can kill over distances hundreds of miles from the site of the explosion and weeks after it takes place, while hundreds or even thousands of square miles would be reduced to ashes by superbombs exploded at high altitudes."

Mr. Aron cited a special U. S. Air Force report comparing the Hiroshima explosion with a Tokyo raid in which 279 planes dropped 1,667 tons of "normal" bombs, destroying nearly sixteen square miles. The Hiroshima bomb destroyed only 4.7 square miles - yet killed and missing equaled those of the Tokyo raid.

The Hiroshima bomb, however, was a primitive weapon compared with the thermonuclear bomb. The explosive power of one such bomb exceeds the total of all the bombs dropped on Germany in the course of World War II.

Mr. Aron observes:

"There is no escaping the fact that the new weapon has brought about quantitative changes so vast that they amount to a qualitative revolution."

The nature of this "qualitative revolution" was outlined in the Scientific American of October, 1964 by two scientific advisers to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, Jerome B. Wiesner and Herbert F. York, writing as "scientists who have been engaged for most of our professional lifetimes in consultation on this country's military policy and in the active development of the weapons themselves..."

Wiesner and York state:

> "...The past two decades have seen a historic revolution in the technology of war. From the blockbuster of World War II to the thermonuclear bomb the vilence of military explosives has been scaled upward a million times."

~~And~~, they point out, the time required to transport these weapons of mass destruction from hemisphere to hemisphere has shrunk from 20 hours for the 300-mile-per-hour B-29 to the half-hour flight time of the ballistic missile. ~~And~~ Moreover, the replacement of the human nervous system by the computer in command and control systems has increased information-processing capacity "by as much as six orders of magnitude." Both

delivery time and defense reaction have reached points of diminishing return; no significant improvements can be made in these directions.

As for the possibility of finding some ideal security in testing and producing the so-called "big" bomb of 100 megatons, Wiesner and York say, in effect, forget it. The term "big" in this connection is absurd. They point out:

> "A one-megaton bomb is already about 50 times bigger than the bomb that produced 100,000 casualties at Hiroshima, and 10 megatons is of the same order of magnitude as the grand total of all high explosives used in all wars to date..."

The Eisenhower Administration had to face the choice between bigger and smaller missiles and decided to produce many more of the smaller.

The Kennedy Administration independently confirmed this decision and increased the ratio of smaller to larger missiles in the nation's stockpile. Testimony during the test-ban hearings revealed that the Air Force had been retiring large bombs of 23-megaton yield or higher because, Wiesner and York write, "There are presumably no targets that call for the use of such enormous explosions."

There is no security, then, in testing and producing "bigger" bombs. Wiesner and York stress the point:

> "The argument that says it is now critical for U.S. national security to build very big bombs and missiles fails completely when it is examined in terms of the strictly technical factors that determine the effectiveness of a missile attack."

Wiesner and York say that the extensive series of weapons test carried out by the United States, involving the detonation of several hundred nuclear bombs and devices, have demonstrated the effects of nuclear weapons over a wide range of yields, and these observations can be extrapolated into areas not fully explored in U.S. tests, for example into the 100-megation range.

Where uncertainty prevails, however, is in predicting the number and kind of weapons systems that might be available to the prospective attacker. They cite the "missile gap" controversy, in which predictions made in the late 1950's, made on the basis of the best available data, were invalidated in the early 1960's, as

"...indicating the magnitude of the uncertainties that surround the variables other than weapons effects with which the military planners must contend...

"Uncertainties of this order and kind defy reduction to mathematical expression. A human activity as complex as modern war cannot be computed with the precision possible in manipulation of the data that concern weapons effects..."

Wiesner and York see no reason to hope that a nation could attain security in development of an anti-missile missile, even if it were possible to create one, because of the contemporary revolution in the technology of war:

"The primary strategic result of that revolution has been to over-balance the scales in favor of the attacker rather than the defender. During World War II interception of no more than 10 percent of the attacking force gave victory to the defending force in the Battle of Britain. Attrition of this magnitude was enough to halt the German attack..."

Now, because of the explosive power of the thermonuclear bomb and the ability of the attacker to have in his arsenal a number of missiles exceeding the number of important targets by, say, a factor of 10, the position of attacker and defender has been reversed:

> "...the successful delivery of only one warhead against each such target would result in what most people would consider an effective attack. Thus where an attrition rate of only 10 percent formerly crowned the defense with success, a penetration rate of only 10 percent (corresponding to an attrition rate of 90 percent) would give complete success to the offense..."

In addition to this revolutionary reversal of the odds, Wiesner and York state that there are many general reasons for believing "that defense against thermonuclear attack is impossible."

They add, "The hopelessness of the task of defense is apparent even now in the stalemate of the arms race."

It takes a long time to move a modern, large-scale weapons system from research and development to operational deployment. The process practically assures that no system can reach full deployment under the mantle of secrecy. The designer, moreover, cannot begin until he knows something about the offensive system: "Inevitably the defense must start the race a lap behind."

In addition to this inevitable lag, the offense has been able further to frustrate the defense by development of "strategems and devices that nullify the most extraordinary achievements in the technology of defense." They illustrate the dilemma by way of the Sage and Nike-Zeus systems, which had to be scrapped because the offense they had originally been designed to parry had given way to a more effective offense they were not adequate to meet. Delivery by bomber gave way to a combined attack of bombers and missiles. The interception of warheads one by one was frustrated by the revolutionary new fact that a 90 percent success in interception constitutes failure; and the designers of offensive systems invented a number of decoys and confusion techniques that made the Nike-Zeus system obsolete. Now, say Wiesner and York, "the race of the tortoise and the hare has...entered the next lap with the development of the Nike-X system as successor to Nike-Zeus."

Wiesner and York then apply similar reasoning to the problem of passive defense, that of sheltering the civilian population. Here again, the defense cannot predict what the offense will do. What we really face here is, they say: "...the sociological problem of the sudden initiation of general chaos, which is not subject to numerical analysis."

Construction of shelters means escalation of the arms race, since the lack of shelters, according to the hostage theory, indicates to the prospective adversary that we do not contemplate nuclear warfare, whereas building shelters might signal our intention to attack.

Fall-out shelters are useless if the attacker assaults population centers. The fall-out shelter program, as a step in escalation, would lead to the blast shelter, and the blast shelter to live-in and work-in blast shelters leading to still further disruption and distortion of civilization:

> "There is no logical termination of the line of reasoning that starts with belief in the usefulness of fallout shelters; the logic of this attempt to solve the problem of national security leads to a diverging series of ever more grotesque measures.

"This is to say, in so many words, that if the arms race continues and resumes its former accelerating tempo, 1984 is more than just a date on the calendar 20 years hence.

"Ever since shortly after World War II the military power of the U.S. has been steadily increasing. Throughout this same period the national security of the U.S. has been rapidly and inexorably diminishing...

* * *

"Both sides in the arms race are thus confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security. It is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution. If the great powers continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation. The clearly predictable course of the arms race is a steady open spiral downward into oblivion."

Close quote and amen. With the help of think factories staffed with game theorists and batteries of computers, the Pentagon has labored mightily to give this nation the most knowledgeable and sophisticated control over these frightful weapons, and to devise strategies which attempt, through what is called graduated response, to keep a direct military confrontation between the two super-powers from escalating into what a British writer in another context spoke of as "closing time in the gardens of the West."

The fact remains, and it may serve as our epitaph, that there is no way to reduce the human factors in this potentially lethal equation to manageable terms - and the equation will become all the more inscrutable as more unpredictable human beings in more and more countries get their hands on the doomsday buttons.

Already, as of 1964, according to Millis, the world's over-kill capacity in nuclear explosives was equivalent to about 70 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet. We are concentrating the most refined intelligence of modern scientific man on the elaboration of irrational games on the rim of hell. If we don't step back, one day, sooner or later, we will step over. As John Kennedy told the United Nations, if we don't end the arms race, it will end us.

No matter how successfully we think we are adjusting ourselves to the nuclear environment, the whole terrain remains booby-trapped with the imponderables of accident, miscalculation, and irrationaltiy. And the

odds are on irrationality, for the simple reason that it is fundamentally irrational to persist in a game that nobody can ultimately win. No wonder that, as Aron says,

> "The majority of the scientists (among American specialists) tend to regard the unlimited arms race and the quest for ever more efficient weapons and means of delivery as dangerous and insane. Such competitive bidding would, in their opinion, gain neither side any decisive advantage, while polluting the atmosphere, aggravating international tensions, and magnifying the very danger it is supposed to avoid..."

Yet the danger persists that by virtue of living with the Bomb, our instinct of self-preservation will be numbed; the daily rounds of life are remote from the underground command station at Omaha; the routines of diplomacy hypnotize the statesmen; one cannot see the forest for the trees. The rim of hell is there, under your foot, but it is difficult on a good day to imagine the unimaginable. Here is one historian's judgment on what happened in Europe in 1914:

"Men are reluctant to believe that great events have small causes. Therefore, once the Great War started, they were convinced that it must be the outcome of profound forces. It is hard to discover these when we examine the details. Nowhere was there conscious determination to provoke a war. Statesmen miscalculated. They used the instruments of bluff and threat which had proved effective on previous occasions. This time things went wrong. The deterrent on which they relied failed to deter; the statesmen became the prisoners of their own weapons. The great armies, accumulated to provide security and preserve the peace, carried the nations to war by their own weight."

(A. J. P. Taylor - "Illustrated History of the First World War.")

We may ride to hell in a handbasket of good intentions, like the statesmen and generals of 1914. The only difference is that, thanks to our scientific and technological skills, our hell is bigger and sooner reached.

The danger is not confined to the nuclear arms race. We have begun to worry about the spread of nuclear weapons. But there is another arms competition, in non-nuclear weapons, which has been going on in the shadows. Alastair Buchan, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London writes (The New Republic, Nov. 6, 1965) of the dangers of this traffic in used arms, which has become as much a part of the arms race as

the used-car business is of the automobile industry. Mr. Buchan states:

> "...It is ironical that the industrial powers of the northern hemisphere, Western and Communist, have in the past decade spent tens of billions of dollars in the attempt to stablilize the balance of power among themselves, but elsewhere have pursued policies leading to local arms races which by committing them increasingly to their client states have risked the destabilization of their own precarious relationship."

There is much private traffic in arms. But the real trouble stems not from the private dealers but from "the sober policy of sober governments." Two pressures, according to Mr. Buchan, are bidding up this official competition in used or obsolescent arms: there is the enormous thirst for major armaments among the new nations, who regard them as status symbols of independence, a demand which is answered by the eagerness of the greater powers to purchase influence in the client country's politics through relationships with its military establishment that derive from training missions and the supply of spare parts. All of the larger states, including the United States, have succumbed to this temptation.

"The second pressure for military aid and trades derives from the hectic pace of the central arms race, which clutters the inventories and depots of the industrial powers with hardware which is obsolescent for their needs but is still quite serviceable. They have gone through three generations of fighter aircraft and tanks in the last 20 years, two of anti-aircraft missiles and one of almost every type of ship. Treasury officials in Moscow as well as in Washington view with less gloom the scrapping of equipment which has cost so much to develop if it can be written off the books by aid or trade to another country, even at a modest value..."

The Russians have disturbed the local balance of power in the Middle East by unloading obsolescent planes on Egypt, and we and the Soviets have had a similar effect through past efforts to buy influence over Indonesia. The United States has had an even worse effect on the Indo-Pakistan conflict over the past 11 years:

"...first India then Pakistan used the supply of Western arms to one side or the other as a pretext for refusing to settle the cause of conflict, Kashmir; and finally for conflict itself. And the outcome of this conflict appears considerably to have accelerated the prospect of an Indian nuclear weapons program."

The American decision to offset our balance of payments deficit by increasing sales, as opposed to gifts, of military equipment within our own alliances has had unhealthy consequences in the Third World, by forcing nations, notably France, who aspire to keep up with our weapons technology,

to seek wider markets as a base for greater research and development; while our policy of selling new equipment to Europe has required our European customers to unload obsolescent equipment elsewhere. Twenty non-African nations are now supplying arms or military training to the 33 African countries.

Mr. Buchan stresses that an American-Soviet agreement would not solve this problem, since so many countries are engaged in the practice. He concludes:

> "But perhaps the most important step forward would be the recognition, in public as well as in official thinking, that arms are not just another form of engineering exports, and that the dividends and employment rolls of Lockheed or Vickers, Boeing or Dassault, Hughes or Oerlikon are trivial considerations by comparison with the damage which their products can inflict in a world bedeviled by the problems of immature nationalism."

Unfortunately, "immature nationalism" afflicts the great as well as the small. Former President Eisenhower, in his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961, issued his now-famous warning regarding the dangers of "the military-industrial complex." His words are worth repeating:

"Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

"...we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, 3.5 million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.

"This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence - economic, political, even spiritual - is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

"In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

"We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together."

General Eisenhower's intentions, as always, were of the best; yet he, perhaps more than the rest of us, was a victim or perpetrator of lag between the march of technology and the limp of public policy, for during his own administration, with the possible exception of the period when Charles Wilson was Secretary of Defense, his own appointees in the Pentagon were lying down comfortably under the steamroller of the military-industrial complex.

Yet one must view this whole question in a longer persepctive. There can be no scapegoats in this matter. If, as Harper's magazine states (March, 1964) the military-industrial complex in the United States has become a sacred cow, it is because the whole country, and not merely a few persons or groups, has accepted a view of American security and world responsibility in which military power is considered more vital than any other element; (not, to be sure, on ceremonial occasions but as a hard matter of fact.) This does not make this democratic nation's degree of dependence on military power and on the profits and employment that stem from maintenance of such a vast military establishment any less of a danger to a free society or any less of an obstacle to efforts to develop an alternative strategy for peace.

It means that not just a few men in government, industry and labor but rather the whole country must engage in an agonizing reappraisal of the unwholesome changes that have occurred in American life during the last twenty years as a result of the Cold War and the arms race. It seemed

briefly that such a reappraisal might be made in the aftermath of John Kennedy's assassination; but the tides of routine swept over our sorrow and drowned our misgivings with respect to the manner in which we generate our badly flawed affluence.

Where are we, then, a little more than twenty years after "the tragedies and agonies"- the words are U Thant's - which made the Charter of the United Nations possible? We remain on the rim of hell. And we will stay there, until Armageddon arrives to claim us, unless we, which is to say the American people, create a working majority for a true strategy of peace that can move us back from the brink.

Needed - A New Alliance for Peace

Because the arms race and the Cold War have so long been, so to speak, our home - the - "way we live now" - any proposal for an alternative way of life runs hard against the charge of impractical idealism. Our first answer to that charge must be a call for re-examination

of the fate that has already overtaken us in the twentieth century because the hard-headed men have prevailed over the tough-minded. Their record is strewn across the past 50 years in the incalculable human casualties of two world wars, of fascism, Nazism and Communism, and of our own moral failure as a nation implicit in our dependence on war and preparations for war as a stimulus to economic growth and employment.

Of all the revolutionary transformations of our time, the greatest consists in the paradox that the utopian solutions to our predicament have become the only practical ones. The idealist is today's practical realist. We have seen that the arms race is a downward spiral to oblivion. Our persistence in it, then, is the most impractical of actions,

Yet we cannot withdraw from it unilaterally. We can, however, wage peace without an agreement, and that is what I propose that we do. The phrase, again, stirs utopian echoes in the mind and memory.

Yet times have changed; and no army, as Victor Hugo observed, can withstand the strength of an idea whose time has come. The time for peace has come, because our science and technology, diligently applied to the perfection of weapons of mass destruction, have made peace the absolute condition for human survival. Our last option is to understand the urgent practicality of being utopian.

We have only so much time, a period of unpredictable duration during which we must signal our intention to our adversaries and our friends that we intend henceforth to wage peace, and we must mobilize our huge economic resources, the wasted labor and skills of our unemployed, our unused productive capacity, the slack, latent energies and enthusiasm of a generation that has been given little cause to hope and aspire, and harness all of these great wasting assets to a ~~great~~ noble, dynamic total war ~~of movement~~ against the poverty, hunger, ignorance and disease that plague the southern half of the planet.

We have no choice but to do this, not only because the balance of terror is inherently unstable - counter-productive as the technicians would term it. We must do it, as well, because in the last twenty years the Third World of the southern hemisphere has been transformed, by its liberation from colonialism, from a passive victim and onlooker of history to an active participant. The new nations are clamoring for development, for achievement of their own identity and status in the world. Yet they have acquired with their independence not only the advantages but the temptations and follies of national sovereignty, precisely at a time in history when the whole planet must move from a tangle of sovereignties into a more coherent and harmonious world community.

We have seen how their own ambitions and the folly of the arms race among the major powers have infected them with the contagion of the Cold War and with national rivalries of their own. The energies they are wasting on such self-defeating ends, like those we are wasting on the

accumulation of overkill, are needed in the struggle to lift the Third World toward higher standards of life.

Merely to transfer to Asia, Africa and Latin America the strategy of military containment of Communism which has been our stance in Europe will not help these peoples to cope with their own problems of poverty and hunger, which Communism seeks to exploit. That we already realize this is evident from President Kennedy's creation of the Alliance for Progress and President Johnson's move to create the Asian Development Bank.

What is needed is a shift in the whole stress and dynamics of our policy, from a negative, military stance to a positive, long-term development effort. Containment derives from the past and places us in the embarrassing position, whatever our real intentions, of seeming to be assuming the role of the older imperialisms. The strategy of containment has made us the ally of national regimes in many countries which lack the

support of their own people; while the Communists ~~can~~ attempt to gain adherents by attacking an intolerable status quo.

The cohesive force of old cultural and religious traditions, together with a new national pride and stubborness, may keep most of the nations of the Third World from succumbing to Communism. But the have-not half of the planet will remain in poverty and turmoil until the major industrial powers succeed in mobilizing their resources, ~~now so largely wasted on military defense,~~ for the difficult tasks of development, tasks which are beyond the means of the new nations.

America has great power and great resources. But they are not equal to the assignment of acting everywhere and into the indefinite future as the world's peacekeeper, especially when such police work fails to touch the deeper problems of the underdeveloped lands.

And we must remember Kennedy's warning that we cannot provide an American solution for every world problem. The task of keeping

the peace leads to a grave occupational distortion in our thinking; we come to believe that the peace we keep must be our peace, arranged by us and defined by us, according to our sense of things, because we dispose of the dominant power.

A peace of the status quo cannot be made to stick, for the status quo of half the world is intolerable. The peace we seek must be the peace of the future. Our policy must let the future be born, and must help to create that future in concert with other nations.

Our confrontation with China may prove to be our greatest challenge in the Third World. In facing that challenge, we must understand that something much larger than a war is going on in Asia: the future relations of East and West are being shaped, against the tug of Asia's long experience of the Westerners as exploiters.

The larger question is not to win a war but to win the peace. Our approach to China should not merely oppose belligerence to belligerence,

a policy which would tend to prove the old men of Peking right. Rather we should employ a forward strategy of peaceful development and ultimate reconciliation, looking toward the day when younger men with different experience and different views will bring an evolution of the regime in China as a younger generation of Russians has been changing the character of Soviet government and society.

A peace offensive, concentrating on lifting up the have-not masses of the underdeveloped lands will demonstrate as no words can demonstrate our will to move in those directions. Times grows shorter and shorter with each year as the gap widens between the minority of prosperous, industrialized nations and the rest of the world.

Such an effort will require great boldness, great patience, great imagination and conviction. Who will deny that America contains and can mobilize these qualities? ~~Yet the decision must be made to act, or else we shall fall from the rim of hell into a fiery abyss that will make of the world merely a burning cinder.~~ — if only the decision is made to act!

~~The gap is widening between the minority of prosperous industrialized nations and the rest of the world.~~

##########

~~Dr./fw 11-3-65~~

We still live in the precarious half-peace of a balance of terror. Hot local wars (persist); underground nuclear explosions continue; the technological or qualitative nuclear arms race has not been halted, and its risks will grow as more nations acquire, as Red China most recently has acquired, the capability of producing nuclear weapons.

This nation is still committed to the strategy of realism and peace. We are still interested in "dealing with the world as it is"; President Johnson, in his Johns Hopkins address of April 7, 1965, eloquently expressed his administration's awareness that the world as it is calls not for military power alone but for peaceful development. He underlined the urgent need for peaceful development by offering a $1 billion economic development program to the peoples of Southeast Asia, regardless of their political complexion.

The trouble is that while our intentions are of the best, we still suffer as a people from the old lag between our technological proficiency and our human responses to human need.

Yet both West and East, despite a broad intellectual awareness of these changes, are still, in the realm of defense and foreign policy, stranded in the rut of the Cold War. In America, ~~particularly,~~ we are still obsessed with NATO and with Europe. We are still mesmerized by the fixed idea that our primary enemy is Communism rather than the world poverty, misery, disease, ignorance and desperation on which Communism feeds.

We are still convinced, when we turn our attention beyond Europe, that we can ride the tiger of revolution, nation-building and development in the have-not regions by a policy mix compounded of several parts military muscle to only one part economic assistance and social imagination.

If we are to free our policies from the grip of the past and at the same time fortify ourselves by an understanding of ~~past mistakes and achievements,~~ current world problems we must examine each of the major crisis situations in the world with cold objectivity and realistic appraisal to insure that we "see things exactly as they really are". ~~the past in perspective rather than live in a one-dimensional present of successive crises~~.

The Cold War - Spawned by Mutual Mistrust

(appropriate quotations)

The popular American version of the Cold War is highly colored by the rationalization, sentimentality and self-satisfaction which we, like all nations, have so often brought to assessments of our behavior in the world arena. This version leans very heavily on the evil nature of a kind of abstract Communism devoid of local differences and frozen in some timeless absolute - and on the innocence and goodness, equally timeless and absolute, of American motives and behavior. Real love of country, true patriotism, can dispense with such mystification and world security demands it. We can give all due weight to the tyranny, the aggressiveness, and fanaticism of Communism without ignoring the historic fact that Western, including American, policy toward the Soviet Union since its birth in 1917 has by no means been constantly, affirmatively directed toward alleviating suspicion and tension.

The Soviet leaders were suspicious and intractable enough to begin with. Their suspicions, aggravated by our suspicions, created a tangle of belligerence and self-righteousness that has turned the world of the nuclear age into a tinderbox.

The Cold War began for Americans of this generation when the Soviet Union imposed friendly governments on the people in the East European states under the guns of the Red Army, in violation of a clearcut promise made by Stalin at the Yalta conference to hold free elections in those countries. And it continued with Soviet pressures on Greece, Turkey and Iran, which we met by promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, aid for Greece and Turkey, and the movement of a naval task force into the Mediterranean.

The Soviets had another version, derived from long memories and security interests (or ambitions disguised as security interest[5]) in those areas inherited from the Czars. Stalin did not have to consult Marxist-Leninist doctrine for reasons to suspect the intentions of what he called the "imperialist" and "capitalist" West.

He could look back to Allied, including American, armed intervention in Russia after the revolution of 1917, in an attempt to strangle that revolution in its infancy. He could remember that the Soviets had been excluded from the Versailles Peace Conference. He could cite Clemenceau's cordon sanitaire: the policy of non-recognition of the Soviets and the establishment of hostile governments on her borders. There was the memory of early Soviet exclusion from the League of Nations - and the fact that, once a member, the Soviet Union was the only country expelled from the League, although Italy, Japan and Germany were equally guilty of committing aggression.

There was the history of Western failure to show any resistance to the moves of Nazi Germany to upset the peace and the Europe of 1919. No effort was made to block Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland. Fascist and Nazi military support for Franco's rebellion against the elected government of Spain was answered by Great Britain, France and the United

States through a non-intervention policy that denied Western arms to the legitimate government of the Spanish Republic.

The Spanish civil war had been the dress-rehearsal for the Nazi onslaught against all of Europe. Fearing this, the Kremlin had supplied military equipment to the government forces. In 1938, with Hitler, Mussolini and Franco moving toward victory in Spain, the Russians saw Great Britain and France sit down with Hitler at Munich and, in effect, hand Czechoslovakia to the Nazis in exchange for a paper promise of what the British prime minister hopefully called "peace in our time". It was not altogether unreasonable for the Russian imagination to see in the Munich settlement a clear invitation to the Nazis to move East.

Hitler did not wait long. The peace lasted a year. In the fall of 1939, the Nazi war machine rolled toward Warsaw; and Stalin, playing his own game at the expense of the western democracies, made his own deal with Hitler over the prostrate body of Poland. Stalin's peace lasted a little longer

than the peace of Munich, but only long enough to enable the Soviets to brace themselves for the Nazi attack that came in the summer of 1941.

All this was almost entirely somebody else's history to the United States. Franklin Roosevelt had made his "quarantine the aggressors" speech in Chicago as early as 1937 but the nation did not really comprehend and continued to live in a dream of splendid isolation. We moved from strict neutrality to the bases-for-destroyers deal in support of Britain, but the war was not really our war until Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December of 1941.

Our wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union was a marriage of convenience in which little love was lost on either side. As soon as the war was over, we stopped lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union. Russia was devastated and had lost at least 20 million lives turning back the Nazi tide. A third of the Nation's territory, including nearly two-thirds of its industrial base, had been turned into a wasteland - a loss, President Kennedy remarked in his American University speech, equivalent to the devastation of the

United States east of Chicago.

All of this is cited not in defense of the Soviet Union or Communism, for tyranny, despotism and prevarication cannot and should not be defended, but in the interest of showing that the Cold War had its origins and continuance in mutual distrust and not solely in unmotivated and unprovoked aggression by Stalin's Russia against an innocent and peaceful West.

The West had to defend against the endlessly voiced intention of Communist leaders ultimately to preside over the total destruction of what they called the capitalist, and we call the free, world. We had the threatening advance of the Red Army into the heart of central Europe, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the large Communist movements in Italy and France, the infiltration of Communist activity and propaganda in the democratic West.

Here was a long record indeed of Soviet aggression and duplicity. With tongue in cheek Russia undertook the coup in Czechoslovakia and argued it was merely an internal matter between Bohemians and Slovaks. The

occupation of the satellites and the imposition of "friendly" coalition governments in which a Communist always held the Ministry of Interior, was for the West another instance of blatant aggression and betrayal of trust. The Soviets shrugged and considered the virtual subjugation of free nations a simple defensive reflex assuring the security of the immediate approaches to the Russian state, a matter of reversing Clemenceau's cordon sanitaire, making it serve Russian security interests rather than those of the Western powers.

The Kremlin feared the long record of Western hostility to the Soviet Union, the apparent tendency of Western diplomacy in the years between the two world wars to appease rather than resist Nazi aggression and to turn the Nazi juggernaut toward the East. They had the construction of a string of American bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union, a necessary deterrent in our view, provocative and hostile in the view of the Kremlin.

Sober historical perspective must find that the clash of two opposing social and economic systems in a world ripped apart by six devastating years

of war spawned mutual distrust and suspicion. And these led in turn to charges and actions by both sides which served essentially the negative forces of fear and hatred.

The Atlantic Community ~~and the Eastern Bloc~~ in Disarray

At the end of World War II, only the United States among the technologically advanced countries had vast economic strength and a potential for production stimulated by a conflict that spared its cities and countryside from destruction. And it alone had the formidable nuclear bomb. A weary Europe, fearful and mistrustful of Communist intentions, devastated and stripped of hope, was floundering in indecision, in an economic and social abyss. Its people needed bread, the better to retain their freedom. They needed hope to rekindle their tired spirit. They needed the tools to rebuild the wanton destruction of bombs and guns. The first essential was the peaceful redevelopment of Europe's shattered economic and social structure.

In 1947 General Marshall outlined the program for European reconstruction which was to bear his name. He stated that it would be directed

deterrent as offset to the Red Army.

With the growing success of economic and social rehabilitation, Europe moved toward greater unity. The Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome, the beginning of the European Economic Community became symbols of a new day of coordinated and cooperative economic activity feeding the peaceful purposes of international development.

In Eastern Europe, which had rejected offers of economic assistance, a similar, but far slower, process of economic recovery was occurring under the domination of the Soviet Union.

But as the ugly scars of war began to be healed; as economic prosperity and social reconstruction inspired hope and confidence; as the threat of aggression receded and fear subsided, a gradual re-assertion of national interests and a growing restiveness sprouted on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

began to lose its sense of purpose and to come apart at the seams because the reason

NATO, ~~which had been born out of fear began to lose its sense of purpose~~ out of which it grew no longer existed. It was created when Europe lay prostrate and exhausted, in a state of total economic collapse and the Russian army stood on the eastern borders of Europe. It was built ~~when the fear abated.~~ France under DeGaulle rejected President Kennedy's "grand design" for a unified Atlantic Community, reasserted its independence

with the mortar of fear and insecurity and it began to crumble when the fear abated.

of United States policy, developed its own nuclear deterrent and blocked expansion of the ECC by vetoing England's entry.

In Eastern Europe, where we had postulated a monolithic and single-minded Communism, Soviet dominance was challenged. Tito bolted the Bloc in 1948 and promptly became a kind of ex-officio beneficiary of the Marshall Plan.

Stalin's death in 1953 and the Khrushchev succession and subsequent denunciation of Stalin's reign of terror produced a thaw in Russia. Rebellion occurred in Poland and revolution and ruthless repression in Hungary. Both rebellions led, first in Poland and eventually in Hungary, to more "liberal" regimes; and Poland, too, became a recipient of American aid.

The Eisenhower-Khrushchev Period

In Washington during the 1950's, it almost seemed that two radically inconsistent policies were being simultaneously pursued by the Eisenhower Administration. American policy confusion in the 1950's cannot be understood

single space

Insert

(Examine here the current state of the Atlantic Community and NATO in somewhat more detail, showing its weaknesses and pointing to the need for a cohesive influence based not on the negative fears of war and resistance to military encroachment but on the affirmative hopes for peace and assistance to the needy nations)

without reference to the impact of two traumatic national experiences: the frustrations of the Korean War, which ended in a peace without victory; and the anti-Communist hysteria generated by the late Senator Joseph P. McCarthy of Wisconsin.

The Korean War engendered in the American people a great fatigue. A yearning for peace and a cessation of the strain and sacrifice entailed by our global commitments came over the nation. Yet at the same time, the nihilistic force and demagogic vehemence of McCarthy's hunt for Communists (or any liberal who could be made to look like a Communist) in government, defense plants and universities prevented a true relaxation of cold war tensions and made a hard-nosed anti-Communist stance the acid test of patriotic purity.

The confused currents of the time and the different temperaments of Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, his Secretary of State, combined to create a split personality in our foreign policy. Eisenhower reflected the fatigue bred of commitment, and the yearning for peace. Dulles spoke for

the crusading puritanical zeal of the self-righteous strain in our national character.

Liberation was promised to the Soviet satellites; Dulles boasted of brinkmanship and threatened massive retaliation. When Adlai Stevenson in the presidential campaign of 1956 warned of the dangers of the nuclear arms race and called for a nuclear test ban, he was cried down as an irresponsible dreamer; and Nixon played the McCarthy game of insinuating that the Democratic Party was the party of treason.

Yet in every major showdown, Eisenhower's quietism prevailed over Dulles' nuclear bluster. Eisenhower vetoed the hard-liners when the challenge came to save the French imperial hold on Indochina. When the Hungarians revolted in 1956, he ignored Republican promises of liberation and authorized no American move to save the freedom revolution from Russian tanks. And when the British, French and Israelis the same year moved against Nasser, after his seizure of the Suez Canal, the Eisenhower Administration joined with the Soviet Union in the United Nations to throttle

the Suez campaign.

Both major antagonists in the Cold War were on the horns of a dilemma. While Eisenhower sensed that general war in the nuclear age was a formula for total disaster, nevertheless his administration placed all its military and diplomatic eggs in the nuclear basket, and was not prepared to commit American troops to limited combat with conventional weapons. The Russians, too, had been reading the handwriting on the wall. A Soviet general in 1960 voiced the opinion that war had become too destructive to serve political ends. And Khrushchev the same year developed a new theory of coexistence, which flew in the face of traditional Leninist-Stalinist doctrine. Khrushchev still thought that Communism would eventually "bury" the Western nations; but he told the Soviet Communist Party's 20th conference that it would come about peacefully; that war was not inevitable and that long-term peaceful coexistence was now possible with the capitalist nations; that the Soviet Union should work to change hostile Western views of

coexistence. He found that the Russian people could now look forward to a better life - provided that disarmament made it possible to release resources for improving the standard of living.

This mutual groping for peace, however, failed to arrive at a stable detente. Both powers were too firmly locked in the rigid stances and gestures of the Cold War; the Eisenhower Administration's inept handling of the U-2 incident torpedoed a scheduled summit conference and both adversaries were off again on another round of mutual distrust and recrimination.

Kennedy's Drive for Peace

President Kennedy, in the fall of 1962, finally cleared up the doubts that had persisted in the Kremlin regarding the true nature of American policy; doubts that had arisen from the apparent contradiction between the Dulles belligerence and Eisenhower's lack of it.

Whatever doubts Khrushchev had concerning the United States determination to keep the Soviet Union out of Cuba - doubts that were nourished perhaps by Kennedy's failure to assure the success (through providing air cover) of the Bay of Pigs invasion - were settled in the Cuban missile crisis. Perhaps he thought he could get away with the placement of missiles in Cuba but President Kennedy, who had understood the essential weakness of nuclear brinkmanship and built up our conventional forces, faced Khrushchev down in the missile crisis by local superiority in conventional force in the Caribbean, a sector remote from Russia and not vital to Soviet security.

Out of that American victory, which was disguised enough to enable the Russian leader to save face (at least in the short-run) by pointing to an American promise not to invade Cuba, Kennedy plucked the test-ban talks and treaty, and the beginning of a Soviet-American detente. At the same time, President Kennedy gained renewed trust and faith among the nations of Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia as the symbol of a new and determined spirit to win the peace and help sow the seeds of economic

and social uplift.

The partial test-ban treaty, unfortunately, was not followed up by a sustained diplomatic effort to end the cold war and the nuclear arms race. On the contrary, the emergence of Red China as a nation with nuclear capabilities, and the Chinese rejection of coexistence in favor of a militant prosecution of what are termed "peoples' wars" or "wars of liberation" against the West, have had the effect, along with the deepening American involvement in Vietnam of reviving cold war tensions and of rendering both more difficult and more urgent the search for genuine disarmament.

The Rim of Hell

"Peace cannot be kept by force; it can be achieved only by understanding."

Albert Einstein

Were it not for the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations - 20 nations may have them by 1968 according to some experts - it might be plausible to suggest, as some analysts have indeed suggested, that the United States and the Soviet Union have learned, if not to love the Bomb,

The fact remains, and it may serve as our epitaph, that there is no way to reduce the human factors in this potentially lethal equation to manageable terms - and the equation will become all the more inscrutable as more unpredictable human beings in more and more countries get their hands on the doomsday buttons.

Already, as of 1964, according to Millis, the world's overkill capacity in nuclear explosives was equivalent to about 70 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet. We are concentrating the most refined intelligence of modern scientific man on the elaboration of irrational games on the rim of hell. If we don't step back, one day, sooner or later, we will step over. As John Kennedy told the United Nations, if we don't end the arms race, ~~it~~ will end us.

No matter how successfully we think we are adjusting ourselves to the nuclear environment, the whole terrain remains booby-trapped with the imponderables of accident, miscalculation, and irrationality. And the

The World at a Crossroads

The Nuclear Arms Race to the Rim of Hell

"Peace cannot be kept by force; it can be
achieved only by understanding."

Albert Einstein

Were it not for the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations - 20 nations may have them by 1968 according to some experts - it might be plausible to suggest, as some analysts have indeed suggested, that the United States and the Soviet Union have learned, if not to love the Bomb,

The Eastern Bloc

switch spaces

separate page

Analyze the developments within the eastern bloc since 1949, stressing the shake-up of the monolithic structure dominated by Russia (Tito, Poland, Hungary, Albania), the growing crisis within the communist world between Russia and China, the economic stresses and strains and their need to satisfy appetites for consumer goods and better living standards. This leads to the conclusion that peace is as necessary to Russia as it is to the western nations

The Eastern Bloc

Analyze the developments within the eastern bloc since 1949, stressing the shake-up of the monolithic structure dominated by Russia (Tito, Poland, Hungary, Albania), the growing crisis within the communist world between Russia and China, the economic stresses and strains and their need to satisfy appetites for consumer goods and better living standards. This leads to the conclusion that peace is as necessary to Russia as it is to the western nations.

Germany swiss space separate page

Still persists as a danger point in the search for peace –

1) Germany cannot move toward unification in the current military context

2) As the second most important economic West national entity in the world, Germany must find a way to be "recognized" it cannot be forever repressed without engendering a resurgence of nationalism

a) it is attempting to gain this "recognition" by insistence on being brought into the military build-up and becoming one of the family of nuclear nations; to (for instance, to move toward a multi-lateral nuclear permit this) is merely to appease its and tacit latent nationalism; military hierarchy ~~and~~ it will cause the program for unification to be delayed even more; in short it would be more rather than less harmful to the search for world peace

b) solution to the German problem therefore must be found outside the framework (ours)

of the nuclear power struggle; this can be done by inviting it to be a full partner in a world effort to build the peace through massive social and economic development; make it an integral partner in the family of nations

Germany

Still persists as a danger point in the search for peace -

1) Germany cannot move toward unification in the current military context

2) As the second most important economic national entity in the world, West Germany must find a way to be "recognized"; it cannot be forever repressed without engendering a resurgence of nationalism

a) it is attempting to gain this "recognition" by insistence on being brought into the military build-up and becoming one of the family of nuclear nations; to permit this, (for instance, to move toward a multi-lateral nuclear force) is merely to appease its military hierarchy and feed latent nationalism; it will cause the program for unification to be delayed even more; in short it would be more rather than less harmful to the search for world peace

b) solution to the German problem therefore must be found outside the framework of the nuclear power struggle; this can be done by inviting it to be a full partner in a world effort to build the peace through massive social and economic development; make it an integral partner in the family of nations.

Underdeveloped Nations

a high space
separate page

Brief reference since a total section
of the book will be devoted to this problem

Underdeveloped Nations

Brief reference since a total section of the book will be devoted to this problem.

Red Chuia

single space

separate page

Discuss further how to treat this problem

Red China

Discuss further how to treat this problem.

"War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means!"

may have contained some validity in days past. In today's context of the nuclear weapon, war as an extension of politics is too hazardous a game for any nation or people to play. Von Clausewitz' formulation belongs to the relics of the past and must no longer be given credence.

No matter how successfully we think we are adjusting ourselves to the nuclear environment, the whole terrain remains booby-trapped with the imponderables of accident, miscalculation, and irrationality. And the

The World at a Crossroads

The fact remains, and it may serve as our epitaph, that there is no way to reduce the human factors in this potentially lethal equation to manageable terms - and the equation will become all the more inscrutable as more unpredictable human beings in more and more countries get their hands on the doomsday buttons.

Already, as of 1964, according to Millis, the world's overkill capacity in nuclear explosives was equivalent to about 70 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet. We are concentrating the most refined intelligence of modern scientific man on the elaboration of irrational games on the rim of hell. If we don't step back, one day, sooner or later, we will step over. As John Kennedy told the United Nations, if we don't end the arms race, the arms race will end us.

Over 140 years ago, Karl von Klausewitz, in the context of the weapons of war of his time, related politics and war as the latter being merely the extension of the former. His/quoted statement: often

(A)

CLAUSEWITZ

Over 140 years ago, Karl von Clausewitz, in the context of the weapons of war of his time, related politics and war as the latter being merely the extension of the former. His ~~often~~ quoted statement:

"War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means"

may have contained some validity in days past. In today's context of the nuclear weapon, war as an extension of politics is too hazardous a game for any nation or people to play. Von Clausewitz' formulation belongs to the relics of the past and must no longer be given credence

Community, reasserted its independence of United States policy, developed its own nuclear deterrent and blocked expansion of the ECC by vetoing England's entry.

Examine here the current state of the Atlantic Community and NATO in somewhat more detail, showing its weaknesses and pointing to the need for a cohesive influence based not on the negative fears of war and resistance to military encroachment but on the affirmative hopes for peace and assistance to the needy nations.

deterrent as offset to the Red Army.

With the growing success of economic and social rehabilitation, Europe moved toward greater unity. The Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome, the beginning of the European Economic Community became symbols of a new day of coordinated and cooperative economic activity feeding the peaceful purposes of international development.

But as the ugly scars of war began to be healed; as economic prosperity and social reconstruction inspired hope and confidence; as the threat of aggression receded and fear subsided, a gradual re-assertion of national interests and a growing restiveness sprouted on both sides of the Iron Curtain. NATO began to lose its sense of purpose and to come apart at the seams because the reason out of which it grew no longer existed. It was created when Europe lay prostrate and exhausted, in a state of total economic collapse and the Russian army stood on the eastern borders of Europe. It was built with the mortar of fear and insecurity and it began to crumble when the fear abated. France under DeGaulle rejected President Kennedy's "grand design" for a unified Atlantic