Inter-Office Communication

July 20, 1967

To Walter

From Irv

Subject

Attached is Chapter one of the Peace Proposal which Guy has prepared. This now is to be added to the earlier brief preface which I transmitted to you.

I suggest that you take the opportunity to read these two drafts and arrange for a meeting with Guy to discuss these and the writing of subsequent chapters.

IB:dm
opeiu42

Attach.

Chapter One

The Problem ... and the Plan

There is still time. There is still time -- and opportunity -- to realize the dream of a warless world freed of the ancient plagues of hunger, disease and social inequality, and time to exorcise the nightmare of sudden extinction. But tomorrow there may not be.

For millenia the world has engaged in, and survived, armed conflict. One scholar's morbid tabulation has it that of the past 3400 years, only 234 have been free of a recorded war. Similarly, man's capacity for social injustice and neglect are as old as humanity itself. Even today, more than half the world lives out its existence in misery and despair.

Our survival in the face of such a record would seem to fortify the resigned and cynical optimism which says: "There have always been wars, and the poor have always been with us. But we'll manage to muddle through." But overnight, as history is measured, that assumption has become a prescription for suicide. An unrelenting arms race, capped by the feverish fabrication and hoarding of nuclear weaponry, brings Armageddon daily closer. Although all logic may insist that the East-West balance of terror has made World War III unthinkable, a score of nations has the technological credentials to qualify for membership at will in the once-exclusive nuclear club. "Accident, miscalculation or madness" have replaced malevolent calculation as the most probable trigger of world incineration.

But while the weapons race has driven man to the rim of a nuclear hell, civilization is being pushed toward chaos by a different but converging force: the revolution of rising expectations. This is a sullen and long-repressed rebellion of irresistible power, drawing its main thrust from that two-thirds of the human family which goes to bed hungry every night through a lifetime ... the once mute millions whose lives have been needlessly blighted and cut short by preventable disease ... the despairing who have borne their degradation in silence for ages, thinking it man's inescapable fate. They are silent no longer.

What is left to us of this century will be dominated by the consequences, for good and for evil, of this angry awakening of the have-nots, suddenly aware that other men no different from themselves live nobler lives, that their heritage of wretchedness is not dictated by an inflexible law of the universe.

The chill statistics serve only to measure, not to describe, a global tragedy: nearly two thirds of the earth's 3.3 billion people inhabit essentially under-developed countries which command barely one-sixth of world income. Of the total, a billion subsist on an annual per capita income of less than $100. Another billion-plus grubs through life on $100 to $250. Bracketed into what is unironically identified as the "middle income" group are 400 million people with annual incomes of from $250 to $750.

The "high income" classification is based on 810 million with more than $750. Above them, as an elite, stand the 175 million in the Common Market countries, averaging $1400, and at the summit, 194 million in the United States with $3000.

It does no violence to Thomas Hobbes to describe the current prospect of two thirds of the human race as a compound of "no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." But it is not in the condition itself that we must look for the forces which will shake and perhaps shatter the century's closing decades. Rather it is in the realization, by the destitute, that their continued humiliation is totally unnecessary, whatever the responsibility for its origins. Modern technology has produced the tools to lift from their backs the crushing burden of malnutrition, pestilence, ignorance and want.

But while the tensions and frustrations which are an inevitable consequence of attempts at rapid bootstrap elevation of living standards promise decades of turbulence among the emergent nations determined to break into the twentieth century, the situation presents the Free World with an historical opportunity which is at the same time an ultimatum. The opportunity is to use our unsurpassed technological capacity to close the gap between the rich nations and the poor. The ultimatum is that if we decline the opportunity we condemn the entire world to the probability of cataclysm.

We have the tools and the capacity to bridge the gap, but we have limited time, as a later chapter will demonstrate, in which to put them to work with reasonable prospect of outracing the world population tide. We confront, thus, both a moral and a practical imperative. If we fail to respond to it we place in jeopardy the security and well-being of each of the "have" nations.

In urging upon the Free World the necessity for both haste and adequate magnitude in the effort at economic rescue, this book intends

no pietistic preachment. It is assumed -- and the international aid record since the close of the Second World War bears the assumption out -- that all of the free nations of the West accept a humanitarian obligation to extend help where help is desperately needed. What is not assumed -- and this is borne out by the record as well -- is that even the best-intentioned of the free nations have not seen the problem in its full and growing dimensions and adapted aid policies to those dimensions.

However justified our present complacence at having at least attempted to "do the right thing" in foreign aid, we simply compound the danger if we continue to assume that its volume has thus far built dikes which can in any significant way be expected to contain the human flood with which the subsistence economies of the world will be inundated within the lifetime of any reader of this volume presently under forty.

Nor will preachment or sloganizing detain desperate men from desperate measures. Whether coming from East or West, the largely empty promises by the ideologically divided advanced nations have been losing whatever impact they may once have had among the underprivileged. United Nations Secretary-General U Thant stressed the futility of parading mere slogans before hungry men when he said: "To preach to them about the virtues of democracy, the virtues of human dignity, the virtues of fundamental human freedoms, is not only irrelevant but comic ... I think the message will not go to their hearts."

Eager for the role or not, the new and underdeveloped lands have inherited the balance of power in a world whose remainder teeters between irreconcilable ideologies. Enlisted in the ranks of the West, the "new peoples" can be a powerful force for universal democracy. Neglected, they are almost certain to fall to communism, an alternative tyranny or

domestic chaos of such depth and reach as to be a constant invitation to war.

These, then, are the dominant and interlocking problems which we confront: how to halt humanity's headlong plunge toward nuclear doom, and how to blunt the bitter and deepening inequalities which rob more than half the earth's inhabitants of their God-given heritage as men. Given the infinite improbability that we shall ever achieve the one goal without the other, we must set after them jointly.

It is fundamental to the argument of this book that we have the means to achieve a peaceful, prosperous world of free and equal men released through disarmament from the costly and deadly burden of the armaments race. But to succeed will require unfettered imagination, the daring to try the untried and think the unthinkable ... and unshakeable faith in the ancient vision that though war be the history of man, peace is the dream of the wise.

In the pages which follow, it is proposed to demonstrate that under the bold, enlightened leadership of the United States the free world can and must start along the road toward that elusive dream today. This is a proposal for waging total peace, for launching an international preventive war against global want -- the only kind of war that nations can win.

In outline, here is the program:

As the first step, the President of the United States would announce an economic aid commitment of unprecedented proportions, massive enough to carry fair promise of raising the under-developed countries to the point of self-sustaining growth before the century runs out. Specifically, the United States would unilaterally pledge an average of $20 billion annually for the next 25 years.

The President's announcement would be coupled with an invitation to other industrialized nations -- non-Communist and Communist alike -- to join this Grand Alliance for Peace with financial and material support of their own. It would be made clear, however, that the American pledge would be honored with or without contributions from other nations.

Simultaneously, in a challenge directed primarily at the Moscow bloc and Peking, the United States would invite all countries to conclude a disarmament agreement, with adequate provisions for verifying compliance, and a provision that the men and materials freed by military cutbacks would be shifted to economic development programs. Accession to the disarmament treaty, indeed, would be a pre-condition for participation in the program either as a contributor or as an aid recipient.

The program's planning and administration would be administered by a new international agency -- preferably, though not necessarily, one with a United Nations affiliation. Its structure would be such as to preclude domination by any single power or power bloc.

The immediate impact of such a declaration of peace would be enormous. The program would come to world attention as nothing less than democracy's challenge to communism to transform a contest for ideological supremacy into a positive, aggressive peace offensive. Whether the Eastern Behemoths accepted or rejected the challenge would not, at first, be a primary concern. The force of the declaration might or might not unhinge their present hopes of conquest through the eventual failure of all competing systems amongst the poorer nations. But it is utterly certain that the plan's actual implementation would impose upon both the Soviet Union and China a radical readjustment of tactics and expectations. Eventually, it is not too much to hope, both would be compelled to participate. Time,

they might reasonably have calculated, has been their automatic ally. Amongst nations whose populations and problems seemed likely to multiply far in excess of their capacity to deal with them, communism could anticipate eventual receivership with little effort to "earn" it. But against a tide of hope in the underdeveloped world, the prospect of inheritance without effort is basically altered.

"The curious thing about the cold war," as the Secretary-General of the United Nations has put it, "is that it is not a battle for more territory or even for more political power. It is a battle ... for the minds of the unconverted." It is a confused but colossal struggle between East and West for the hearts of millions eager to embrace any doctrine that can prove by performance -- not promises and slogans -- that it can raise them out of their choking stagnation.

"The problem of our age," as Conor Cruise O'Brien has observed in the Catholic publication 'Commonweal', "is not how to stop, fight or eradicate communism. It is how to cope with its challenges and its appeals in such a way that the competing systems on the planet may produce more benefits to mankind than threats and suffering."

The loyalties of the desperate will go to the system which fills their empty bellies, clothes their naked backs, heals the ills of their bodies, opens the road to self-fulfillment and, above all, points the way to lasting peace. It is here that the free-society system and communism stand in crucial confrontation.

Neither side can win by military power, however overawing. Along that path lies inevitable destruction for all -- the most affluent as well

as the poorest. In this nuclear age, the ideological tournament must be fought with other weapons: science, technology, industrial capacity and good will.

Fought on such a terrain, the contest permits the industrialized democracies to exploit their most imposing assets. Under American leadership, they will go into the battle for peace and rehabilitation strong and fully armed -- against a Communist bloc which is not only mortally divided internally, but which shows gaping chinks in its economic armor.

Fundamentally, the Communist promise of a brave new world is based on the claimed superiority of their economic system over ours. Only by the artificial and wasteful stimulus of war, their theoreticians contend, can the free countries keep from falling into economic chaos and, ultimately, collapsing entirely.

There is a germ of seeming truth in the otherwise erroneous propaganda. It is a disturbing fact that never in peacetime has the United States' economic machine run at full speed. Between wars, our country has regularly slipped back into periods of recession or depression, marked by unemployment and idle production capacity.

That flaw, however, stems from faulty practise and not from any irremediable defect in the economic system. It is, indeed, this very weakness -- our unused and under-used inventories of manpower and machinery -- which can be converted into almost immediate sources of strength in the global peace race which is here proposed against the Communist powers. We need only imagination and courage to perform a dazzling miracle. Harnessed to a greatly expanded aid effort, these presently wasted resources can

permit us to meet many of the most imperative needs of the under-developed nations without curbing the flow of goods and services to our normal domestic and overseas markets. At the same time, so doing would enable us to take up the slack which plagues America with agricultural surpluses, unemployment, and throttled-down industries even at the most prosperous peaks of peacetime periods.

Our steelmills, factories, machine shops and assembly lines, rarely operating at anything approaching full capacity, can pour out the trucks and tractors, the tools and medical instruments, the clothing and the books which the stagnating half of the world needs to begin moving into the twentieth century. Our agricultural surpluses, a recurrent curse when the incredible productivity of the American farm sector overleaps domestic demand, will be a crucial stopgap resource for feeding hungry millions until, with our help, their own agricultural technology catches up with population increases. Indeed, current projections of population growth, when set against probable rises in farm productivity, suggest that emergency food transfers from the industrialized world to the underdeveloped will become, within a very few years, an almost daily necessity if famine is not to sweep half a helpless world.

To our own jobless and under-employed citizens, of course, the program I propose would bring the blessing of permanent and full employment. Thus the liability of our frequently burdensome under-utilized productive capacity can quickly be converted into our most powerful asset.

Clearly, the strategy here proposed of enormously accelerated aid to those countries still generations short of industrialization and self-sufficiency does more than respond to an iron necessity. It promises to hit the Communist giants precisely where they are weakest. Late-comers

to the industrial age, both Russia and China lag, in performance, far behind their blatant promises of producing a better life for their people. Their still immature industrial muscle is overtaxed by their stubborn emphasis on the military build-up and, in Russia's case, on the space race. In the consumer sector, their production facilities are stretched to the snapping point. Neither will, for years to come, be able to quiet the ever rising clamor of its own peoples for higher living standards. Under these conditions, obviously, neither Moscow nor Peking has much to spare for the impoverished beyond its borders.

The disparity between the West's latent productive capabilities and the Communist world's overstrained economies represents the Archimedean lever of the total peace offensive. With it, we can raise the neglected populations to the economic and social level which should be the heritage of all men in the atomic age. With it, simultaneously, we can pry open the door to total disarmament. Only then will the dream of peace become more than a hopeless illusion.

Let us consider briefly the probable responses of the Eastern powers to a peace-through-aid offensive by the free nations on the scale here proposed. Faced with the invitation to join the free world in the Grand Alliance, the Soviet Union would have three choices. First, it could flatly refuse to help wage the peace under any conditions. Such a reaction, however, is a highly improbable one, for it would mean meekly forfeiting the global ideological struggle to the democracies, risk the freezing of Communist influence at its present level, and invite defections even from ranks already under such influence.

Secondly, and ideally, the Communist nations could embrace the peace proposal sincerely and without reservations, creating a condition of what might seem instant millenium. Realistically, however,

it would be over-optimistic to expect regimes whose conditioned foreign policy reflex is a suspicious, cautious hostility to make such a happy choice -- at least at the outset.

The most likely Soviet choice would be a third course: to compete with the West's economic aid program with a limited, echoing aid offensive of their own. And that decision alone would be a first Russian step, however unwittingly taken, along the road to international disarmament. That is said for this reason: as long as the American foreign aid budget remains at its current timid level of about three billion dollars a year, there is no serious leverage upon the Soviets to respond in kind, and thus no internal pressure upon the Russian economy to provide exportable capital in significant quantity.

But a $20 billion-a-year American challenge would force an entirely new production pattern on Soviet planning. Only the Western nations have the industrial capacity to undertake a rescue operation among underdeveloped lands on the scale required, while still raising the living standards of their own people and maintaining adequate defense strength. We can afford both guns and butter; the Communists cannot.

How, then, can the Soviet Union compete with the United States in the contest for the loyalties of the under-developed and uncommitted world? How can it hope to convince the unconvinced that the vaunted economic system of communism is, indeed, superior to the free world's way? For convince it must. We must remember that it was in an economic context -- and not necessarily a military one -- that Nikita Khrushchev boasted to the West: "We will bury you."

As one possibility, the Russians might try to match our $20 billion commitment by diverting the tools of peace from the civilian

sector of their own economy. But for all its authoritarian grip on the Soviet population, it is increasingly improbable that the Moscow government would dare to risk a course so dangerous. There are already audible rumbles of discontent from a Russian people burdened by a voracious war establishment which for two generations has gobbled all but the crust of the Soviet economic loaf. Russian peasants and factory workers alike have waited too long for the fulfillment of bureaucratic promises of a soon-to-come living standard matching that of the West. Under the lash of war and officially sponsored war hysteria, they might continue to accept their deprivation stoically (if not willingly) in the interest of national security. But they could hardly be expected quietly to forego the fruits of a long-promised and only now budding consumer industry in the interests of unknown peoples far beyond their frontiers. Moscow, we may assume, knows the mood of Soviet citizens. There have been reports of riots between workers and police as meat and butter prices were raised. At the Black Sea port of Odessa, longshoremen staged a strike to protest a shipment to Cuba of consumer goods badly needed and wanted at home. These wisps of surface smoke, in a nation where overt protest has been all but unheard of for decades, may confidently be taken to indicate large subterranean fires.

A similar situation prevails among the Kremlin's East European allies, where the myth of an international Communist monolith, under pushbutton domination by Moscow, has been eroded by the drift toward economic independence among Soviet satellites whose governments are themselves under intensive and rising pressure from their own populations for more consumer production.

The nub of the matter is that, with its consumer industries thus strained (and with a more or less explicit pact with its subjects to widen and enrich the variety of the consumer sector), the Soviet regime would be forced to look elsewhere for the resources with which to compete in the worldwide assault on poverty. And there is only one other source: the military segment of the economy. Only by diversion of men and materials from its war machine can the Soviet Union even remotely hope to match American economic aid to underdeveloped countries, as it must -- tractor for tractor, clinic for clinic, school for school.

Thus stripped of options, the Kremlin will be ready to take the only road open: toward disarmament. Obviously, Russia would no more consider disarming unilaterally than would the United States. But outflanked by an American determination to wage the peace single-handedly if necessary, she would be forced to abandon the rigid position which has for years deadlocked the East-West disarmament conferences.

Warily, no doubt, the Soviet Union could be expected to accede to peripheral agreements initially, aimed at lightening its own burden of armament expenditures. Whether these steps were taken in the form of cutbacks in projected military outlays, a "bomber bonfire", a ban on underground nuclear testing, a non-proliferation treaty or a combination of these and still other alternatives, the important thing would be that the arms race would inevitably have been slowed, and with rising prospect that it might eventually be braked to a dead halt. The world would have taken a first shy step away from the

rim of destruction. It would be ready to steer a new course, along the highway toward peace.

Now let us examine a less comfortable presumption: that the Russians, by fringe cutbacks might pare their arms budget only to the point where they could approximately match America's $20 billion-a-year aid program, but still leave themselves in possession of a conventional and nuclear arsenal sufficiently formidable to launch a major war, or, by accident, or intent, touch off a global holocaust. This is a possibility seriously to be reckoned with.

Again, as with the original initiative, the power to force the Soviet Union below that critical threshold lies with the United States. Assume, for example, that the Kremlin were to agree with the United States to a balanced armament reduction sufficient to raise the $20 billion in Soviet overseas aid -- this by non-crucial trimming of their military establishment. The United States could at this point reduce its own arms spending by a matching $20 billion. Of that amount, half could be ploughed into domestic rehabilitation programs -- education, housing, pollution control and other projects of direct and immediate benefit to its own citizens. The remaining half could be added to our original pledge to the under-developed world, thus raising our annual overseas assistance outlay to $30 billion. Again, to stay in the peace race, the Russians would be obliged to follow the American initiative by raising their competing allocation by $10 billion. And inescapably, their only source of financing would be their military juggernaut -- a fact which would compel the Soviets to return to the negotiating table for new and ever more significant disarmament agreements.

Once set in motion, the interacting drives toward disarmament on the one hand and elevated living standards on the other would continue to move forward under the impetus of America's economic one-upmanship.

Clearly, then, even should the Soviet Union opt to compete outside the peace proposal which this book outlines, the world would gain enormous benefits. However modest at the outset, the arms curtailment which would inevitably result would ease the danger of an all-destroying war. A mutual reduction of expenditures for military Frankensteins would lighten the appalling burden for peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The swords of war would be reforged into the tools of peace in a grand assault against poverty, hunger, disease and ignorance.

Ultimately, it is logical to assume, the Russians would be likely to abandon a go-it-alone competitive aid program and accept the invitation of the democracies to join the Alliance for Peace as a full-fledged and cooperating member.

That expectation is based on more than pious hope. Visibly, even without having abandoned its goal of worldwide ideological conquest, Soviet communism is mellowing with age and gradual resignation to the unwillingness of history to move to the cues of dogmatic prognostication. The iron-fisted extremism of the Stalin era has been blunted by the rising expectations of its own people, by incipient nationalism among the Soviet satellites and, worldwide, by the nuclear stalemate with the United States.

However abrasive its style, Russian policy has moved perceptibly toward rapprochement with the West almost in pace with the industrial growth of the giant ex-protege, China, to the East. Increasingly preoccupied with a new enemy so muscular and bellicose, the Russians are transparently

less and less willing to risk, through war-provoking intrusions in the West, what they have so painfully acquired. Their own emergence into the ranks of the industrialized countries has had the effect of making them more rational, more responsible, and less paranoid members of the international community. This is perhaps the natural evolution of those who have considerable to lose and little to gain through recklessness.

Yes, but China?

Still largely self-quarantined behind a Great Wall of sullen suspicion and neurotic xenophobia, China has until now been -- whether in sternly limited dealings with the democracies or other Communist nations -- intransigently uncooperative when not, at least vocally, downright belligerent. To many, alarmed by China's incessant and warlike stridency, the voice of President Johnson may have seemed the carrier of pure pious gullibility when he said: "We do not believe in eternal enmity. All hatred among nations must end in reconciliation. And we look to the day when the policies of mainland China will permit such a reconciliation."

Nevertheless, a reflective study of the record will show such an anticipation to be something more than mere vacuous sentiment. For all of its verbal ferocity, the Chinese Communist regime has shown a persistent and shrewd restraint in its international dealings.

In Korea, its military forces crossed the Yalu River only when United Nations troops were hammering at the gates of Manchuria and when the bombing of power installations and other targets on Chinese soil was being demanded by influential American strategists. Yet despite what so intensely nationalist a power might well have considered extreme provocation, Peking's response (backed by a then friendly Soviet Union's formidable military assistance) was deliberate to the point of reluctance. It was, in any case, anything but frenzied.

Again, Peking's annexation of Tibet, although deeply and carefully planned, was less an example of expansionist Communist adventuring than an assertion of a historical territorial claim. Both the Nationalists on Formosa and the Communists in Peking insist on Chinese hegemony

over Tibet. This fact hardly justifies the take-over, but it does suggest that the absorption of Tibet was a move at least as Chinese as it was Communist Chinese.

Similarly, in the Sino-Indian frontier dispute, Peking could make a not altogether implausible case for "agression" against a trans-Himalayan neighbor. In contesting the validity of the MacMahon Line border, the Chinese can claim with some justification that the boundary was imposed by a strong British colonial government in India at a time when China was too weak and disorganized to resist. On this point, too, Peking and Taipei are in agreement.

Finally, with full-scale American military intervention in Viet Nam deep into its third year, Communist China was confining its assistance to its hard-pressed Hanoi ally to a relatively niggardly trickle of military and non-military advisers and materiel -- and a generous flood of belligerent polemic. Notwithstanding American air strikes at their very doorstep and not infrequent errant intrusions over Chinese territory itself, Peking has discreetly avoided entering the war, either w th regular military forces or -- as in Korea -- with "volunteers."

None of the foregoing is to argue that the Chinese Communist regime is a peace-loving government, maligned and isolated by sinister Washington imperialists, but it does illustrate an aspect of Peking's foreign policy which is often and easily overlooked. The fact is, there is a far higher quotient of rationality in the behavior of the regime than in its pronouncements.

The reasons which explain mainland China's relative restraint are not far to seek. Still shakily in the throes of compressed industrialization, not yet immune to crop-failure famine, incapable as yet of conducting military operations beyond the nation's immediate periphery, China simply cannot risk an open clash of armed forces with a powerful United States. For the moment, the worst the Chinese can do is to harass their domestic backsliders, condemn Kremlin "revisionism" and Western "imperialism," give lip-service to "wars of liberation" throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America and, in Viet Nam, fight to the last Vietnamese.

Yet for all of her manifest weaknesses, Communist China is on her way to challenging the United States and the Soviet Union as a world power. It would be criminally short-sighted for the West to fob off as impotent a nation of nearly 800 million people with a fanatical ideological determination to foreshorten the history of industrial development. Even now, what an economist might regard as a paper dragon has an industrial skeleton, military sinews with truly formidable land-war potential, and nuclear claws. It is a question of no mean importance whether -- and how -- the dragon can be tamed before it has gorwn the muscle with which to tear the world apart.

I submit that the answer lies in India -- the subcontinent to the south.

In many respects, the neighbors are near-twins. Both have borne for centuries the leaden weight of classical imperialism.

India's population of nearly 500 million is second in the world only to China's. Each is coping with overwhelming industrial, agricultural, economic and social dislocation problems spawned by the "revolution of rising expectations" within its own borders.

Yet there is one elemental difference between the two colossi: Communist China represents totalitarianism at its most militant and dogmatic extreme; India is the world's most populous democracy.

Nowhere is the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between systems more dramatic. And nowhere are the stakes higher. For in the words of the venerable Indian diplomat B. N. Chakravarty: "Political freedom will have no meaning if it is not accompanied by rapid improvement in our economic and social life. Economic and social progress is vital ifour democratic way of life is to be preserved. If no substantial progress can be achieved, a different political system such as that in China may well look attractive."

There is the crucial center of the challenge to the West.

We have in our hands the opportunity and the wherewithal for a successful response. We can help India to demonstrate with unassailable proof that the cherished dream of economic and social betterment can be achieved without sacrificing political freedom. The demonstration, we may be sure, will not be lost on the canny Chinese people.

Again, our most potent tool would be the mobilization of our now-under-used industrial capacity. India, despite every conceivable obstacle, has worked her way to the tortured edge of take-off into self-sustaining growth. There is wide consensus among development economists that a final, sustained aid push can put the Indian economy

into a productivity orbit, but that it must come now if the painfully constructed apparatus of flight is not to be buried under an avalanche of population.

With massive aid given now, we can help India to bring to solid completion a launching pad from which her depressed millions can lift themselves into at least the lower reaches of hope. The free world can, within two decades, free India of the devastating famines which have almost annually wracked her people, drained her economic vitality, and fanned the flames of the desperate despair in which communism takes deepest root. Multiplied American and free world assistance can, with reasonable speed, convert India into an Asian showcase, igniting a huge beacon of democratic aspiration amongst the continent's millions with even longer and more arduous roads to travel.

Should we fail to seize this opportunity, however, or dawdle too long in grasping it, it is difficult to foresee, in India or the remainder of Asia, any outcome short of massive drift into totalitarian attempts to solve the increasingly insoluble. China, with a brutal grip on every phase of Chinese life, can in effect convert human tissue into development capital and govern birth rates virtually by edict. It is a repudiation of the very essence of a free society dictatorially to harness lives to the demands of national planning and the machinery of development, but we will forfeit all right, whether moral or practical, to expect nations so deeply in travail as India permanently to resist

resort to authoritarian expedients if we deny them, in the most intense depth of their crises, the tools of salvation which we now have in such abundance in the Western world.

But just as neglect of India promises to push that nation into the maw of totalitarianism, rescue of India promises a possibly profound impact eventually upon China. A neighboring India in economic upswing, able to achieve the institutional modifications necessary to industrialization through democratic consent and popular participation in public decisions, would be certain, over time, to have a softening influence on Communist China, putting that country under the same pressures that would be operating within the Soviet Union -- toward unilateral reduction of military spending or adherence to a universal disarmament treaty.

Meanwhile, it is not too soon to begin probing for cracks in the Great Wall which the Communists have built around mainland China. There is a growing realization among scholars and pragmatists the world over that there can be no serious prospect of lasting peace while one-quarter of the world's population lives in a backwater of angry isolation from the social, economic and political mainstream.

One of the most recent (and persuasive) proposals for breaching the Wall was prepared by a panel of eminent national experts for the United Nations Association of the United States of America.

As a first step, the study recommends, the United States must withdraw its opposition to U. N. membership for Communist China. The aim "should be membership for both Chinas," the one governed from Peking and the other from Taipei. While acknowledging that the United States "must continue to protect its Asian allies, several of them China's close neighbors, from military attack," the analysis points out that

"many members, indeed, probably the majority of the United Nations members, are not inclined to take as seriously as does the United States the extreme and often outrageous statements made by the leaders in Peking."

The benefits of exposing Chinese Communism to the force of international opinion and broadened diplomatic contact would be wide-sweeping even if not immediate and even if difficult to achieve. But the urgency of an effort now is sharply stressed by the study, which concludes that action delayed may be tragically late. "The absence of effective general communication between Peking and large segments of the international community increases the difficulty for each making accurate assessments of the other's intentions ... at a time when miscalculations could lead to an Asian catastrophe."

Nothing of what we know of mainland China suggests that it will be easy to coax Peking out of its iron cocoon, but a prudent concern for the future stability of Asia (as, indeed, for the cost of our own security) dictates that an initiative in that direction be taken now. The probability of early rebuff of overtures proposing cultural exchanges, trade in non-strategic materials, exchanges of newsmen, scholars and experts in medicine and public health should not deter us from their repetition. The stakes are too high to permit us the luxury of quietly accepting defeat under such circumstances. On us lies a heavy burden of obligation to persevere even in the face of paranoid rejection, for as President Johnson has said: "We believe that even

the most rigid society will some day, one day, awaken to the rich possibilities of a diverse world ... We believe that cooperation, not hostility, is really the way of the future in the 20th Century." That declaration is more than a Sunday vocalization of credo. If it is not, the 20th Century may well be the world's last.

The Structure of the Plan

To fulfill its maximum promise, the Grand Alliance for Peace would be financed by contributions representing a given percentage of each participating country's Gross National Product. As in the case of United Nations assessments, the contribution by each country would be based on a sliding scale which takes into account per capita income, the economic growth rate, and related factors.

Fund administration would be in the hands of an International Social and Economic Agency staffed by international civil servants with training and competence appropriate to their tasks and drawn from all participating countries, donor and recipient alike.

It need not be a rigid requirement that the Agency operate within the United Nations framework, but there are compelling arguments for such an association. In technical assistance, for example, the U. N. and its affiliated bodies represent a brimming reservoir of long and invaluable experience. Unlike the old and politically oriented League of Nations, the successor world organization has, through its more than two decades of function, laid dominant emphasis on economic and social

accomplishments. Some 80 percent of the personnel and budget of the U. N. are already, in fact, earmarked for development work. Projects of direct benefit to underdeveloped peoples are the immediate concern of the U. N. family's most active and effective organs, among them the U. N. Development Program, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the U. N. Children's Fund, the International Labor Organization, and the U. N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

United Nations affiliation, moreover, would allay any possible suspicion that the International Economic and Social Agency whose creation I propose would be an American-dominated instrument, operated primarily for the benefit of the United States. However unjustified, the fear of "economic imperialism" has soured a discouraging number of our well-intentioned unilateral assistance programs abroad. Experience joins inherent logic to urge that multilateral aid, administered through an economically "neutral" United Nations, will tread more gently on the perhaps exaggerated but often understandable national and ideological sensibilities of recipient countries.

The Agency would establish an eligibility formula for recipient nations based largely on their per capita incomes. Assistance would be provided in goods and services or, under special circumstances as crises might dictate, as monetary contributions earmarked for development.

It is essential to the concept advanced here that assistance rendered through the Agency be considered as long-term, interest-free loans, repayable only when the recipient country's Gross National Product

has reached a specified level. In no case should a country's annual repayment exceed the "danger point" percentage of its GNP alluded to by George D. Woods, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as he wrote: "When all amortization, interest and dividend payments are taken into account, the backflow of some $6 billion from the developing countries offsets about half the gross capital inflow which these countries receive."

More ominously, Woods added: "These payments are continuing to rise at an accelerated rate, and in a little more than 15 years, on present form, would offset the inflow completely. In short, to go on doing what the capital-exporting countries are now doing will, in the not too long run, amoutn to doing nothing at all."

As against the swelling magnitude and urgency of underdeveloped nation needs, we have already reached the point of "doing nothing at all." The aid budgets of the free world in recent years have been declining as the crisis has risen. We are doing less and less about more and more.

As this book is published, over 50 percent of the world's total population inhabits those nations which cover the planet's southern half. Today, this "hungering half of the human race," as Robert S. McNamara has called it, commands barely one-sixth of the world's total goods and services. In a few scant years, by 1975, the dependent children alone of these nations -- which is to say children under fifteen years of age -- will exceed in number the aggregated populations of all

of the developed countries to the north. Per capita income in nearly half of the 80 underdeveloped nations which are members of the World Bank over which Mr. Woods has presided with skill, devotion and compassion, is rising by a skimpy one percent or less. Their most sanguine prospect, by present projections, is to reach a per capita income, by the close of this century, of $170 per year or less. By that same time, and by similar projections, the United States will have attained a per capita income of over $4,500 per year.

"The conclusion to all of this," as the Secretary of Defense has written, "is blunt and inescapable. Given the certain connection between economic stagnation and the incidence of violence, the years that lie ahead for the nations in the southern half of the globe are pregnant with violence. This would be true if no threat of Communist subversion existed."

Under the proposal here submitted, each government participating in the Plan, whether as donor or recipient, would be required to accept specific conditions formulated to give maximum drive and meaningful direction to the peace offensive. Recipient countries would, for example, pledge themselves not only to cooperate with the International Social and Economic Agency in blueprinting and implementing development programs, but also to carry out the provisions of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. They would also commit themselves to the exploration and fulfillment of proposals for the equitable distribution of new national wealth created by the impact of the War on Want. For, clearly, no stable and expanding social structure can stand on the shaky foundation of

"average income" if, as is the case in a number of technically "prosperous" countries, 20 percent of the population enjoys 80 percent of the national wealth. Equity is as central to the purposes of civilization as physical well-being, and "average income" statistics, if they conceal deep injustice in the distribution of national wealth, will neither fill empty bellies nor blunt the thrust of social and political discontent among those cheated of their rightful share.

But above all, each nation participating in the Plan would vow to take its finger off the trigger and put its foot heavily on the brake of war. It would be a primary obligation that every participant not only adhere to the nuclear test-ban treaty and related international covenants but pledge to work unceasingly, both alone and through bilateral and multi-lateral agreements, in the exploration of new paths leading away from the brink of nuclear conflagration. Ultimately, of course, the goal would be universal accession to the still elusive treaty of general and complete disarmament.

This, then, is the heart of my proposal, to be documented and expanded on in the chapters to follow: a self-perpetuating program of disarmament through economic aid ... of accelerated development assistance financed through military cutbacks ... an upward spiral toward a new epoch for mankind -- toward a world emerged from the ancient shadow of war and want and into the bright sun of freedom, prosperity and peace.

Inter-Office Communication

July 31, 1967

To Walter

From Irv

Subject

Attached is Guy Nunn's Chapter Two of the Peace Proposal.

It is somewhat urgent to meet with Guy before negotiations start in earnest so you can give him the benefit of your reaction to what he has already written and give him direction as to the rest of the book.

Please advise.

IB:lm
opeiu42
att.

Chapter Two

"You cannot step twice into the same river; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you."

Change, now as in the time of Heraclitus, is a law of life. But in our time, history flows not like a river but a torrent. The whole world, even its most peaceful segments, is in revolutionary turmoil. The sharply quickening pace of change has posed mounting problems even to this change-habituated nation -- problems within our society and in the world around us.

Even as we have grown relatively old among the nations, we have prided ourselves on our openness to innovation; we have regarded ourselves as the instigators of the new. Yet we must in honesty concede that our receptivity to the new has in recent decades gone primarily to scientific and technological innovation. These, by the depth of their penetration, have forced cultural adaptations upon us. but we have been much less open to and ready for premeditated change in the social, political and economic realms. We have therefore suffered from a sometimes serious lag in harnessing the science and technology at our command to human needs and aspirations. To cite but one example, we have lagged decades and even generations behind other societies in offering minimal public assistance to the social and economic victims of change. For the most part our people have had to improvise their own hit-or-miss adaptations to radically new environments created by a highly organized and deliberately fostered technological revolution.

Under the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, we have begun in the past few years to move to overcome this lag; yet we are only at the beginnings of our labors. And while we have begun tentatively to come to grips with the folly and immorality of tolerating the persistence of poverty in the midst of our national affluence, we have yet to face up to the ever greater and more lethal folly of an arms race in a world of conflicting ideologies while half or more of the human family live out lives of poverty, ignorance, disease and despair.

That marvellous old man, Pope John XXIII left us as a last but lingering legacy an appeal to desist from a negligence so lethal, an appeal as eloquent as it is simple:

> "... it is with deep sorrow that We note the enormous stocks of armaments that have been and still are being made in more economically developed countries, with a vast outlay of intellectual and economic resources. And so it happens that, while the people of these countries are loaded with heavy burdens, other countries as a result are deprived of the collaboration they need in order to make economic and social progress.
>
> "The production of arms is allegedly justified on the grounds that in present-day conditions peace cannot be preserved without an equal balance of armaments. And so, if one country increases its armaments, others feel the need to do the same; and if one country is equipped with nuclear weapons, other countries must produce their own, equally destructive.
>
> "Consequently, people live in constant fear lest the storm that every moment threatens should break upon them with dreadful violence. And with good reason, for the arms of war are ready at hand. Even though it is difficult to believe that anyone would deliberately take the responsibility for the appalling destruction and sorrow that war would bring in its train, it cannot be denied that the conflagration may be set off by some uncontrollable and unexpected chance. And one must bear in mind that, even though the monstrous power of modern weapons acts as a deterrent, it is to be feared that mere continuance of nuclear tests, undertaken with war in mind, will have fatal consequences for life on the earth.

"Justice, then, right, reason and humanity urgently demand that the arms race should cease; that the stockpiles which exist in various countries should be reduced equally and simultaneously by all concerned; that nuclear weapons should be banned; and that a general agreement should eventually be reached about progressive disarmament and an effective method of control."

Nowhere is our proclivity for the quick technological breakthrough more sharply contrasted with our slowness in coping with the human aspects of change than in the literally explosive domain of foreign policy. And it is precisely here that the price of error is confiscatory, precisely here that our vaunted scientific and technological know-how can convert to instant ash and rubble the very civilization which created it.

In a notable address at Yale University, President Kennedy put this nation on notice that we had long victimized ourselves by mistaking myth for reality in our domestic economic affairs. In his brief tenure he moved as well to bring a heightened sense of reality into our conduct of global policy. In a Seattle speech on November 16, 1961, he told us: "We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, that we cannot always impose our will on the other 94% of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution for every world problem."

Later, in a historic address announcing the American-Russian talks which were to lead to the partial test ban treaty, Kennedy elaborated his concept of realism in the conduct of our foreign policy:

"Let us focus ... on a more practical, more attainable peace -- based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual

evolution in human institutions, on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interests of all concerned. There is no single, simple key to this peace, no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process -- a way of solving problems."

"Let us re-examine our attitude toward the Cold War, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last eighteen years been different."

That call for understanding, realism and a gradual liquidation of the Cold War through the calculated and purposeful pursuit of peace through concrete steps was issued on June 10 of 1963. It was heard not only in America but in the Soviet Union and throughout the world. Its product was the partial test ban treaty, signed now by over a hundred governments.

But the detente ushered in by that treaty has yet to bear its full fruit. We still live in a precarious half-peace rooted in a balance of terror. Hot local wars persist, underground nuclear testing continues, and the qualitative nuclear competition expands with new entrants year by year.

Nominally this nation is still committed to the strategy of realism and peace, of "dealing with the world as it is." The Johns Hopkins address by President Johnson on April 7, 1965, was

an eloquent expression of his administration's awareness that military power was no solution for the problems of the world as it is and the expression was accompanied by a pledge of a $1 billion economic development program for the nations of Southeast Asia, regardless of their political complexion.

But the realism of the analysis was not matched by the magnitude of the gesture. In proposing an aid program of dimensions so pitifully inappropriate to the size of the Southeast Asia development problem, the President was doubtless deeply influenced by a "realistic" appraisal of what the U. S. Congress would accept. Our trouble, here as elsewhere, is an old one: while our intentions are normally of the best, we still suffer as a people from an aching lag between our technological proficiency and our human responses to human need.

Our situation, in consequence, is a difficult one, whether it be analyzed psychologically, politically or economically. This country, over the past twenty years, has unwittingly and perhaps inescapably acquired a tremendous vested interest in the Cold War -- to a point where defense and defense-related expenditures currently consums over half of the total annual Federal budget. Long-sustained and high-volume Federal investment of any kind tends to be self-perpetuating (as, indeed, in most areas, it should be), but massive and continued military investment shows itself to be particularly immune to the counsels of prudence and unresponsive even to radical alterations in the international environment which may, on given past occasions, have made such investment advisable. Whereas public

works, anti-poverty expenditures or non-military foreign aid comes, normally, under intensive congressional scrutiny and must justify themselves, annually, to earn renewal, our military outlays, either in volume or in their particular components, are rarely put under questioning scrutiny.

What might be called a condition of addictive symbiosis has emerged, with the armed services, the defense contracting corporations and a largely uncritical Congress living in mutual interdependence and relatively free of competent critical review or analysis -- a form of subterranean power which, even if infrequently abused, is incompatible with the democratic ethos. Through its sheer bulk and pervasiveness, moreover, if not through its almost automatic ability to silence criticism as unpatriotic, this vast establishment has acquired a pre-eminence in the struggle for Federal appropriations which forces other (and at times more pressing) national needs into scrabbling for pieces of the half-loaf which remains after the military monolith has been fed.

It is significant far beyond its actual public impact that former President Eisenhower felt obliged, after leaving the White House, to sound a warning to the effect that a key threat to free government was represented by what he called the "military-industrial complex." We had become so accustomed to blandness and innocent optimism from this man that the warning went largely unheard. Coming, as it did, from a man virtually the whole of whose career had been spent in the upper echelons of the military hierarchy,

it should have led to startled and serious national soul-searching. It didn't.

Clearly, the world has changed drastically since America with her Allies and Russia crushed the Nazi and Japanese war machines nearly twenty five years ago, and since the atomic age opened. And yet, in the main because our political and human responses have not altered sufficiently with events, because we have been frenziedly preoccupied with the technology of nuclear weapons and the cold-war confrontation with the Soviet Union, we are over-prepared for a war which cannot be fought without destroying civilization -- and lamentably unprepared for the only war that is worth fighting and which must be fought: the war against the mass poverty and human desperation which now grip more than half the human family in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

A Realistic Re-Look at NATO

Nearly a quarter-century after the end of the Second World War, the Atlantic Community is in prosperous disarray. NATO, its sense of historic purpose lost and its cohesion gone, is coming apart at the seams. Africa and Southeast Asia, charged with the spirit of national independence, have replaced western Europe as world problem centers. What we once saw as a monolithic Communist conspiracy intent on global domination has been fractured by a major schism between the Soviet Union and Mao's China. There has been an evolution toward national forms of Communism, a

loosening of bloc ties in Eastern Europe, and a resumption of economic and cultural relations across the Iron Curtain.

The bipolar world of the Cold War period is losing its once-sharp boundary lines. Europe, including Eastern Europe, is finding prosperity and reasonable economic stability despite failure to consummate political unity in the West and despite Germany's continued division. Clearly, the focus of world tension has shifted from Europe to the Third World of the southern hemisphere, a world of mass poverty, underdevelopment and feverish struggle at nation-building.

Yet both East and West, despite what one must assume is a broad intellectual awareness of these changes, are still, in the real of defense and foreign policy, stranded in the rut of the Cold War. In America, as if by old and conditioned reflex, we remain obsessed with NATO and with Europe. We are still mesmerized by the fixed idea that our primary enemy is Communism, rather than the world poverty, ignorance, disease and desperation on which it feeds and from which, alone, it can sustain any hope of forging international power.

We seem still convinced, when we turn our attention fitfully beyond Europe, that we can ride the tiger of revolution, nation-building and development in the have-not regions of the earth with policy mix compounded of several parts military muscle to only one part economic assistance and social imagination. It will be a rough ride -- and lead us nowhere but to disaster if we do not, and promptly, change the mix.

If we are to free American policy from the grip of the past, we must fortify ourselves with clear understanding of what we face. We must examine each of the major crisis situations in the world with cold objectivity, free of dogma. In a spirit of realistic appraisal, we must "see things exactly as they really are."

The Atlantic Community in Disarray

At the close of the Second World War, only the United States among the technologically advanced nations of the West had an intact economy and a production potential which had been enhanced, rather than scarred, by the war. And it alone had the formidable nuclear bomb.

A weary Europe, fearful and mistrustful of Communist intentions, devastated and stripped of hope, floundered at the bottom of an economic and social abyss. Its people needed bread, the better to retain their freedom. They needed hope to rekindle spent spirit. They needed tools to undo the wanton destruction of bombs and artillery. They needed help.

They got it. In 1947 General George Marshall outlined a proposal for European reconstruction which was to bear his name. It was not, he said, to be directed against any "ism," but against the devastation and dislocation then parlyzing the European continent. Stalin, briefly tempted to do otherwise, chose to isolate Communism from the community of nations and refused to accept aid. The western nations, with the emergency blood transfusion of the Marshall Plan, quickly set about the business of reconstruction.

European recovery, however, and recession of the early post-war fear of internal Communist take-over in France and Italy, brought no abatement in East-West hostility. Russia's still-mobilized legions along the length of the Iron Curtain made the North Atlantic Treaty and the creation of NATO eminently logical. The brazen thrust of North Korean Communist troops across the 38th parallel gave force to the presumption that the Kremlin intended to acquire by force what its puppet national parties in western Europe could not achieve by persuasion. The brutal putsch which turned out the light of freedom in Czechoslovakia had launched that presumption. NATO's creation was welcomed by virtually the whole of western Europe as an essential deterrent to Soviet aggression, a defense shield behind which the economic thrust of the Marshall Plan could work its full rehabilitative effect.

With recovery, Europe moved toward economic unification. The Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome, the beginnings of the Europe Economic Community, became symbols of a new day of coordinated and cooperative economic activity serving the peaceful purposes of international development.

But as the scars of war healed, as social reconstruction and economic resurrection inspired hope and confidence, as the threat of aggression receded and fear of the Soviets subsided, NATO began to lose its sense of purpose, for the simple reason that the impelling threat which had led to its creation no longer existed. Its initial cohesion, the cement of its unity, had been a common fear of Communist military aggression. As that fear dissipated, as the iron unity of the captive nations behind the Curtain betrayed a growing

restiveness and tendency toward reassertion of national interests, NATO became increasingly an organization without a cause.

Today, NATO is comparable to an aging, still-talented actor, once enormously in demand but now unemployed and badly in need of a new role. Europeans no longer believe in a serious military threat from the USSR. They put their faith in part in the nuclear stalemate with its resultant "balance of terror" but in large part, too, in a deepening conviction that the Soviet Union has become a pacific nation. It was only within this framework of relative security that DeGaulle would have dared to withdraw France from participation in an integrated military defense system, reject President Kennedy's "grand design" for a unified Atlantic Community, develop France's own nuclear deterrent and block expansion of ECC by vetoing England's entry.

Even before DeGaulle gave it the coup de grace, NATO had been visibly ailing. Much of the energy of the participant nations had been given over to debating sterile politico-military gimmicks such as the MLF (Multilateral Nuclear Force) and manifesting other symptoms of severe organizational goal displacement. The challenge to the West which had brought NATO into existence was no longer a military one in Europe. There was a new and infinitely more complex challenge to be met -- a socio-economic one in Asia, Africa and Latin America -- and to which NATO and the West have yet seriously to address themselves.

Manifestly, all the clanking armored divisions in Germany, and the awesome nuclear striking force which back them up are totally useless to the quiet but decisive war against poverty which the West must now launch. And yet NATO, although born to counter a military threat, embraces the very nations best equipped to meet the new challenge.

Western Europe throbs with unprecedented prosperity as the Common Market continues to multiply its benefits. The German "miracle" has been followed by a French "miracle", and this by an Italian "miracle." This cooming "Europe des Marchands," as Gaullists have sometimes contemptuously called it, has profoundly altered the balance of world power by its spectacular success, creating a powerful magnet for Eastern European countries long-starved for consumer satisfactions and, simultaneously, making colossal nonsense of two of the favorite shibboleths of Communist doctrine.

Not only has Marxist dogma as to the moribund nature of non-Communist economies been proved ridiculous by the West European upsurge. A favorite Leninist dictum has been exposed as equally ludicrous. It was a central Lenin postulate that the nations of the West could sustain domestic prosperity only through exploitation of their colonial possessions. Once stripped of such resources, their domestic economies would spiral quickly into economic and social collapse. Thus the dogma. But it has been precisely <u>since</u> the nations of Western Europe shed their colonies that their economic expansion has been most spectacular. The absurdity of the doctrine was evident, of course, long before de-colonialization, but it

could retain the color of plausibility and a certain emotional persuasiveness while the major Western powers retained colonial outposts. Through its economic successes, Western Europe has not only made the Soviet bloc countries look (and, indeed, feel) shabby and drab by comparison; it has also cut deeply into the ideological underpinnings of Communism throughout Europe.

Germany: Divided and Dangerous -- or a Bridge to Disarmament?

Lying across the spine of Europe, a dismembered Germany still presents the largest remaining threat to stability and peace on a continent where the signs for the future are otherwise sanguine. Economically powerful but politically half-emasculated, Germany is once more entering a period of nationalist feeling. Its intensity and breadth remain debatable, but it has already disquieted Germany's Western friends and alarmed the Eastern European governments and their peoples.

The creeping revival of German nationalism may be the grimmest price which Europe is paying for DeGaulle's fascination with a 19th century concept of French "grandeur." For until the French president frustrated any real progress toward European unity by his adamant demand for a "Europe de Patries," the dominant mood in Germany was for subordination of national feeling to a new faith of Europeanism. Indeed, probably more than any other Europeans, the Germans -- and particularly the German youth -- looked to the European ideas of Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann as their spiritual home for the future.

That spirit, happily, is not yet extinct in Germany. There is still time, if the time be used resolutely, in which to guide the emotional energies of the new German nationalism away from the militaristic "revanchism" which the Soviets hold up as a nightmare to the Eastern European satellite countries to counter their growing aspirations to independence. But it cannot be done by leaving the German issue dormant or by trying to sweep it under the rug.

The urgency of diverting the German nationalist impulse, whatever its actual power as of the moment, into other channels is too obvious to require elaboration: the German "problem" is the touchstone of relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the determinant of the degree to which Moscow's grip on the Eastern satellites will be relaxed, and even the gauge of genuine unity among the NATO powers.

In Germany itself, one fact has emerged with foreboding clarity: disappointed in their hopes for a politically integrated western Europe, the Germans have turned to seeking the political unity of their country as a central strategy. West Germany's Gerhard Schroeder, speaking as Foreign Minister, expressed this mood authoritatively:

> "The growing impatience of the German people with the continued partition of Germany is finding increasing political expression. No German government, constitutionally sworn in as it is to act on behalf of all Germans and to restore unity, could abandon the policy of reunification."

It is equally clear, at the same time, that German reunification is today completely unrealistic and unachievable, even in the state of reduced tension prevailing in Central Europe.

Any rise in the pressure for reunification, in the present context, will automatically reinvigorate and intensify the fears and tensions which were the original justification for partition.

To break out of this vicious circle will require action which is both bold and imaginative, and addressed to a much broader question than Germany itself. Fritz Erler, speaking as the Social Democratic Party's floor leader in the West German Bundestag, went to the heart of the matter when he said:

> "There will be no solution to the German problem without a new approach in the field of security. As long as the arms race continues, Germany will remain divided."

In other words, Germany will remain divided until the Soviet Union agrees to a general disarmament and a peace conference. And if that condition cannot be brought about within a reasonably short span of time, intensifying German nationalism, feeding on the frustrations of thwarted reunification, could easily exacerbate East-West tensions to a point making disarmament improbable for decades. If Germany's nationalist energies can be directed into fruitful channels, on the other hand, the prospects would be enormously improved for a final peace settlement in Europe under the umbrella of a major disarmament agreement.

We grievously delude ourselves if we seriously expect that a people as vigorous and economically powerful as the Germans will be content indefinitely with mere sops to their pride such as the aborted MLF. They must see some substance, some cooperative plan, which will allow them to play a role on the world stage commensurate with their impressive material and human resources.

Frustrated in their earlier desire to mould their future in a new European identity, frustrated again in their hopes of regaining national unity, the Germans clearly need a major new outlet for their pride and energy ... an outlet, moreover, which can earn them new respect in the eyes of the world, and eventually blot out the nightmare memory of Hitler's jack-booted legions.

As the second most important <u>economic</u> entity among nations, West Germany cannot forever be confined to second-class national status. The search for meaningful international identity cannot be artificially repressed. Some Germans, under the Status impulse, have already become hypnotized by a desire to put their country in the tense circle of nuclear powers. To succeed in doing so would not only be a blind alley for Germany, but the probable graveyard as well of the currently fair hopes for further relaxation between NATO and the U. S. S. R. It would, moreover, gravely damage the prospects for eventual German reunification.

A solution to the German problem therefore must be found outside the framework of the nuclear power struggle. That solution can be found, I contend, in inviting Germany into full partnership in a world effort to build the peace through massive social and economic development. The German people, both psychologically and materially, are ripe for such participation. Their skills and economic resources could become vital elements in such a program, and

their energetic and skillful dedication to such a goal could, perhaps paradoxically, become an early bridge to their own political objective of reunification. As a full partner in a world effort at peace and rehabilitation, West Germany would fully reenter the family of nations, re-channeling its nationalist drives, and creating a world image of a Fatherland of service rather than of power. Truly, for West Germany, the road to Berlin lies more through Quito, Addis Ababa, Karachi or a dozen other capitals gasping for survival than through nearby Magdeburg.

The Nuclear Arms Race to the Rim of Hell

> "Peace cannot be kept by force; it can be achieved only through understanding."
>
> Albert Einstein

Were it not for the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations (some twenty nations are now within reach of their possession), it might be plausible to suggest -- as some analysts have, indeed, already done -- that the United States and the Soviet Union have learned, if not to love the bomb, at least to adjust without hysteria to the nuclear environment. I wish now to focus attention on the dangers -- and fatuity -- of such an "adjustment."

Walter Millis has suggested that the Cold War came about primarily

in consequence of the Bomb and that rather than being regarded as a prelude to a hot war, it should be seen as a "conflict situation" in which the parties seek to avoid hot war by working out problems without mass bloodshed. Millis calls the Cold War an "oddly effective form of peace," and says that it is "fearfully dangerous in its potentialities but in actual fact rather remarkably successful over the past fifteen or twenty years as a system for regulating the international power struggle without precipitating total disaster."

All of which seems a rather roundabout way of saying that we can all be thankful that we're not already dead. Ironically, it is those who have most deeply studied the development of nuclear weaponry and speculated most profoundly on its implications who are least "adjusted" to our continued perfection and multiplication of atomic potential for military purpose.

The nature of the "qualitative revolution" in such weaponry was clearly outlined in the Scientific American of October, 1964, by two eminent advisors to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, Jerome B. Wiesner and Herbert F. York. Writing as "scientists who have been engaged for most of our professional lifetimes in consultation on this country's military policy and the active development of the weapons themselves," they state:

> "The past two decades have been a historic revolution in the technology of war. From the blockbuster of World War II to the thermonuclear bomb, the violence of military explosives has been scaled upward a million times."

Further, they point out, the time required to transport these

weapons of mass destruction from hemisphere to hemisphere has shrunk from 20 hours (for the 300 mile-per-hour B-29) to the half-hour flight of the ballistic missile. Information-processing capacity, moreover, has been increased "by as much as six orders of magnitude" through the replacement of the human nervous system by the computer in command control systems. Investment in improvements in either delivery time or in defense reaction time, they contend, has reached a point of diminishing returns. No significant improvements can be made.

As to the possibility that there is some form of ideal security to be found in the production of the so-called "big" bomb of 100 megatons, their considered counsel is, forget it. The very term "big", in this context, is absurd.

> "A one-megaton bomb is already about 50 times bigger than the bombs that produced 100,000 casualties at Hiroshima, and 10 megatons is of the same order of magnitude as the grand total of all the high explosives used in all wars to date ..."

The Eisenhower administration, faced with the need to choose between bigger and smaller missiles, opted for increased production of the smaller. That decision was re-examined and independently reaffirmed by the Kennedy administration, which further increased the ratio of smaller to larger missiles in the nation's stockpile. Testimony during the test-ban hearings revealed that the Air Force had, indeed, been retiring large bombs of a 23-megaton yield or higher because there presumably are no targets calling for the use of such enormous explosions.

There is no security, then, in testing and producing "bigger" bombs. Wiesner and York stress the point:

> "The argument that says it is now critical for U. S. national security to build very big bombs and missiles fails completely when it is examined in terms of the strictly technical factors that determine the effectiveness of a missile attack."

Nor is security, they conclude, to be found in development of an anti-missile missile, even if it were possible to create one, because of the contemporary revolution in the technology of war.

> "The primary strategic result of that revolution has been to overbalance the scales in favor of the attacker rather than the defender. During World War II interception of no more than 10 percent of the attacking force gave victory to the defending force in the Battle of Britain. Attrition of this magnitude was enough to halt the German attack."

Now, however, because of the devastating power of the thermo-nuclear bomb, and the ability of the attacker to create an arsenal of missiles whose number may exceed the number of important targets by a factor of ten or more, the position of attacker and defender has been reversed:

> "... the successful delivery of only one warhead against each such target would result in what most people would consider an effective attack. Thus where an attrition rate of only 10 percent formerly crowned the defense with success, a penetration rate of only 10 percent would give complete success to the offense."

In addition to this revolutionary reversal of the odds, Wiesner and York state, there are many general reasons for concluding that

defense against thermonuclear attack is impossible." Furthermore, "The hopelessness of the task of defense is apparent even now in the stalemate of the arms race."

Moving a modern, large-scale weapons system from research and development to operational deployment is enormously time-consuming. The process is of a physical magnitude to assure that no system can reach full deployment under the mantle of secrecy. The designer of defense weapons, moreover, cannot begin until he knows something about the offensive system. "Inevitably the defense must start the race a lap behind."

To this inevitable lag, the offense has been able to add a further frustration of the defense through development of "stratagems and devices that nullify the most extraordinary achievements in the technology of defense." That frustration is illustrated by the fact that the Sage and Nike-Zeus defense systems had to be scrapped because the offense they had originally been designed to parry had given way to an offense rendering them obsolete. Delivery by bomber gave way to a combined attack of bombers and missiles. The once-probable efficacy of one-by-one interception of warheads has been voided by the revolutionary new fact that a 90 percent success in interception may constitute total failure.

Similar reasoning is applicable to the problem of passive defense, that of sheltering the civilian population. Here, again, the defense is hopelessly crippled by inability to predict what

the offense will do. What we really face here, these experts tell us is "the sociological problem of the sudden initiation of general chaos, which is not subject to general analysis."

Construction of shelters, in fact, might logically be construed as a means of escalation of the arms race, since the lack of shelters, according to the hostage theory, indicates to the prospective adversary that we do not contemplate nuclear warfare -- whereas building shelters might signal our intention to attack.

But whatever the weight of such logic, it is obvious that fall-out shelters would be useless if the attacker assaulted population centers. The fall-out shelter program, as a step in escalation, would lead to the blast shelter, and the blast shelter to live-in and work-in blast shelters ... this leading to still further disruption and distortion of civilization.

> "There is no logical termination of the line of reasoning that starts with belief in the usefulness of fallout shelters; the logic of this attempt to solve the problem of national security leads to a diverging series of ever more grotesque measures.
>
> "This is to say, in so many words, that if the arms race continues and resumes its former accelerating tempo, 1984 is more than just a date on the calendar 20 years hence.
>
> "Ever since shortly after World War II the military power of the U. S. has been steadily increasing. Throughout this same period the national security of the U. S. has been rapidly and inexorably diminishing ...
>
> "Both sides in the arms race are thus confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security. It is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution. If the great powers continue to look for solution in the area of science and technology

> only, the result will be to worsen the situation. The clearly predictable course of the arms race is a steady open spiral downward into oblivion."

Close quote and amen. With the help of think factories staffed with game theorists and batteries of computers, the Pentagon has labored mightily to give this nation the most knowledgeable and sophisticated control over weapons whose frightfulness beggars description, and has, with desperate ardor, worked at devising strategies which attempt, through what is called "graduated response", to keep a direct military confrontation between two super-powers from escalating into what has been called "closing time in the gardens of the West." Yet the fact remains, and it may serve as our epitaph, that there is no way to reduce the human factors in the potentially lethal equation we confront to manageable terms. And that equation will become the more inscrutable as more unpredictable human beings in more and more countries get their hands on doomsday buttons.

For years now, the world's overkill capacity in nuclear explosives has amounted to the equivalent of some 70 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on the face of the planet. Yet we persist in concentrating the most refined intelligence of modern scientific man on the elaboration of irrational games on the rim of hell. If we don't step back we will, one day late or soon, step over. As John Kennedy told the United Nations, if we don't end the arms race, the arms race will end us.

No matter how successfully we think we are adjusting ourselves to the nuclear environment, the whole terrain remains booby-trapped with the imponderables of accident, miscalculation and irrationality. And the odds are heavily on the side of irrationality -- not only as the probability mathematicians would read them, but for the simple reason that it is fundamentally irrational to persist in games in which nobody can ultimately win. It is small wonder that, as Raymond Aron has said:

> "The majority of the scientists (among American specialists) tend to regard the unlimited arms race and the quest for ever more efficient weapons and means of delivery as dangerous and insane. Such competitive bidding would, in their opinion, gain neither side any decisive advantage, while polluting the atmosphere, aggravating international tensions, and magnifying the very danger it is supposed to avoid ..."

Yet the danger persists that by virtue of living with the Bomb our instinct of self-preservation will be numbed. The daily rounds of life are remote from the underground command station at Omaha. The routines of diplomacy hypnotize statesmen. The forest becomes invisible for the trees. The rim of hell is there, under your foot, but on a good day it is difficult to imagine the unimaginable.

A British historian, describing the onset of the first World War, has pictured a condition which may well be one from which the last will erupt:

> "Men are reluctant to believe that great events have small causes. Therefore, once the Great War started, they were convinced that it must be the outcome of profound forces. It is

Hard to discover these when we examine the details. Nowhere was there conscious determination to provoke a war. Statesmen miscalculated. They used the instruments of bluff and threat which had proved effective on previous occasions. This time things went wrong. Their deterrent on which they relied failed to deter; the statesmen became the prisoners of their own weapons. The great armies, accumulated to provide security and preserve the peace, carried the nations to war by their own weight."

(A. J. P. Taylor, "Illustrated History of the first World War.")

We may ride to hell in a handbasket of good intentions, like the statesmen and generals of 1914 -- with thr crucial difference that, thanks to our scientific and technological skills, our hell will be bigger, sooner reached, and a one-way junket.

The Arms Traffic: Poisoning the Wells of Peace.

The nuclear arms race is the central danger in our current course, but there is another arms competition which has, in the shadows, been blighting the prospects of peace for over two decades. I am referring to the traffic in non-nuclear arms, used and unused, between the developed nations and the under-developed, a traffic which has become almost as much a part of the arms race as the used-car business is of the automobile industry. Of this traffic, Alastair Buchan, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London has written:

> " ... It is ironical that the industrial powers of the northern hemisphere, Western and Communist, have in the past decade spent tens of billions of dollars in the attempt to stabilize the balance of power among themselves, but elsewhere have pursued

> policies leading to local arms races which by committing them increasingly to their client states have risked the destabiliza- of their own precarious relationship."
>
> (New Republic, November 6, 1965)

There is much private traffic in arms. But the real trouble stems not from the private dealers but from "the sober policy of sober governments." Two pressures, according to Mr. Buchan, are bidding up this official competition in used or obsolescent arms: there is the enormous thirst for major armaments among the new nations, who regard them as status symbols of independence, a demand which is answered by the eagerness of the greater powers to purchase influence in the client country's politics through relationships with its military establishment that derive from training missions and the supply of spare parts. All of the larger states, including the United States, have succumbed to this temptation.

> "The second pressure for military aid and trades derives from the hectic pace of the central arms race, which clutters the inventories and depots of the industrial powers with hardware which is obsolescent for their needs but is still quite serviceable. They have gone through three generations of fighter aircraft and tanks in the last 20 years, two of anti-aircraft missiles and one of almost every type of ship. Treasury officials in Moscow as well as in Washington view with less gloom the scrapping of equipment which has cost so much to develop if it can be written off the books by aid or trade to another country, even at a modest value ..."
>
> The Russians have disturbed the local balance of power in the

Middle East by unloading obsolescent planes on Egypt, and we and the

Soviets have had a similar effect through past efforts to buy influence over Indonesia. The United States has had an even worse effect on the Indo-Pakistan conflict over the past 11 years:

> " ... first India then Pakistan used the supply of Western arms to one side or the other as a pretext for refusing to settle the cause of conflict, Kashmir; and finally for conflict itself. And the outcome of this conflict appears considerably to have accelerated the prospect of an Indian nuclear weapons program."

The American decision to offset out balance of payments deficit by increasing sales, as opposed to gifts, of military equipmemt within our own alliances has had unhealthy consequences in the Third World, by forcing nations, notably France, who aspire to keep up with our weapons technology, aggressively to enter the sales competition in order to retain both markets and non-domestic "testing grounds" for the products of their own technology.

The resigned rationale offered by apologists for America's participation in the international arms traffic (that if we don't sell the weapons, others will) fails either to take into account or to justify the almost incredible volume of such commerce which is of U. S. fabrication. It is estimated that over the sixteen-year period between mid-June of 1949 and June of 1966 the United States sold over $16 billion in weaponry and made gifts of another $30.2 billion in arms and military equipment. The Defense Department projects a continuing flow of sales and grants averaging about $2 billion a year until 1975.

To the extent -- and it is considerable, especially in relation to their means -- that underdeveloped nations have been sold or been given the trappings of military establishment, the dangers and liabilities are obvious. Maintenance of an armed force diverts scarce resources from constructive development applications into generally unproductive outlets. The contention that we are justified in exporting arms to underdeveloped nations by threats to their stability by domestic Communist influences has been answered by

Defense Secretary McNamara:

> "It would be a gross oversimplification to regard communism as the central factor in every conflict throughout the underdeveloped world. Of the 149 serious internal insurgencies in the past eight years, Communists have been involved in only 58 of them -- 38 percent of the total -- and this includes seven instances in which a Communist regime itself was the target of the uprising." (May 18, 1966)

In some instances, let it be conceded, American willingness to fortify essentially military regimes with more weapons and equipment has been primarily motivated by a desire to bring about sufficient "order" so that social and economic development programs might mature. Yet even in these cases, the record points sharply to the futility of military aid. We are forced to raise the question put to the Harvard alumni by Adlai Stevenson on June 17, 1965:

> "How can we be sure that unlimited support of any authoritarian anti-Communist government may not merely hasten the day when their citizens become Communists as the only means to change?"

The question is particularly acute in Latin America, where the role of the military has generally been that of a clear barrier both to economic growth and to the democratic and peaceful dissolution of traditionalist and static land-owner systems of political control. In most Latin American countries, military budgets consume between 30 and 50 percent of total annual government income. In several, there are "private armies," under local regional or state leaders whose costs do not appear in normal budgetary allowances, but which are a still further drain on resources desperately needed for development.

And yet, although apart from some minor skirmishing there has been no outright war between Latin American nations over the period, the total of U. S. military aid to Latin America in the past fifteen years has exceeded one billion dollars.

Worse, the timing of such aid appears to have coincided, in dismal precision, with the rise of Latin American military juntas.

The point here is not that U. S. policy has sought to place authoritarian juntas in power. The point is that we err grievously if we assume that such regimes can ever be the agents of the kind of stability in which social and economic development can proceed. Yet, on a year-to-year basis, and country-by-country, U. S. military aid has risen when the juntas were expanding their power and decreased when civilian rule was established. If the case of the Dominican Republic is unpersuasive for its confusion (there, military assistance to the Bosch government went to barely $200,000 during fiscal 1962, but jumped, with Bosch's ouster, to $2,500,000 in fiscal 1964), the case of Brazil should not be. Displeased, through 1962 and 1963, with the demagoguery of Brazilian President Joao Goulart, and with his verbal flirtations with what the State Department seemed to consider Communism the U. S. government drastically cut back aid to Brazil for fiscal 1963 and helped to plunge an already-troubled nation into severe economic crisis. When the military, thus "justified" in overthrowing Goulart, seized Brazil in 1964, the U. S. responded with unprecedented alacrity in declaring its support for the new government and promising it substantial sums in aid. For some while our State Department attempted to picture this as aid under the Alliance for Progress, but this claim yielded to the embarrassing revelation that the Brazilian military junta had submitted the economic plan (required in all Alliance grants) after the aid had been promised.

Since the take-over by the Brazilian military, a country which was reckoned by most development economists to have been, earlier, on the edge of sustained economic upsurge has been the victim of a frantic flight of capital, been wracked by an inflation which has sliced real earnings by as much as fifty percent per year and seen the frail beginnings of Brazilian democracy poisoned by the extension of authoritarian controls into virtually every institution, including the trade unions, on which political democracy must rest.

Let me insert, parenthetically, that my concern over the virtual destruction of the trade union movement in a major developing country is not merely what some readers might take to be a "professional" one. Without organization, the deep-felt frustrations which workers inevitably feel in under-developed countries -- where often they are denied the basic rights of respect, opportunity and equality -- have neither outlet nor prospect of satisfaction. Social and political equality are only won in struggle. That was the case in our own history, and the history of no other country provides exception. The social and political rights of labor are anything but inherent in the highly stratified societies of most underdeveloped countries. They must be asserted and won, and this is possible only through organization. Social justice needs both a voice and a measure of social power. In most countries in fact -- and in all potentially -- this is a crucial role which unions alone can fulfill. There is protection for still-developing

nations, moreover, is the fact that effective unions, even when a constant goad to the culture, are a vital nexus to the society for workers otherwise likely to be deeply alienated. In union membership/a worker gains a sense -- and in time -- the substance of participation in the basic decisions of the society which can be offered by no other form or organization.

Contrasted to Brazil, in this connection, one of the principal reasons for the heartening success of Venezuela's democratic revolution has been the vital contribution of its labor movement, whose members have provided vigorous leadership in many of that country's most challenging social undertakings. Their pressure for social justice has been successful not only in the areas of wages and working conditions, but in achieving significant improvements in social security, health care and education. Sending out large numbers of volunteer teachers and worker education specialists from their own ranks, they have provided an effective leaven for change even in regions of their country still to be touched by industrialization. Their militant democratic spirit has been a powerful membership magnet as well. Today Venezuela has, in some 4500 trade unions, more than a million, five hundred thousand workers -- approximately 35% of the adult population.

Even without comparison to Brazil, Venezuela offers, in its own recent history, a striking contrast between the development potential of a society under military dictatorship and under democracy. Under the infamous Perez Jimenez dictatorship of 1948-1958, the literacy rate -- which had been rising until 1948, showed

steady decline. By 1958, illiteracy plagued 31.6% of the population. In the few short years since the overthrow of Jimenez, illiteracy has been cut back to 11.8%. By 1970, literacy is expected to reach 95%, by far the highest rate in Latin America and comparable to the highest in the world.

Without suggesting that political democracy is more than one of several key ingredients of uncoerced industrial development, it is revealing that Venezuela has -- in large part because of its aggressive political democracy, been alone among the South American nations in breaking the shackles on food production imposed by a static and traditionalist agricultural system. Today, nearly 80 percent of the nation's once-landless farmers own their own land. 117,460 farmers have acquired 6,523,000 acres. And under agrarian reform, production has quintupled.

It was in direct reference to the Brazilian military coup which was so warmly welcomed by the U. S. State Department that President Leoni of Venezuela declared:

> "We are worried by the aggressive advance of military coups. If Communist violence is considered a threat to the right of self-determination of people, it is equally incongruous and reprehensible to use the arms of a republic to achieve the destruction of democratic and constitutional order. And since Venezuela has suffered under the rule of non-elected governments more than any people in Latin America ... each time that these deplorable acts of usurpation occur, we react with vehemence and passion as much as though our own sovereignty were directly and seriously threatened."

Whatever the directive role of the American policy in promoting Latin American counter-revolution -- and there is no

serious recent proof that it has anywhere been decisive, the fact remains that the availability of American arms, by gift or through purchase, has represented a constant temptation to use them, and to use them with fair assurance that such resort will be greeted by the U. S. with something approaching benign approval if the putsch be engineered in the name of anti-Communism. In the grim span of one year, ending March 31, 1964, the governments of Miguel Ydigoras y Fuentes in Guatemala, Carlos Julio Arosemena in Ecuador, Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic, Roman Villeda Morales in Honduras, and Joao Goulart in Brazil were overthrown by military coups. All five represented constitutionally elected regimes which were, with much or little efficiency, attempting to mobilize their countries to take important steps in social reform. In each case, the counter-revolution was consummated in the name of anti-communism.

It may be asking too much of a nation which cannot resolve the problem created by its own internal and promiscuous traffic in weapons that it set about stopping the international traffic in military hardware and training, but we are by far the world's largest participant in this lethal commerce and the moral obligation upon us to get out of it and to ask that others do likewise is correspondingly heavy. Already twenty non-African nations are supplying arms or military training to thirty-three African countries. In the second flash war in the Middle East, the six impoverished participants had more tanks at their disposal than Hitler commanded

on the day he launched the invasion of France. Hitler built his tanks. Six of the great powers provided those deployed on the borders of Israel.

Mr. Buchan stresses that an American-Soviet agreement would not solve this problem, since so many countries are engaged in the practice. He concludes:

> "But perhaps the most important step forward would be the recognition, in public as well as in official thinking, that arms are not just another form of engineering exports, and that the dividends and employment rolls of Lockheed or Vickers, Boeing or Dassault, Hughes or Oerlikon are trivial considerations by comparison with the damage which their products can inflict in a world bedeviled by the problems of immature nationalism."

Unfortunately, "immature nationalism" afflicts the great as well as the small. Former President Eisenhower, in his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961, issued his now-famous warning regarding the dangers of "the military-industrial complex" to which I have already referred, and the full text of which is worth repeating:

> "Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.
>
> " ... we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, 3.5 million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.
>
> "This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize the imperative need

for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

"In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

"We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together."

General Eisenhower's intentions, as always, were of the best; yet he, perhaps more than the rest of us, was a victim or perpetrator of lag between the march of technology and the limp of public policy. For during his own administration, with the possible exception of the period when Charles Wilson was Secretary of Defense, his own appointees in the Pentagon were lying down comfortably under the steamroller of the military-industrial complex.

Yet one must view this whole question in a longer perspective. There can be no scapegoats in this matter. If, as Harper's magazine states (March, 1964) the military-industrial complex in the United States has become a sacred cow, it is because the whole country, and not merely a few persons or groups, has accepted a view of American security and world responsibility in which military power is considered more vital than any other element; (not, to be sure, on ceremonial occasions but as a hard matter of fact.)

This does not make this democratic nation's degree of dependence on military power and on the profits and employment that stem from maintenance of such a vast military establishment any less of a danger to a free society or any less of an obstacle to efforts to develop an alternative strategy for peace.

It means that not just a few men in government, industry and labor but rather the whole country must engage in an agonizing reappraisal of the unwholesome changes that have occurred in American life during the last twenty years as a result of the Cold War and the arms race. It seemed briefly that such a reappraisal might be made in the aftermath of John Kennedy's assassination; but the tides of routine swept over our sorrow and drowned our misgivings with respect to the manner in which we generate our badly flawed affluence.

Where are we, then, a little more than twenty years after "the tragedies and agonies" -- the words are U Thant's -- which made the Charter of the United Nations possible? We remain on the rim of hell. And we will stay there, until Armageddon arrives to claim us, unless we, which is to say the American people, create a working majority for a true strategy of peace that can move us back from the brink.

Needed -- A New Alliance for Peace

Because the arms race and the Cold War have so long been, so to speak, our home -- the "way we live now" -- any proposal for an alternative way of life runs hard against the charge of impractical

idealism. Our first answer to that charge must be a call for re-examination of the fate that has already overtaken us in the twentieth century because the hard-headed men have prevailed over the tough-minded. The record of the "realists," of the "practical" men is strewn across the past fifty years in the incalculable casualties of two world wars, of Fascism, Nazism and Communism -- and in our own moral failure as a nation with an implicit dependence on war and preparations for war as a stimulus to economic growth and employment.

Of all the revolutionary transformations of our time, perhaps the greatest consists in the paradox that once-idealistic solutions to the human predicament have become the only practical solutions. The international idealist is today's practical realist. We have seen that the arms race is a plunge into oblivion. Our persistence in it, then, is the most impractical of actions.

Although we cannot (in terms of its political feasibility) unilaterally dismantle our capacity to make and sustain arms, we <u>can</u> wage peace without an agreement, and that is what I propose that we do. The times have changed. And no army, as Victor Hugo observed, can withstand the strength of an idea whose time has come. The time for peace has come. It has come because our science and technology, diligently applied to the perfections of weapons of mass destruction, have made peace an absolute condition of human survival. Our last option is to understand the urgent practicality of idealism.

The time left to us in which to exercise that option dwindles daily. We must quickly signal our intention -- to friends and adversaries alike -- that we intend, henceforth and relentlessly, to wage peace. We must mobilize our huge economic resources, the wasted labor and skills of our unemployed, our unused productive capacity, the slack, latent energies of a generation which has been given little cause to hope and to aspire and we must harness these great wasting assets to a dynamic and total war against poverty.

In saying that we have no choice but to do this, I do not mean merely that to reasonable minds the balance of terror is inherently unstable -- "counterproductive", as the technicians would put it. I mean as well that in the past twenty years the Third World of the southern hemisphere has been transformed, by its liberation from colonialism, from a passive victim and onlooker of history to an active participant. The nations which make up that World know that rapid development is possible. They will have it, whatever its price or source. C. P. Snow, in "The Two Cultures", concludes that:

> "There is no getting away from it. It is technically possible to carry out the scientific revolution in India, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, within fifty years. There is no excuse for western man not to know this. And not to know that this is the one way out through the three menaces which stand in our way -- H-bomb war, overpopulation, the gap between the rich and the poor. This is one of the situations where the worst crime is innocence.
>
> "Since the gap between the rich countries and the poor can be removed, it will be. If we are shortsighted,

> inept, incapable either of goodwill or enlightened self-interest, then it may be removed to the accompaniment of war and starvation; but removed it will be. The questions are, how, and by whom."

Merely to transfer to Asia, Africa and Latin America the strategy of military containment of Communism which has served admirable purpose in Europe will in no way help the developing peoples to cope with their own problems of hunger and poverty, which Communism can exploit without alleviating. That we already partially realize this is evident from President Kennedy's creation of the Alliance for Progress and President Johnson's move to create the Asian Development Bank. Neither of these undertakings, however, is of a magnitude or depth to permit development in either Asia or Latin America to outrace the population rise, let alone to begin narrowing the gap in well-being between the peoples of these regions and those of the Western nations.

What is needed is a shift in the whole stress and dynamics of our policy, from a negative, military stance to a positive and long-term development effort. Containment was an emergency response to a danger now supplanted. Its pursuit, particularly in nations where Communist influence is merely a reflection of indigenous desperation, places us in the embarrassing position, whatever our real intentions, of seeming to assume the role of the older imperial - isms. The strategy of containment has again and again made us the ally of regimes in underdeveloped countries which have lacked the support of their own people, and permitted Communism to seek adherents as the only national element seriously willing to attack

an intolerable and indefensible status quo.

A peace of the status quo cannot be made to stick, for the status quo of half the world is insupportable. Our policy must be to let the future be born, and to help create, in concert with other nations, an environment in which it can mature in reason and tranquillity.

There is, finally, the moral imperative to act upon the basis of what we know and of what we can do. C. P. Snow, a scientist, has expressed it as clearly as any professional moralist could:

> "We cannot avoid the realisation that applied science has made it possible to remove unnecessary suffering from a billion human lives -- to remove suffering of a kind which, in our own privileged society, we have largely forgotten, suffering so elementary that it is not genteel to mention it. For example, we <u>know</u> how to heal many of the sick: to prevent children dying in infancy and mothers in child-birth: to produce enough food to alleviate hunger: to throw up a minimum of shelter: to ensure that there aren't so many births that our other efforts are in vain. All this we <u>know</u> how to do.
>
> "It does not require one additional scientific discovery, though new discoveries must help us. It depends on the spread of the scientific revolution all over the world. There is no other way. For most human beings, this is the point of hope. It will certainly happen. It may take longer than the poor will peacefully accept. How long it takes, and the fashion in which it is done, will be a reflex of the quality of our lives, especially of the lives of those of us born lucky: as most in the western world were born. When it is achieved, then our consciences will be a little cleaner; and those coming after us will at least be able to think that the elemental needs of others aren't a daily reproach to any sentient person, that for the first time some genuine dignity has come upon us all." ("The Two Cultures".)

I do not deceive myself, nor do I suffer from any temptation to deceive others, that the program which this book proposes will

require anything short of great boldness, great patience, great imagination and conviction. Yes, it will take, on our part, a willingness to accept a measure of sacrifice. But who will deny that America contains and can mobilize these qualities, in pursuit of the rewarding purposes of peace, if only the decision is made to act!