THE COMING CHOICE FOR U. S.:

FIGHT OR SURRENDER?

Story of the Blackmail Behind the Threat of Nuclear War

Despite the talk of peace and disarmament—

Military experts, key officials are worried about the safety of this nation.

"Balance of terror" is seen as no longer an assurance against a nuclear war.

Russia—ahead on missiles, gaining in power, dedicated to world dominance—is in a position to blackmail the U. S. under threat of a nuclear attack.

A new official report says the U. S. is vulnerable, if that attack comes.

Here are the facts about the danger—from the studies of experts and the analyses of men in a position to know.

At some point, not many years from now, the American people are likely to be offered this choice: Surrender or fight a nuclear war. And, the way things are going, the United States could lose that war.

These are the studied conclusions of some key officials in the innermost councils of the U. S. Government.

Why? What accounts for this pessimistic attitude at a time when optimism is bursting out on all sides and the world's leaders are talking of peace and disarmament?

The answer, as given by Americans whose lives are spent in assessing powerful forces at work in the world, is complex. It is given in part by a study made for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a research group at Johns Hopkins University. This report was made public December 6. A second study, published by Stanford Research Institute on December 8, gives another part. Yet another study came on December 7 from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Add to these reports the views of highly informed Government officials, and the full answer emerges. It is based upon the following conclusions:

1. The United States is now "open and vulnerable" to a direct attack by nuclear missiles—and this country's vulnerability is steadily increasing. This was the warning contained in the December 6 report of the Johns Hopkins University research group, whose conclusions are presented on page 112.

2. There can be no guaranteed security in the world when rival systems of government exist, each possessing the means of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons are a fact. Nothing—no agreements, no treaties, no end to tests—can wipe out that fact or can stop science and the human mind from developing weapons of even greater destructiveness. Nuclear weapons, within a few years, will be possessed by many more nations than at present. And the horror of nuclear war may prove no deterrent if a showdown comes. This is brought out in the Stanford Research Institute study of December 8, which appears on page 54. Another warning that "the possibility of war must be faced" is contained in the Rockefeller Brothers Fund report, the conclusions of which are printed on page 52.

3. In the world of today, the inexorable trend is toward dominance in the world by a single power. Rival powers or rival groupings of powers inevitably will develop antagonisms—military or economic—and those antagonisms are likely, in the future as in the past, to lead to a test of

strength. Only through world dominance by a single power can assurance of safety from nuclear war be established.

4. The United States, at the end of World War II, was in a position to assume world domination. That opportunity was rejected. The United States, ever since, has been retreating gradually from one position after another. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, is demonstrating a determination to rule the world. At the end of World War II, Russia was prostrate. Today—only 15 years later—she is able to challenge America. There is no record in history of such a reversal of positions between nations in so short a time. This Russian success breeds Russian confidence and strengthens Russian determination to push ahead.

5. Soviet Russia, pushing out as U. S. draws back, is tilting the balance of power steadily in her direction. When that tilt seems to her rulers to be decisive, she then will be tempted to offer the United States the fateful choice: surrender or fight a nuclear war. There may be much testing of strength and many alarms before that showdown comes.

Said an official who sits in the top councils of the U. S. Government:

"I hold the deepest pessimism concerning this nation's future. The American people appear to lack interest in the life-or-death problem they face, and appear to lack the will to make the sacrifices that their safety calls for. The American nation seems to lack any tangible objective other than that of making life easier and more enjoyable.

"The American Government, to hold power, is forced to direct its effort toward satisfying the voters' desire for more and more of the good things of life instead of toward assuring safety for the nation through a dominant position in the world.

"Soviet Russia, by contrast, is hard. As a nation, its objective is fixed. Every move, every action, all the nation's power is directed toward reaching that objective of world domination. Sometimes its progress is slow. Sometimes there are detours. But always the objective is to tilt the world's balance of power against the United States. Today, Russia's challenge is reaching cautiously into Latin America. It is beginning to be felt in Africa. The tide keeps running."

Leading where? As this man and other key thinkers on the power balance of the world see it, the answer is: Toward a time when the U. S. will be in a corner, facing a choice of surrender or nuclear war.

The Shift That Khrushchev Brought

Soviet Russia, these men say, has rejected the doctrine that a nuclear war is too horrible to contemplate, or that a "balance of terror" makes nuclear war too dangerous for either side to start. This rejection was made at the time Khrushchev took power. Soviet policy, as now being assessed, is based on the beliefs that nuclear war would not necessarily mean mutual annihilation, that one nation could emerge as a real winner, and that the odds increasingly favor Russia as that winner.

A hard, factual appraisal of what nuclear war might mean, both for Russia and for the U. S., is given in the study published by the Stanford Research Institute. According to that study, it would be possible for Russia, striking first, to weather a nuclear counterattack with no more damage than she suffered in World War II.

It is this analysis of Russia's nuclear philosophy that underlies much of the pessimism of American planners.

But isn't disarmament now in the air? Haven't both U. S. and Russia stopped testing nuclear weapons? Isn't President Eisenhower going to talk again with Nikita Khrushchev to help ease tensions in the world?

The answer to these questions is: Yes. But military men whose business it is to delve deeply into problems of national security say this: Things are not what they seem on the surface. No dictator with a goal and making progress toward that goal ever has given up his advantage—or ever will. No agreement ever will be made by a Soviet dictator that does not involve a gain for him, or what he thinks is a gain for him. Only the U. S., among powers which have had the opportunity to accept world direction, has shrunk from that responsibility and drawn back, leaving the field to a dangerous rival.

No End in Sight for the Nuclear Race

Even while disarmament talk goes on, alarms are being sounded of arms developments to come that will add to war dangers in the years ahead.

Missiles of awesome power and accuracy are being perfected. France today is on the verge of producing atomic weapons, preparing to test those weapons in the Sahara Desert. West Germany now possesses the know-how and probably the means to produce atomic weapons. In one way or another, the Germany of the near future is seen as certain to possess all the modern weapons of mass destruction. So, probably, will Japan.

It is being predicted that Communist China will join the circle of nuclear powers within 10 years. If Red China gets nuclear weapons, then India will feel that she needs them, too.

An official, who is deeply versed in the whole subject, commented:

"There is no way to stop men from thinking. The knowledge needed to produce nuclear weapons is widely held by scientists in nations large and small. In spite of any agreements or treaties, those weapons will be devised and, if necessary, will be tested."

This further statement was made by the same official and supported by others:

"The talk of preventing nuclear war by banning tests of nuclear weapons is deceiving. Its effect is to lull the American people into a false sense of security.

"The facts are simply these: The United States and Soviet Russia both possess large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The stockpile of the U. S. at this time almost surely is larger and more varied than that of Soviet Russia. But Russia's stockpile is sufficient to destroy most of America's biggest cities. A ban on tests will not destroy those stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

"The means thus exists for each side to inflict tremendous damage on the other. A stop to testing will not remove that fact.

"Both sides, too, possess the means to deliver those weapons on targets in the other's territory. The United States holds an edge in delivery by manned aircraft. The Soviets hold an edge in delivery by ballistic missiles.

"If nuclear war is really to be curbed, the only way that it can be curbed in today's world is by destruction of every means of delivering nuclear weapons.

"Politicians are not even talking about destroying all aircraft and all missiles and all other possible means of placing nuclear weapons on targets.

"Thus, this whole exercise of talks between U. S. and Soviet Russia about ending nuclear tests is misleading. Soviet Russia sees an advantage in it for herself, or she would not be sponsoring this deception."

But isn't Russia behind the U. S. in number and variety of atomic weapons? Would not this indicate that, from Russia's

Rockefeller Study—

"POSSIBILITY OF WAR MUST BE FACED"

The danger of Soviet superiority in arms is discussed in a report on "The Mid-Century Challenge to U. S. Foreign Policy," published December 7 by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. It is based on a study by a panel headed by Dean Rusk, former Assistant Secretary of State. Excerpts follow:

"A foreign policy which devoted itself exclusively to avoiding war would neglect the constructive aspects out of which a true peace must develop. A free nation which sought nothing but peace would gain peace only at the price of its freedom. . . .

"The possibility of war must be faced. . . . The nature of the present situation offers no escape.

* * *

"The possibility cannot be ruled out that the Soviet leadership, if it secures a clear superiority in the arms race, will use this advantage to blackmail or to attack its major opponent without warning. That possibility must at all costs be forestalled.

"Under present conditions, and for as long as necessary, the strength of the Western deterrent must be maintained, with clear realization that this cannot be done easily or once and for all.

* * *

"The abolition of arms has been once more proposed by the Soviet Government. Whether the proposal is serious is open to doubt. . . .

"Negotiations must test whether there are sufficiently significant changes in the Russian position to make it possible to move toward a mutually acceptable plan for disarmament. . . .

"Persistent and unremitting efforts to achieve step-by-step control and reduction of arms should not blind the U. S. to the really fundamental issues involved. If the control of arms becomes effective on a broad scale, it will almost certainly be because international institutions will have developed greatly in scope and authority over the coming years.

* * *

"This underlying, basic Soviet danger [of expanding Communist power and isolation of the United States] has not been as well understood in the United States as it should be. Certainly the situation will not be changed by a lull in the crises which have served to keep the United States awake. . . .

"In any case, the free world, as a basic tenet of policy, must not permit the Communist states to extend their rule.

"The United States cannot accept, under the guise of compromise or the easing of tensions, measures which would abandon West Berlin to Communist rule, dissolve NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], allow West Germany to fall within the Soviet orbit, or otherwise undermine the free states of Europe. . . .

"Possibilities must be kept open, but the West cannot afford to accept illusory agreements."

viewpoint, it would be better for tests to continue, so she could catch up? What is the advantage that Russia sees in agitating for an end to tests? Just what is the Kremlin's game?

Here is the answer given by one American analyst:

"To anyone not blinded by wishful thinking, the basic motives of current Russian tactics seem quite clear. They grow out of the simple fact that all of the Soviets' aggressive aims could be achieved more easily if they encountered no nuclear opposition.

"The Soviets, therefore, have every reason to stop all testing and development of nuclear weapons. Look what they could gain thereby:

"**First,** halting tests would slow or stop the development of nuclear weapons which could be used defensively by the U. S. against missile attack. This would insure the continued vulnerability of America to nuclear attack.

"**Second,** by blocking the use of nuclear weapons, Russia would free its own superior conventional forces for blackmail or military aggression.

"**Third,** Russia would slow the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations on which it has designs, and thus hamper their resistance to bullying tactics of aggression. What if there had been a way to arm the Hungarians with nuclear weapons in their revolt?

"**Fourth,** ending tests would stop our development of 'discriminate' nuclear weapons—clean ones which could be used in limited wars against minor Communist aggressions.

"Even if the U. S. remained technically ahead on nuclear weapons, such an edge would have no significance so long as the Soviets gained tactical advantages of the kind just listed."

Assuming that the spread and development of nuclear weapons cannot be stopped, as these experts believe: Who suffers the most thereby?

Here is one analyst's answer on that:

"Of course, the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers has disadvantages for both Russia and the U. S. But, on balance, the Soviets have much more to lose thereby than we. The Soviets, in their aggressions, would be forced to move much more cautiously in the face of possible opposition by nuclear weapons. The U. S., with no aggressive aims, would not have this problem.

"If the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, slowing it down is clearly to the Soviets' gain."

With Better Missiles, More Danger

What about missiles?

Most analysts agree with this man's size-up:

"It is in missiles that the armament race really centers now. We already have the nuclear warheads on hand. As you improve the means of delivering those warheads to their targets, the danger of nuclear war increases.

"Also, with missiles, the potentialities of nuclear blackmail become enormous. A powerful nation can be held in terror of a sudden surprise attack for which there is, so far, no defense—only retaliation.

"When it comes to blackmail, the Russians have a tremendous advantage over the U. S. or any other free and democratic nation. Dictators are able to threaten and blackmail far more effectively because they don't have to be concerned about the morality of their acts or the attitudes of the voters.

"Can you imagine President Eisenhower threatening to create a nuclear holocaust over Berlin or Formosa? Yet the Soviets did this over Suez, when Britain and France attempted to move in there in 1956. And this year they

appeared to be doing it again over Berlin. Khrushchev, just a few days ago, declared that Russia has enough nuclear-armed rockets 'to raze to the ground all of our potential enemies.'"

On missiles, though, the U. S. is considered to be behind. Russia is conceded a lead. Then why doesn't Russia agitate for an end to missile tests, instead of an end to nuclear tests, in order to freeze its missile advantage and keep the U. S. from catching up?

In answer to this question, you get from some experts another question:

"Suppose Russia gets an agreement with the U. S. to halt nuclear tests and then follows up by proposing an end to missile tests. Would the U. S. be in a position to accept that challenge—and thus accept a permanent disadvantage in missiles? Yet, if the U. S. refused, Russia would then have the same propaganda advantage on the missiles issue that it has had on the nuclear-test issue."

Then there's this question: Can the development of missiles really be stopped, any more than you can stop the development of nuclear weapons?

Key analysts say: "No. What you're really up against is the impossibility of stopping human thought.

"Who is going to keep Communist China, as one example, from driving ahead to develop these weapons? Who is able to police China's vast territory to make sure that this is not being done? If Communist China gets such weapons, is it likely that India will be willing to overlook the dangers involved?"

This further point is made: John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State, was guided by one simple conclusion—that the United States cannot be secure so long as a dictator rules a powerful nation, heavily armed and operating in secrecy behind an iron curtain.

It is reported that the late Senator Brian McMahon, who was chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy when Russia acquired the atom bomb, wrote to the then President, Harry S. Truman, warning him of the dangers that this development generated. According to these reports, Senator McMahon urged that the U. S. should tell Russia either to agree to an effective plan for control of atomic weapons or to expect attack. This suggestion was not followed.

Today, weapons are much more powerful than then, the ability to develop these weapons is widely dispersed through the world, and no real chance is seen of stopping this development.

Then what is the answer? Is there any alternative to the prospect, for the United States, of surrendering or fighting a nuclear war in which there is grave danger of defeat?

It is here that you run into a sharp difference in official views.

View One. This is the present official view of the White House and the Department of State. It is based on the concept that you can do business with Soviet Russia, that it is possible to reach agreements which will permit a stopping of nuclear tests and then lead to gradual disarmament.

It is in keeping with this view that the United States is now negotiating with Soviet Russia and Great Britain at Geneva, seeking a formula for effective inspection and enforcement of an agreement to halt bomb tests.

It is recognized by the U. S. Government that halting tests is of itself no disarmament move. But the hope is that an agreement on tests will be a first step, that, if mutual confidence and co-operation can be established in this field, then further steps toward actual disarmament can follow. This is the real meaning of the Geneva talks.

View Two. This is largely a military view. It rests upon evidence of rapid expansion of the Soviets' missile capacity and recurring new evidence of the Soviets' threatening policy of expansion.

Said an exponent of this view:

"The only solution, it seems to me, is for the U. S. to get into this arms race with both feet and win it. And to tell the Russians frankly what you are doing. Leave them in no doubt about your determination.

"The main element in our weakness has been the lack of determination—determination to stand up to Khrushchev every time he makes a threatening move. This is not advocating preventive war. It is just advocating a realistic view



After Two Enemy Bombers—

WILL ALASKA BE LOST?

- In Siberia are 26 Soviet bases in easy range of Alaska.
- "Two enemy bombers from these bases could put Alaskan bases out of action," says Lieut. Gen. Frank A. Armstrong, Jr., commander of Alaskan defense forces. He adds: "If the attacks were followed up with paratroop landings, Alaska itself would be lost."
- "With Russians in the Fairbanks and Anchorage areas," General Armstrong concludes, "President Eisenhower would have to decide quickly whether to bomb Alaska, or leave the rest of the country open to close-range attack from Red troops along the Yukon. The Strategic Air Command can count on putting out of action only 8 of the 26 bases in Siberia that threaten Alaska."

Source: Speech by General Armstrong on July 29, 1959, in Anchorage.

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of the world situation. It is facing up to the fact that, the way things are going, the U. S. some day is likely to be faced with the choice of fighting or surrendering under threat of nuclear destruction."

View Three. This view is tending to grow among those in Government—both military and civilian—who are closest to strategic problems. It is a pessimistic view: That it is impossible for the U. S. to overtake the Soviet advantage in missiles without an all-out effort. But that, instead of making this all-out effort, the U. S. is tending to restrict its arms effort in the interest of avoiding a rise in Government spending and an increase in taxes.

The position that Soviet Russia holds in the arms race is encouraging her to be bold in her maneuvers abroad. The policy of deterrence by a "balance of terror" is seen as losing its effectiveness as Russia's missile capabilities increase. The possibilities for Russia to impose its will upon the U. S. by nuclear blackmail are seen as growing enormously, in a situation where she holds an arsenal of missiles against which there is, so far, no real defense.

This warning is being heard with increasing frequency: If the U. S. fails to realize what is happening, and prefers to take the easy road, she may find the power balance tilting so far in Russia's direction that it cannot be righted in time. It is then that a Soviet dictator most probably would issue his challenge.

All this is why the optimism that is so widespread with the American public appears not to be shared by many of those whose business it is to assess the U. S. future.

The two reports that follow, each made independently, bear on this whole problem.

WHY RUSSIA WOULD RISK NUCLEAR WAR ON U. S.

Will the threat of nuclear retaliation by U. S. really deter Russia from a surprise attack on this country? A study of nuclear war and its probable effects suggests that Russia would be willing to run the risk.

Herman Kahn, an experienced analyst of defense problems, warns that Russia may not share the view that a nuclear war is too horrible to contemplate—or consider a surprise attack on the U. S. as too dangerous to attempt.

Mr. Kahn's views are based on intensive studies with the Rand Corporation and at the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. In these studies, Mr. Kahn has had access to much official information.

The following excerpts are from an article by Mr. Kahn in the Stanford Research Institute "Journal" for the fourth quarter of 1959, released on December 8. That article summarizes a book by Mr. Kahn, "Three Lectures on Thermonuclear War," which is to be published next spring by the Princeton University Press.

by Herman Kahn

We are now entering the fifteenth year of the nuclear era. We are becoming increasingly aware that much is still to be learned about the likely effects of a nuclear war and the conduct of international relations in a world in which force is tending to be increasingly less usable. Basic foreign policies formulated earlier in the nuclear era require review and examination.

First, and perhaps most important, doubt has been cast recently on the widely accepted theory that existence of nuclear weapons has created a reliable balance of terror. The theory most commonly held indicates that a thermonuclear war would mean certain and automatic annihilation of both antagonists, if not the end of civilization.

Herman Kahn is a physicist. For five years, as an employe of the Rand Corporation, he has been making studies of strategic systems of defense, mostly for the U. S. Air Force. Mr. Kahn, 37, was educated at the University of California at Los Angeles and at California Institute of Technology.

In many ways, this concept has been comforting. It makes plausible that, as soon as governments are informed of the terrible consequences of a nuclear war, they will realize that there could be no victors and, therefore, no sense to such a war; therefore, no sane leader would ever start one. Hence the hope that the very violence of war would deter it.

* * *

Many proponents of the mutual-annihilation view believe that it is important to emphasize the horror and impracticability of thermonuclear war in order to establish the urgent necessity to settle our differences by peaceful means and to remove temptation from adventurers.

The success of such a program depends on the fears thus generated being mutual and reliable. . . . The mutual-annihilation theory can be successful in forestalling an all-out nuclear attack only if both sides completely accept it.

If only the West "buys" it and because of this drops its guard, the negligence can be incredibly dangerous. Even mutual belief in the automatic-annihilation theory can still lead to trouble. It is an open invitation to blackmail of the Munich type.

Therefore, to the extent that the theory may not be true—or the Communists think it isn't—we should not weaken ourselves to the point where we are courting either "Pearl Harbors" or "Munichs." It is important to understand this problem objectively even if analyses aimed at doing so give an impression of callousness.

The mutual-annihilation view is not unique to the West. Malenkov [former Soviet Premier Georgi M. Malenkov] introduced it in the Soviet Union several

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years ago. . . . A different view seems to have been held by Khrushchev and the Soviet military. They agreed that war would be horrible, but argued that this was no reason for the Soviet Union to drop its guard—that, with sufficient preparations, only the capitalists would be destroyed. With some modifications their views seem to have prevailed.

So much depends on this notion of the balance of terror. Is it really true? Would only an insane man initiate a thermonuclear war? Or, are there circumstances in which a nation's leaders might rationally decide that a thermonuclear war would be the most preferable of the possible alternatives?

Perhaps, not surprisingly, one can conclude on examination that, with current technology, there are plausible, even probable, circumstances in which the leaders of a country might decide that war was the best alternative. Equally unsurprising, many people get very annoyed or angry at anyone making such a statement, although recognition of a situation is not necessarily endorsing it.

To indicate how this conclusion about the "feasibility" of thermonuclear war was reached, it is necessary to describe a thermonuclear war and the kinds of risks that can arise against which the decision makers must compare the alternatives of going to war and not going to war.

* * *

What All-Out War Would Be Like

Genetic effects. Many biologists and geneticists are worried about the genetic effects of even the peacetime testing of nuclear weapons; some even talk as if the future of the human race is being jeopardized by exploding a few bombs a year in the Pacific Ocean or the Soviet Arctic. It is certainly true that a lot of bombs exploded inside a country would be far more dangerous than a few exploded farther away. But would it be cataclysmic?

Calculations in this field are inherently uncertain. In addition, experimental evidence is insufficient to be conclusive about some of the important effects. One can, however, make orienting studies. One study indicated that the survivors of the war might average about 200 or 300 roentgens of radiation to their reproductive organs before age 30. This is an enormous amount of radiation. It is about 1,000 or 2,000 times as much as people in the United States would receive as a by-product of the test program. It is about 50 to 100 times as much as they would normally get from natural sources. It is a large and frightening dose. It would result in much damage, but there is no evidence that it would be "annihilating."

If present beliefs are correct, the most serious genetic effect of this amount of radiation would be to raise the number of children born seriously defective about 25 per cent, or from the current 4 to a new level of 5 per cent of the total. This is a large penalty to pay for a war, and, more horrible still, one might have to continue to pay a similar though smaller price for 20 or 30 or 40 generations, but it is still far from annihilation. . . .

Medical problems. There are medical problems other than the genetic ones—for example, the bone cancers and leukemias that might be caused by strontium-90, and the other life-shortening effects of the internal and external radiation from fission products.

Here, again, examination indicates that, while the problems are horrible, they may well be within the range we are accustomed to. . . .

The situation devolves to this: More and closer bombs will cause more trouble than fewer and further ones—but not necessarily that much more. If a country is hit hard—hundreds of bombs more or less on target—but people take advantage of the moderate protection that is available in existing buildings and take other simple measures—things which the Russians, for example, seem to be doing or thinking of doing, today—then both the long and short-term effects of fall-out are mitigated drastically. With such preparations and some advance warning (the more preparation the less warning is needed) most people can survive the short-term fall-out effects. The long-term effects are less avoidable. The war might result in an average life shortening of less than 1 or 2 years, for those who were lucky, and 5 or 10 for those who were not. In any case, life will go on.

Economic recuperation also looks more feasible than is generally supposed. Most people—laymen and some experts—looking at the highly integrated character of a modern economy, argue that a nation is like a body; destroy the heart or other vital organs, and the body dies. . . .

This view is questionable. Suppose the United States were divided into two countries—an A country with the largest 50 to 100 cities, and a B country the remainder. The A country cannot survive without a B country, but the B country, as far as we can see, can survive without the A country. Further, B has the resources and skills needed to rebuild A in, say, 10 years. In other words, a country should not be considered analogous to a body, but rather considered as two semi-independent pieces that trade with each other.

Further, it is possible, by utilizing existing construction and otherwise improvising fall-out protection to prepare the B country to receive evacuees from the A country and protect them reasonably satisfactorily. If preparations have been made, then, for most of the year, either the Soviets or the United States could improvise fall-out protection on just days' or hours' notice. . . .

Current (1958) Russian Civil Defense manuals indicate that they are making such preparations. In addition, the Russians claim to have given every adult in Russia something between 20 and 40 hours of instructions in civil defense followed by a compulsory examination. Perhaps most important of all, their program seems to include preparations for evacuation to improvised fall-out protection.

How effective would such an evacuation be?

About 50 million Russians live in the largest 135 Soviet cities. If they evacuated, say, 80 per cent of these 50 million to their B country and left the remainder to operate the cities, all essential functions would be maintained while exposing only about 10 million citizens. Also, having evacuated most of the urban population, it would be possible to evacuate those remaining comparatively easily.

As long as our ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] force is small they don't even have to do the evacuation before they launch an attack. They have time to do so before our retaliatory bomber force reaches the majority of these cities.

Under these circumstances, if the Russians strike first and are reasonably successful, our attack should kill not more than 5 or 10 million Russians, probably much less, unless things go incredibly badly for them. Thus, they might lose only a fraction as many people as they lost in World War II.

Calling a Soviet Bluff

In some tense situation the Soviets could deliberately evacuate their A country in order to put the pressure on us. By this they make it credible that they intend to go to war unless we back down. While this gives us a sort of warning, we may not act on the warning. We may resolutely refuse to be "bluffed." In any case, unless we are willing to accept a Soviet retaliatory blow, the only practicable counteraction we may have might well be to back down or to put our SAC [Strategic Air Command] on alert and to evacuate our own cities—an action, incidentally, for which we have made almost no realistic preparations—in order to

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try to make them back down. The other possibility—to make the assumption that they don't mean what they seem to mean—may be too risky.

Such maneuvers are risky for the Soviets because we may attack first. But the probability of such an attack is small and they might be willing to face this prospect. If we don't attack or back down, they may go to war. In particular, the Soviets could start such a war in any circumstances in which the risks of not going to war appear larger to Khrushchev than going to war.

Consider a very plausible circumstance, the Hungarian revolution, which the Russians bloodily suppressed. Much pressure was applied to the United States to intervene. . . .

Assume that we had acceded to that pressure and intervened. The Russians would then have been faced with three fairly serious choices:

1. They could do nothing. This could almost automatically mean a Polish and East German revolt. Such a revolt would mean serious political repercussions within Russia, which we know worries them.

2. Secondly, they could fight a limited action. But that, too, is risky. If we fight a limited action with conventional high-explosive weapons, we would lose, just by the sheer weight of numbers. If we go to atomic weapons, it is still doubtful that we would win and even more doubtful

IF ATOMIC WAR COMES

What Latest Study Shows

MOST OF U.S. WOULD SURVIVE THE BOMBS . . .

"A" Country:
Cities that probably would be destroyed in an all-out thermonuclear attack.

"B" Country:
The remainder of U. S., outside the big cities. It can survive without the cities, rebuild "A" country in, say, 10 years.





NOTE: "Target" areas shown on map include 50 largest population centers plus some typical defense centers. Stanford study did not list specific cities as probable targets.

Source: Study by Herman Kahn, published by Stanford Research Institute

U. S. City-State map, copyright by Rand McNally & Company

that the war would stay limited. In particular, the Soviets might easily believe that we were quite capable of suddenly expanding the scope of the war with a surprise attack at their strategic forces.

3. The third possibility might appear safer. Rather than wait for the satellites to revolt or for the limited war to erupt into a general war at a time chosen by the Americans, they might decide to hit us right away. They could argue that this guaranteed them the all-important first strike, at least if they hurried.

It is clearly possible that such potentially dangerous situations could arise again, and in some of them we may be deeply, if involuntarily, involved. (Consider an East German revolt in which a rearmed West Germany felt obligated to intervene, or a U. S.-Chinese war which became all out.)

Our retaliatory capability must always be good enough that, even if the Soviets evacuate their cities, they will still feel that it is more risky to strike than to accept whatever alternative seems in store. . . .

Even, or especially, if the "balance of terror" theory is correct and we don't have to worry about a deliberate Soviet attack on the United States, we are still faced with important strategic problems. In 1914 and 1939, it was the British who declared war, not the Germans. Such a circumstance might arise again, but, if the "balance of terror" were correct, then we are as likely to be deterred as the Soviets; it is doubtful that the United States would resort to an all-out attack on the Soviets, even to correct or avenge major Soviet aggression in Europe.

Consider a hypothetical situation in which American defenses were so weak and Soviet retaliatory forces so strong

(Continued on page 110)



WAR'S EFFECTS ON PEOPLE WOULD BE "HORRIBLE . . . *BUT STILL FAR FROM ANNIHILATION*" . . .

Casualty rate: If caught by complete surprise, U. S. might lose up to 60 million people. But surprise to that degree is "doubtful." With some warning, and by taking shelter in existing buildings and by other measures, most people can survive short-term fall-out effects even if hundreds of bombs hit cities. Despite losses of many millions, "in any case, life will go on."

Genetic effects: Radiation from bombs and fall-out might give war's survivors 200 to 300 roentgens to reproductive organs by age 30. This would raise the percentage of children born with serious defects to 5 per cent of all those born, where it is 4 per cent now.

Medical effects: For "lucky" survivors, long-term radiation effects might shorten life 1 or 2 years; for those "not lucky," 5 or 10 years.

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THE BIRTH-CONTROL ISSUE— WHAT BOTH SIDES SAY

Controversy over birth control is revealing wide differences among religious leaders.

What, exactly, is the attitude of Catholic authorities? How does it differ from the stand of Protestants?

On these pages—in an interview and statements—you get both sides of the issue.

The Catholic view is given by the Rev. William J. Gibbons, S. J., of Fordham University.

The Protestant view is presented in statements by the World Council of Churches on October 7 and by Episcopalians on December 8. Also included: a report in 1958 to the Lambeth Conference of the Anglican Church.

WHY CATHOLICS REJECT "ARTIFICIAL BIRTH CONTROL"

Interview with Father William J. Gibbons, Fordham Sociologist

At NEW YORK CITY

Q Father Gibbons, is the world facing a problem of overpopulation?

A Yes, though that word is easily misunderstood. The difficulty arising from present trends is very appreciable, not in terms of absolute overpopulation, but rather in terms of the rates of growth.

Q What's the difference?

A The difference is this: Absolute overpopulation would only be present where you would have no more living space or where you would not have adequate resources, despite any advance in technology. Such a situation is obviously quite a way off. According to estimates of good economists on the capacity of the world at a reasonable level of living, it's anywhere between 10 and 20, or even more, times the present population.

Q Is the actual problem the rate of growth?

A Yes. An excessive rate of growth prevents orderly economic and social development. It presents problems with capital formation, with the creation of job opportunities, with the provision of adequate housing and living space in cities and so on.

It also has very serious impacts on education in the provision of schools, teachers and facilities to educate people to live in the new complex, technological civilization which is now spreading to the underdeveloped areas.

Q Are we in that phase now, do you think?

A I would say definitely we are, and particularly in the less-developed areas, more especially Asia, Africa and parts of Latin America—a situation where their growth rates are quite high and they do not often have the social and economic base with which to meet increasing pressures. The result is poverty, lack of educational opportunities, discontent and disorganization, and a good bit of concern about living standards and improving their way of life.

Q If population continues to grow at the present rate, what will happen to living standards in these areas?

A I believe that we can look forward to eventual decline in certain of the areas. It is desirable that something reasonable and morally acceptable is done to slow down rates of growth. This is in addition to—by no means a substitute for—intensive economic development. It seems clear that rates of 2½ to 3 per cent or more a year increase in population are excessive for a struggling economy to bear for long. Even dynamic economies require vast amounts of effort and money and personnel to keep expansion going at such a pace. Yet the undeveloped areas often lack the literacy and technical skills that are the fundamental base of continuing progress, such as you find in Western Europe and North America. Moreover, in these latter areas, birth rates declined while living standards were improving, and even today remain low as compared with the poorer lands.

Some economists note that rates of economic expansion can be made to exceed population-growth rates, and point to particular examples. But I am not sure they always appreciate the long-term situation, should present trends on births and deaths continue indefinitely into the future.

Q Just how does the Catholic demographer—the student of populations—look at the population problem? Does he differ with those of other faiths?

A So far as the basic demographic and vital statistics and facts are concerned, I think there's no difference whatsoever. Any conscientious Catholic demographer wishes to know the facts, to interpret them adequately and to foresee, to the extent that this is possible, future trends.

With respect to his attitude toward what should be done about excessive fertility, he recognizes there usually is a difference. The Catholic demographer, however, is realistic enough to know that he has to take into account the conscientious convictions of other people, and he doesn't believe that we should impose virtue upon them, as conceived necessarily by himself. He does wish, however, to maintain human dignity, and I believe he shares this with any responsible demographer anywhere.

Over all, I believe both of them would be very loath to see extension of such practices as abortion or complete sterilization—particularly if there were any element of compulsion about it—around the world in underdeveloped areas.

Q What does the Catholic Church feel should be done about the excessive rate of growth in such areas?

A The Catholic Church, as such, has no doctrinal judgment

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The Coming Choice For U. S.:

FIGHT OR SURRENDER?

[Continued from page 57]

that, if the United States responded to a Soviet ground attack on Europe, the Soviet counter-retaliation would kill all 177 million Americans. Suppose, also, that the Russians have forced us to think for a day or so as to whether to start a thermonuclear war in cold blood in the full consciousness that the Russian retaliatory blow will mean the annihilation of every American.

Who, if he were President of the United States, would initiate such a blow? Under such conditions it would not be surprising if neither the Europeans nor the Soviets found the United States promise to come to the aid of Europe credible.

If the Soviets and the Europeans would not believe that we would honor our commitments to our allies if it means 177 million American deaths, what level of casualties do they believe we would accept? How many, indeed, if the decision were yours, would you accept? 100 million? 50 million? 10 million? 1 million? It's a hard question.

I have discussed this question with some Europeans, asking them to guess how the American President would act. I have found no European who believed we would initiate a war if the casualties would be much over 20 million, and some believed we would be deterred at less than 2 million. One thoughtful critic thinks we would be deterred just at the prospect of the Russians destroying five or 10 empty cities.

Published unclassified estimates of the amount of damage that the United States would suffer in a war generally run around 50 to 60 million. If these estimates are relevant—which is doubtful, since they generally assume a Soviet Union surprise attack on an unalert United States—then we are already deterred from living up to our alliance obligations. If they are not relevant, then we ought to make relevant estimates for both now and the future.

The critical point is whether the Soviets believe we can keep our casualties to a level we would find acceptable, whatever that level may be.

If so, they will be deterred from very provocative aggressions, such as a ground attack on Europe or evacuating their cities and presenting us with an ultimatum.

But if they do not believe we can keep casualties to an acceptable level, the Soviets may feel safe in undertaking these extremely provocative military adventures. Or at least the Europeans may feel that the Soviets will feel safe, which creates an extremely dangerous pressure and blackmail situation.

* * *

But what deters the Russians from a series of Koreas and Indo-Chinas? It is probably less the fear of a direct United States attack with our current forces than the probability—in response to such crises—that the United States and its allies will greatly increase both their military strength and their resolve.

The deterrent effect of this possibility can be increased by making explicit preparations for a capability for increasing our strength very rapidly whenever the other side provokes us. For example, in June, 1950, the United States was engaged in a great debate whether our defense budget should be 14, 15 or 16 billion dollars. Along came Korea. Congress quickly authorized 60 billion dollars, an increase by a factor of 4.

No matter what successes the Russians had in Korea, that authorization represents an enormous military defeat for them. However, it was almost three years before that authorization was fully translated into increased budgets and increased military power. It is very valuable to have a capability to increase our defense expenditures, but this capability becomes many times more valuable if authorizations can be translated into military strength in a year or so.

If the Russians know that, if they allow international relations to deteriorate, we will probably go into an effective crash program, then they may be much less willing to let international relations deteriorate.

The problem, of course, is: "Would we have the time to put in a useful program?" For example, the basic military posture—including installations—must be of the proper sort if it is to be possible to expand it, within a year or so, to the point where it is prepared to fight a war in addition to being able to deter one. Our current posture is probably far from optimum for doing this.

Particularly if these preparations were at least moderately expensive and very explicit, the Russians might find it credible that we would initiate and carry through such a program if they were even provocative, say, on the scale of Korea or even less. The Russians would then be presented with three alternatives:

1. They could strike the United States, before the build-up got very far. This might look very unattractive, especially since the build-up would almost certainly be accompanied by an increased alert and other measures to reduce the vulnerability of SAC.

2. They could try to match the United States program. This would be very expensive.

3. They could accept a position of inferiority. This would be serious, since we would now have a "fight the war" capability as well as a "deter the war" capability.

In all cases the cost and risk of their provocation would have been increased, and it is not at all unlikely that the Soviets would take these extra costs and risks into account before they attempt provocation. If they were not deterred, then we could launch into the crash program so that we would be in a position to correct the results of their past provocation or at least so that they would be deterred, in the future, from exploiting these results.

Need: "Limited-War Program"

It might be particularly valuable to have credible and explicit plans to institute an adequate civil-defense program and a limited-war program. The institution of a crash program would make it very credible to the Russians, our allies and neutrals that we would go to war at an appropriate level if we were provoked again.

It is important to understand that we have this asset, the ability to spend large sums of money rather rapidly.

Let us, for example, assume a new Berlin crisis. . . . It would be most improbable that we would wage a war if

the Russians gradually put the squeeze on Berlin. Nevertheless, in all likelihood State Department negotiators negotiating with the Russians will try to tell them that they couldn't afford to push us out of Berlin because in some vague way we will do something very violent; that we would use our military forces. But our negotiators would be afraid to spell our threat out, for nothing that they could spell out would be credible.

Even today the Russians have told us that, if we send soldiers, they will kill them; that, if we send tanks, they will burn them; and that they can deter us from an all-out war, because they have rockets trained on our cities. The Soviets are saying that, at any level of violence that we care to use, they can either meet that level on the spot or promise such a severe punishment that we will be deterred. The Russians have also pointed out that Berlin is a chess game, not a poker game; that everybody can see what our position is.

If the Soviets are right, that our only alternatives are violence or defeat—where defeat would be an acceptance of some new and unsatisfactory status of Berlin—then the Soviets could probably be successful in talking us into adopting a face-saving method of losing Berlin, rather than one which made it clear to all that we have suffered a serious defeat.

In actual fact, we have some very strong cards to play, but if we do not know what these cards are we may be tricked out of playing them.

If we refuse to accept a face-saving defeat and, in fact, force the Russians to rub our noses in the dirt, then it would be clear to all in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the United States that, unless we do something spectacular to recover the situation, the NATO nations can no longer rely on us for any kind of protection.

Under these circumstances the United States Government would have to go into enormous defense budgets, probably close to at least a 100-billion-dollar-a-year level. These defense budgets would be designed not only to implement our current forces but also to buy large limited-war forces, and to buy things like civil defense and the corresponding military forces that would give us a credible capability for initiating a war if a humiliating crisis should be repeated.

There will also, under these circumstances, be enormous pressure on the NATO nations to combine into an even tighter alliance and to mobilize their resources for their defense also. This would mean that, as in Korea, even if we lost Berlin in the military sense, the Russians would have lost this particular campaign. While Berlin is important both ethically, politically and even resourcewise, its loss would not compare to the greatly increased power on the side of the West.

This is the threat we have against the Russians. If we don't know that we have this threat, if we believe that increasing the budget by a factor or two really would mean some sort of immediate bankruptcy or other financial catastrophe, then the Russians can present us with alternatives which may in the end result in their getting the diplomatic, political and foreign-policy victory. It is important that we understand our own strength.

CONCLUSIONS

Even if we have acquired the highest-quality deterrence capability, we must still have a capability for fighting and surviving wars as long as it is possible to have such a capability. This is true not only because it is prudent to take out insurance against a war occurring unintentionally, but also because we must be able to stand up to the threat of fighting a war or even be able to credibly threaten to wage war ourself. We must have an "alternative to peace," as long as we don't have a world government and as long as it is technologically and economically possible to have one.

Under current programs the United States may not be willing in a few years to accept a Soviet retaliatory blow, no matter what the provocation. The occurrence of such a situation is equivalent to breaking our alliance obligations and signing a nonaggression treaty with the Soviets—a nonaggression treaty with almost 200 million American hostages to guarantee performance.

Since it now seems most unlikely that the Soviet menace will go away by itself and since we have eschewed preventive war as a possibility, we must seek the solution to our problems along the path of some degree of coexistence or collaboration.

If we are to do this effectively, we must appear extremely competent to the Soviet leaders. They must feel that we are putting adequate attention and resources into meeting our military, political and economic problems. This is not a question of attempting to bargain from strength, but one of looking so invulnerable to blackmail and aggressive tactics that Soviet leaders will feel it is worthwhile to make agreements and foolish not to. . . .

How Russians See U. S. Leaders

One gets the impression that, up to about 1956 or 1957, the average senior Russian did have an enormous respect for United States planners and decision makers—a respect which they have now begun to lose. Many of the comments they make on remarks that some of our military and political leaders have made are contemptuous—and, a sober examination indicates, properly contemptuous. In the precarious present and the even more precarious future it would be well to go to some trouble not only to be competent as an antagonist to the Russians, but to look competent.

Ideally, winning the "cold war" would mean the establishment of peaceful democratic and prosperous nations everywhere and the complete elimination of all international conflicts of greater significance than those that, for example, occasionally plague United States-British relations.

No sober student of the international scene visualizes anything of this sort occurring. Even a more limited objective, the attainment of a physical security that is independent of Soviet "good will," is probably unattainable. . . .

But the situation is worse than this. It is most unlikely that the world can live with an uncontrolled arms race lasting for several decades. It is not that we could not match Soviet expenditures; it is simply that, as technology advances, as weapons become more powerful and more diverse, it is most likely that there will have to be at least implicit agreements on their use, distribution and character if we are not to run unacceptably high risks of unauthorized or irresponsible behavior.

No matter how inimical the Soviets feel toward us, they have common interests with us in this field. This does not mean that they will not try to use the common threat to obtain unilateral advantages; it just means that there is an important area for bargaining here and one which we must fully exploit.

As a prerequisite to exploiting it we must do our homework. We must know what we are trying to achieve, the kind of concessions that we can afford to give, the kind of concessions that we insist on getting from the Soviets. All of this will require, among other things, much-higher-quality preparations for negotiations than have been common.

* * *

Aside from the ideological differences and the problem of security itself, there does not seem to be any objective

[continued]

FIGHT OR SURRENDER?

quarrel between the United States and Russia that justifies the risks and costs that we subject each other to. The big thing that the Soviet Union and the United States have to fear from each other is fear itself. . . .

* * *

But, even if it were conceded that all we have to fear is fear itself, this would not imply that the problem is simple or easy, or even that it can be eliminated by any kind of arrangements that are practical for the next decade or so; it is only to say that there do not seem to be any fundamental blocks to making things more manageable and safer than is the current arrangement, namely, an almost uncontrolled arms race ameliorated by some vague implicit agreements and unilateral practices.

Progress is so fast, the problems are so unprecedented and the lead times for cultural assimilation so long that it is difficult to believe that muddling through will work. We will need much better mechanisms for forward thinking, for imaginative research into problems of strategy and foreign policy, for anticipating future developments and for planning to meet them than we have had.

These mechanisms can be made available. The tools actually or potentially available to the analyst, planner and decision maker, both organizational and technical, are many orders of magnitude better than anything we have had before; it is just barely possible that, with a determined effort by large numbers of responsible people, we can achieve enough to make a significant difference. The survival of our civilization may depend on this effort being made. Let us hope that it can be done.

U.S. NOW FACING ITS GREATEST DANGER

This warning is contained in a new official report: The U.S. is now open to a devastating nuclear attack. Russia's lead in missiles is seen as confronting the United States with the greatest danger in its history.

Here is an official report on the peril that menaces this nation in this age of missiles and nuclear bombs.

It was made for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of Johns Hopkins University. Researchers at Johns Hopkins have been making studies of military problems for the U. S. Government for many years.

Following are excerpts from the report, released by the Senate Committee on Dec. 6, 1959:

The military position of the United States has declined in the short span of 15 years from one of unchallenged security to that of a nation both open and vulnerable to direct and devastating attack.

This decline coincides with the rising military power of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet challenge could not have been made with such swiftness and success were it not for developments in military technology enabling that nation to threaten the security of the continental United States.

* * *

The advent of the nuclear-missile weapons generation, heralded by the Soviet ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] test of August, 1957, brought a drastic compression of the time required for the delivery of nuclear explosives at intercontinental ranges, and a corresponding reduction in the attack warning time available to the victim of strategic aggression.

These effects, added to the fact that there is as yet no active defense whatsoever against an intercontinental ballistic missile in flight, have gravely increased the temptations to strike first in a nuclear war.

They have also made an opponent's manned-bomber force highly vulnerable to surprise attack by the side that first achieves a comprehensive strategic missile arm.

Should the Soviets be the first to do so, and this now appears likely, the marked first-strike advantage now attributed to our Strategic Air Command would transfer to them.

It is this possibility that disturbs those who see in the "missile gap" of the early 1960s the greatest danger to its security that the United States has ever faced.

* * *

It is unlikely that the United States could close the anticipated missile gap, or appreciably shorten this dangerous transitional period, merely by accelerating the production of our present strategic weapons.

* * *

Progress in military technology will continue at an accelerating rate during the next decade, increasing both the performance of individual weapons systems and the number of systems that it becomes feasible to develop.

The arms race is likely to be of such scope and intensity as to provide each of the two great adversaries with repeated chances to seize an important lead in areas to which they assign priority.

* * *

It does not now appear possible to develop active or passive defense systems capable of fully protecting large areas from nuclear attack, or even to provide those point targets whose locations are known to the enemy with "invulnerability" to multimegaton weapons.

A high degree of national security is therefore likely to remain a goal unobtainable by military means alone during the next decade. The protection of retaliatory power will continue to depend heavily on the multiplication, dispersal and, later, the "mobilizing" of strategic-weapons systems.

* * *

To assume that the level of mutual destruction now possible from a total nuclear war, or the magnitude and intensity of the accompanying radioactive fall-out, is sufficiently high to make nuclear war "suicidal"—and therefore "impossible"—is but to evade the most serious military problem that this nation has ever faced.

The initiation of total war may be made increasingly hazardous for the potential aggressor, but it will remain a course open to him for at least the next decade.

and crawled up on the beach. He was vomiting when his men came up to him. He said, "Ross, you try it tonight." Then he passed out.

In the afternoon Ross swam across to Island B. He took a pistol to signal with, and spent the night watching Ferguson Passage. Nothing came through.

The next morning everyone felt wretched. Some prayed. Johnston said, "You guys make me sore. You didn't spend ten cents in church in ten years, then all of a sudden you're in trouble and you see the light of day."

When Ross came back, Kennedy decided that the group should move to a larger island to the southeast, where there seemed to be more coconut trees and where the party would be nearer Ferguson Passage. Again he towed McMahon, with the strap in his teeth, and the nine others grouped themselves around the timber. The swim took three hours.

The men were suffering most from thirst, and they broke open some coconuts lying on the ground and avidly drank the milk. Kennedy and McMahon, the first to drink, were sickened, and the others drank sparingly. During the night it rained, and someone suggested moving into the underbrush and licking water off the leaves. In the morning they saw that all the leaves were covered with droppings. Bitterly they named the place Bird Island.

On this fourth day the men were low. Even Johnston was low. McGuire had a rosary and Johnston said, "McGuire, give that necklace a working over." McGuire said quietly, "Yes, I'll take care of all you fellows."

Kennedy was still unwilling to admit that things were hopeless. He asked Ross if he would swim with him to an island called Nauru, to the southwest. They were very weak indeed, by now, but after an hour's swim they made it.

They walked painfully across Nauru to the Ferguson Passage side. On the beach they found a box of Japanese candy and hardtack, a keg of water, and a one-man canoe. The two had a wary feast. When night fell, Kennedy took the canoe, and a can of water from the keg, out into Ferguson Passage. But no PT's came, so he paddled to Bird Island and gave out small rations of hardtack and water. Before dawn, Kennedy started out in the canoe to rejoin Ross, but a wind arose and the canoe was swamped. Some natives appeared from nowhere in a canoe, rescued Kennedy and took him to Nauru. They showed him where a two-man canoe was cached. Kennedy picked up a coconut with a smooth shell and scratched a message on it with a jackknife, "ELEVEN ALIVE NATIVE KNOWS POSIT AND REEFS NAURU ISLAND KENNEDY." Then he said to the natives, "Rendova, Rendova"—the island where the PT base was located. The natives seemed to understand. Taking the coconut they paddled off.

Ross and Kennedy lay in a sickly daze all day. When it got dark, conscience took hold of Kennedy and he persuaded Ross to go out into Ferguson Passage with him in the two-man canoe. Ross argued against it. Kennedy insisted. The two started out. As they got into the Passage the wind rose. The waves grew until they were five or six feet high and eventually they swamped the dugout. The two clung to it. Kennedy at the bow, Ross at the stern. The tide carried them toward the open sea, so they kicked and tugged the canoe, aiming for the island. They struggled that way for two hours. . . . They saw a white line ahead and heard a frightening roar—waves crashing on a reef. It was too late to do anything except hang on and wait.

A wave broke Kennedy's hold, ripped him away from the canoe and turned him head over heels. His ears roared and his eyes pinwheeled, and for the third time since the collision he thought he was dying. Somehow he was not thrown against the coral but floated into a kind of eddy. Suddenly he felt the reef under his feet. He shouted, "Barney!" There was no reply. Kennedy thought of how he had insisted on going out in the canoe, and again called, "Barney!" This time Ross answered. He, too, had been thrown on the reef. His right arm and shoulder had been cruelly lacerated and his feet, already infected from earlier wounds, were cut some more.

They struggled to the beach, fell down and slept. In the morning they were awakened by a noise. They looked up and saw four husky natives. One said in an excellent English accent, "I have a letter for you, sir." Kennedy tore the note open. It said: "On His Majesty's Service. To the Senior Officer, Nauru Island. I have just learned of your presence on Nauru Is. I am in command of a New Zealand infantry Patrol operating on New Georgia. I strongly advise that you come with these natives to me. Meanwhile I shall be in radio communication with your authorities at Rendova, and we can finalize plans to collect balance of your party. Lt. Wincote." . . .

A PT came alongside. Kennedy jumped into it and hugged the men aboard. The PT picked up the men on Bird Island and roared back toward base. The squadron medic had sent some brandy along to revive the weakened men. Johnston felt the need of a little revival. In fact, he felt he needed quite a bit of revival. After taking care of that, he retired topside and sat with his arms around a couple of roly-poly mission trained natives. And in the fresh breeze on the way home they sang together a hymn all three happened to know:

"Jesus loves me, this I know,
For the Bible tells me so;
Little ones to Him belong,
They are weak, but He is strong.
Yes, Jesus loves me; yes, Jesus loves me . . ." [END]



INELIGIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENCY?

(Is Senator John F. Kennedy, Democrat, of Massachusetts, to be regarded as ineligible for the Presidency just because he is a Roman Catholic?

The press in recent days has printed varying views on the so-called "religious issue" in American politics. This writer happened to re-read this week the condensation in "Reader's Digest" in August, 1944, of an article by John Hersey published two months earlier in "The New Yorker." Excerpts follow.

Is it possible that many Americans consider as ineligible for the Presidency the young naval lieutenant whose heroism is described here?—David Lawrence, Editor.)

By John Hersey

ONE DAY LAST AUGUST an officer of a PT squadron in the Solomons wrote home these unhappy words:

". . . Last night George Ross lost his life for a cause he believed in stronger than any of us, because he was an idealist of the purest sense. Jack Kennedy, the ex-Ambassador's son, was on the same boat and also lost his life. The man that said the cream of a nation is lost in war can never be accused of making an overstatement of a very cruel fact. . . ."

A couple of days later the squadron held Mass for the souls of Kennedy, Ross and the other 11 men of the PT 109.

But sorrow at the PT base was premature. This is the account of what really happened. It shows that among all the horrible things in Pacific War, there is one wonderful thing: the will of men to live.

Skippered by Lieutenant John F. Kennedy, PT 109 was out one starless night patrolling Blackett Strait in the mid-Solomons. At about 2:30 a.m. Kennedy was at the wheel and he saw George Ross, up on the bow with binoculars, turn and point into the darkness. The man in the forward machine-gun turret shouted: "Ship at two o'clock!"

Kennedy saw a shape and spun the wheel around to turn for an attack, but the motor torpedo boat, running on only one of her three engines, so as to make minimum wake and avoid detection from the air, answered too sluggishly. The shape became a Japanese destroyer, cutting through the night at 40 knots and heading straight for the 109. All hands froze to their battle stations as the destroyer crashed into the PT and cut her right in two. Kennedy thought, "This is how it feels to be killed." In a moment he found himself on his back on the deck, looking up at the destroyer as it passed through his boat.

Only McMahon, engineer, was below decks. He was thrown painfully against a bulkhead. A tremendous burst of flame came back at him from some of the gas tanks. He put his hands over his face, drew his legs up tight, and waited to die. But he felt water hit him after the fire, and he was sucked far downward as his half of the PT sank. He began to struggle upward through the water. Over his head he saw a yellow glow—gasoline burning. He broke the surface and was in fire. He splashed hard to keep a little island of water around him.

Johnston, another engineer, had been asleep on deck. The collision dropped him overboard. The destroyer's turbulent wake took him down, turned him over and over, shook him, and drubbed on his ribs. The next day his body was black and blue.

The undamaged watertight compartments forward kept Kennedy's half of the PT afloat. The destroyer rushed off into the dark. There was an awful quiet: only the sound of gasoline burning.

Kennedy shouted, "Who's aboard?"

Feeble answers came from three enlisted men, McGuire, Mauer and Albert; and one officer, Thom.

One by one the survivors in the water answered Kennedy's hails: Ross, the third officer; Harris, McMahon, Johnston, Zinsser, Starkey, enlisted men. Two did not answer: Kirksey and Marney, enlisted men.

Harris shouted from the darkness, "Mr. Kennedy! Mr. Kennedy! McMahon is badly hurt!"

Kennedy, who had been on the Harvard swimming team five years before, dived in and swam to McMahon and Harris, a hundred yards away, and then took McMahon in tow and headed for the PT. A gentle breeze kept blowing the boat away from the swimmers. It took 45 minutes to make what had been an easy hundred yards. On the way, Harris, who had hurt his leg, said, "I can't go any farther." Kennedy, of the Boston Kennedys, said to Harris of the same home town, "For a guy from Boston you're certainly putting up a great exhibition out here, Harris." Harris complained no more and he made it to the hull. Then Kennedy swam from man to man, to see how they were doing. All were wearing life preservers. Those who couldn't swim had to be towed back to the wreck by those who could. It took nearly three hours to get everyone aboard.

The men stretched out on the tilted deck. Some collapsed into sleep. The others talked about how wonderful it was to be alive.

When it got light the men saw three miles to the northeast, the monumental cone of Kolombangara

(Continued on second preceding page—page 114)



INELIGIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENCY?

[continued from page 116]

Island; there, they knew, 10,000 Japanese swarmed. To the west, five miles away, they saw Vella Lavella; more Japs. To the south, only a mile or so away, they actually could see a Japanese camp on Gizo. Kennedy ordered his men to keep low so that no moving silhouettes would show against the sky. The listing hulk was gurgling and gradually settling.

McMahon, horribly burned, and Johnston, who coughed continually from gasoline fumes that had gotten into his lungs, had to have room to lie down. Kennedy ordered the other men into the water, and went in himself. They cursed war in general and PT's in particular. At about ten o'clock the hulk heaved a moist sigh and turned turtle. McMahon and Johnston had to hang on as best they could.

It was clear that the remains of the 109 would soon sink. Kennedy said, "We will swim to that small island," pointing to one of a group three miles to the southeast. "We have less chance of making it than some of these other islands here, but there'll be less chance of Japs, too." Those who could not swim well grouped themselves around a long timber which had been knocked loose by the collision. They tied several pairs of shoes to it, as well as the ship's lantern wrapped in a life jacket to keep it afloat.

Kennedy took one end of a long strap on McMahon's Mae West in his teeth and swam breast stroke, towing the helpless man. The salt water lapped into his mouth through his clenched teeth, and he swallowed a lot.

It took five hours to reach the island. It was only 100 yards in diameter. Kennedy lay down, exhausted. He had been in the sea, except for short intervals on the hulk, for 15½ hours. His stomach was heavy with salt water he had swallowed. But he kept thinking. Every night for several nights the PT's had cut through Ferguson Passage on their way to action. Ferguson Passage was just beyond the little island. Maybe?

He stood up. He took a pair of shoes, put a rubber life belt around his waist, hung a .38 around his neck on a lanyard. He took his pants off. He picked up the ship's lantern, a heavy battery affair, still wrapped in the kapok jacket. He said, "If I find a boat, I'll flash the lantern twice. The password will be 'Roger,' the answer will be 'Willco.' "

It took Kennedy half an hour to swim to the reef around the next island. Now it was dark. He blundered along the uneven reef in water up to his waist, making his way like a slow-motion drunk, hugging the lantern. He cut his shins and ankles on sharp coral. At about nine o'clock he came to the end of the reef, alongside Ferguson Passage. He took his shoes off and tied them to the life jacket, then struck out into open water. He swam about an hour, until he felt he was far enough out to intercept the PT's. Treading water, getting chilled, waiting, holding the lamp, he listened for the muffled roar of motors.

He looked west and saw flares and the false gaiety of an action beyond Gizo, ten miles away. Kennedy realized that the PT boats had been chosen, for the first night in many, to go around Gizo instead of through Ferguson Passage. There was no hope.

Kennedy started back. But this swim was different. He was very tired and now the current was running fast, carrying him to the right. He saw that he could not make the island, so he flashed the light once and shouted "Roger! Roger!" to identify himself.

The men saw the light and heard the shouts. They thought that Kennedy had found a PT. They walked out onto the reef, and waited. They waited a long time, but they saw nothing except phosphorescence and heard nothing but the sound of the waves. They went back, very discouraged. . . .

Kennedy had drifted right by the little island. He thought he had never known such deep trouble, but something he did shows that unconsciously he had not given up hope. He dropped his shoes, but he held onto the heavy lantern, his symbol of contact with his fellows. He stopped trying to swim. He seemed to stop caring. His body drifted through the wet hours, and he was very cold. Darkness and time took the place of a mind in his skull. For a long time he slept, or was crazy, or floated in a chill trance.

The tide shoves and sucks through the Solomon Islands and makes the currents curl in queer patterns. Jack Kennedy drifted in a huge circle—west past Gizo, then north and east past Kolombangara, then south. When light came at about six, he saw that he was in Ferguson Passage, exactly where he had been the night before when he saw the flares beyond Gizo. For a second time he started home. He thought for a while that he had lost his mind and that he only imagined that he was repeating his attempt to reach the island. But the chill of the water was real enough, and his progress was measurable. This time he made the island

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Scientists Ask New Board To Solve Peace Problems

By The Associated Press.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 11—A committee of top scientists proposed today that the United States set up a new agency to study and help solve the technical problems of keeping the peace. The scientists, among them two Nobel Prize winners, said that there now was no competent scientific group seeking solutions to the grievously complex problem of disarmament.

According to the plan of the scientists, who are advisers to a Democratic party group, the new agency would tackle the disarmament issue first. Later it might broaden its scope to cover other problems, such as providing effective assistance to under-developed nations.

The agency might ultimately become an international body, but initally it should be established by the United States, the committee said.

And it should be an independent agency, not a part of the United States Defense or State Departments.

Backed by Democrats

It would borrow from the experience of such departments and from agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission in reaching its own findings with which to advise the President, Congress, the National Research Council — whatever individuals or organizations might become involved.

The plan was proposed by a so-called Pasadena Group of scientists who are acting as advisers to the Democratic party.

It was adopted by the seventeen-man advisory committee

Continued on Page 9, Column 5

SCIENTISTS URGE NEW PEACE UNIT

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

on science and technology of the Democratic Advisory Council at a special Sunday session.

If the Advisory Council accepts the recommendations, they may become a part of the Democratic party platform.

The proposal was announced at a news conference by the committee chairman, Dr. Ernest C. Pollard, and by the two Nobel Prize winners, Dr. Polykarp Kusch and Dr. Harold C. Urey.

Dr. Pollard is chairman of the Biophysics Department of Yale University.

Dr. Kusch, winner of the Nobel Prize in physics in 1955, is Professor of Physics at the Columbia University Radiation Laboratory, New York.

Dr. Urey, who received the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1934, is with the University of California Institute of Technology and Engineering, La Jolla, Calif.

Plan Drafted by 4 Men

Dr. Pollard said that a subcommittee of four Pacific Coast scientists, known as the Pasadena Group, had drawn up the plan in the form of a report on problems of science and technology as related to United States foreign and military policy.

The subcommittee members, all from Pasadena, Calif., included three men from the California Institute of Technology —Dr. Harrison Brown, Professor of Geochemistry; Dr. Frank Goddard, Jet Propulsion Laboratory; and Dr. Charles C. Lauritsen, Professor of Physics, the fourth member is Trevor Gardner, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for research and development, who is president and chairman of Hycon Manufacturing Company.

Dr. Pollard said that the suggested new agency would act as a permanent laboratory for active study by "first class" scientists of disarmament problems, including those of inspecting areas and detecting atomic explosions with seismographs, or of sending up satellites for nuclear reconnaissance.

Soviet Successes Noted

"These scientists would make realistic suggestions for meeting the technical problems of disarmament, and meeting them in a professional way on a solid basis," he said.

Dr. Urey said today that in the face of the enormous and very dramatic challenge from the Soviet Union, in the wake of the Soviet space-probing successes, the United States had been fed "intellectual tranquilizers."

He said that Sputnik I had given President Eisenhower a tremendous opportunity to awaken the nation to deficiencies in its educational system, but he had failed to take advantage of it.

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Democratic Scientists Ask Science Agency

See Republican 'Platitudes,' Urge Millions for a Disarmament Study

By Warren Rogers Jr.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 11.—Fourteen Democratic scientists, including two Nobel Prize winners, today proposed creation of a new scientific agency to investigate all aspects of the technological cold war.

"You can't stop intercontinental ballistic missiles with platitudes," the scientists declared at a news conference.

They were scornful of the Republican party's recent fifteen-page pamphlet, "The Impact of Science and Technology," put out as a statement of Republican principles.

Dr. Harold C. Urey, of the University of California, who won the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1934, challenged the competence of the Republican "task force" which prepared the pamphlet.

"When you look at who wrote this, one must conclude that there aren't any Republican scientists at all," Dr. Urey said. "Their report says a great many nice platitudinous things with which it is hard to disagree, but the point is the Republican party has done nothing about any of them."

The Republican pamphlet was written by a committee headed by Charles E. Ducommun, president of Ducommun Metals & Supply Co. Its eight other members included a college director of scholarships, a former president of the American Medical Association, an advertising executive, a college professor of architectural engineering, an opinion researcher, a research laboratory president, a fellow of the American Institute of Architects, and a lecturer-broadcaster.

The Republican report called, among other things, for continued Federal support of the scientific community. But it said that, except for military weapons, Federal funds for scientific research "should be held to present levels or perhaps gradually diminished."

The Democratic scientists objected to that philosophy. Dr. Ernest C. Pollard, of Yale University, chairman of the Democratic group, said America

Continued on page 14, column 6

Scientists

(Continued from page one)

should spend "a sizable amount"—he indicated it should be in the millions of dollars—for disarmament research, if it is willing to spend billions for arms research.

The agency proposed by Dr. Pollard's group would be independent of the State and Defense Departments. He described it as "a laboratory of first class scientists," drawing on the experience of other agencies like the Atomic Energy Commission but also doing its own basic research.

"The acquisition of technical information on which to base a disarmament plan should have first priority," Dr. Pollard said. "I am confident we could get the best brains in the nation. Emotionally, this is the kind of thing our scientists want to do."

The meeting and news conference of the Democratic scientists in Washington coincided with calls by two Democratic Senators for more money in the missile and space race.

Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, Tex., the Democratic leader, told television interviewers America needs a space czar, with authority over both the civilian and military effort. Sen. Stephen M. Young, D., Ohio, like Sen. Johnson a member of the Senate Space Committee, said in a radio interview that too many civilian agencies are slowing down the nation's missile program.

Sen. Young called for "heroic efforts." He estimated Congress would have to provide at least $2,000,000,000 more for the United States to close the missile gap in the next five years.

Dr. Pollard, Dr. Urey and Dr. Polykarp Kusch, of Columbia University, who won the 1955 Nobel Prize in physics, told their news conference that "abysmally" little is known about the technical aspects of various disarmament proposals.

The agency they propose, they said, would try to learn, for example, how much an underground nuclear blast can be muffled so as to defy detection, whether nuclear explosions can be picked up by a chain of unmanned monitoring stations around the globe, and so on.

"But I personally would also like to see a basic scientific study of foreign aid from a technical point of view," Dr. Pollard said. "I would like to know, for instance, do you do best helping India with better vaccines, or with better bullock carts?"

Dr. Urey said the Eisenhower administration failed to react strongly enough to the Soviet sputnik challenge. He declared:

"We've been given nothing but intellectual tranquilizers. Nothing has been done to improve our education. It is a tragic situation. Nothing is being done to meet this challenge.

"All the President had to do was to tell the people of the United States how serious the challenge was, and he would have gotten an enormous response. The opportunity was handed to him on a golden plate and nothing was done."

DEMOCRATIC SCIENTISTS—Dr. Harold C. Urey, right, and Dr. Polykarp Kusch, Nobel Prize winners, who joined twelve fellow Democratic scientists in proposing a new scientific agency to examine the technological cold war.

The Washington Post

Times Herald

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Democrats Ask Agency On Science

Propose Laboratory On Technical Phase Of 'Waging Peace'

By Edward Gamarekian
Staff Reporter

A proposal that the United States establish a large scientific laboratory to work out the technical problems for "waging peace" was put forth yesterday by the Science and Technology Committee of the Democratic Advisory Council.

With regard to "the enormous and dramatic challenge from Russia," one of the Commitee's Nobel Prize-winning scientists charged that President Eisenhower had failed to take advantage of a "tremendous opportunity" to awaken the Nation to the deficiencies of its educational system. Americans have been fed "intellectual tranquilizers" instead, he stated.

The Committee, formed last spring, consists of 17 scientists and engineers, many of whom have achieved national and international prominence in their fields. Ernest C. Pollard, chairman of the Biophysics Department at Yale University is chairman. Among its members are Nobel Prize winners Harold C. Urey of the University of California and Polykarp Kusch of Columbia University. The reference to "intellectual tranquilizers" came from Urey.

Also on the Committee is Trevor Gardner, Assistant Air Force Secretary for Research and Development during part of the Eisenhower Administration, now president and chairman of the Hycon Manufacturing Co.

Fifteen members of the group met at Democratic headquarters here yesterday for an all day session on:

• The problems of science and technology in relation to

See SCIENCE, A8, Col. 4

SCIENCE—*Fr. Page 1*

Technology 'Lab' Urged By Democrats

United States foreign and military policy.

• The U. S. space program.

• Proposed planks on science and technology for the 1960 Democratic platform.

• Civilian defense problems.

The meeting was held behind closed doors. At a news conference during the midday break, the committee said almost nothing about the subjects discussed or the conclusions reached, except for its proposal of a national laboratory to work on the problems of peace.

A Democratic Advisory Council spokesman disclosed later that the Council was preparing an all-inclusive statement which will probably be made public this December.

Pollard said his committee had proposed a laboratory for waging peace because there is at present "no competent scientific group seeking the grievously complex problem of disarmament."

The new agency would tackle this issue first, he said, and might later broaden its scope to include other problems, such as providing truly effective assistance to underdeveloped countries.

Might Become World Body

It was the consensus of the Committee members that the agency might ultimately become an international body. Initially it should be established by the United States, they said, and should be made independent of the Departments of State and Defense, coming under the President directly or under the National Security Council.

The State and Defense Departments are both represented on the Security Council.

The Committee has not agreed on how much should be spent for this type of research, Pollard said, but "we are not talking about peanuts."

Yesterday's meeting came one week after a report by the Republican Task Force on the Impact of Science and Technology, a sub-group of the Republican Committee on Program and Progress. This 15-page report calls for a greater public and private effort in all fields with a minimum of government control. The task force's chairman, Charles H. Percy, president of Bell and Howell, said 250,000 copies of the report are being distributed.

The Democrats were critical of both the report and the make up of the task force.

"You can't stop ICBMs with platitudes," said Pollard.

There don't seem to be any scientists on this scientific task force, Urey observed. "Most scientists are now Democrats," he quipped, "but I know some good scientists who are still Republicans and could have recommended some names."

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FOR P.M.'S RELEASE
June 4, 1959

UNITED STATES DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT POLICIES

(Remarks of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey on the Senate floor, June 4, 1959)

Mr. President:

As the three nuclear powers (the U. S., and Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom) move closer to an agreement to stop nuclear weapons tests under an effective and workable control system, those who question the wisdom of such an agreement continue to voice their doubts.

In a free society each citizen has the right to give his opinions and to present his arguments. An informed citizen on a particular question not only has the right to present his case; he has an obligation to share his knowledge and views with others. When many of our fellow-citizens, including some of my good friends, champion the cause of continued nuclear testing they are performing a service by stimulating debate and discussion on a subject of vital concern to all Americans. I feel sure that these friends will welcome the fact that I, too, wish to join with them in debate, and to offer some comments and arguments of my own.

Those who oppose an international agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests have two main arguments. One argument is that the control and inspection system would not be good enough to detect secret tests in violation of any test ban treaty that might be agreed to. I have discussed aspects of a control system on three separate occasions on the Senate floor since the beginning of this Congress. I do not at this time intend to dwell at length on the nature of the control system now being negotiated except to reiterate my own position. My position, in short, is that, while no system can be perfect, it is possible to install an effective and workable control system to monitor an agreement to suspend all nuclear weapons tests. Such a control system must have as its main elements five basic features:

1) The establishment of appropriately instrumented control posts at specified intervals throughout the territories of the nuclear powers, and including provision for the improvement of the system.

2) The staffing of the control posts and all other personnel connected with the control system to be international in character so that objectivity and impartiality in the operation of the system will be guaranteed.

3) The right of the control commission to conduct an unimpeded on-site inspection of any event which the control system cannot identify as being natural in origin.

4) A time schedule whereby the agreement and the control system shall extend to other nations and areas in addition to the territory and test areas of the three nuclear powers.

5) A control organization which can conduct its business without being thwarted by the use of a veto on key decisions.

So far as I am aware, the United States and the United Kingdom in their negotiations with the Soviet Union for a test ban treaty have not sacrificed any of these five fundamental features of a control system. I do not agree with those who say that the control system cannot be made to work. Furthermore, I do not agree with those who say that the United States has already accepted aspects of a control system which are not sufficient to deter a violator or to catch him if he tries to sneak a few tests undetected.

Atomic Tests and Limited Nuclear War

The second argument that is given in opposition to a test ban treaty concerns a thesis of military strategy. The advocates of this thesis would have us reject a test ban agreement regardless of the type of control and inspection system that the nuclear powers might agree to.

What is this thesis and why do these people feel so strongly about the need to continue nuclear weapons tests?

First, they believe that war with the Soviet Union and perhaps Communist China is probable and, therefore, we must do everything in our power to prepare for such a war.

Second, since a war is likely, they believe it is vital that we try to prevent it from spreading to envelop the whole world in a nuclear holocaust with the consequent possible result of the end of civilization as we know it. In order to prevent the spread of such a war, it is necessary to limit the weapons used and also, insofar as possible, to restrict the geographical area of combat.

Third, if we are to limit the weapons and restrict the area of combat, they believe it is imperative that we have a large family of tactical nuclear weapons at our disposal. These weapons cannot be the large megaton hydrogen bombs which are not really weapons of war so much as they are weapons of mass destruction of innocent peoples. Furthermore, it is argued, we cannot use non-nuclear weapons because these weapons are not powerful enough to fight a limited war. What power they have is further handicapped by their heavy weight. In other words, conventional armaments are considered no longer adequate for the United States because in helping to defend the entire free world we must be able to move large numbers of weapons quickly and with great mobility to the scene of crisis or actual combat. The use of our armed forces in limited wars without the resort to nuclear weapons is likewise considered inadequate because the Soviet Union and Communist China, having a combined population vastly greater than ours, and having less appreciation than we of the worth of human lives and the dignity of individual human beings, would have an insurmountable advantage.

The advocates of a program of continuous atomic weapons tests say that when big hydrogen bombs are eliminated as too powerful and when conventional armaments are eliminated as not powerful enough, the only thing left is the category of small atomic weapons. These weapons, say these advocates of continued testing, have the advantage of being light in weight, and therefore highly mobile, and of being sufficiently powerful to destroy an opponent's armed forces, but not so powerful as to be weapons of mass destruction. Only in this way, they say, can limited wars be fought and won without great destruction to human life around the globe.

The proponents of continued testing claim that the United States does not now have a sufficient number and variety of small atomic weapons for the purpose of defense in limited wars. Furthermore, the opponents of a nuclear test ban also contend we have not reached the necessary stage of development of these weapons. They conclude that under no circumstances should the United States enter into an agreement to discontinue tests of atomic weapons at this time.

The advocates of continued atomic testing for the purpose of assuring an arsenal for defense in limited nuclear war ignore, in my view, many of the realities of present day international political life. Their thinking, I submit, is based on a faulty concept of the nature of the crises facing us. They have constructed hypothetical situations about fighting wars which do not correspond to the actual situation in which we are apt to find ourselves.

What are the weaknesses in these arguments?

Weaknesses of Limited Atomic War Thesis

Weakness Number One: The assumption that small nuclear weapons must be used as a defense against the large armies of the Soviet Union and Communist China fails to recognize that the Soviet Union also has a large supply of nuclear weapons and that if we use such weapons there is nothing to prevent her from using them, or making them available for use against us. If small atomic tactical weapons are effective against the large armies of the Communist bloc, they are no less effective against smaller armies of the Western bloc. The idea that small nuclear weapons will give us a decisive military advantage in a war in which both sides use nuclear weapons is fallacious. This is not to deny that the small weapons may be militarily useful in a nuclear war. But there is no evidence that they will be substantially more useful to us than to the other side. And to assume that the Communists will not recognize their utility and be prepared to exploit it would be to repeat an old error. We have no monopoly on these weapons, large or small.

Indeed, we must accept the fact that if we use these weapons there is no assurance that an enemy would not reciprocate in kind. To some extent, this concept about having nuclear weapons to use against large armies of a potential enemy is a hangover from the days back in the mid '40's when the United States had a monopoly on the atomic bomb and when the U. S. armed forces were cut back way below those of the Soviet Union. Then we could say that our nuclear weapons stockpile was an active deterrent to aggression by the swollen Soviet armies, but this comforting idea has become increasingly outdated during recent years as the Soviets have developed a stockpile of nuclear weapons comparable to our own. The deterrent may still exist but it is a deterrent that now applies to both sides.

Weakness Number Two: If the United States ever became involved in using nuclear weapons against the land armies of the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union this would probably not remain a limited war. It would become a major conflict. It is extremely difficult to envisage a situation whereby the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China would be engulfed in a nuclear war without large strategic weapons being used. It seems almost impossible to contemplate a nuclear war in which tactical weapons of small size are used against the large Communist armies but in which the war is politely limited to these weapons. It is unlikely that the belligerents in such a major war would limit the size and nature of the weapons through fear of retaliation in kind. And even if the "big bombs" were not used, the Soviets would have the small weapons just as we.

The conclusion seems unavoidable that when the advocates of limited atomic war capabilities speak of a limited atomic war, they are thinking primarily in terms of conflict on territory controlled neither by the United States nor the Soviet Union. As I shall suggest in a moment, it is not at all clear that third parties welcome the idea of being used as a nuclear battlefield.

Weakness Number Three: If the United States is the first to use nuclear weapons, be they tactical or strategic, this country will be stigmatized throughout many parts of the world. We would deliver to the Communists a political victory of such proportions that any military victory, if one were achieved, might not offset the political defeat. I have tried to test my viewpoint in this matter by addressing to the Department of State and the Department of Defense questions related to the attitudes of other nations on the use of nuclear weapons. I asked, for example, whether the difference in kind between the conventional weapons - even the largest - and nuclear weapons - even the smallest - is not such that it is inevitable that a distinction be present in

minds of people. The Department of State did not deny that such a distinction exists. It merely held that the development of tactical nuclear weapons "would help to correct the distinction now made between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and obtain recognition that there is a continuous spectrum of yields." The Department of Defense answered my question by saying that it was not "attempting to propagandize the fact that nuclear weapons are no different than conventional weapons. The nuclear weapon is different and this fact stands up by its own recognition." What this means to me is that nuclear weapons are regarded by many, if not by most people in the world, as a class of weapons quite different from so-called conventional weapons.

Of course, the nation that commits the act of aggression should and would be stigmatized and condemned by all peace-loving nations. But since many people do place nuclear weapons in a special category and since it is doubtful that we could succeed in changing their attitudes, then we must live with the reality that such attitudes exist.

My concern on this score is echoed in a letter recently received by the Committee on Foreign Relations from a distinguished career diplomat now retired. He pungently states the case in the following comment:

> "It is said that we need not worry over this eventuality because we will more than counter a conventional aggression with the use of our nuclear weapons. This does not reassure me because I, for one, am anything but convinced that in a showdown we will dare to loose a nuclear war if the other side does not. The responsibility is too great, the moral obloquy too heavy, the danger to our own existence too overwhelming. If my suspicion is correct, where would this leave us?. . ."

Weakness Number Four: We cannot assume that all countries would risk the total devastation that would probably result from the use of nuclear weapons as the price of defense against Communist imperialism. No country wishes to be the victim of Communist aggression and each would want to have help defending its people against Soviet and Chinese tyranny. In fact, a number of countries have accepted our aid in building their defenses and in preventing Communist aggression from being successful. But the defense that we employ must be commensurate with the threat.

There is a tendency to talk about small tactical nuclear weapons as though they were similar to the weapons of World War II, but these weapons are not similar. Our small tactical nuclear weapons contain enormous destructive power. This destructive power is not only inherent in the weapon itself, but it also comes from local radioactive fallout. This local fallout can affect the water supply, the soil, foodstuffs, and all the various kinds of materials on which a population must feed itself.

Four years ago, the United States Army and Air Force held some joint maneuvers in Louisiana called Operation Sage Brush. This was one of the first attempts to use tactical nuclear weapons in a simulated way in local warfare. The exercise showed that not only was the enemy defeated, but our own troops also suffered severely from the local radioactivity. Hanson Baldwin, who witnessed

these maneuvers at the time, termed them a "frightening experience." It was found that during these maneuvers not only the State of Louisiana, but also an area the size of twelve states would have been devastated, the cities partially destroyed, and the surviving inhabitants completely affected by radioactivity. The size of weapons used in this maneuver ranged from two kilotons to over forty kilotons - the military terms such weapons small tactical weapons.

Operation Sage Brush took place four years ago. It is possible that the Armed Forces have learned how to use tactical nuclear weapons to better advantage since that time, so that the residual radioactivity will not be so damaging to civilian populations. I tried to learn something about this problem when the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified earlier this year before the Disarmament Subcommittee. Unfortunately, they would not be communicative even in Executive session. Their lack of candor makes me suspect that our ability to reduce local fallout in a limited atomic war has not increased in four years. I urge Representative Holifield, Chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, who is about to hold hearings on the results of a thermonuclear war, to hold hearings and inquire into the results of a limited atomic war as well. This study is urgently needed in light of recent efforts to underscore the importance of continued atomic weapons testing for the purpose of developing so-called smaller tactical atomic weapons.

My point in bringing up the results of Operation Sage Brush is that I question whether any nation wants to be the battlefield for a limited atomic war, to defeat an enemy only to turn around and find even its agricultural produce has been well fertilized with radioactive dust. I am aware there are those who claim this problem can be solved by developing so-called clean bombs. The Atomic Energy Commission has produced large yield weapons with reduced fallout. Although the development of small weapons with reduced fallout has not yet been achieved, some of our scientists think this too can be realized. But even if the fallout hazard can be reduced, it is doubtful that it can be completely eliminated. Moreover, it does not help our safety and those of people everywhere if our weapons are 60 to 90 percent "clean" and those of an opponent are not.

Weakness Number Five: Our defense officials have persuaded us that the free world with its armed forces, conventional armaments, and industrial power cannot without nuclear weapons withstand the armies and armaments of the Soviet bloc. Again, we are presented with reasoning that is inconsistent. If the full land armies of the Soviet Union and Communist China were ever thrown into battle the war would no longer be limited. Both sides - starting perhaps with the side that seemed to be losing - would use nuclear weapons.

Another of our high officials in the Foreign Service stated recently to the Committee on Foreign Relations with respect to our NATO strategy:

> ". . .a military policy that reaches for nuclear weapons as its main ingredient, is a self-defeating policy, in that it guarantees a dead Europe. Moreover, a military policy tailored to the concept of 'limited nuclear war' is also a policy which is likely to lose us our European allies. For what this notion comes down to, is a confession that America and Russia realize that the nuclear weapons are too dangerous to use against each other. Hence they will be used against Europe or on European terrain alone."

"What we need is a military policy leading to military forces in being that will not be more terrifying than the fear of hostile threats . . ."

A number of experts in military strategy contend that conventional armed strength can be made to offset that of the Soviet bloc, without the use of nuclear weapons, at least if the conflict is not all-out war. In other words, if the full force of Soviet and Chinese Communist armed forces are not used in a conflict, the conflict would already be significantly limited. In such a case the use of nuclear weapons by us might well not be appropriate, indeed, their employment by the defense might serve only to breach the limits and bring on total war.

It is in the area of conventional armaments and armed forces that the United States and the free world should build up its defenses. Unfortunately, the Administration and some of the advocates of continued nuclear testing at all costs have persuaded the American people that a defense consisting of nuclear weapons is about all that we need to have. They have tried to lull us into the concept that we can be strong and deter aggression without sacrifices in men and money. This is a new type of defense panacea -- a kind of automation. These same people argue that wars can be prevented, or if they break out, can be won, with only limited participation of our manpower and without the cost of paying for an adequate defense establishment based on the principle of balanced forces and balanced weapons. We have been so brainwashed about this automation of our defenses that today when a member of Congress rises to point up the tragic lack of balance in our defenses, people are likely to accuse him of undermining the deterrent effect of our nuclear arms.

New Concept Needed of Defense and Disarmament

I have attempted to cite the weaknesses in the arguments of those who advocate continued atomic tests at all costs because I am convinced that the faulty and misguided strategies on which this concept is based must be revealed and brought forth for debate.

I wish to make it quite clear that I am not arguing that we should unilaterally forego the use of atomic weapons, their testing, development and production, and the determination to employ them if the world situation became so intolerable that our very existence and survival was at stake. Furthermore compared to the military strategists who would place most of our reliance for defense on the very large multi-megaton hydrogen bombs and on long range missiles, I think the advocates of a diversified atomic stockpile have the stronger case. And so long as the nuclear powers fail to reach an agreement based on effective and workable controls I support them in their efforts to expand and diversify our nuclear weapons stockpile.

Where I part company with many of my friends in the atomic weapons field is in their notion that continued atomic weapons development is more important than anything else we can do, that it is more important than trying to have an effective test ban agreement based on effective controls, more important than trying to slowdown the arms race, more important than trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons production throughout many countries, and more important than getting the Soviet Union to accept and implement the principle that control and inspection must be part of the reduction of armaments. It is here that balance is lost and judgment becomes blurred. It is on this point that certain military factors are overlooked and political and psychological factors are almost ignored completely. And it is here that the fatalism about the inevitability of another war and the skepticism and cynicism about the prospects for progress on disarmament produce a distorted concept of what the goals of our defense and foreign policy should be.

I shudder to think of the military situation that would confront this nation and, indeed, the world if several other nations achieved a nuclear weapons and missile delivery capability of their own. To prevent such a situation is one of the main reasons why a total ban on nuclear weapons tests is more desirable and more urgent than a ban only on tests in the atmosphere and underwater. It is to our own national interest, and indeed to the interest and well-being of humanity to try to limit the membership of the nuclear power club.

For too long now the words defense and disarmament have been treated in our thinking as though they represented the opposite points on a compass or the extremes in the thermometer. Writers on defense and military strategy compose long and scholarly dissertations without once mentioning the subject of armaments control; or occasionally they may throw in a sentence or two, almost as a sop. At the other extreme, there are writers and organizations who prepare equally long and learned theses on the subject of disarmament without mentioning weaknesses in our defense establishment.

I do not see why disarmament and defense cannot be made the inseparable twins of national security policy. I would like to illustrate this concept by referring to the present missile gap.

Ample evidence has been presented that the United States has allowed the Soviet Union to move dangerously ahead in the development and production of long range ballistic missiles. We now know that unless we put forth great effort, within the next two years especially, this gap will so widen that the Soviets may feel able to attempt a major surprise strike. The Soviet Union may be tempted to strike because the Kremlin will know that we do not have enough long range missiles, well enough protected and dispersed, to strike back after an initial attack and that our strategic bomber command would not have sufficient time to get off to deliver a major blow against the Soviet Union in retaliation. A military balance of terror is not very comforting, in fact it is a horrible thing. But this horror is exceeded by the prospect of an imbalance of terror, an imbalance favoring the Soviets!

I am no defense expert, but insofar as I am aware no one in the Administration and no one in the military departments of our government has argued that these are not facts. As a consequence the United States is inviting disaster through a failure to take the necessary steps to close the missile gap and to take the necessary steps to harden our strategic air bases.

At the same time the United States has not persisted in the development of plans whereby the threat of an attack by long range missiles might be removed and themissiles eliminated or their production and testing curtailed. The Surprise Attack Conference was a start but at that conference the United States terms of reference were limited to inspection only. Measures of control and reduction of missiles, for example, were not included. We were not prepared for that conference and neither were the Soviets. But that conference is over now and we shculd not be standing idle. We must start to talk and to prepare for the next one. We ought to have a plan and a policy which is pursued vigorously for the control or the eventual elimination of these missiles. Soon the missiles will be installed in their launching platforms and readied for instant firing. A mistake, a miscalculation, or madness on the part of one or a few people could send these gigantic birds of destruction on their way to foreign territory. Yet, months and years go by and little serious effort is made toward their control.

The noted scientist, Dr. Harrison Brown, has stated the problem very well. He has said:

> ". . . we are faced during the course of the next twenty-five years with the prospect of seeing one nation after another achieve the means of manufacturing nuclear explosives and of delivering them with planes, missiles, and submarines. With the addition of each new nation to the list, the problem of achieving control of any sort will increase enormously. As missiles become more dependable agents for delivery, increased emphasis will be placed upon the use of nuclear explosives for defensive purposes. Eventually most nations will be heavily armed with these weapons. Stockpiles for offensive purposes will be numbered in the hundreds of thousands and those for defensive purposes will be numbered in the millions."

We must simultaneously increase our efforts and our expenditures, if necessary, to close the missile gap on the one hand and to devise plans for missile control on the other. Such an effort should be pursued all down the line in areas of defense and disarmament. Alongside such a program of action, our negotiators, our information service, and our diplomats should be waging a campaign to bring pressure on the Soviet Union and other nations to enter into serious negotiations. This campaign should be waged at every level -- at the United Nations, at Summit Conferences, at Foreign Ministers meetings, and at any other forum where representatives of the major powers meet.

The American people are not unwilling to make sacrifices for adequate security and defense. They will make the sacrifices provided two conditions are met. First, they must be told the truth -- the hard facts about the world situation -- facts that are military, political, social and economic. And secondly, they must be shown that these sacrifices may one day contribute to the emergence of a better world -- a world in which competing systems, be they religious, economic, social, or political, can compete without the fear that the competition must lead to all-out war.

The international crises demand that we adopt such a program for our national security and for the security of the rest of the world. Military preparedness alone cannot give us the security we want. A policy of <u>defense only</u> is inadequate and promotes attitudes of hopelessness on the part of our people. And we can use beautiful words about disarmament and peace but these will be futile also unless we apply ourselves and make the necessary efforts both to control and reduce the weapons of war and to build a defense establishment that is balanced and meets the nation's defense requirements.

If we do these things then our sights can be lifted beyond the terrible thought that a nuclear war, large or small, is probable. So long as the United States views the world crisis primarily in military terms, and exclusively as crisis against Communism, its moral stature and its leadership qualities will be seriously questioned and may be irrevocably undermined in nations and among peoples throughout the world who have not a prayer of a chance to defend themselves against aggression by a major power. It is one thing to build varied and strong defenses but quite another to say this defense is all we have. If the democracies of the world are to survive they must place more emphasis and put more effort into works of peace at the same time that their defense efforts act to deter war from breaking out. Defense is a shield designed to give protection and buy time while we pursue with courage, imagination and purpose the war against man's ancient and relentless enemies -- poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, injustice and economic stagnation.

[Detroit Free Press, 12/28/59]

AS DRUMMOND SEES IT

U.S. Trapped on Disarmament

BY ROSCOE DRUMMOND

WASHINGTON — We are facing a disarmament dilemma which needs to be frankly stated.

President Eisenhower is continually saying that the United States will not accept any disarmament which cannot be verified.

But we are being continually drawn into disarmament positions which require systems of inspection and control that are technically unworkable or which the Soviets show every sign of rejecting.

Drummond

Let me illustrate concretely how we have put ourselves into a box of our own making in which our disarmament commitment is greater than the means to verify it.

The United States is favoring an end to all nuclear-weapons testing—an end to atmospheric tests and an end to underground tests.

* * *

AT GENEVA the United States agreed with Soviet and British nuclear experts on methods of checking possible illegal tests which we said would be effective. But the American Government accepted these recommendations of the technicians before it had fully examined the scientific evidence produced by a major series of underground tests in the fall of last year.

And now where are we? We are right here: We have accepted as adequate a method for verifying both atmospheric and underground testing which, later experience has proved, is inadequate for verifying underground testing.

This is the immediate and dangerous disarmament dilemma which the Administration is not frankly stating and which is almost certainly going to hit the American people on a very sensitive nerve in the next few weeks.

Why hasn't this issue come out into the open before?

* * *

LONE REASON is that the Soviets have thus far not been willing to accept inspection and control methods we have been advocating and which we now know would be unequal to verifying underground explosions.

This means that we are being, temporarily at least, saved from our own inadequate inspection proposals by the refusal of the Soviets to accept them.

The chilling fact is that if the Soviets agree to our inspection proposals — and we can't count on them not to— then we'll really be stuck since we would then be accepting the end to all nuclear-weapons testing in the knowledge that the agreed method for underground verification could not be relied on.

* * *

FOR SEVERAL weeks the Soviet, British and American scientists have been examining the evidence growing out of the United States underground tests in late 1958. Now this conference has broken up in total disagreement, with the Soviet scientists rejecting the data as unimportant after refusing even to look at the evidence for a year.

The American scientists who participated in the conference and who, like most scientists, are eager for an East-West agreement, unanimously agree that under the test-verification system advocated by the Soviets—unless it is altered to take account of the new data—the underground nuclear tests conducted by the United States last year—will be classed as "earthquakes ineligible for inspection."

That's the kind of inspection system we have already once embraced and which, as things are now going, we will be stuck with if the Soviets agree to what we ourselves have proposed.

* * *

AS A SECOND step toward the reduction of nuclear armaments we have proposed to halt the flow of fissionable material into weapons. But there is today no known method of verifying the flow of fissionable material into weapons if a country wants to cheat.

As a third step we have proposed to destroy all nuclear stockpiles. But United States scientists have frequently stated that it is quite easy to conceal nuclear weapons. Therefore neither side could never really know whether the other side possessed them.

It seems to me we need some plain speaking by our highest officials on this disarmament dilemma.

AS OTHERS SEE IT

A 'Hurrah' for Our Teens

IT'S NOT sensational, and it may not be even news, but I wonder if you would make public this thanks of a citizen to a group of wonderful teen-agers who, I think, are really doing their bit to make this world a better place in which to live.

About a month ago I was confined to St. John's Hospital. I had a bed by the window, and at about 3:30 every day I would watch teen-agers stream into the hospital. When I asked the man in the bed next to me why they came to the hospital, he replied that they were volunteer workers in the hospital.

* * *

I REMEMBER seeing young people filling up water containers, but up to this

Intercepted Letters

PRES. NASSER
Cairo, Egypt

Dear Gamal:

HOPE your promise to repay that new World Bank loan holds up better than your pledge to Dag Hammarskjold on the Israel-Suez issue.

PIPELINE PETE

tions such as the Detroit Bar Association, NAACP, and the Civil Liberties Union complain about wrongful police conduct, it is my posi-

Catholic Church for contraception or birth control as it is commonly understood? There is an automatic excommunication for the direct and voluntary successful abortion (Canon 2350 #1 of the Code of Canon Law).

Precise information about Catholic medical ethics may be found in "Medico-Moral Problems," Gerald Kelly, S. J. Catholic Hospital Association, St. Louis, Missouri, 1957. This is published in an inexpensive paper back edition and everyone interested in this should have a copy or a similar work.

* * *

APPARENTLY, in the clamor about the religious and moral views of a po-

JOHNSTON URGES OFFENSIVE BY U. S.

Says at Printing Week Fete Soviet Threat Must Be Met With Economic Plans

Eric Johnston warned last night that the United States must undertake coordinated, long-range and expensive economic, political and social programs to meet the threat of Soviet competition.

Mr. Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, urged an affirmative approach to world development as the only way to assure sustained international economic growth.

"Our program thus far, in essence, has been defensive, a program too close for comfort to the reflex action of the Pavlov experiment," he asserted.

Mr. Johnston spoke at the annual Printing Week dinner in the Commodore Hotel. One thousand representatives of the advertising, printing and publishing industries attended. Printing Week here, which began Sunday, ends Saturday.

Two Methods Scored

Two approaches to the Communist challenge—isolation and complacency—would lead to disaster, Mr. Johnston said.

Instead, he declared, the United States should "set out as leader of the free world to make the free world so strong that it can neither be splintered, nor eroded, nor capsized by any total state no matter what tactics and determination it may employ."

This will mean "meeting Communist competition on our terms," Mr. Johnston said. "It means the setting of priorities for ourselves through a long-term, affirmative drive to expand freedom, economic as well as political."

Mr. Johnston pointed out that such a program would require much money.

"It is highly unlikely," he said, "that we'll be able to dangle tax cuts before our rose-colored spectacles for a long time to come."

Before his address Mr. Johnston received the 1959 Benjamin Franklin Award for championing "freedom of expression for the printed, spoken, filmed ward * * * for the articulation of democracy."

Fabian Bachrach

ASKS ATTITUDE SHIFT: Eric Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association of America. He said the U. S. must change to a more affirmative approach to world problems.

Franklin's Skills Lauded

Earlier in the day Benjamin Franklin's accomplishments as a journeyman printer, employer, skilled craftsman, advertising man, educator and patriot were discussed by speakers in a ceremony at City Hall.

The meeting, held at noon in the Board of Estimate chamber, was attended by several hundred students from the New York School of Printing. The school will dedicate its new building, on Forty-ninth Street between Ninth and Tenth Avenues, on Thursday.

The City Hall gathering formally began Printing Week in New York, a tribute by the city's second largest manufacturing industry to the 253d anniversary of the birth of Franklin. Deputy Mayor Paul T. O'Keefe read Mayor Wagner's proclamation of the week.

After the ceremony, the students placed wreaths at Franklin's statue in Printing House Square near by.

2 U. S. ATTORNEY AIDES

Wickersham Names Deputy Chiefs in Criminal Division

Cornelius W. Wickersham Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District, announced on Sunday that assistant United States attorneys Charles W. Stewart and Morton J. Schlossberg had been named deputy chiefs of the criminal division in his office.

Mr. Stewart will assist Kenneth C. Sternberg, who has general supervision of the criminal division. Mr. Schlossberg will head a special rackets unit.

Mr. Wickersham also named John E. Hurley Jr. of Levittown, L. I., as an assistant in the civil division.

Rogers Peet

Sale

Speech by Allen W. Dulles on Military-Economic Challenge of the Soviet Union

Special to The New York Times.

NEW ORLEANS, April 8—Following is the text of an address on the challenge of Soviet power, prepared for delivery today by Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, before the Edison Electric Institute:

I appreciate this opportunity to speak to your twenty-seventh annual convention on the subject of the "Challenge of Soviet Power."

This topic is particularly appropriate for the Edison Electric Institute. It was Lenin who defined communism "as the Soviet system plus electrification." The very first Soviet economic plan in the early Nineteen Twenties had as one of its principal objectives the development of a modern electric power system.

In effect, the Soviets propose to electrify Marxism. What they may in fact do is either to shock their backward political institution into key with their more modernized technical and industrial skills or electrocute the whole archaic Marxist political system.

In any event, the Soviet Union has certainly sought to follow up Lenin's emphasis on electric power and has become a leader in many electronic fields. It has developed intensively the role of radio in its massive effort to promote its subversive policy on a world-wide basis. It uses electricity to jam the airways and to build an electronic iron curtain around the minds of their own people.

Role of Electricity Noted

In my own business of intelligence, the various manifestations of electrical power are changing the whole system of information collecting in many vital fields. Electricity operates the radar which is on watch against sneak attack. It helps to make possible the ready transmission of warning of impending danger and as the mass of intelligence pours in day by day, over electric channels, it is electronic machinery which becomes a valued partner in helping us in its collation and dissemination.

The challenge of Soviet power presents today a triple threat: first, military; second, economic, and third, subversive.

This challenge is a global one.

As long as the principles of international communism motivate the regimes in Moscow and Peiping, we must expect that their single purpose will be the liquidation of our form of free society and the emergence of a Sovietized, communized world order.

They change their techniques as circumstances dictate. They have never given that they have the capability to produce such submarines and will probably unveil some in the near future.

I would add a word on the ballistic missile situation.

When World War II ended, the Soviet acquired much of the German hardware in the missile field. V-1 and V-2, and with them many German technicians. From that base, over the past ten years, they have been continuously developing their missile capability, starting with short-range and intermediate-range missiles. These they have tested by the hundreds, and have been in production of certain models for some time.

Geography Cited as Factor

They also early foresaw that in their particular geographical position the long-range ballistic missile would become their best instrument in the power struggle with their great rival, the United States. As the size and weight of powerful nuclear weapons decreased, with the improvement of the art, they became more and more persuaded of this. Hence, they have concentrated on these weapons, have tested some and assert that they now have I. C. B. M.'s in serial production.

They hope in this way eventually to be able to hold the United States under the threat of nuclear attack by I. C. B. M.'s while they consolidate their position in the fragile parts of the non-Communistic world.

Before leaving the military phase of the Soviet threat, I want to dispel any possible misinterpretations. First, I do not believe that the Soviet now have military superiority over us; and second, I do not believe that they desire deliberately to provoke hostilities with the United States or the Western world at this time. They are well aware of our deterrent force. They probably believe that the risks to them even if they resorted to surprise attack would be unacceptable.

Taking into account our over-all military strength and our strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, I consider that our military posture is stronger and our ability to inflict damage is today greater than that of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, we have allies. The strength, the dependability, and the dedication of our allies put them in a very different category than the unwilling and undependable allies of Moscow, even including the Chinese Communists.

Assertive Policy Seen

But as the Soviet military capabilities and their nuclear power grow, they will feel that their foreign policy can be somewhat more assertive. has been at the annual rate of 3.6 per cent for the seven years through 1957. If one included 1958, the comparison with the rate of Soviet growth would be even less favorable.

Investments Compared

I do not conclude from this analysis that the secret of Soviet success lies in greater efficiency. On the contrary. In comparison with the leading free enterprise economies of the West, the Communist state-controlled system is relatively inefficient.

The secret of Soviet progress is simple. It lies in the fact that the Kremlin leaders direct a far higher proportion of total resources to national policy purposes than does the United States. I define national policy purposes to include, among other things, defense and investment in heavy industry.

With their lower living standards and much lower production of consumer goods, they are, in effect, plowing back into investment a large section of their production, 30 per cent, while we in the United States are content with 17 to 20 per cent.

Soviet investment in industry as planned for 1959 is about the same as United States investment in industry during 1957, which so far was our best year.

Although the Soviets in recent years have been continually upping the production of consumer goods, their consuming public fares badly in comparison with ours. Last year, for example, Soviet citizens had available for purchase barely one-third the total goods and services available to Americans. Furthermore, most of the United States output of durable consumer goods is for replacement, while that of the U. S. S. R. is for first-time users. In summary, the Soviet economy is geared largely to economic growth and for military purposes; ours is geared largely to increasing consumer satisfactions and building a higher standard of living.

Soviet Leads in Machine Tools

Here are some examples: while the Soviets last year were producing only one automobile for every fifty we produced, they were turning our four machine tools to our one.

This contrast in emphasis carries through in many other fields. Our capital expenditure for transportation and communications is more than double the comparable Soviet expenditure. Yet this is largely accounted for by our massive highway building program which has been running fifteen to twenty times the U. S. S. R. spending, whereas their annual investment in railroad rolling stock and fixed assets substantially exceeds ours.

steel capacity apparently was reached in 1958.

The comforting illusion spread by the "disciples of the absolute gap" should not serve as a false tranquilizer.

Prediction Discounted

At the same time it is important not to exaggerate Soviet prospects in the economic race. In the propaganda surrounding the launching of the seven-year plan Khrushchev made a number of statements about Societ economic power which were nothing more than wishful thinking. Specifically he stated that "after the completion of the seven-year plan we will probably need about five more years to catch up with and outstrip the United States in industrial output."

"Thus," he added, "by that time (1970), or perhaps even sooner, the Soviet Union will advance to first place in the developed nations of the free world. By 1965 Soviet output of some basic raw materials and some industrial products will be approaching, and in a few cases exceeding, that of the United States. Most prominently, these products will be the kind that are needed for industrialization in the less developed countries.

The outcome of this contest —the Communist challenge in underdeveloped areas — is crucial to the survival of the free world.

Colonial Rule Ending

This is an unprecedented epoch of change. Within little more than ten years, over three quarters of a billion people, in twenty-one nations, have become independent of colonial rule. In all of these newly emergent countries, there is intense nationalism coupled with the determination to achieve a better way

U.S. Will Outproduce Russians Through '70, Allen Dulles Says

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

equivalent to our own," he continued, adding.

"They accomplish this with a gross national product which is now less than half of our own."

In a news conference prior to delivery of his speech, Mr. Dulles said he would not label the Soviet military effort the chief challenge to us.

"Their military effort is one of the serious challenges," he said. "Presently the Soviet challenge to the free world is even more economic penetration."

In his talk, Mr. Dulles said he felt that as Soviet military capabilities and nuclear power grew, the Russians' foreign policy would become "more assertive."

"There are two points to keep in mind as we view the military future," he said. "Firstly, with a much lower industrial base than we, they are producing a military effort which is roughly equivalent to our own; and secondly, they have conditioned their people to accept very real sacrifices and a lower standard of living to permit the massive military build-up to continue.

"If the Soviet should decide to alter their policies so as to give their own people a break in the consumer field with anything like the share in their gross national product which we, as a people, enjoy, the prospects of real peace in our time would be far greater."

He departed from his text at this point to add, "However, I do not anticipate this."

Mr. Dulles emphasized that Mr. Khrushchev was not relying entirely on military means to achieve the victory he seeks.

"He is convinced that the final victory of communism can



The New York Times
Allen W. Dulles

be achieved mainly by non-military means," Mr. Dulles said. "Here the Soviet economic offensive looms large."

He also warned that despite a moderate slow-down in the Soviet Union's industrialization pace, it was still more rapid than the growth rate of the United States. He said Soviet industry had been growing during the last seven years through 1958 at an annual rate of 9½ per cent, compared with a United States rate of 3.6 per cent for seven years through 1957.

"If one included 1958, the comparison with the rate of Soviet growth would be even less favorable," he added.

3,200 students, technicians, and military specialists have now received such training behind the Iron Curtain.

While these figures are still below the total of our own aid, loan and training programs, this massive economic and military aid program is concentrated in a few critical countries and of course these figures do not include Soviet aid and trade with the East European satellites and Communist China.

India, which has received over $325,000,000 of bloc grants and credits, is a primary recipient. The Soviet economic showplace here is the Bhilai steel mill, being built by the Russians. The U. A. R. over the past four years received over $900,000,000 in aid and credits. This investment today does not seem quite as profitable to the Soviet as it did last year.

Iraq provides a prime example of the opportunistic nature of the bloc's aid program.

Policy of Subversion

Prior to the coup d'etat on July 14 last year, Iraq's economic involvement with Communist nations had been negligible. In the past few months, the USSR has provided over $250,000,000 in military and economic development credits. The Iraq Development Board has dropped its two Western advisers. Western technicians are also being dismissed and contracts with many Western firms cancelled. Increasingly, Moscow is pressuring the Iraq Government to accept dependence on Communist support and the number of fellow travellers in high government posts is growing.

The Soviet policy of economic penetration fits like a glove into their world-wide campaign of subversion, which is the third main element of the triple Soviet challenge: military, economic and subversive.

International communism has not changed its operating procedure since the days of the Comintern and the Cominform. The Communist party of the U.S.S.R., of which Khrushchev is the leader, is the spearhead of the movement. It has a world-wide mission, formulated by Lenin and Stalin and now promoted by Khrushchev but with more subtle techniques than those of Stalin. This mission continues to be the subversion of the entire free world, starting of course with those countries which are most vulnerable.

Its arsenal of attack is based, first of all, on the Communist partis of the Soviet Union and Communist China. These in turn direct the hard core Communist organizations which exist in practically every country of the world. Every Communist party main-

some 90,000,000 members throughout the world. International organizations of youth and students stage great festivals at frequent intervals. This summer they are to meet in Vienna. This is the first time they have dared meet outside of the Iron Curtain.

They have the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Teachers Unions, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers; Communist journalists and medical organizations. Then cutting across professional and social lines, and designed to appeal to intellectuals, the Communists have created the World Peace Council which maintains so-called peace committees in forty-seven countries, gaining adherents by trading on the magic word of "peace."

Agents for Espionage

To back up this massive apparatus, the Soviet has the largest number of trained agents for espionage and secret political action that any country has ever assembled. In Moscow, Prague and Peiping and other Communist centers, they are training agents recruited from scores of other countries to go out as missionaries of communism into the troubled areas of the world.

Much of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and particularly Black Africa, are high on their target list. They do not neglect this hemisphere as recent disclosures of Communist plotting in Mexico show us. Their basic purpose is to destroy all existing systems of free and democratic government and disrupt the economic and political organizations on which these are based. Behind their Iron Curtain they ruthlessly suppress all attempts to achieve more freedom—witness Hungary and now Tibet.

The task of destruction is always easier than that of construction. The Communist world, in dealing with the former colonial areas and the newly emerging nations of the world, has appealing slogans to export and vulnerable economic conditions to exploit. The fragile parliamentary systems of new and emerging countries are fertile ground for these agitators.

Also under the heading of subversion we must not overlook the fact that the Communist leaders have sought to advance their cause by local wars by proxy—Korea, Vietnam, Malaya are typical examples.

In conclusion I wish to emphasize again the pressing need for a clearer understanding of the real purpose of the Sino-Soviet program. There is no evidence that the present leaders of the Communist world have the slightest idea resources to our destruction than we have been willing to dedicate to our own preservation.

They are not supermen. Recently they have made a series of blunders which have done what words could not do to help us unmask their true intentions. These very days Communist actions in Iraq and Tibet have particularly aroused Moslems and Buddhists against international communism. The institution of the so-called "communes" system on the China mainland has shocked the free world and even the Soviet leaders apologetically refuse to endorse it.

Despite the problems surrounding the Berlin issue, Western Europe is stronger than it ever has been since World War II. Much of free Asia and the Middle East is becoming alerted to the true significance of communism.

The outcome of the struggle against international communism depends in great measure upon the steadfastness of the United States and its willingness to accept sacrifices in meeting its responsibility to help maintain freedom in the world.

INSURANCE COMPANY FORMED FOR CLERGY

PHILADELPHIA (RNS) — The oldest life insurance company in the world, the nonprofit Presbyterian Ministers Fund, marked its 200th anniversary at a special service in Old Pine Street church here.

Growing out of a "Presbyterian Fund for Pious Uses," set up in 1717, the fund's history dates to 1759, when Thomas and Richard Penn, sons of William Penn, granted it a charter as the first life insurance company in America. This was three years before the Equitable of London was chartered to serve the general public.

Today the company has as sets of $68,554,000, 60,000 policyholders with insurance totaling $194,000,000. It serves clergymen, ministers abroad, theological students and their families of more than thirty denominations. With headquarters in Philadelphia, it has fourteen branch offices in thirteen states and Canada.

Coverage at first was limited to Presbyterian clergy. Laymen of the denomination were accepted in 1828, and in 1852 all Protestant clergy presbyterially governed. Between 1876 and 1894 the fund offered to insure anyone, but since that period has limited its services to clergy and their dependents.

The fund's ability to provide the usual forms of life insurance at more favorable rates and pay higher dividends than commercial companies stems from the longevity of ministers, which makes them "good risks." Clergy deaths annually

of free society and the emergence of a Sovietized, communized world order.

They change their techniques as circumstances dictate. They have never given us the slightest reason to hope that they are abandoning their over-all objectives.

Aims Not Nationalistic

We sometimes like to delude ourselves into thinking that we are faced with another nationalistic power struggle of which the world has seen so many. The fact is that the aims of the Communist international with its headquarters in Moscow are not nationalistic; their objectives are not limited. They firmly believe, and eloquently preach, that communism is the system which will eventually rule the world and each move they make is directed to this end. Communism, like electricity, seeks to be an all-pervasive and revolutionary force.

To promote their objectives they have determined — cost what it may — to develop a military establishment and a strong national economy which will provide a secure home base from which to deploy their destructive foreign activities.

To achieve this objective, they are devoting about twice as much of their gross national product to military ends as we do. The U.S.S.R. military effort as a proportion of G.N.P. is greater than that of any nation in the world. Their continuous diversion of economic resources to military support is without parallel in peacetime history.

We estimate that the total value of their current annual military effort is roughly equivalent to our own. They accomplish this with a G.N.P. which is now less than half of our own.

2,500,000 in the Army

Here are some of the major elements which go into their military establishment. The Soviet Union maintains an army of 2,500,000 men and the tradition of universal military training is being continued. The Soviet Army today has been fully re-equipped with a post-World War II arsenal of guns, tanks and artillery. We have reason to believe the army has already been trained in the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

They have the most modern types of aircraft for defense: night and day fighters, a very large medium bomber force and some long-range bombers. They have built less of these long-range bombers than we had expected several years ago, and have diverted a major effort to the perfection of ballistic missiles.

Their submarine strength today is many times that with which Germany entered World War II. They have over 200 long-range modernized submarines and a like number of less modern craft. They had made no boasts about nuclear powered submarines, and on all the evidence, we are justified in concluding that we are ahead of them in this field. We must assume, however,

Assertive Policy Seen

But as the Soviet military capabilities and their nuclear power grow, they will feel that their foreign policy can be somewhat more assertive. In 1956 during the Suez crisis, we had the first Soviet missile rattling as a new tactic of Moscow diplomacy. Since then there have been the Taiwan Strait and Berlin crises, and today the aggressive Communist penetration of Iraq. Hence, we must assume that they will continue to probe and to test us, and they may even support other countries in aggression by proxy. They will put us to the test.

There are two points to keep in mind as we view the military future. Firstly, with a much lower industrial base than we, they are producing a military effort which is roughly equivalent to our own; and secondly, they have conditioned their people to accep very real sacrifices and a low standard of living to permit the massive military build-up to continue. If the Soviet should decide to alter their policy so as to give their own people a break in the consumer field with anything like the share in their national gross product which we, as a people enjoy, the prospects of real peace in our time would be far greater. However, I do not anticipate this.

I will turn now to some of the highlights of the economic aspect of the Soviet challenge.

The new confidence of Khrushchev, the shrewd and vocal leader of the Soviet Communist party, and incidentally head of government, does not rest solely on his conviction that he, too, possesses a military deterrent. He is convinced that the final victory of communism can be achieved mainly by non-military means. Here the Soviet economic ofsenve looms large.

The proceedings of the recent twenty-first party congress laid out what we might call the Soviet economic order of battle.

Khrushchev explained it in these words, to summarize the ten hours of his opening and closing remarks:

"The economic might of the Soviet Union is based on the priority growth of heavy industry; this should insure the Soviet victory in peaceful economic competition with the capitalist countries; development of the Soviet economic might will give communism the decisive edge in the international balance of power."

In the short space of thirty years, the Soviet Union has grown from a relatively backward position into being the second largest industrialized economy in the world. While their headlong pace of industrialization has slowed down moderately in the past few years, it still continues to be more rapid than our own. During the past seven years, through 1958, Soviet industry has grown at the annual rate of 9½ per cent. This is not the officially announced rate which is somewhat larger. It is our reconstruction and deflation of Soviet data.

Our own industrial growth which has been running fifteen to twenty times the U. S. S. R. spending, whereas their annual investment in railroad rolling stock and fixed assets substantially exceeds ours.

At the moment, they do not feel much incentive in the road building field. They have no interest in having their people travel around on a massive scale. Also this would put pressure on the Kremlin to give the people more automobiles.

Commercial investment, which includes stores, shopping centers, drive-in movies and office buildings, has been absorbing over $6,000,000,000 a year in the United States, and only $2,000,000,000 in the U. S. S. R.

Our housing investment is roughly twice that of the Soviet even though living space per capita in the United States is already four times that of the U. S. S. R.

What of the future? In Khrushchev's words, "The Soviet Union intends to outstrip the United States economically . . . to surpass the level of production in the United States means to exceed the highest indexes of capitalism."

Seven-Year Plan Listed

Khrushchev's ambitious seven-year plan establishes the formidable task of increasing industrial production about 80 per cent by 1965.

Steel production, according to the plan, is to be pushed close to 100 million net tons. Cement output is set at a level somewhat higher than industry forecasts place United States production in 1965.

The energy base is to be revolutionized. Crude oil and natural gas will constitute more than one-half of the total energy supply, and relatively high cost coal will be far less important than now.

By 1965, the U. S. S. R. plans top roduce about 480,000,000,000 kilowatt hours of electricity. As a study comparing United States and U. S. S. R. electric power production prepared by a leading industrial research group pointed out, this means that the absolute gap between the United States and U. S. S. R. in the quantities of electricity generated will increase somewhat in our favor over the next seven years.

This interesting study received a considerable amount of deserved publicity. We agree with its conclusion. However, what is true about electric power is not true across the board, as some commentators concluded.

For example, compare primary energy production trends in the two countries. Soviet production of coal, petroleum, natural gas and hydroelectric power, expressed in standard fuel units, amounted to 45 per cent of the United States production in 1958. By 1965 it will be close to 60 per cent. The absolute gap in primary energy has been closing since 1950. At the present pace it will continue to narrow over the next seven years.

Similarly, the absolute gap in steel production has been shrinking over the past five years. The maximum gap in with and outstrip the United States in industrial output."

"Thus," he added, "by that time (1970), or perhaps even sooner, the Soviet Union will advance to first place in the world both in absolute volume of production and in per capita production."

First of all, to reach such improbable conclusions, the Kremlin leaders overstate the present comparative position. They claim U. S. S. R. industrial output to be 50 per cent of that of the United States. Our own analyses of Soviet industrial output last year concluded that it was not more than 40 per cent of our own.

Secondly, Khrushchev forecasts that our future industrial growth will be only 2 per cent a year. If this is true, the United States will be virtually committing economic suicide. This prediction I regard as unrealistic.

A saner projection would place 1965 Soviet industrial production at about 55 per cent of our own. By 1970, assuming the same relative rates of growth, U. S. S. R. industrial output, as a whole, would be about 60 per cent of that in the United States.

Further, when Khrushchev promises his people the world's highest standard of living by 1970, this is patently nonsense. It is as though the shrimp had learned to whistle, to use one of his colorful comments.

These Soviet exaggerations are a standard tool of Communist propaganda. Such propaganda, however, should not blind us to the sobering implications of their expected economic progress.

Implications Analyzed

First of all, rapid economic growth will provide the Kremlin leaders with additional resources with which to intensify the arms race. If recent trends and present Soviet policies continue, Soviet military spending could increase by over 50 per cent in the next seven years without increasing the relative burden on their economy.

Secondly, some additional improvement can be made in the standards of living of the Russian people, even with continued emphasis on heavy industry and armaments. It is only since the death of Stalin in 1953 that serious attention has been given to improving living standards. The moderate slow-down in the headlong growth of heavy industry which then ensued has been caused, in large part, by the diversion of more resources to housing, to agriculture, and consumer goods.

Living standards, based on present Soviet plans, are expected to increase about one-third over the next seven years. This level, if achieved, will still be far below that which our own citizens are now enjoying, but it will look good to people who for long have been compelled to accept very low standards.

Finally, the Soviet seven-year plan, even if not fully achieved, will provide the wherewithal to push the expansion of trade and aid with the uncommitted and under-people, in twenty-one nations, have become independent of colonial rule. In all of these newly emergent countries, there is intense nationalism coupled with the determination to achieve a better way of life which they believe industrialization will bring them.

The leaders of world communism are alert to the opportunity which this great transformation provides them. They realize the future of communism can be insured only by expansion, and that the best hope of such expansion lies in Asia and Africa. While they are attempting to focus all our concern on Berlin, they are moving into Iraq with arms, economic aid, and subversion, anrd giving added attention to Africa.

The Communist bloc trade and aid programs in undeveloped countries by the bloc in this year. In the four-year period ending 1958 the total of grants and credits totalled $2,500,000,000, of which $1,600,000,000 came from the U.S.S.R. and the balance from the satellites and China. Three-fifths of the total delivered to date has been in the form of arms to the U.A.R.—Egypt and Syria—Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia. These same countries, plus India, Argentina, Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia, have received the bulk of the economic aid.

Technicians Assisting

Over 4,000 bloc technicians have been sent to assist the development of nations in the free world. About 70 per cent of these technicians are engaged in economic activities. Others are reorganizing local military establishments and teaching bloc military doctrine to indigenous personnel.

The bloc also has a well developed program for training students from underdeveloped countries. About

munist parties of the Soviet Union and Communist China. These in turn direct the hard core Communist organizations which exist in practically every country of the world. Every Communist party maintains its secret connections with Moscow, or in case of certain of the Communist parties in the Far East, with Peiping.

These parties also have an entirely overt association with the international Communist movement. At the twenty-first meeting of the Soviet party congress, there were present representatives of some sixty Communist parties throughout the world, including two representatives of the United States Communist party. The single theme of these Communist leaders was their confidence in the eventual world-wide triumph of the Communist movement.

Agreements Discounted

From time to time Moscow has made agreements such as the Litvinov Pact, in 1933, not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. On the strength of this we resumed relations with the Soviet. They are eager to conclude like agreements of "friendship and non-aggression" with all countries of the world. These are not worth the paper they are written on. During World War II, Moscow abolished the international Comintern to propitiate the United States, its then wartime ally. Its functions have, however, been carried on continuously under other forms.

In addition to its worldwide penetration through Communist party organizations, the Communists in Moscow and Peiping have set up a whole series of front organizations to penetrate all segments of life in the free countries of the world. These include the World Federation of Trade Unions, which claims

need for a clearer understanding of the real purpose of the Sino-Soviet program. There is no evidence that the present leaders of the Communist world have the slightest idea of abandoning their goal, or of changing the general tactics of achieving them.

Those who feel we can buy peace by compromise with Khrushchev are sadly deluded. Each concession we give him merely strengthens his position and prestige and the ability of the Soviet regime to continue its domination of the Russian people whose friendship we seek.

Firmness Advocated

Our defense lies not in compromise but in understanding and firmness, n a strong and ready deterrent military power, in the marshalling of our economic assets with those of the other free countries of the world to meet their methods of economic penetration, and finally in the unmasking of their subversive techniques.

The over-all power of the free world is still vastly superior to that under the control of the leaders of international communism. If they succeed and we fail, it will only be because of our complacency and because they have devoted a far greater share of their power, skill and

ance at more favorable rates and pay higher dividends than commercial companies stems from the longevity of ministers, which makes them "good risks." Clergy deaths annually are less than half the general death rate. The average age for claims paid over the last three years was 72 years.

In 1777, the fund's managers placed at the disposal of the Continental Congress more than half its assets for use by the colonies in the war for independence.

Dr. John Witherspoon, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, was an early policyholder, but was one of the first to let his policy lapse because his salary as president of Princeton University was so irregular.

5-YEAR-OLD TAXES MA

Exacts 1c Toll to Cross Span to Mother's Beauty Salon

LANDRUM, S. C. (AP) — Chalk up another small businessman as a failure.

Jerry Clark, 5 years old, strung up a barricade with his fishing tackle at a small bridge leading to his mother's beauty parlor.

He had cleared 21 cents—one cent a customer—when Mom, Mrs. Wayne Clark, put him out of business.

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

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Soviet Lead in Science Predicted by Dr. Teller

MILWAUKEE, May 21 (AP). —Dr. Edward Teller, one of a half dozen physicists who pioneered the development of the hydrogen bomb, predicted last night that Russia will be the world's scientific leader in 10 years.

"All we can hope to do is regain our lost leadership at some later date," Dr. Teller said. "Ten years from now, Russia's position as the world leader in science will be unquestioned. Nothing we can do will change that."

Dr. Teller, a professor of physics at the University of California at Berkeley, is generally credited with the major portion of thermonuclear research leading to the development of the hydrogen bomb in the period immediately following World War II. He spoke at the opening session of a three-day Marquette University conference on "The Education of the Scientist in a Free Democracy."

"The world will also be modeled after Russian ideas," Dr. Teller said, "and not after our own by the end of the century."

Dr. Teller suggested that in the field of American education scientifically inclined children be started early and that talent, which he described as only a strong interest "in what is an endless game with surprises around every corner," be developed.

Governors Ask